DISCOURSE ON IMMIGRATION IN THE UK: REPRESENTATIONS AND EVALUATIONS OF ROMANIANS AND BULGARIANS AS 'BENEFIT TOURISTS'

by

Deanna Demetriou

Canterbury Christ Church University

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Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to examine discourse on immigration within the UK in relation to the expiration of transitional restrictions for Bulgarian and Romanian citizens on 1st January 2014. In particular, the focal point of the study concerns the representation and evaluation of Romanians and Bulgarians as ‘benefit tourists’, alongside arguments de/legitimising welfare controls put forward by the UK government. The study will consider how these representations and evaluations are present within the Mail Online, analysing a series of articles and their corresponding public comments.

The thesis primarily draws upon the Discourse-Historical Approach to provide both a politically motivated as well as reflexive account of the discursive strategies used in the representation and evaluation of EU migrants vis-à-vis other social actors, and the de/legitimisation of restrictions and controls enforced (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001; 2016). Moreover, in an attempt to develop and extend the DHA’s view of ‘evaluation’ alongside ‘representation’, this thesis also incorporates Martin and White’s (2005) Appraisal Theory.

Findings from this investigation show that the advancement of these representations and evaluations had further implications with regards to Britain’s position and identity within the EU. Not only was a Balkanist dichotomy between eastern and western EU member states constructed and reinforced, but also discourse on immigration was also inextricably linked to argumentation for Brexit. Furthermore, although new participatory structures can allow for resistance to emerge, the openess, scalability and anonymity of the Internet allowed for the spread of racist representations and evaluations which, in this case, constructed Romanians and Bulgarians (in particular) and EU migrants (in general) as the ‘Other’.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction

1.1 Background and Rationale

Since the turn of the 21st century, immigration to the UK has been a politically pervasive and divisive topic. As opinion research specialists Ipsos MORI (2016-2018a) have demonstrated, immigration has been the ‘most important issue’ for the nation at two time conjectures since the year 2000. The first period, between 2005-2008, correlates with the expansion of the European Union (EU) to include ten ‘Central’ and ‘Eastern’ European countries; the second time period, between 2015 until the EU referendum in June 2016, equally ties immigration to concerns about the EU and Britain’s role and relationship with/in the supranational organisation (Blinder and Richards, 2018). With immigration being labelled not just as an important issue but also a public ‘concern’, there has also been a rise in anti-immigrant sentiment, where fear and anxiety about the immigrant ‘Other’ has been constructed. To some scholars, discourse about immigration within Britain has appeared to reflect “a contemporary moral panic” (Mawby and Gisby, 2009). In particular, it has been evidenced how “moral entrepreneurs” (Hall et al., 1978), or elite institutions and social actors (van Dijk, 1993), inclusive of politicians and journalists, play influential roles in constructing anxieties surrounding immigration to Britain. Research has subsequently shown that the notion of immigration brings with it profoundly negative undertones (van Dijk, 2000; Mawby and Gisby, 2009; Rasinger, 2010; Balch and Balabanova, 2016) which also contribute to racist discrimination (van Dijk, 1992, 1993, 1997, 2000; Charteris-Black, 2006; KhosraviNik, 2009; Hart, 2010; Wodak, 2015). However, the information provided by Ipsos MORI (2016-2018a) also indicates something else: that these ‘concerns’ about immigration also revolve around nationalism and an increased sense of Euroscepticism.

In an age of globalisation, characterised by and celebrated for its global inter-connectedness, ‘multi’ or ‘inter’-culturality and technological advancements, I am personally and politically saddened to witness and experience continued anti-immigrant hostility and a subsequent rise racism. As Michael Rosen pointed out in a public lecture examining the language of migration (Rosen, 2014), immigration to the UK is not a ‘new’ thing and having relatives, friends or colleagues from other countries or cultural backgrounds is the norm for a majority
myself included. I therefore write this thesis from a dual perspective: as both the child of an immigrant mother from Macedonia and immigrant grandfather from Cyprus, and as a British citizen, born, raised and educated within the UK. I also write from an anti-racist position and acknowledge the role of reflexivity and triangulation within the methodological process (see Chapter 3) to ensure my research is rigorous and systematic, despite my political and personal motivation to conduct this study.

Coming from an immigrant family, I know that when immigration is problematized this subsequently leads to the problematization of immigrants, people, too. Yet, whether this problematization is perceived to be ‘racist’ or ‘discriminatory’ is also a matter of contention, dependent not only on how these terms are defined, but also how they can be strategically denied, mitigated and/or obscured (see van Dijk, 1992). The racism experienced by my family may not be considered racism to some, who may instead perceive it in an ‘old’, overt form, attacking the ‘Other’ based on ‘biological’ factors. However, subtler examples highlight that we have been at the receiving end of what might be labelled ‘new’ or ‘cultural’ racism (see Chapter 4). This has included: ridicule and mockery directed towards my mother and grandfather for their ‘foreign’ accents; fascination with my surname (Demetriou) and surprise at my own level of English proficiency (despite being raised in the UK); questions about why ‘we moved here’ and why we do not ‘live in our own country’; unjustified visa denial and limitations for my Macedonian family to visit; and on many occasions feeling the need to explain that we also ‘pay taxes’ and therefore ‘contribute’ to the country. This is despite the fact that we are all British citizens and that immigration to the UK is far from being a new or novel phenomenon.

Nevertheless, I also recognize that tied up with a discourse on immigration in Britain are tensions surrounding individual and national identity, borders, religious beliefs, cultural norms, public security and safety, and financial/economic inequality and struggle; thus, discourse which is exclusionary and discriminatory, and results in anti-immigrant hostility, is largely overdetermined. Growing up in a coastal town that continues to experience high levels of social-deprivation, I am fully aware that people who hold racist prejudices, including my own family and friends, do so out of very genuine
concerns about their own ‘access’ to and ‘exclusion’ from society, in particular wealth (e.g. employment or social welfare), and other provisions including the National Health Service (NHS) and education.

The primary concern of this thesis is to critically explore and analyse how the topic of immigration is reported on and debated by the British media and the public via online newspapers within the context of EU expansion. In doing so, it will focus on one topic: namely the representation and evaluation of Bulgarian and Romanian immigrants in light of the expiration of transitional restrictions, which occurred on the 1st January 2014. Significantly, I am concerned with the representation of immigrants vis-à-vis other social actors and to what extent they are represented and evaluated as the ‘Other’. Within the methodology (Chapter 5), it will become apparent that in order to achieve this, a case study was constructed which focused on a narrow and specific discourse topic preceding the uplifting of transitional restrictions, namely the implementation of welfare restrictions for EU migrants. Chapter 5 will also highlight why a particular newspaper, the Mail Online, was chosen for the purposes of micro-linguistic analysis.

Although discourse about immigration has previously attracted much scholarly interest (not only within the UK but globally), I believe that it continues to evolve and transform, thus requiring further critical investigation. Further research in this area should be pursued not only to describe, interpret, and highlight the discursive structures apparent and how they may or may not position immigrants as the ‘Other’, but also to explore why such tensions exist and whether resistant or counter discursive structures have a platform to emerge.

There is limited research focusing on the representation and evaluation of immigrants from within the EU. Although some studies have looked at the linguistic constructions and framing of Bulgarian and Romanian immigrants within the British press (Allen and Vicol, 2014; Balch and Balabanova, 2016), this study aims to consider two levels of discursive analysis: 1) articles from the online newspaper, Mail Online, and 2) their corresponding public comments. Furthermore, this study will draw on a synergy of theories and methods, situated within the broader area of Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) and will aim to extend the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, 2016) to be
more inclusive of linguistic evaluation. This will be achieved through the incorporation of Martin and White’s (2005) ‘Appraisal Theory’.

Although considerations of public views with regards to immigration might have previously been limited to methods of survey and/or interview, it has become increasingly evident that social media platforms have given rise to the necessary affordances and dynamics (boyd, 2010) which have allowed for the public to explicitly engage with and co-produce discourse about immigration. The incorporation of social media into research is a relatively recent phenomenon and therefore poses methodological and ethical issues (Page et al., 2014); however, the voice of the public has become increasingly visible due to an increased presence on social media. It would appear that a variety of attitudes, opinions and beliefs with regards to immigration are made explicit online, whether these demonstrate pro/anti-immigration views and/or whether these comments are explicitly/implicitly racist or anti-racist. Thus, social media potentially provides a platform where racist ideologies can be reproduced or resisted through discourse. Although there have been discussions surrounding the democratic or cosmopolitan potential of the Internet, it does appear that the ‘freedom of speech’ associated with this has given rise to both overt and covert expressions of racism (Hughey and Daniels, 2014). Nevertheless, the changing nature of participatory structures has also evidenced a change in power dynamics between ‘producers’ and ‘consumers’ of texts (KhosraviNik and Unger, 2015). Therefore, social media also has the potential to provide a platform for debate and deliberation.

It is also evident that discourse about immigration has become inextricably linked to both the culture and identity of Britain and also Britain’s role and relationship with/in the European Union (EU). Among other things, it has been the rise in popularity of right-wing or ‘communitarian’ values (Giddens, 1994), seen somewhat with the rise (and fall) of the far-right British National Party (BNP) and populist Islamophobic groups such as the English Defence League (EDL), which has also seemingly problematised immigration within Britain (Richardson and Wodak, 2009). Directly related to this has been the rise of Euroscepticism evidenced through the growth in support for the UK Independence Party (UKIP) (Bloom and Tonkiss, 2013). Thus, I will now consider the context of EU expansion and restriction to labour markets imposed for Romanians and Bulgarians.
1.2 EU Expansion

Within a period of three years, between 2004-2007, the EU witnessed enlargement from fifteen to twenty-seven member states. In 2004, eight new countries from ‘Central’ and ‘Eastern’ Europe joined, known as the ‘A8’ accession. This was alongside a further two countries, Malta and Cyprus, later on in the same year (with ‘A8’ often replaced with ‘A10’). It was then in 2007 that two more countries, Bulgaria and Romania (the ‘A2’ accession), also joined (Mawby and Gisby, 2009). As it currently stands, the EU consists of twenty-eight member states, with Croatia being the latest country to join in 2013 (European Union, 2015). Additionally, there are continued efforts from at least eight further countries to join. It is clear, therefore, that there are many perceived benefits associated with EU membership including: free trade, investment opportunities, economic growth and increased climate controls across Europe. However, it is the principle of freedom of movement, which has become increasingly controversial in British public debate (Favell and Hansen, 2002).

As a result of a relatively quick expansion (between 2004 and 2007), the EU offered the original fifteen member states the ability to impose transitional restrictions on access to labour markets. Although Britain did not impose these formal restrictions for the A8/A10 countries, restrictions were later enforced for Bulgarian and Romanian workers (Light and Young, 2009). It is likely that the unrestricted nature of the initial expansion within 2004 was permitted due to shortages in the labour market; however, it is thought to have directly resulted in higher levels of anti-immigrant hostility (Bloom and Tonkiss, 2013), with news outlets often commenting on the “unexpectedly large influx of workers” that it resulted in (BBC News, 2009). In light of this, the government sought to impose restrictions for Bulgarian and Romanian citizens, which allowed for a transitional period of seven years. In this period, the right to work and claim benefits was restricted. On the 1st January 2014 these restrictions expired and it was this event that appeared to spark further controversy regarding the ‘problems’ and/or ‘issues’ surrounding immigration from Romania and Bulgaria in particular.

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1 However, Britain’s exit from the EU, which is due to occur in 2019, will result in the EU comprising twenty-seven member states.
1.3 Research Questions

In formulating a study to critically analyse discourse on immigration within the UK, two main research questions were initially constructed. Research Question 1 (RQ1) aimed to find out how EU migrants, in particular Romanians and Bulgarians, were represented and evaluated in discourse and Research Question 2 (RQ2) sought to find out to what extent these representations and evaluations could be considered racist. However, as the study progressed, I realised that it was also important to consider how EU migrants were discursively represented and evaluated vis-à-vis other social actors. The primary reason for this was that it became evident how other social actors played a large role in the articulation and dissemination of discourse and inherent (racist) ideologies about EU migrants. Thus, by considering how these social actors were also represented and evaluated in discourse, it would highlight how certain positions were endorsed or discredited within the selected media texts and the corresponding public comments. It would also highlight the extent to which dichotomies between the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ might be apparent. In thinking about these aspects, the final research questions were formulated:

RQ1:
*How are EU migrants, in particular Bulgarians and Romanians, represented and evaluated vis-à-vis other social actors in discourse about immigration?*

RQ2:
*Can discourse about immigration surrounding the representation and evaluation of Romanians and Bulgarians be considered racist, and to what extent is this apparent in the selected online newspaper articles and their corresponding public comments?*

Furthermore, as the research project progressed and a case study was constructed, one further research question was added. Research Question 3 (RQ3) is therefore focused on a specific aspect of the case study, namely the way in which welfare restrictions were de/legitimised in the selected articles and their corresponding public comments, including how the arguments behind this might have contributed to the representation and evaluation of EU migrants, in particular Romanians and Bulgarians, as the ‘Other’.
RQ3:
*How are new welfare restrictions de/legitimised in Mail Online articles and their corresponding public comments, and to what extent might this contribute to the representation and evaluation of Romanians and Bulgarians as the ‘Other’?*

1.4 Thesis Structure

The thesis begins with an overview of immigration to the UK in Chapter 2, considering historical, political and discursive responses to immigration from the implementation of the Aliens Act of 1905: the first recognised policy to control entry to Britain (Hayes, 2002). It will then go on to demonstrate how immigration was debated post-1945, with Commonwealth immigration seemingly acting as the driving force behind restrictive immigration control, and how recent interpretations have provided opposing views regarding the role and/or presence of racism (Solomos, 1993; Hansen, 2000; Geddes, 2003). The chapter will then explore the changing nature of immigration within the 1990s by reviewing legislation and discourse surrounding asylum seekers and refugees (Kaye, 2001; Sales 2002; Patterson, 2002). Finally, it will address discourse about immigration in the 21st century in light of the Labour government’s ‘managed migration’ at the turn of the millennium, and the Coalition government’s restrictionist approach from 2010 onwards (Young, 2003; Consterdine, 2015; Gilligan, 2015).

Following this, two theoretical chapters will be presented. In Chapter 3, the approach to discourse analysis that I will adopt, namely the Discourse-Historical Approach, will be outlined vis-à-vis not only other approaches within the Critical Discourse Studies paradigm, but also in contrast to post-structural discourse analytical theories: Discourse Theory (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985) and Discursive Psychology (Wetherell and Potter, 1992). It is here that I will outline the way in which ‘ideology’, ‘critique’ and ‘power’ is to be considered and the epistemological position of the DHA will be elaborated. This chapter will also consider the role of the media and social media and explain how they are considered from a CDS perspective.

In Chapter 4, I will explore the concept of racism and consider theories related to the representation of the ‘Other’ in discourse, namely *Orientalism* (Said, 1978/2003) and *Balkanism* (Todorova, 1997/2009). In relation to this, I argue for
the syncretic understanding of racism, which is inclusive not only of conceptions of ‘race’ but also nationality, ethnicity and religion. This conception of racism is seen to comprise two logics to greater or lesser extents, that of *inegalitarianism* and *differentialism* (Taguieff, 1987/2001; Miles, 1994; Wieviorka, 1994). Moreover, it argued that these logics are present within *Orientalist* and *Balkanist* representations of the ‘Other’ that are dominant within the ‘West’ and seek to construct a demonised image of the ‘East’.

Chapter 5 presents the methodology applied to the study. In relation to the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA), this chapter outlines and details the five discursive strategies to be considered in the linguistic analysis of the articles and their corresponding public comments: *referential, predicational, argumentation, perspectivization* and *intensification/mitigation* (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001; Reisigl and Wodak, 2016). Moreover, this chapter will also outline Martin and White’s (2005) ‘Appraisal Theory’ in depth, explaining how and why it may be incorporated into the DHA. Following this, I discuss my data collection and selection, justifying my choice of selected texts from the *Mail Online*. Here a ‘global analysis’ is presented examining larger macro-contexts, and I identify how discourse on welfare, employment and crime are inter-discursively linked to discourse about Romanian and Bulgarian immigration. In constructing a case study primarily related to a specific discourse topic emerging from these discourses, namely the implementation of welfare restrictions for EU migrants and the construction of a ‘benefit tourist’, I will also explain how articles were narrowed down for the purposes of micro-linguistic analysis.

The following two chapters will present the main analysis: Chapter 6 focusing on the selected *Mail Online* articles and Chapter 7 on the corresponding public comments. As the analysis is concerned with the representation and evaluation of EU migrants, in particular Bulgarians and Romanians, vis-à-vis other social actors in discourse, both chapters will follow the same structure initially considering the following social actors: UK Political, UK Public, EU Political and EU Migrants (Romanians and Bulgarians). From here, argumentation strategies focusing upon the de/legitimisation of welfare restrictions will be analysed.

In Chapter 8, the findings from the two analytical chapters will be synthesised in an attempt to present some overall conclusions about the
representation and evaluation of EU migrants, in particular Bulgarians and Romanians, across the newspaper articles and corresponding public comments selected. This will be achieved by returning to the three main research questions outlined above, answering each fully. This chapter will also consider limitations to the study and discuss areas for further research.
Chapter 2 - Immigration to the UK: Historical, Political and Discursive Overview

2.1 Introduction

One of the most interesting and thought provoking images of immigration to and from the UK is the description provided by Robert Winder (2004: 1), where immigration is thought of as an “epic story”:

Imagine for a moment that we could watch, from some all-seeing camera high in space, the long history of the British Isles unfolding before our eyes...the most striking sight would be the astounding traffic into and out of our ports. Thousands of ships and planes, millions of people, year after year, century after century...We would not see that some of the arrivals never leave, or that some of the departures never return...

However, Winder (2004: 1) acknowledges that it may not always be the case that British people regard the UK as a place “settled at a deep level by immigrants”. It is stated, instead, that there appears to be a kind of consensus which amounts to an ‘idea’ or ‘belief’ that there are in fact inherent ‘British’ values, traits or essences. Even though there have been attempts to define and articulate multicultural Britain, this model has reflected “multiculturalism on an island” where immigrant groups have been envisioned as “‘nationalised’ in relation to British social and political institutions”, thus giving an impression to some of ‘fortress Britain’ (Geddes, 2003: 44). Often ignored are historical movements and migrations that have shaped the UK including, for example, the Romans, Anglo-Saxons, and Normans; the cultures and traditions they brought with them; the laws imposed; and the languages spoken, which have in one way or another, moulded the English Language spoken today. Even after these historical settlements, the UK has been and continues to be shaped by immigrant groups including: Irish immigration of the 18th and 19th centuries; Jewish immigration from Eastern Europe in the Victorian and Edwardian periods; and immigration from ‘British subjects’ of the
Commonwealth and former colonies including India, Pakistan and the Caribbean in the 20th century (Solomos, 1993). Even with these few examples, it becomes clear how immigration as a process, battle, escape or adventure has and continues to shape the face of the UK. However, as Winder (2004: 1) also reminds, too often the construction of “mythologies of the national [British] character as something stable” has itself reinforced a binary opposition that consequently envisions immigrants as ‘problems’ or ‘threats’ to national identity and/or security.

The aim of this chapter is to explore the recent history of immigration to the UK alongside political responses and discursive structures found in political, media and public domains. This will be achieved through the consideration of significant policy and legislation passed since the 1905 Aliens Act and via the critical examination of scholarly work and debate, especially in relation to attitudes and dominant ideologies of what it means to immigrate to the UK. Although some scholars have suggested that the topic of immigration has only recently become prominent and ‘toxic’ in political debate (previously only affiliated with the far-right) (Charteris-Black, 2006; McLaren and Johnson, 2007; Consterdine, 2015), I will show that discourse about immigration has possessed a discriminatory tone since before the implementation of the first measures of control in 1905, working to positively represent ‘us’ and negatively represent certain groups of people, at certain periods of time, as unwanted ‘Others’. While scholars have noted the emergence of immigration as becoming “more salient in British elections” (McLaren and Johnson, 2007: 709), especially since the 2005 General Election, I will show that historical, political and discursive structures have all contributed to its elevated status. An overview of this sort is a necessary precursor to the analysis of discourse about immigration in the UK, as it will enable comparative insights during the description, interpretation and explanation of discursive structures (Fairclough, 2010) alongside providing the broader socio-political and historical context in which discursive practices are embedded (Richardson and Wodak, 2009). Situating the thesis historically is also a core component of the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001; 2016).

This chapter will be structured as follows. Section 2.2 will present a discussion of the 1905 Aliens Act as the first provision within UK law to control
immigration. Following on from this, section 2.3 will consider immigration from the Commonwealth alongside a series of policies and acts up until the 1981 British Nationality Act. In section 2.4, the role and representation of asylum in the UK will be discussed, especially in relation to media responses. Finally, immigration in the UK in the 21st century will be reviewed in section 2.5, with a summary of this chapter being presented in section 2.6.

2.2 The 1905 Aliens Act

Up until the late nineteenth century, there were few rules and restrictions with regards to immigration to and from the UK and, in a more general sense, people could go “in and out of the country with ease” (The Aliens Act of 1905, 2015). During this time, immigration from Ireland was significant. Although Irish immigration was motivated by seasonal work, it is clear that at this time there were no apparent laws and minimal "state intervention" (Solomos, 1993: 42). Although this was also partly due to “the Act of Union” in 1800, which saw Ireland as part of the UK (ibid), it is also thought that “Britain prided itself on liberty” and other immigrant groups were also, quite freely, able to enter the UK with little restraint (The Aliens Act of 1905, 2015). However, this “laissez-faire approach” (Solomos, 1993: 42) to immigration began to alter later in the nineteenth century when many Jewish, Eastern Europeans from Russia and Poland migrated to the UK, fleeing pogroms and persecution (Hayes, 2002). As many studies have consequently shown, “the political and ideological” reaction to this, led the way to the enforcement of new immigration acts within the UK (Solomos, 1993: 43). Additionally, discourse that both preceded and followed the 1905 Aliens Act, “illustrates a long term construction of the refugee [and immigrant] in such a way as burdensome, needy, socially costly, and consequently undesirable” (Hayes, 2002: 30).

Focusing on the period preceding the 1905 Aliens Act, it is clear that concern about the arrival of large numbers of refugees was evident in political and public debate as far back as the 1870s (Hayes, 2002). Much of the discourse opposing immigration was overtly racist and based on ‘scientific’ classifications of ‘race’ that placed humans on a hierarchical scale of superiority and inferiority (see Chapter 4). One example of this includes a letter to The Times by journalist Arnold White claiming that immigrants were “replacing English workers and driving to
despair men, women and children of our blood” (cited in Winder, 2004: 254-255). Moreover, in the creation of the society ‘For Preventing the Immigration of Destitute Aliens’, White also enabled the publication of articles such as ‘The Alien Invasion’ (Wilkins, 1892: 5), which associated immigration with societal ills and considered the Jewish immigrants to be:

...of an immeasurably inferior calibre...by whom the conditions of existence are made harder than before, and the standard of comfort and decency in the home-life of our people is infinitely lowered...

It is also the case that, during this period, ‘aliens’ were blamed also for “stealing jobs and forcing up rents by living in tight spaces” (Winder, 2004: 255), an argument that resonates profoundly with discourse about intra-EU immigration. Thus, an anti-immigration ideology became dominant and manifested itself within many domains of social life. Take, for example, H.G. Wells’ enthusiasm for the ‘science’ of eugenics combined with his publication of The War of the Worlds in 1898, a story enjoyed by many and recently seen on stage and screen but ultimately about “an apocalyptic battle between civilisation and alien invaders”2 (Winder, 2004).

Furthermore, as is acknowledged by Hayes (2002: 31), it was in the lead up to the 1905 Aliens Act that the term ‘alien’ became synonymous with ‘Jew’. This is evident from how the Select Committee, appointed in 1888 to decide whether it would be ‘desirable’ to impose immigration restrictions which had previously not existed, focused primarily on the “habits and lifestyle” of the Jewish immigrant in comparison to other immigrant groups such as Scandinavians who were considered “of a respectable class” (Select Committee, 1888: v cited in Hayes, 2002: 30-31). It is not surprising, therefore, that a rise in anti-Semitism “served as an explanatory model to account for objective problems” such as poverty and unemployment (Lebzelter, 1981: 102 cited in Solomos, 1993: 44). Further evidence of discursive structures displaying an anti-immigrant sentiment is highlighted by Solomos (1993: 44), where slogans such as “England for the

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2 Although, The War of the Worlds is also interpreted as being a critique of British imperialism and colonialism (Zebrowski, 2005).
English" dominated political and media texts and became popular rhetorical devices for trade unions. More recently, prior to the May 2015 General Election, Radio 4 also focused on discourse about immigration preceding the 1905 Aliens Act, where it is explained that popular headlines in the press included: “The Jewish Invasion” and “60,000 Coming” (The Aliens Act of 1905, 2015).

On the 11th August 1905, the Aliens Act was passed after several failed attempts in 1894, 1898 and 1904 (Hayes, 2002). However, it was considered symbolic, as it was the very first endeavour within British politics to establish immigration control (Wray, 2006). Consequently, it enforced the rule that ‘undesirable aliens’ would be refused entry to Britain from 1st January 1906 (The Aliens Act of 1905, 2015). Although the term ‘alien’ referred to all those who were not British subjects, it has since been documented that new restrictions predominantly targeted Jewish Eastern Europeans (‘Aliens Act’, Making Britain Database). Solomos (1993: 45-46) summarises the most significant provisions of the act which centered upon: 1) refusal of entry if “sanitary conditions” were deemed inadequate and; 2) repatriation “without trial or appeal” if immigrants were receiving financial support, if they were homeless, or living in unhygienic circumstances due to overcrowding in properties. In addition to this, dominant, but essentialist, predications of the undesirable ‘alien’ included that they were: ‘impoverished’, ‘anarchists’, ‘prostitutes’, ‘criminals’, ‘lunatics’, ‘idiots’, and people who were ‘diseased’ (Hayes, 2002; The Aliens Act of 1905, 2015). As the thesis progresses, it will become apparent that these themes have persisted, even to this day.

On closer examination of the 1905 Act, it is evident that new laws mainly affected ‘steerage passengers’, especially on the basis that ‘undesirable aliens’ would be “unlikely to travel in first or second class” (Hayes, 2002: 34). There were four main categories of undesirability: the diseased, the insane, the criminal, and the burden on the public purse (Hayes, 2002: 34). However, there is something particularly noteworthy of discussion with regards to the last category, especially in relation to dominant ideas about ‘benefit tourism’ that will be investigated in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.

From 1905 onwards, the British government was not only transforming its policy on immigration, but also its policy on welfare with the introduction of the
1908 Old Age Pensions Act and the 1911 National Insurance Act. As Britain’s empire began to diminish, alongside its dominant position on the world stage, Hayes (2002: 37) argues that “concern shifted to the health of the nation” because, “how could the nation dominate if its populace were not fit for work and war?”. From this perspective, the welfare programme was established (in-part) as the re-building and re-asserting of Britain as a nation, and as a nation that wanted to protect its own citizens. Moreover, the notion that immigrants were a burden to Britain was “twinned with a further powerful ideology concerning welfare and nation” (Hayes, 2002: 30) which resulted in:

...immigration controls which consistently place[d] at their centre the need to access welfare as grounds for refusal of entry, and a welfare state which ensure[d] provision [was] restricted to its own. (ibid)

This ideological twinning between immigration and welfare has not only existed since the first restrictive measures placed upon immigration to Britain but has since reinforced the dichotomies between ‘us’ and ‘them’, where a ‘British self’ is contrasted to a ‘foreign’ or ‘undesirable’ ‘Other’. Furthermore, this ideological twinning between immigration and welfare is a theme highlighted within recent studies pointing towards ‘welfare chauvinism’. Understood by Balch and Balabanova (2016: 20) as “the extent to which people believe that welfare benefits should be restricted to citizens”, welfare chauvinism is also considered likely to rise if immigrants continue to be “connected with crime and disease or other negative connotations” (ibid). Although the general principle of welfare is to promote social inclusion, Hayes (2002: 38) points out that it has “at its heart the premise of exclusion” especially with regards to those considered ‘undesirable’, ‘alien’ or ‘Other’.

As an outcome of the 1905 Aliens Act, immigration officers were responsible for controlling the borders and medical officers were recruited to assess immigrants upon their arrival (The Aliens Act of 1905, 2015). Although the law had become much stricter, immigrants who were able to articulate a genuine fear for life were permitted entry (although not labelled in this way at the time, they effectively became Britain’s first asylum seekers). One of the reasons for this
was due to opposition by the Liberal Party. This was “one of the major concessions the Liberals were able to force” onto the Conservative government before the act was passed (ibid).

Following 1905, there were a series of successive acts including the Aliens Restriction Act of 1914. This act was enforced on the first day of World War One, due to securitisation fears mainly surrounding German immigrants already domiciled in the UK, some of which were already married with children (Bird, 1986/2015). As Winder (2004: 270) suggests, “If Europe had remained at peace, then the Aliens Act might have simply fallen into disuse…” but due to the war the Aliens Act was secured. At least 32,000 ‘aliens’ were interned and thus criminalised, more than 20,000 were repatriated and those who remained lived with many restrictions to their legal rights including housing and employment prospects (Bird, 1986/2015). Thus, the idea or belief that immigration is in some way dangerous, problematic or even threatening is not a new construct.

In the coming years, there were further amendments to the Aliens Act, including, the Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act of 1919 and the Aliens Order 1920 (Solomos, 1993). It is here where the law changed for those seeking asylum in the UK, as “both the right of appeal to Immigration Boards against refusal to leave to land and the provision exempting refugees from the poverty test were abolished” (London, 2000: 17). Moreover, as Louise London (2000) argues, these immigration policies allowed for and reflected the restrictionist attitude Britain presented prior to and during World War 2, where admitting Jewish refugees from Germany and other occupied territory became subject to this very immigration control and, as a consequence, failed to save thousands of Jewish civilians murdered by the Nazis. This is despite the belief or ‘myth’ that pertains today that there was a great humanitarian effort to help Jewish refugees and that “Britain did all it could for the Jews between 1933 and 1945” (London, 2000: 13). Thus, as London (2000) has demonstrated, the 80,000 refugees admitted to the UK prior to and during the war only accounted for around 13% of the 500-600,000 civilians on record that submitted their cases for consideration.

Although asylum cases were no longer bound by law, this did not mean that refugees were not permitted to enter in the years leading up to World War 2, as the persecution of Jews intensified. Thus, “sympathetic consideration” was
enforced but this was subject to “Home Office discretion” (London, 2000: 18), and in a sense, the UK were effectively able to pick and choose the people they considered most ‘desirable’. Although immigration policy was strict, especially in 1933 when Hitler became German Chancellor and as “Britain [and other European countries were] struggling to shake off depression” (London, 2000: 19), movement across Europe for visitors was not as strict, with visas abolished for many European countries, including Germany, in 1928. Thus, when Jewish refugees arrived between the years of 1933-1938, many presented themselves, initially, as visitors. However, with the persecution of Jews by the Nazis increasing, the UK government were aware that large numbers of Jewish refugees were arriving, and their concern turned to limiting numbers. One of the arguments presented for controlling and restricting the entry of Jewish refugees revolved around the concern that “refugees could not be allowed the threaten British jobs” (London, 2000: 38), an argument that persists today and is presented as a theme within the analysis presented in this thesis. However, a more concerning argument was that the presence of a large number of Jewish people would cause an increase in anti-Semitism, and London (2000: 38-39) goes on to explain that “[t]he argument was based on the assumption that anti-semitism was, at least in part, caused by Jews and that it was therefore necessary to restrict Jewish immigration and select new entrants with care”. Subsequently, those who managed to enter the UK as refugees were financially assisted by charities and organisations such as the Jewish Refugees Committee, an agreement that the government welcomed so long as public funds were not being used (London, 2000).

However, as the plight of Jewish civilians worsened in Germany, so the immigration restrictions became tighter in the UK. An amendment to the visa policy was enforced after the Anschuluss, the annexation of Austria by the Nazis in March 1938. With the increase of refugees as a result of this, Jewish charities were no longer able to fund their settlement in the UK and, almost one week later, policy was amended reinstating the requirement for visas, for which refugees were ineligible, “unless he or she fell into the exclusive category of desirable immigrants...consist[ing] of people with international reputations in science, medicine, research or art...” (London, 2000: 65). Such a restrictionist policy did
not go unnoticed by the UK public, however, and increasing pressure from activists saw the government add further categories to this idea of the ‘desirable’ refugee, including “young people for training or education” (London, 2000: 70). A range of other initiatives were also set-up, as Britain were on the verge of war, including a refugee camp in Richborough, Kent which supported approximately 3,500 refugees. However, the government saw the majority of Jewish refugees in the UK as transitory migrants, with the UK as a temporary home before arrangements were made to settle more permanently in the U.S. or Palestine. Furthermore, once the war commenced, sympathetic discretion was minimal, as refugees were also “seen as a security risk” and “an extra burden” (London, 2000: 172). However, if refugees were in a ‘desirable’ industry, such as the manufacturing of diamonds, and could “yield a return for the war effort”, discretion was still applied (London, 2000: 181-182). Thus, London (2000: 189) ultimately shows that “war-time humanitarian aid for refugees was relegated to the sidelines...[and] officials were now adept at using the war effort to justify all actions and omissions”.

2.3 Immigration Post-1945

Post-1945, the politics of immigration in Britain shifted, and discourse about immigration focused on immigrants from the Commonwealth. As Solomos (1993: 56) writes, “black migration was politically perceived in a different way from European migration”. Upon reflection, it is clear to see that notions of ‘immigration’ and ‘race’ were visibly linked. However, what is not so clear is the extent to which ‘racist’ ‘illegal’ or ‘covert’ measures were enforced to discourage immigration from Commonwealth countries. Although racism towards, what was openly referred to as ‘coloured immigration’, certainly existed in political, media and public discourse, there remain opposing arguments with regards to the extent to which the British government was involved in and advocated the unlawful control of ‘coloured’ immigration, especially between 1948 and 1962 (Carter, Joshi and Harris, 1987; Solomos, 1993; Hansen, 2000).

Despite differing accounts and interpretations, it can be noted that post-1945, discourse about immigration within the UK had become ‘racialised’. As Geddes (2003: 30) notes, “The effect has been that ideas about ‘race’ and ethnic difference matter in British social and political debate about immigration” and
they do so in the UK more prominently than any other European country. As will be evidenced below, there were a variety of reasons for Commonwealth immigration to Britain from 1945 onwards, and the racialisation of this is evident through a series of ‘Immigration’ and ‘Race Relations’ Acts that ensued.

2.3.1 Post-war Labour Shortages

Whereas countries such as Germany, Austria and Denmark adopted guest-worker schemes designed to attract Eastern European workers to attend to labour shortages after the Second World War, the UK relied upon workers from former colonies (Hansen, 2003). Although European workers are said to have been ‘preferred’ because of the prejudice that already existed towards black workers (Small and Solomos, 2006), the UK’s guest-worker schemes were, ultimately, not as attractive (Hansen, 2003). Therefore, the UK relied on workers from the Commonwealth. Even though their labour was sought, this did not mean that black immigrants from the Commonwealth were perceived in the same way white Europeans:

*The relatively liberal attitude towards the arrival of European workers contrasted sharply with the fears expressed about the social and racial problems which were seen as being related to the arrival of ‘coloured’ colonial workers...* (Solomos, 1993: 56)

Although people from the Commonwealth began to settle in places such as London, Liverpool and Cardiff, numbers remained low within the UK immediately after the Second World War (Small and Solomos, 2006). This is significant, because as Small and Solomos (2006: 237) explain: “This means that the vast majority of white British had never personally seen or interacted with a ‘coloured colonial subject’.” Moreover, any public knowledge about ‘threats’ or ‘problems’ associated with Commonwealth immigrants, were based primarily on representations “from media, from cinema and other popular cultural forms, and thus were largely stereotypical” (ibid). Thus, much of the public’s attitude (which was to become largely hostile) was mostly shaped, not through physical problems or ‘real’ threats, but through the discursive construction of a racialised ‘Other’.
2.3.2 The 1948 British Nationality Act

Although immigration control had been enforced within Britain since 1905, Hansen (2000: 5) points out that in the period between 1948 and 1962 it was the “absence...of migration control” which saw a rise of immigration from Commonwealth countries. Due to events concerning the citizenship of individuals within Canada, and interests from the Dominion states that saw them disengaged with Britain, the British government saw the need to embrace a common nationality with the aim to unite the Commonwealth. A common status for all countries involved was constructed and it was one that granted 'British Subject' status to all in the Commonwealth. Thus, the British Nationality Act (BNA) of 1948 was implemented. This subsequently ensured that approximately 800 million people across the globe “enjoyed the same status and rights in the UK regardless of citizenship” (Hansen, 2000: 48). However, parliamentary debate surrounding the BNA 1948 never once considered mass migration as a result of such an Act as “no one imagined such movement possible” (ibid: 49). Significantly, this new status ensured that all Commonwealth citizens were British subjects and, as a consequence, exempt from classifications of ‘alien’ and also immigration control (Solomos, 1993; Hansen, 2000; Geddes, 2003).

2.3.3 Debates about Immigration Control: 1948-1962

After the implementation of the BNA 1948, it soon became evident that British subjects were going to exercise their right to enter and live in the UK. The UK, as the multicultural state that exists today, was constructed as a result of this. However, as McLaren and Johnson (2007: 710) state, multiculturalism was seen as the “unwanted consequence of a desire to retain the British Empire at the end of the Second World War”. It was during the 1950s, when the scale of immigration became evident and political debates surrounding the restriction of immigrants from New Commonwealth countries began to take place. Many scholars regard such debate as evidence of racist discrimination against black immigrants from the New Commonwealth (Carter, Joshi and Harris, 1987; Solomos 1993). However, there is opposition to this view, especially evident within the work of Hansen (2000).

Whether or not the state was involved in perpetuating and disseminating a racist ideology about black people within the UK, one thing that is certain is after
the arrival of black immigrants from the New Commonwealth, a dominant racist ideology about ‘coloured people’ became another component in discourse about immigration control. Although, some may view the role of the state as ‘welcoming’ and/or ‘encouraging’ immigration, Carter, Harris and Joshi (1987) argue the contrary:

...by 1955 the State had developed a clear policy towards Black immigration...[that] amounted to the construction of an ideological framework which Black people were seen to be threatening, alien and unassimilable.

This is a view also shared by Solomos (1993: 57) who refutes the idea that further controls were enforced “with great reluctance and considerable official debate”. Moreover, Carter, Harris and Joshi (1987) assert that by 1952, both the Labour and Conservative governments had “instituted a number of covert and sometimes illegal, administrative measures” to restrict and dissuade potential black immigrants. Not only did this include a number of actions such as the strategic deferment of issuing passports in places such as Pakistan, India and the West Indies, but it also included elements of moral surveillance at ports, including the adjustment of shipping schedules and ensuring migrants were placed at the back of queues (ibid).

Moreover, as the debate escalated about formalising immigration control as legislature, Carter, Harris and Joshi (1987) talk of a “confidential meeting” held in 1954 in which ministers decided the restriction of New Commonwealth immigration could only be passed if there was enough empirical evidence of the ‘problems’ caused by black immigrants. It was here when information had started to be gathered concerning “unemployment and National Assistance, ‘numbers’, housing, health, criminality, and miscegenation” (ibid). As Solomos (1993) also points out, these practices were evident prior to the Nottingham and Notting Hill riots, which occurred in 1958. These are often mis-quoted as the start of such talks on immigration control (ibid).

In relation to employment, racist examples of discourse designed to discourage immigration were seen via predications of black men as “physically unsuited to heavy manual work” and black women as unsuited to factory work as
they were “slow mentally” (Carter, Harris and Joshi, 1987). However, this did not stop black immigrants being recruited for service roles for domestic purposes and in healthcare. In relation to housing, arguments were contrived linking the shortage of housing to new immigration. Although this was presented as mere ‘common sense’, Carter, Harris and Joshi (1987) negate such claims by acknowledging that black immigrants were not actually eligible for council housing at this time. Finally, in relation to concerns about criminality, it is highlighted how many unfounded stereotypes were constructed based on the belief that black immigrants were involved with drug trafficking and working illegally (ibid). However, such claims were also unfounded with Carter, Harris and Joshi (1987) giving the example of the Chief Constable of Middlesbrough, who reported that “on the whole the coloured population are as well behaved as many local citizens”.

Thus, the search for empirical evidence did not provide sufficient grounds for the implementation of new immigration restrictions. It is here where it is claimed that consent was manufactured with regards to the idea that black immigration was now a ‘threat’ to the ‘racial character of the English’ (Carter, Joshi and Harris, 1987: 6) and ultimately a threat to national identity (Solomos, 1993). However, immigration legislation that would restrict Commonwealth immigration was still not passed, as there were a number of contextual factors that prevented this from happening. This included the fact that, economically, immigration was indeed welcome, and Geddes (2003: 32) points out that the roles in which Commonwealth immigrants held actually “played an important part in the development of the British welfare state”.

In turning to the case made by Hansen (2000), there is clear opposition to the role of the government in the perpetuation of discourse about black immigration that was inherently racist. Moreover, Hansen (2000) claims that the thesis put forward by Carter, Harris and Joshi (1987), and supported by Solomos (1993: 15), is a ‘myth’ based on only a selective reading of sources and in fact “palpable nonsense” (ibid: 63). Although racism is not denied during this period, it is argued that there were more government officials who advocated an anti-racist position and, that in discussions surrounding policy about immigration control, there was a “genuine” belief by most (but not all) that this could be
achieved in a non-discriminatory manner (ibid). Thus, as an example, Hansen (2000: 15) makes reference to Alan Lennox-Boyd, the Colonial Secretary, who “threatened to resign” when a proposal was made to restrict immigration to non-white immigrants. However, it is difficult to accept Hansen’s perspective, particularly since it fails to acknowledge another type of immigration that was indeed welcomed, one which was “overwhelmingly white and European in origin” (Small and Solomos, 2006: 237). Moreover, it was not long until such restrictions on black immigration were enforced, in a series of Immigration Acts implemented in the 1960s and 1970s.

2.3.4 The Acts of the 1960s and 1970s

As discussed previously, it was the 1958 ‘race riots’ that are often referred to as the time when legislation surrounding the control of immigration started gained momentum. Moreover, the extensive coverage of the riots in the press resulted in the entire country being made aware of what was essentially seen as an uprising due to racial tension (Hansen, 2000: 81). Thus, it was soon after when the first Act limiting immigration came into force: the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962. Although over 400,000 migrants from countries such as India, Pakistan and the West Indies had already moved to UK, this new Act’s purpose was to limit the entry of “new immigrants” (McLaren and Johnson, 2007: 711 – their emphasis). Moreover, by this time, both Labour and the Conservative Party were advocating, “that strict controls were desirable and necessary” (ibid). Although Hansen (2000: 86) explains that after the 1958 riots, the first immigration control took four years to implement because “the liberal wing would not accept a panicked response to the riots”, it cannot be denied that the restrictions were based on racist responses from both politicians and the public.

In fact, it is in the construction of a carefully manufactured argument, which proposed that immigration control was necessary for the maintenance of positive ‘race relations’, where this racialist tone was apparent. It is also an argument that, to this day, continues to be perpetuated and reinforced. Moreover, the Act was also legitimised due to an apparent need to limit black immigration because of assimilation ‘issues’, including that racist pressures from the public was considered a legitimate concern to the government (Solomos, 1993).
Although the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act kept the citizenship status of 'Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies' (CUKC), it made clear the distinction to the rights of citizenship: namely that “only citizens with British issued passports enjoyed the full rights of citizenship” (Hansen, 2000: 100). Other specificities of the Act included restrictions being applied to the following groups of people: 1) those who had not been born in the UK; 2) those who did not hold a UK passport as a citizen on the UK and Colonies or a Republic of Ireland passport and; 3) those who were not included in the passport of 1 + 2 (Hansen, 2000: 109). However, it must be stressed that “a passport was defined as one that was issued by the UK government” (ibid). Alongside these conditions, there was also an “employment scheme” and the introduction of law focused upon the deportation of those who had committed a criminal offence and were subject to immigration control (ibid). Although the Act limited primary immigration, it did not stop family reunification (or secondary immigration), which pursued as a consequence, and became a new ‘political issue’ (ibid: 123). However, as Geddes (2003: 35) points out, one of the most ironic aspects of the Act was that it seemed encourage what is best describes as a ‘beat the ban’ immigration “from people who feared that they might be affected by the restrictions”.

Shortly following the introduction of the 1962 Act was the introduction of the first Race Relations Act in 1965 by the Labour government. According to Hansen (2000: 129) it “provided the institutional basis for official measures against racism and in favour of integration”. However, although the Labour Party was opposed to anything that insinuated racial discrimination, a faction within the party, the trade unionists, opposed the Act, being sceptical of large-scale immigration to Britain. The implementation of the Race Relations Act meant that racial discrimination would be illegal “if practised in places to which the public have access” and it also was an extension of the Public Order Act meaning that it prevented the spread of written communication which was abusive “and likely to stir up hatred against that group on grounds of race or colour” (ibid: 139-140). It is evident, however, that the implementation of this Act was largely based on events that occurred in the lead up to the General Election of 1964, especially the political contest that took place in the town of Smethwick.
It was in the town of Smethwick where the contest for MP was fought by Patrick Gordon Walker the Labour candidate who is said to have been “a liberal on immigration” and the Conservative candidate Peter Griffiths who put forward an extremely racist view on immigration “defending interests of the local white majority” (Solomos, 1993: 65). As a result, explicit racism emerged in discourse and the phrase “If you want a nigger for a neighbour vote Labour” was circulated and also endorsed by Griffiths who went on to win the seat (cited in ibid). Since this event, immigration has also been considered one of the “greatest potential vote-loser[s] for the Labour party” (Hansen, 2000: 133).

Although the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act restricted some black immigration, it did not restrict all. The 1968 variation of the Act was, again, motivated by ‘racial’ concerns, especially since the original Act did not stop immigration of African Asians from countries such as Kenya and Uganda (Solomos, 1993). As many faced persecution and discrimination, immigration from these countries continued to the UK. Thus, it was under this new law that the role of ones heritage gained legal precedence as people would now “be subject to immigration control unless they or at least one grandparent was born, adopted, naturalised or registered in Britain” (Solomos, 1993: 66). Moreover, it was the increase in immigration from the previously exempt African countries, which was the main motivation for Enoch Powell’s infamous ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech.

Although Enoch Powell is remembered for his persuasive racism, it is important to note that he also sought to redefine nationhood based on the concepts of ‘Britishness’ and ‘whiteness’. The main premise to his arguments therefore was that “mass immigration was itself a threat to nationhood” (Hansen, 2000: 181). His speech occurred in April 1968, after the implementation of the 1968 amendment, and he therefore discredited the attempts of the Labour government to restrict immigration. His speech had a profound effect and, as Solomos (1993: 67) argues, “helped to popularise the racial message that even tighter controls on immigration were not enough to deal with the ‘race problem’”. It is worth exploring Chilton’s (2004) critical discourse analysis of Powell’s speech, especially since Powell’s discourse went onto explicitly inspire right-wing and the far-right’s discourse about immigration to the UK. As will be shown below, this is also true with regards to a modification of the British Nationality Act in
1981. Moreover, although Enoch Powell was suspended immediately after transmission of his speech, his words continue to resonate. In fact, almost immediately after the uplifting of restrictions for Romanian and Bulgarian workers, Nigel Farage made reference to the speech stating that “the basic principle” of the speech was essentially “right” (Graham, 2014).

Chilton (2004: 111-117) points out that within the speech, there were two types of legitimisation. The first strategy was ‘epistemic’, about claims to facts that are ‘real’, ‘objective’ and ‘rational’. The way that Powell was able to attend to this type of legitimisation was through the employment of numbers and statistics such as: “It almost passes belief that at this moment 20 or 30 additional immigrant children are arriving from overseas in Wolverhampton alone every week...” (Powell, 1968). The second type of legitimisation was ‘deontic’, where Powell was able to evidence how he was “not only ‘right’ in a cognitive sense, but ‘right’ in a moral sense” (Chilton, 2004: 117). It is also noted that ‘feelings’ are important within this strategy, especially those to do with “fear, anger, sense of security, protectiveness [and], loyalty” (ibid). The most profound example of this being the construction of Briton’s as ‘strangers’ in their own country:

For reasons which they could not comprehend, and in pursuance of a decision by default, on which they were never consulted, they found themselves made strangers in their own country. They found their wives unable to obtain hospital beds in childbirth, their children unable to obtain school places, their homes and neighbourhoods changed beyond recognition, their plans and prospects for the future defeated; at work they found that employers hesitated to apply to the immigrant worker the standards of discipline and competence required of the native-born worker; they began to hear, as time went by, more and more voices which told them that they were now unwanted. (Powell, 1968)

Moreover, these legitimisation strategies showed the “establish[ment] of moral authority and [a] common moral ground” and, by drawing upon Habermas’ validity claims, it is clear that Powell attended to claims of ‘truthfulness’ and
‘rightness’. Chilton (2004: 117) explains that this was achieved through a juxtaposition of authoritative voices, where Powell quoted not only the every day English man, but also the Roman poet Virgil: “I am filled with foreboding; like the Roman, I seem to see the River Tiber foaming with much blood.” (Powell, 1968). It is also clear, within the example above, that the British public were represented as victims of immigration. Although it is clearly racist in its intention, what is particularly notable is the strategically covert manner in which such racism is articulated. Furthermore, with regards to the way in which grammatical Agents and Patients were represented, it becomes clear in Chilton’s analysis that a number of passive sentences were employed which made the British public “the Patient of an unspecified Agent’s action” (Chilton, 2004: 123), as in the following example: “their homes and neighbourhoods changed”.

Moving towards the 1970s, a number of further Acts were passed in relation to immigration control. This included the 1969 Immigration Appeals Act, which was introduced to make sure that “restrictions were applied fairly” (Hansen, 2000: 68). Attention then focused on secondary immigration, and the 1971 Immigration Act reflected this with the introduction of the classifications “patrial” and “non-patrial” – where patrial meant those who had a British born parent or grandparent (Small and Solomos, 2006: 244). Although a new Race Relations Act was also brought in, in 1976, Small and Solomos (2006) note that it is within the 1970s that “the criminalization of black youth” also occurred. Thus, it was here when the phenomenon of ‘mugging’ made headlines across the media in the co-construction of a ‘moral panic’ which enabled heightened ‘fear’ of the ‘Other’ (Hall et al., 1978). The far right also played a prominent role during this time and there was a strong anti-immigrant feeling with the rise of the National Front (Husbands, 1983/2007). Although anti-racist groups also developed, including the ‘Anti-Nazi League’ (ibid) and ‘Rock Against Racism’ (Goodyer, 2003), Small and Solomos (2006: 244-245) explain that these were “pushed to the side in terms of popularity” and a shift to a mind-set of multiculturalism “focused [instead] on the cultural differences of those recently arrived in Britain, and on the need to help them to ‘British Ways’ – learning English, political customs and so forth”.

2.3.5 The 1981 British Nationality Act

From 1979 onwards, it is widely quoted that immigration dropped off the radar as a political issue within the UK (Hansen, 2000; Geddes, 2003). Preceding the 1979 General Election, it is clear that Margaret Thatcher and the Conservative Party were able to effectively put a case together in which they would take the “hard-line” on immigration (Small and Solomos, 2006: 245). This also meant a decline in support for far right parties such as the National Front (NF), and Husbands (1983/2007) explains: “The Conservative Party successfully co-opted the major issues of the NF”. Furthermore, Thatcher continued to reinforce Powellite themes within her rhetoric about immigration, stating that the levels of immigration were too high and that British people were “rather afraid that this country might be rather swamped by people with a different culture” (cited in Hansen, 2000: 210). Thus, by drawing on water metaphors such as ‘swamped’ (Charteris-Black, 2006) and perpetuating a belief that ‘difference’ should be ‘feared’, Thatcher was able to manufacture consent surrounding the dangers of immigration. Moreover, it was the Powellite themes of ‘Britishness’, ‘whiteness’ and ‘nationhood’ in which Thatcher’s government attended to in the establishment of the 1981 British Nationality Act (BNA) (Dixon, 1983).

It was the BNA of 1981 which effectively denoted Britain as an ‘island’ and a nation, rather than as an ‘Empire’ – where to be British meant that you were not Jamaican, Indian or Pakistani (Dummett, 1981). Effectively, a dominant ideology developed in relation to nationality, which predominantly drew upon and reinforced cultural dichotomies. It was one that served the purpose of differentiating white/British from black/non-British and, furthermore, presented the “dangers” of non-British (and therefore black) immigration (Solomos, 1993: 70). Ideologically, a “populist appeal to nation” was sought, defining the concept of ‘one nation’ with respects to ‘one people’ (Dixon, 1983: 161). It was also the first time since the 1948 BNA that the concept of nationality had been modified, with formal “rejection of 1948 arrangements” (ibid: 162). Moreover, the main ideological component of the act was to construct an ‘imagined community’ of one nation (Anderson, 2006) and to “search for a fresh start for Britain and the British” (Dixon, 1983: 164). However, as Blake (1982: 179) notes, the legislation never actually provided a definition of “what a nation is, what the British nation is...and
how citizenship might differ from nationality”. Thus, this is reason enough to infer ‘racial’ motivations in the definition and construction of what it means to be a nation.

The specific details of the Act included three new categories of modified citizenship: 1) ‘British Citizenship’ which was established for people with already established links to the UK; 2) ‘British Dependent Territories’ for those living in British dependencies and whose immigration to the UK would have been dependent on the territory’s law and; 3) ‘British Overseas Citizenship’ for other CUKCs which in itself did not contain a right of abode. Other notable and important details of the Act included the abolishment of *jus soli*, where British Citizenship would only be granted to a new-born in the UK only if either parent was a British Citizen or had settled status (Blake, 1982).

Whereas the Act was defended by MPs to “give a greater sense of security” to immigrant communities within the UK, Dixon (1983: 164) argues the opposite, showing that in many respects it undermined the security of the Asian community (in particular). Underlying the political discourse about Britain as a ‘nation’ were persistent themes of Powellite racism, especially since Thatcherism promoted the vision of British nationality, “not as something new, but rather as the traditional feelings, instincts and culture” of a united people with an established and long history of sameness (Dixon, 1983: 170). Moreover, such an ideology also linked to other tenants of Thatcherism that sought to move away from dependence of the welfare state, to the privatisation of the UK, and to an ideology which was also adopted by New Labour (in the late 1990s and early 200s) which “[presented]...human nature as fundamentally individualistic and competitive” (ibid: 174). More importantly, these traits were considered to be inherently British/white and contrasted, for example, with practices such as arranged marriages in Asian cultural traditions (Dixon, 1983) – thus making the culturally ‘different’ also socially ‘deviant’ (see also Chapter 4, section 4.3.3).

**2.4 Applications for Asylum**

Despite the restriction of immigration within the 1970s and 1980s, migratory patterns to the UK appeared to change at the onset of the 1990s. Through a series of global and political shifts, it was the rise in number of applications for asylum that facilitated a rise in discourse about immigration
within the UK based, not on themes of ‘empathy’, but on notions of ‘distrust’. Furthermore, even with the implementation of a series of Immigration and Asylum Acts which sought to minimise the number of applications, clear instability around the world led to an increased amount of applications throughout the course of the 1990s. This was primarily connected to the break-up of Yugoslavia and the subsequent wars, particularly the Bosnian genocide (KhosraviNik, 2009). In numerical terms, Hansen (2000: 234) provides the following figures: from 1988 to 1991, applications for asylum in the UK rose from 3,998 to 44,840 and although these dropped slightly in the years that followed, in 1995 there were over 40,000 applications, and in 1996 and 1997 were at 27,930 and 32,500 respectively.

The following sub-sections will outline both the political and media response to the increase in applications for asylum. This is important since the theme of ‘distrust’ that developed here has been sustained. As will become apparent, despite the UK’s commitment to the UN convention of Human Rights, dominant discursive constructions of the ‘bogus’ or ‘abusive’ asylum seeker emerged that worked to, effectively, delegitimise and demonise a particularly vulnerable group of people. This is despite such terms being labelled ‘nonsensical’ (Gabrielatos and Baker, 2008), and as the Refugee Council has explained: “There is no such thing as an ‘illegal’ or ‘bogus’ asylum seeker” (Refugee Council, 2012). Hayes (2002: 42) also writes that there was a “focus on the welfare entitlement of asylum seekers and a concerted effort to limit it, restrict it and police it”. Moreover, at a time when the British government could have acted to assist those with successful applications, it will become clear that, instead, prominence was placed on the control and restriction of entry (Sales, 2002), as has been a recurring theme throughout this chapter.

2.4.1 Political Response

The political response to an increased number of applications for asylum saw a series of new Acts introduced over the course of the 1990s to control and manage the number. This started with the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993, which focused on this by reducing or taking away many of the rights that previously existed (Kaye, 2001; Sales 2002; Patterson, 2002). This included practices such as fingerprinting, new powers of arrest, removal of previous
accommodation rights under the homeless legislation, and the responsibility of housing associations to assess and validate claims of homelessness (Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993). The fast tracking of applications deemed ‘manifestly unfounded’ (Kaye, 2001) was also evident here. Moreover, discourse that accompanied this new legislation explicitly linked asylum seeking with ideas of abuse, evident for example in the press release New Rules to Curb Abuse by People from Abroad (cited in Patterson, 2002: 162).

By January 1997, the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996 also came into action. Here, welfare benefits, including housing benefit, disability benefit, and child benefit were removed from asylum seekers. It was also this Act which made it illegal to employ any person who had not been granted the right to live or work in the UK (Asylum and Immigration Act 1996). In terms of tightening the approach to management of application, it was also here that a list of ‘safe countries’ was produced, enabling the continuation of the fast-track system developed in 1993 (Kaye, 2001). However, the removal of welfare made the UK an extremely difficult place to live in, meaning that many people risked destitution, homelessness and isolation (Geddes, 2003). This decision was taken to the courts where it concluded that local authorities would be responsible for the welfare of asylum seekers under conditions of the 1948 National Assistance Act (ibid: 43). However, with responsibility falling to local authorities (LA’s), and with asylum seekers living mostly in London and the South East, it became clear that such a system was unequal and placed excessive pressure on only a few LA’s. It also became evident that local residents were dissatisfied with such an arrangement, with an example seen within the Dover Express on October 1st 1998, where it was reported that “illegal immigrants, asylum seekers, bootleggers and scum of the earth drug smugglers have targeted our beloved coastlines. We are left with the back draft of a nation’s human sewage and no cash to wash it down the drain” (Geddes, 2003: 43).

By May 1997, New Labour had formed a government and it was anticipated that some of the controversial policies surrounding the rights of asylum seekers in the UK would be ‘softened’ (Kaye, 2001). However, this was not the case, as evident in the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. As Sales (2002: 471) informs, this Act "went even further in restricting rights". Among other things, the Act saw the
implementation of a ‘one-stop’ right of appeal, further powers for search and arrest without warrants (including the searching of premises), and the establishment of detention centres (Immigration and Asylum Act 1999). Moreover, responsibility was lifted for local authorities and a new system was designed to support asylum-seekers: the National Asylum Support Service (NASS). Since asylum-seekers were prohibited from working, a new benefits package was assembled by the NASS, which became known as the voucher scheme (Oxfam and the Refugee Council, 2002: 6). This scheme was undoubtedly one of the most controversial elements of asylum legislature, and was subsequently disbanded by 2002.

There are many reasons why the voucher scheme was considered inhumane, but it was the way in which asylum-seekers were denied physical money that led to it being classed as an exclusionary practice. With benefits being paid at only 70% of the regular amount in vouchers, and of that only £10 available in cash, it has been shown that many asylum-seekers were not able to buy suitable food products (e.g. following religious dietary requirements), were located great distances from the participating retailers, were unable to buy cheaper alternatives at local shops, and were the targets of discrimination from a public who could now clearly identify them (Oxfam and the Refugee Council, 2002). Moreover, one of the biggest problems was not being able to receive change for vouchers when their total worth was not spent meaning, “the value of the weekly allowance was reduced even further” (ibid: 6). Thus, even when charities decided to swap vouchers for their monetary worth, the practice was banned by the government (ibid). With asylum-seekers also being refused the right to work, they automatically became cast as the ‘undeserving’ within society (Sales, 2002). This is especially true under New Labour’s ideological turn, which focused not on ‘equality’ as in traditional Labour, but on ‘social inclusion’ and ‘individual achievement’ and where: “Its preoccupation with paid employment as the path to social inclusion devalue[d] other forms of work” (Sales, 2002: 459). This change in ideology, under New Labour saw a “new conception of social citizenship which emphasized the responsibilities of individuals to provide for their welfare needs” (Duvell and Jordan, 2002: 502). As asylum-seekers were not permitted to work, they were essentially “forced to depend on benefits or to work illegally” (Sales,
2002: 464). It is also the case that, through the voucher scheme, there was an added element of ‘moral surveillance’ where the public were essentially ‘recruited’ as unofficial immigration officers, for example with retail assistants and checkout operators being required to “check eligibility and ensure that purchases [did] not include banned items” (ibid).

2.4.2 Media Response

There is a substantial body of work that focuses on the representation of refugees and asylum seekers in the media during this time, some of which will be discussed below. Although applications for asylum did extensively increase, Geddes points out that metaphorical language used by the media, including that of “floods and invasions” clearly “over-stated the scale” (Geddes, 2003: 40). Moreover, Robinson (2010 p.62) notes that much of what was evident in the media was “often generalising and inflammatory, perpetuating stereotypes and popular myths”. With the media’s far-reaching audience, such dissemination of ideas were clearly able to invoke emotions of ‘fear’ and ‘anxiety’ within the general public's view of immigration.

In relation to the discussion of asylum-seekers’ entitlement to welfare, it was primarily the attribute ‘bogus’ which pre-modified/collocated with asylum-seeker that gained prominence within the media (Kaye, 2001; Geddes, 2003). In an investigation into press representations of refugees and asylum seekers in the UK, Kaye (2001) found that predications such as ‘bogus’ and ‘phoney’ were some of the most common. However, it was clear that despite all newspapers using such terms, the context surrounding the appearance and usage of these differed between papers. Whereas the Guardian, the Independent and the Times were often using these terms in reported speech (as quotations), journalists in the Telegraph and the Mail frequently used these descriptors as their own. Moreover, Kaye (2001) also notes that although the Times, the Mail and the Telegraph did not critique or question the use of such terms, the Guardian and the Independent did frequently criticise politicians’ use of the terms in question. Even though a divide with regards to the acceptance and dispersion of such terms by the media is, in some respects, evident as due to their left/right wing political orientations, Kaye (2001:60) notes that, “the Mail [stood] out as quite distinctive from the other
newspapers” especially since such terms were also frequently used in their editorials.

In another study conducted by *The Information Centre about Asylum and Refugees* (ICAR), analysis of the media proved to be a very important site for research (2002). Conducting their study on behalf of the *Greater London Authority* (GLA), they were motivated by a concern that some asylum-seekers and refugees were victims of harassment in London. Moreover, the media was seen as potentially influencing some of this behaviour, especially when it came to dissemination of stories about recently arrived refugees and asylum-seekers. In the findings, clear evidence was found of unbalanced and inaccurate reporting, informing of large and “allegedly overwhelming but unspecified influxes of asylum seekers” (ICAR, 2002). It was also found that there were numerous reports of criminality, which was likely to concoct a sense of fear in the reader; the use of emotive language particularly in relation to issues of asylum and refuge and; newspapers not necessarily checking the reliability of their sources when reporting on asylum issues. Moreover, they highlighted the dominant presence of quotations from political parties but an absence of quotations from charities (ICAR, 2002).

Buchanan and Grillo (2004), who investigated the content and structure of media messages about asylum-seekers and refugees, also found that references to charities were non-existent. In this study it was also revealed that there was a large amount of confusion when it came to the referential strategies used within newspapers in relation to the legal status of immigrants. In fact, they found 51 varieties of labels just for those seeking asylum in the UK, many of them meaningless. This included items such as ‘illegal refugee’ and ‘asylum cheat’ (Buchanan and Grillo, 2004: 41). They also point out that, “The terms ‘illegal immigrant’, ‘asylum seeker’, ‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’ were used as synonyms” (p.41). The study also investigated media images (including print and television). In both cases, images portrayed single males who looked as though they were “breaking into Britain” (ibid) and there were “very few photographs of refugees or asylum seekers with their families or in an everyday domestic or work setting” (p.42). Again, like Kaye’s (2001) study, there were certain newspapers that they singled out for failing to contextualise or properly reference the
statistics/quotations used: namely the Daily Mail, the Daily Express and the Sun. The study also sought to interview refugees and asylum seekers and it was found that many felt “alienated, ashamed and sometimes threatened as a result” (p.42). Among other things, such as experiences of abuse and racism, it was also felt that the media was able to scapegoat and blame asylum seekers for a range of unrelated domestic issues. Finally, it was pointed out that in relation to the policy amendments discussed above, much of this was government led and other NGOs, charities and asylum seekers/refugees themselves were rarely consulted. In this respect, it was concluded that they were all merely “passive objects of policy making” (p.42).

It is interesting to find that there are exceptions to the portrayal of refugees in the media in a negative way, but it does seem that discourse that is more sympathetic only arises where and when atrocities are culturally and politically closer to home. This is evident in the work of KhosraviNik (2009) who compared and contrasted the media discourse about refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants (otherwise known as RASIM) in both 1999 and 2005. Focusing (for now) on the 1999 context, where as a result of the ethnic cleansing and genocide atrocities, the UK were seen to be at War with Serbia, KhosraviNik (2009: 483) found that “the general evaluation of the situation of refugee [was] ‘positive’” and “the analysed newspapers reflect[ed] a generally sympathetic macrostructure”. This included, amongst other things, the employment of topoi of humanization and victimization and the representation of refugees as “engaged in various normal activities” (ibid). However, comparable with Kaye (2001) and Buchanan and Grillo (2004), significant differences are highlighted between, for example, the Mail and the Guardian where the Mail chose to focus on dramatic representations while the Guardian embedded representations within an attack against Serbia and Milosevic (KhosraviNik, 2009: 485). Moreover, it was also found that a micro-linguistic strategy employed by the newspapers in relation to the refugees was that of extensivization where “the actions and situations of refugees” were described “in detail and adding as much subsidiary information as possible” (ibid).

In a related RASIM project, which examined a larger body of media texts through methods of corpus-linguistics, Gabrielatos and Baker (2008) were able to further validate many of the findings found in the studies outlined previously. In
relation to reports surrounding the numbers of RASIM entering the UK it was found that “one in five uses of refuge/asylum seekers [was] accompanied by some form of quantification” (p.22). Moreover, in each case large numbers were accompanied by water metaphors such as FLOOD, POUR and STREAM. It was also found that the newspapers appeared to operate with dictionary definitions of refugees and asylum seekers rather than definitions given by the Refugee Council. This was related to how RASIM terms were confused/conflated within media representations and confirmed the presence of meaningless ‘nonsensical’ terms. Thus, this study showed that although collocates such as ‘illegal refugee’ and ‘bogus immigrant’ were not legal terms, the persistent use and mixing of such terms leads to an authoritative tone, whilst at the same able to provide a negative evaluation of RASIM to the UK (Gabrielatos and Baker, 2008: 30). It was concluded overall that within Conservative and tabloid press the combination of ‘nonsensical’ terms, negative topoi, and a series of negative metaphors produced discourse about RASIM, which was essentially “responsible for creating and maintaining a moral panic”, and that this “has increasingly become the dominant discourse in the UK press” (ibid: 33).

In summing up both the political and media response to the rise in asylum applications during the 1990s, it is clear a dominant ideological dichotomy developed between the ‘deserving’ and the ‘undeserving’ (Sales, 2002). It is also apparent that ‘nonsensical’ terms during this period of time meant that there was and is still much confusion and conflation surrounding discourse about immigration within the UK even within the second decade of the 21st century. The attitudes that prevailed in the 1990s appear to have continued into the 21st century and certain ideologies about cultural ‘Others’ have persisted in relation to EU expansion as another type of unwanted immigration to the UK. With a rise in Eurosceptic right wing and far right populist parties across Europe, discourse about immigration was to become an effective resource to further their own political interests (Hampshire, 2016).
2.5 Immigration in the 21st Century

2.5.1 Labour’s Managed Migration

At the turn of the millennium, previous restriction with regards to immigration in Britain seemed somewhat to dissolve and immigration policy “was transformed...to one of the most expansive in Europe” (Consterdine, 2015: 1434). This was New Labour’s ‘ideological shift’ that aimed to highlight the positive effects of immigration within a globalized world (Young, 2003; Consterdine, 2015; Gilligan, 2015). This ideology, often labelled the ‘Third Way’ (Giddens, 2007), sought to distance itself from ‘Old’ Labour values of “protectionism, nationalism and above all Keynesian economic ideas” and instead focused on becoming more business minded (Consterdine, 2015: 1442). The ‘Third Way’³ was seen to “update left-of-centre thinking in light of the big changes sweeping through the world” namely that of globalisation (Giddens, 2007). However, this shift in ideology was not one that worked to positively embrace all types of immigration to the UK, but one that sought only to focus on the economic benefit of immigration. Thus, New Labour’s approach to ‘managed migration’ saw new worker systems and schemes implemented “based on the supply and demand of skills” (Consterdine, 2015: 1434).

Although discourse of immigration appeared to encompass global values under the ‘New’ Labour government, Balch and Balabanova (2016: 21) write, ‘managed migration’ still “had a certain Manichean appeal” where binary distinctions of the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ continued to be perpetuated and reinforced. Inherent to the term ‘managed migration’ is, of course, the implication that immigration needs to be controlled, and a restrictive tone continued to dominate. As such, despite new worker schemes being introduced (Consterdine, 2015) and the criteria for work permits being “diversified” to ensure they met “skills gaps in the labour market” (Berkeley, Khan and Ambikaipaker, 2006: 13) it was clear that there were ideological elements contained within policy documents that continued to demonise immigrants as ‘Others’ in the UK.

A contradictory discourse developed, which on the surface appeared to talk about immigration in a liberal sense, but also contained illiberal arguments

This was not only in response to a rise of asylum applications and a dominant ideology which deemed many to ‘abuse the system’, but also in response to so-called ‘race riots’ which occurred in the summer of 2001, in the northern towns of Oldham, Bradford and Burnley (Young, 2003). This was consolidated within the White Paper Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain (Home Office, 2002a) where the ideas of nationality and citizenship were highlighted and the idea of ‘social inclusion’ was not just about being in work, but also sharing citizenship (Young, 2003; Blackledge, 2006).

Although this might be viewed as something which promoted integration, Blackledge (2006) found assimilationist aspects in relation to language practices and Cheong et al. (2007: 26) explain that assimilationist practices had developed in response to the riots and also the so-called ‘war on terror’.

Blackledge (2006: 67) argues, in particular, that the government response to the riots was to focus on Asian language practices and that a “dominant ideology [emerged] in which Asian languages should either be used only in private, or should not be used at all”. In particular, this was seen within Labour MP, Ann Cryer’s speech:

There is little point in blaming the situation simply on racism and Islamophobia. We must instead consider in detail what causes the under-achievement that I have mentioned. The main cause is the lack of a good level of English, which stems directly from the established tradition of bringing wives and husbands from the sub-continent who have often had no education and have no English. As a result, the vast majority of Keighley households have only one parent with any English and children go to school speaking only Punjabi or Bangla. That frequently gets children off to a slow start, which can damage their progress and mean that they leave school with few, if any, qualifications. Many cannot get paid work or find only poorly paid jobs. (cited in Blackledge, 2006: 69)

In Blackledge’s analysis of this, he explains how language practices were directly linked to danger via a range of “logical connectors...[which] presuppose
causal and commonsensical relationships” (2006: 70). This not only served to legitimise assimilationism and monolingualism as a dominant ideologies but also to promote a division between ‘us’ and ‘them’ where Asian (and not British) people appeared to be blamed for the emergence of the riots. It is also clear that these kind of arguments justified new legislation, outlined in the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, where language testing became part of the process to gain British citizenship, alongside citizenship ceremonies, oaths and pledges (Home Office, 2002b). It was also the case that in the development of an Australian type points system for the evaluation of workers prior to EU expansion, “‘highly skilled’ English speaking migrants [were] ranked above ‘low-skilled’, non-English speaking workers” (Cheong et al., 2007: 35).

These new processes surrounding British citizenship reflected New Labour’s communitarian values (Geddes, 2003; Cheong et al., 2007). These aimed to promote social cohesion via “a diverse mosaic of cultures with a ‘thick’ common framework of citizenship” (Young, 2003: 453) and social inclusion was formed via a “reciprocity of rights” where the government was responsible for inclusion only if the individual was a responsible law-abiding and working citizen (Young, 2003: 450; Geddes, 2003). However, this presented a monocultural rather than multicultural ideal which “negate[d] the complexity and intersectionality of belonging” where “social cohesion may be achieved at the expense of the social alienation of Others who have not adopted the language and culture of the dominant mainstream” (Cheong et al., 2007: 40). However, as previously discussed, this ideological shift, which saw people as ‘deserving’ only if they were in paid employment. Thus, it did not solve issues for asylum-seekers who were not permitted to work, maintaining a climate in which there continued to be “greater scepticism about the legitimacy of many migrants today” (Berkeley, Khan and Ambikaipaker, 2006: 1).

It would also appear that such constructions were not only illiberal, but were also illogical. This is because, as Young (2003: 458) states: “The Asian youths who rioted in northern towns had the same accents and expectations as the white youths who rioted on the other side of the ethnic line”. Young (2003: 458) believes that there was something sinister about the riots of 2001, something categorically different to disturbances witnessed in large parts of Britain within the 1980s.
Thus, it is argued that while the riots 20 years previously could be thought of as "riots of inclusion" and a fight against certain social exclusions such as "police racism, unemployment [and] political marginalization" (especially of the Afro-Caribbean community), the riots of 2001 were, on the contrary, fuelled by racist tensions and a response, not to an inability to integrate (as was believed by the government), but because of a rise of racism and "structural exclusion" (ibid).

Young (2003: 458) also warned that this atmosphere would facilitate "dangerous opportunities for parties of the far right" and in an examination of the rise of the British National Party (BNP) within an earlier study (Demetriou, 2013), it was evident that the 2001 riots, fuelled mostly by a rise in Islamophobia (Slade, 2010), appeared to directly benefit the BNP's growing anti-Muslim campaign. This had started to gain momentum in 1999 after the BNP acknowledged that the equality legislation that protected both Jews and Sikhs as 'races' did not protect Muslims or the Islamic faith (Allen, 2011). Combined with the 9/11 terror atrocities in New York, the BNP's campaign 'Islam out of Britain' was evidently a success when, in the local elections of 2002, “33 BNP candidates were declared winners with a further 70 finishing in second place” (Allen, 2011: 282). The rise in Islamophobia and the representation of Muslims in racist and discriminatory ways has since been widely analysed (see for example Richardson, 2004; Saeed, 2007; Awan, 2014; Wodak, 2015). Moreover, it was in this context, where knowledge of the English Language and a common citizenship was promoted, that Muslims within the UK were demonised because of their familial bonding – something that would have been previously viewed in a positive light (Cheong et al., 2007: 31).

The early 21st century was also a time in which a discourse about security emerged in direct relation to discourse about immigration, especially in response to terrorism. In Britain, this emerged following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and the 7/7 London bombings. Securitisation in relation to immigration did not only help to construct 'Fortress Britain' but also 'Fortress Europe' and, if it had not already been perceived in this way, immigration became something to fear. Wodak (2015: 54) also explains that this inter-discursive connection facilitated a rise in the 'politics of exclusion' and noted that immigration was often identified in relation to crime and security risk rather than "Human Rights conventions or
other social and economic considerations and policies.” This view is also corroborated by Cheong et al. (2007: 42) who have stated that “Immigration has been framed as a security risk, igniting xenophobia and the fear of the Other”. Aykaç (2008: 128) has also discussed how it is not only Muslims who suffer from racist violence and discrimination because of terrorism but immigrants more generally: “Yet it is asylum-seekers, immigrants or ‘foreigners’ more generally that are targeted, irrespective of their religious beliefs or country of origin.”

2.5.2 EU Expansion and Immigration

Although the EU granted original member states the ability to enforce transitional restrictions in 2004, which allowed for the imposition of regulations for access to labour markets, the UK was one of only three countries that did not impose such restrictions⁴ (Drinkwater, Eade and Garapich, 2006). While it is not entirely clear why this decision was made, most explanations link to a report by Dustmann et al. (2003: 8), which estimated that the UK would attract between “5,000 and 13,000 net immigrants per year”. On reflection, those estimates were profoundly inaccurate⁵, as according to the Accession Monitoring Report (Home Office et al., 2006) more than 447,000 workers made applications to the Worker Registration Scheme and Tony McNulty (Home Office Minister of State for Immigration) estimated that the figure was closer to 600,000 as self-employed workers were not required to register (BBC News, 2006).

Regardless of ‘New’ Labour’s ‘managed migration’, many did not welcome this ‘new’ pattern of immigration to Britain, and a “rampant politicisation of immigration in the UK” pursued (Balch and Balabanova, 2016: 21). Subsequently, much of the debate surrounding immigration from the EU found in right-wing political and media discourses perpetuated themes of concern, EU dissatisfaction, and blamed the Labour government for socio-political problems that had apparently ensued as a direct result of mass immigration from new EU member states. Discourse about immigration reflected what might be best described as a ‘contemporary moral panic’ (Mawby and Gisby, 2009; Moore and Forkert, 2014). Thus, the right wing political and media ‘elite’ were able to play influential roles

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⁴ Although application via the Worker Registration System was compulsory.

⁵ However, they were based primarily on the assumption that other countries would also not impose restrictions – with reference primarily to Germany.
in constructing ‘populist’ beliefs about immigration: fuelling anti-immigrant hostility, discrimination/xenophobia, anxieties and fear towards the immigrant ‘Other’ (Wodak, 2015). The Conservative opposition openly criticised Labour’s approach to immigration as “clueless, chaotic and potentially catastrophic” (Davis, 2004) and it was their 2005 General Election campaign in which the rhetoric surrounding immigration in particular began to intensify.

For the Conservative Party, immigration became a “central issue” especially since the two previous campaigns were unsuccessful (Charteris-Black, 2006: 563). As Ipsos MORI (2016-2018a) have evidenced, immigration was the ‘most important issue’ of the time for the public, and it is clear (from above) that immigration was also considered a ‘security issue’. It is the rhetoric surrounding immigration and the general election of 2005 that will be investigated now from a discursive perspective, not only because slogans that they used dominated their campaign, but also because they were “widely interpreted as an attempt to play on people’s fears about immigration” (Quinn, 2006: 174).

In focusing particularly on the 2005 general election, Charteris-Black (2006) has discussed the role of metaphor within the rhetoric of the Conservative party and the British National Party (BNP). In his analysis two main metaphors were identified: ‘disaster’ metaphors that relate “predominantly [to] the behaviour of fluids” and, ‘container’ metaphors that relate “especially...to the build up of pressure” (Charteris-Black, 2006: 569). The significance of these metaphors is evident in the way that they work to “discourage empathy with immigrants” (ibid) as they produce discourse, which works to objectify immigrants and allows an unethical framing. Popular ‘disaster’ metaphors in discourse about immigration related to “an excessive flow of water” which included references to ‘flow’, ‘wave’ and most commonly ‘flood’ (Charteris-Black, 2006: 572). It is evidenced how ‘flood’ appears extensively within the BNP manifesto and Charteris-Black (2006: 572) also goes on to explain:

*Flood based metaphors may be employed in legitimation because they fit in with the underlying myths related to Britain as an*

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6 As seen within Gabrielatos and Baker (2008).
island that has been historically threatened by invasion and also for reasons of argumentative simplicity.

‘Container’ metaphors were utilised mostly in relation to the nation as a container as in the example: “Britain is full up” (p.575). However, it was also apparent that the idea of ‘securing borders’, originally apparent in Labour’s ‘managed migration’ rhetoric (see Home Office, 2002a), was upheld and also transformed by the Conservative party in their election campaign. According to Charteris-Black (2006), this presented a “more abstract conceptualization of a container” as is shown by the following example:

To defeat the terrorist threat we need action not talk – action to secure our borders. Action to secure our borders will also help in the fight against crime. (Howard 2005, cited in Charteris-Black, 2006: 576).

Charteris-Black (2006: 576) also noted that this was rhetorically effective because “security from danger is a basic human need”. In this respect, it is clear how such container metaphors worked to represent and evaluate immigration to the UK as dangerous. Another aspect of the container metaphor moves away from the idea of ‘control’ and towards the idea of ‘pressure’ within a container. In Charteris-Black’s (2006) comparison of center right and far right uses of such metaphors, it was clear that the container only explodes or bursts in extreme right-wing examples.

The study also showed that there were other nuances between the metaphors employed by the centre right and far right, perhaps as a way to deny any racist intention by the former. Thus, while the far right appeared to target ‘immigrants’ the centre right focused only on ‘immigration’ (Charteris-Black, 2006). It was also found that ‘container’ metaphors were dominant in Conservative rhetoric, while ‘disaster’ metaphors were more prevalent in the discourse of the far right British National Party (BNP). Although this might be considered a way of avoiding racism, it is my belief that this is a form of subtle and covert racism and this is a position also shared by Pitcher (2006).
Pitcher (2006: 537) has also analysed racist ideology emanating from the political discourse of the election campaign in 2005. In the study, Pitcher (2006) therefore corroborates the presence of ‘new’ or ‘cultural’ racism (see Chapter 4, section 4.3.3) evidencing how racism has become “obliged to find expression through the language of multiculturalism and anti-racism”. In this work, Pitcher showed that both the Labour and Conservative parties “employ[ed] normative conceptions of belonging that depend[ed], often quite subtly, on a range of racist exclusions” (2006: 538). With regards to the Conservative Party’s campaign, the first slogan which was particularly contentious was their billboard campaign which read: “It’s not racist to impose limits on immigration” (cited in Pitcher, 2006: 539; see also Goodman, 2010). According to Pitcher, such a slogan “skilfully negotiate[d] the hegemonic public discourse of anti-racism in its rhetoric of disavowal” whilst at the same time subtly promoted a view of restriction and control that is in itself exclusionary and tied to racist rhetoric. Another related slogan used by the Conservatives was the rhetorical question ‘Are you thinking what we’re thinking?’ (cited in Pitcher, 2006: 539). Pitcher’s interpretation of such a question informs of how the disavowal of racism works through “an essential ambivalence that is inflected by racist beliefs while at the same time denying their very possibility” (p.539-540).

Pitcher (2006) also analysed the Labour Party’s campaign within the 2005 general election, and evidenced how discursive strategies appeared to mitigate accusations of racism through employing a strategy of ‘fairness’ (a strategy also discussed by van Dijk, 1997). This can be seen in the example given of Prime Minister Tony Blair’s speech below, legitimising concerns about immigration:

> Concern over asylum and immigration is not about racism. It is about fairness. People want to know that the rules and systems we have in place are fair; fair to hard-working taxpayers, fair to those who genuinely need asylum and who use the correct channels; fair to those legitimate migrants who make a major contribution to our economy… (Blair, 2005 cited in Pitcher, 2006: 543).
In relation to the above, Pitcher showed that a scenario was set up “constructing a tacit description of whom a “fair” system must exclude” (2006: 543). It was also pointed out that each of the adjectives used to describe “asylum seekers and immigrants allude[d] to their illegitimate opposites” which although implicit are part of a covert racism.

Despite the Conservatives ‘hard-line’ approach to immigration, the Labour party retained power after the 2005 general election, and Quinn (2006) puts this down to their position of other issues of public concern including the NHS. However, the Conservatives’ discourse about immigration continued to resonate in public consciousness. Moreover, the public and the opposition were increasingly dismayed by high numbers of immigrants arriving from ‘new’ EU countries, and with Romania and Bulgaria set to have the same ‘freedoms’ in 2007, restrictions were discussed more intensely. It was then on October 24th 2006, that Home Secretary John Reid announced the government would be placing restrictions on Romanian and Bulgarian rights to work in the UK (Oliver, 2006). I argue that this decision automatically imposed a sense of ‘difference’ between the ‘A8’ (‘A10’) and the ‘A2’ accession countries and was the start of a discourse that more intensely demonized the nations of Romania and Bulgaria, their citizens and their position and identity within the EU.

From 2007 onwards, immigration became highly politicised and this was paralleled with rhetoric emphasising the value of Britishness and a stronger national identity. This was evident most prominently in Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s speech, where he claimed to be focusing on “British jobs for British workers” (Brown, 2007). It was also here that discourse about immigration in the UK turned to focus on economic issues or an economic ‘threat’ as displayed in the work of the Caviedes (2015), who examined the news portrayal of the British newspaper the Daily Telegraph in relation to comparable papers in Italy and France. It is shown here that in the period between 2008-2012, the Daily Telegraph “largely avoids linking crime to immigration” and that the dominant discourse emanating from this paper in particular linked immigration to the economy and labour market, where immigration was seen as a ‘threat’ to British

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7 2008 also marked the year of the ‘Great Recession’ and the collapse of the global markets, meaning job insecurity was not only a concern but also a reality (Grusky et al., 2011).
jobs, thus legitimising Gordon Brown’s focus on ‘British jobs for British workers’ (Caviedes, 2015: 908). Examples of headlines evident at this period of time also included: ‘Young Britons “Losing Jobs To EU Migrants’” and ‘Migrant Jobs; Rise is Twice UK Worker Figure’ (ibid: 909-910).

By the time of the 2010 General Election it soon became clear that “Labour’s managed migration was certainly not a vote winner” (Consterdine, 2015: 1433) and that the public were dissatisfied with limited restriction of EU free movement. Thus, the 2010 General Election saw the UK public vote for a hung parliament, and it was here that a Coalition government was formed. However, it was the Conservatives that gained the upper hand within the coalition, and Prime Minister David Cameron pushed through their restrictionist approach to reduce immigration from hundreds of thousands to tens-of-thousands (Balch and Balabanova, 2016). David Cameron’s rhetoric also continued to link immigration to fears of crime, terrorism and incompatible ‘cultural’ differences, evident primarily where he suggested that “the doctrine of state multiculturalism” had encouraged segregation and was to blame for a rise in extremism in the UK (Cameron, 2011).

2.5.3 Romanian and Bulgarian EU Accession

As stated above, from 2006 onwards, particular emphasis was placed upon the newest EU member states - Bulgaria and Romania. From a Criminal Justice perspective, Mawby and Gisby (2009) demonstrated how the media channelled in on the perceived ‘crime risks’ associated with this newest phase of EU enlargement. They explain how “the coupling of migration and crime” was a prominent theme, not only within the media, but also across a number of different discursive platforms (Mawby and Gisby, 2009: 38). Specifically, they highlight how events during the 1990s, including the collapse of communism and opening up of EU borders, enabled EU policy makers to position “those outside their borders as the ‘other’, as dangerous outsiders...threatening the security of those states inside” (Mawby and Gisby, 2009: 38). Therefore, even when those ‘outsiders’ legally became ‘insiders’, tensions were unveiled and fears of these ‘outsiders’ were a contentious part of the debate concerning immigration within the EU. Focusing on The Guardian (broadsheet, left wing) and The Express (tabloid, right wing), Mawby and Gisby evidenced how representations of Bulgarians and
Romanians in *The Express* “moved from a tone of ‘threat of impending flood’...to a tone of ‘confirmation of flood’ and associated crime wave” pre- and post-accession in 2007 (p.41). Alternatively *The Guardian* (including Sunday edition *The Observer*) “moved from a tone of anticipatory welcome to one of reporting mixed stories” and challenged “some of the projected stereotypes” evident within *The Express* (ibid) by channelling in on benefits of immigration, “pointing out that each successive phase of enlargement has generated prosperity and stability” whilst not ignoring issues of crime (ibid: 43). *The Guardian*, is seen to provide a ‘rounded’ coverage of immigration and after establishing that *The Express*’ idea of a ‘flood’ did not materialise, Mawby and Gisby frame this reaction to immigration in terms of a ‘moral panic’ (see also Cohen, 1972; Hall et al, 1978).

In a further study, conducted by Light and Young (2009), in the field of Cultural Geography, representations of Romanians were examined in both UK and Romanian newspapers alongside "how these representations are bound up with larger processes of imagining 'Europe' in the post-1989 period" (Light and Young, 2009: 282). Within their analysis of UK tabloids, they showed how a Balkanist representation was constructed positioning the UK as “open and vulnerable” to an imminent ‘invasion’ and/or ‘flood’ of up to 30 million citizens (the combined population of Romania and Bulgaria) (ibid: pp.286-287). Moreover, although Bulgarians were categorised with Romanians through collocation, the tabloids consulted within the study adhered to an essentialist and reductionist view where Romanians, specifically, were deemed to be “an identifiable, ever-present and imminent threat” (ibid: 287). In a development that departed from traditional accounts of this type of discourse as a ‘moral panic’, Light and Young adopted a theoretical lens based on Todorova’s (1997/2009) concept of Balkanism, as they believed there were certain ways of thinking about and categorising Eastern Europe present, which are historically “embedded within the Western imagination” (Light and Young, 2009: 283; see also Chapter 4, section 4.2.2). Moreover, it is claimed that the moral panic model did not allow for explanations of these types of representations, and they illustrated how Balkanism “offer[ed] a way of engaging of with the longer term work of social construction which underpins the generation of stereotypes and threats” (ibid: 291). Consequently, this Balkanist representation is situated in its wider historical context, where
ideas of invasion allude or relate to actual European invasions (e.g. Ottoman Empires) and a fear of the Eastern European ‘Other’ is discursively manifested in popular culture. The prime example being that of Bram Stoker’s *Dracula*:

“To talk of the ‘Romanian invasion’ evokes notions of Count Dracula in the UK, the predator from the East who is intent on invading and colonising British society but who can pass unnoticed on the streets of London.” (Light and Young, 2009: 291).

Although these ‘ways of thinking’ do appear to be profoundly embedded within a ‘Western imagination’ of the Eastern European ‘Other’, Balkanism continues to be resisted, and in this case it was also shown how the Romanian press challenged and inverted these stereotypes, for example by confronting “British self-assumptions of rationality” (Light and Young, 2009: 294-295).

From a linguistic perspective, Allen and Vicol (2014) conducted a study for The Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford, in order to find out more about the language used to discuss migration from Bulgaria and Romania in the UK. In their quantitative study, utilising the methods of corpus linguistics, they explored 18 different national newspapers (inclusive of Sunday editions). In total this included over 4,000 texts, and amounted to 2.8 million words. They found a series of patterns with regards to the way in which ‘ROMANIANS’ and ‘BULGARIANS’ were discussed. Thus, although Bulgarians and Romanians were frequently collocated in discourse, this was primarily in relation to migration issues. Migration from the two countries was discussed in relation to a series of

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8 Allen and Vicol (2014) is a study that, on the surface, is extremely similar to this present thesis. However, there are at least three main differences:
(1) The study presents a quantitative analysis of a large corpus, whereas this present study presents a qualitative micro-linguistic analysis, focusing specifically on welfare restrictions and the construction of EU Migrants (Romanians and Bulgarians) as ‘Benefit Tourists’. This is a topic that is not discussed by Allen and Vicol (2014).
(2) Whereas Allen and Vicol (2014) analyse patterns across 19 different newspapers (inclusive of Sunday editions), this study considers only the Mail Online (for reasons discussed in Chapter 5) plus the addition of social media via corresponding public comments.
(3) Although Allen and Vicol (2014) present a discourse analysis via methods of corpus linguistic, it is not a ‘critical’ discourse analysis, thus differing to the aims and objectives of this present thesis.

9 Capitals are used here following how the referents and verbs are presented in Allen and Vicol’s (2014) study.
figures, the most common of which were ‘29 million’, “the approximate combined populations of Romania and Bulgaria” (ibid: 2) and ‘50,000’, “a prediction from pressure group MigrationWatch” (ibid). Moreover, this was described as “particularly striking, given the relative lack of data regarding the actual scale of migration...” (ibid: 20). Additionally, the verbs used in relation to the two nationyms were also about movement or travel to the UK, including ‘COME’, ‘ARRIVE’, and ‘HEAD’; particularly notable in tabloid papers were “metaphors related to scale” such as ‘FLOOD’ and ‘FLOCK’ (ibid: 2). Verbs appearing before the nationyms collocated together were frequently about prevention of immigration, and included items such as ‘STOP’ and ‘CONTROL’ in tabloids and ‘DETER’, ‘RESTRICT’ and ‘DISSUADE’ in broadsheets (ibid).

When Romanians and Bulgarians were discussed separately, there were more nuanced findings, including that Romanians, in particular, were discussed in relation to crime and anti-social behaviour with referents such as ‘CRIMINAL’, ‘BEGGAR’ and ‘THIEF’ being prominent (Allen and Vicol, 2014: 2). Although this did not occur to the same extent with regards to Bulgarians, they were primarily discussed in relation to a specific story, namely “a kidnapped Bulgarian girl” (ibid: 16). It was also found that references to ‘ROMA’ and ‘GYPSIES’ occurred frequently and these were used, often “interchangeably...in contexts related to crime and settlement” (ibid: 19).

Debates about accession and free movement of Bulgarians and Romanians were also analysed by Balch and Balabanova (2016) from a political perspective. By applying an ethical framing analysis, they analysed arguments about immigration evident in six British newspapers over both critical junctures outlined above: focusing on reports prior to accession in 2006 and before the lifting of restrictions in 2013. In this study, arguments were categorised into ‘tropes’ or ‘frames’ that labelled either ‘communitarian’ or ‘cosmopolitan’, moving away from traditional political alignments of right or left (see Giddens, 1994). Following Bader (2005: 345-352), Balch and Balabanova (2016: 22) showed how their communitarian frame is based upon five interconnected themes:

1) duty to the national community (special obligations or prioritisation of citizens);
2) cultural protectionism (maintaining a national identity);
3) liberal constitutionalism (emphasising membership/citizenship and the democratic process);
4) domestic social justice (welfare chauvinism, economic nationalism); and the need to maintain public order and security.

Alternatively, values situating themselves in opposition to these were considered to be cosmopolitan (ibid: 23). Although not so easy to group together, it is suggested that they should include the following and all adhere to “an appreciation of the ‘other’”, setting them apart from communitarian values looking to protect the self (ibid):

1) a universalist understanding of liberal principles;
2) utilitarian/consequentialist logic [...] preconditioned by underlying economic assumptions;
3) enhanced intercultural/multicultural social cohesion;
4) ‘post-national’ forms of identity.

The findings indicated that communitarian frames led the immigration debate in both 2006 and 2013; however, communitarian frames were significantly more prominent in 2013. Of these, the ‘domestic social justice’ frame came out on top when it came to justifications for migration controls (p.25). With regards to welfare chauvinism (inherent within ‘domestic social justice’), there were some dramatic shifts over the course of the seven years. For example, the occurrence of welfare chauvinist arguments rose from 41.5% in 2006 to 74% in 2013. Furthermore, it was reported that these arguments surrounding the protection of welfare were also directed towards different types of ‘public goods’, for example in 2006 these arguments focused on “the costs of education, medical care and housing” in contrast to 2013 where “claiming social benefits” alongside “concern over pressure on public services” dominated (p.26). A similar pattern was true for the frame of public security. Not only were more arguments found in 2013, but also the nature of these arguments again shifted to show an explicit connection between welfare and criminality suggesting “an intensification of securitisation in debates over migration” (p.28). Where opposition to these arguments existed, primarily within left-wing papers, Balch and Balabanova contended that many
counter-strategies were generally weak. When, in 2006, the ‘economic benefit’ of immigration was used to challenge communitarian values, by 2013 these arguments fell short due to the hard-hitting recession that was suffered. Moreover, Balch and Balabanova regarded the assertion of economic benefits by the left as “a false opposition” as they “do not counter the de-humanising narrative of securitisation” (pp.28-29). However, it is also noted that in 2013, rational debate was sought “by countering ‘myths’ with ‘facts’” (p.29).

2.5.4 UKIP, Euroscepticism and Immigration

Although this was not the first time in history that immigration to Britain had been conceived of as ‘problematic’, Geddes (2014: 289) has suggested that four elements evidence new distinctions: (1) the scale of migration; (2) that much of this migration is actually EU free movement; (3) the rise of UKIP; and (4) a more general disconnect between the people and politics. It is worth exploring points (3) and (4) in more depth, as it becomes clear that the rise of UKIP is directly related to members of the public who felt (and continue to feel) disengaged from established political parties.

By the time of the expiration of transitional restrictions of Bulgarian and Romanian workers (1st January 2014), the UK Independence Party (UKIP) was considered by many commentators to be part of mainstream British politics. However, part of this newfound popularity was down to the party’s changing temperament under its leader Nigel Farage, who was in a sense, both the face and brand of UKIP. Often denigrating EU migrants, he used immigration as a tool to blame for many of the socio-economic problems the UK faced, including the fact he was once caught in a traffic jam on the M4 motorway (Rawlinson, 2014). He expressed discomfort about hearing foreign languages being spoken on the train (Evening Standard, 2014), and also exclaimed that he would feel uncomfortable if Romanians moved next door to him (BBC News, 2014). At the same time, he was often pictured smoking and having a beer in local pubs. As a result, voters who otherwise felt disengaged with politics were able to reconnect through identification with him (Geddes, 2014). Thus, he was clearly drawing upon right-wing populist discursive strategies, that promoted fear of the ‘Other’ (Wodak, 2015) alongside offering seemingly simple, ‘common sense’ solutions to this perceived ‘problem’ of immigration – the disbandment of the EU. Branding UKIP
in this way was a very effective strategy to gain voters, reconnecting the political and the ordinary (Geddes, 2014).

Consequently, a once Eurosceptic party on the fringe of politics, evolved “into a populist radical right party that was campaigning heavily on immigration and a populist critique of established politicians” (Dennison and Goodwin, 2015: 172). As part of this transformation, Farage strategically merged UKIP’s Euroscepticism, an issue previously of low public concern, with the established and contentious issue of immigration (Dennison and Goodwin, 2015: 172). From this point onwards, it was clear that Britain’s role and relationship with the EU was inextricably linked with discourse about immigration, associated almost entirely with EU migrants.

The rise of Euroscepticism and a populist anti-immigration ideology is not confined to Britain10, and this is evidenced by Wodak (2015) in The Politics of Fear. Moreover, there are other factors apart from immigration that should also be taken into consideration, including a lack of common European identity and the fact that much of the public’s knowledge about the EU is retrieved from media sources that perpetuate a Eurosceptic ideology (Inthorn, 2006). Drawing on these ideas, it would seem that Euroscepticism has been hovering in a range of discourse topics, but it clearly gained political prominence in Britain through discourse about immigration, which scrutinized, and denigrated a ‘new’ EU ‘Other’.

It is Balch and Balabanova (2017) who, building upon their previous analysis on debates concerning Romanian and Bulgarian accession, have also shown how the UK press was partly able to disseminate a Eurosceptic ideology in relation to immigration from the EU by showing “how the EU is imagined in different arguments over free movement” (p. 239). Although they found, in the same data examined in Balch and Balabanova (2016), that the EU was somewhat ‘invisible’, they also clarified that representations of the EU in 2006 were largely ‘economic’ over ‘political’ and that this was reversed in 2013 where it was represented largely as a ‘political space’ (p.244-245). However, it is also interesting to note that in both 2006 and 2013, the EU was represented as “an outside force acting upon the UK”, but that in 2013, this was apparent in a

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10 Although Euroscepticism and anti-immigration discourses appear to be inextricably linked (as will be evidenced empirically in Chapters 6 and 7), it must be stressed that they are nevertheless distinct discourses and ideologies, and one does not necessarily presuppose or infer the other.
significantly larger percentage of articles: 65% in comparison to 43% in 2006 (p.244). Moreover, they have explained that in the 2006 context, where there was debate and choice surrounding whether transitional restrictions would be enforced for Romanians and Bulgarians, there was seemingly “no discussion of how the EU works” and “nothing in the entire sample about how the rules of free movement emerged…or how they could be enforced or modified through the EU’s legal system” (p. 245). This in itself suggests a one-dimensional view of the EU – that of an external force acting upon the UK, where the UK remains a largely passive or submissive actor. In the 2013 data, examples showed that “we [Britain] are obliged under EU law” but even where political contestation was found, this was often portrayed through a negative series of metaphors such as ‘war’ – “surrender control of your borders” (p.246).

2.6 Chapter Summary

This chapter has explored the history, politics and discourse of immigration to the UK, since the 1905 Aliens Act, to the context in question within this thesis: namely the expiration of transitional restrictions for Romanians and Bulgarians on 1st January 2014. Moreover, it has been evidenced that discourse about immigration within the UK has been discriminatory and many representations, evaluations, and arguments discussed from the past are similar, albeit recontextualized, to what is seen within dominant discursive constructions within the 21st century. Within this chapter, the role of the media and of the government, as ‘elite institutions’, has also been explored and it can be concluded that they play a largely dominant and influential role in the construction and dissemination of a discriminatory ideologies. It has also been evident that there are certain discourse topics, which are interdiscursively linked to discourse of immigration and combine to produce a dominant discriminatory ideology. This has included (but is not limited to) topics concerning welfare, crime/security and the restrictions/control of immigration. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that such discourse topics work to construct what Berkeley, Khan and Ambikaipaker (2006: 25) would call “unrelenting staple of panics about mass influxes, criminal behaviour, welfare crises and illiberal cultural difference.” As De Cleen et al. (2017) would suggest, discourse about immigration incorporates ‘securitarian’, ‘economic’ and ‘culturalist’ ‘logics’ and this chapter has evidenced their operation
in the reproduction and continued problematization of the immigrant ‘Other’ in the UK.

To Berkeley, Khan and Ambikaipaker (2006: 25) this narrow set of themes and topics in the media effectively “constrains the ability of the public to engage with debate about immigration” and it is within my own analysis of public comments where we will be able to see how the public engage with such debate and the relationship between that and the newspaper itself. As was demonstrated above, constant media panics help to promote a “perception of perpetual crisis about immigration policies and social problems” (Berkeley, Khan and Ambikaipaker, 2006: 25).
Chapter 3 - Critical Discourse Studies and the Discourse Historical Approach

3.1 Introduction

To develop both a theoretical and methodological framework for the analysis of discourse about immigration, it is necessary to assess previous definitions and discussions surrounding the concept of ‘discourse’, alongside how ‘discourse analysis’ (DA) is understood and utilised. The purpose of this chapter is therefore to highlight that DA is considered to be a multi, inter-, or transdisciplinary enterprise and different approaches to DA may not always share epistemological and ontological principles (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002). By reviewing three approaches to discourse analysis, namely: Discourse Theory, Discursive Psychology and Critical Discourse Studies (CDS), I will demonstrate how and why this study aligns with the CDS paradigm. Once this has been outlined, an appropriate and grounded ‘critical’ analysis of the discourse about immigration may occur. However, it is not only ‘discourse’ that needs to be defined, but also concepts such as ‘critique’, ‘ideology’ and ‘power’. Elaborating on these concepts will not only ensure that this thesis performs a critical discourse analysis but will also provide insight into the nuanced approaches within CDS. Furthermore, I will be able to consider the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) vis-à-vis other approaches in CDS.

This chapter will be structured as follows. Firstly, ‘discourse’ and approaches to DA will be outlined epistemologically and ontologically in section 3.2. Secondly, CDS will be explored in depth, and it is here that ‘ideology’, ‘power’ and ‘critique’ will also be defined and explained in section 3.3. Finally the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) will be introduced and outlined in section 3.4, with section 3.5 providing a summary of the chapter.

3.2 Discourse

In everyday terms, the word ‘discourse’ is generally adopted to mean one of two things: either it is employed as a noun to identify “written or spoken communication or debate”, or it is employed as a verb either to “speak or write authoritatively about a topic” or simply to “engage in conversation” (Oxford Living Dictionaries, 2018a). However, the way in which ‘discourse’ has been utilised for
theoretical and methodological purposes across disciplines, to describe, explain, interpret but also critique social phenomena, is certainly more varied and polysemous; it is therefore a more difficult term to define. This difficulty arises not only from its polysemy, but also from it often being “left undefined” by scholars (Mills, 1997:1). As a consequence, understandings of discourse can appear broad or general. However, what is central to most understandings is the predominant role of language/semiosis and the patterns of meaning people create within everyday social life. In the process of analysing these patterns, discourse analysis occurs (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002). Still, discourse is a term which is realised not only through an understanding of patterns of meaning, but additionally through acknowledging whether these patterns can be considered ‘dominant’, ‘powerful’, ‘hegemonic’, ‘ideological’, ‘antagonistic’, ‘oppressive’, ‘natural’, ‘true or false’ or part of ‘common-sense’. It is thus important to note that, in defining the properties of discourse, a theoretical conception of the social must also be sought. In outlining the three different approaches to discourse analysis within this chapter, it will become evident that approaches do not necessarily share consistent ideas about how discourse relates to the social world.

In tracing how the term ‘discourse’ has evolved over time, it is notable how emphasis on the linguistic has moved to encompass a wide array of disciplines including (but not limited to) psychology, politics, sociology, media and cultural studies etc. Previously, to analyse ‘discourse’ would have been a linguistic exercise focusing only on spoken language (‘text’ analysis would be to focus on written language) (Crystal, 1987: 116). However, the 1960s saw a new French philosophical understanding of the term emerge. It is Michel Foucault who is credited for this transformation and in one of his earlier works, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, he explains:

> Instead of gradually reducing the rather fluctuating meaning of the word ‘discourse’, I believe I have in fact added to its meanings: treating it sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements. (Foucault, 1972: 80)
As is evident above, Foucault asserts three different strands to his notion of discourse. Mills (1997) analyses these strands and interprets the meaning behind each one. The first, ‘the general domain of all statements’ is said to refer to “all utterances or texts which have meaning” and which have “effects in the real world” (Mills, 1997: 7). Thus, a view of discourse closer to some of the more traditional understandings where discourse appears to belong to the linguistic, to statements and utterances, which have some effect on the wider world; perhaps they belong to rhetoric and the ability to persuade or metaphor and literary language that help to produce images and representations. However, as the second and third definitions are considered, some of the greater forces behind the concept of discourse can be appreciated. This includes the coherence that can group discourses (‘as individualizable group of statements’), which in turn, provides us with the ability to label discourses (such as ‘immigration discourse’) (Mills, 2007). Finally, Foucault’s third interpretation of discourse as ‘a regulated practice which accounts for a number of statements’ relates to the social processes and practices that unite and govern discourses in society. This goes beyond the linguistic, focusing on the “rules and structures which produce particular utterances and texts” (Mills, 1997: 7). Moreover, this relates somewhat to dominant or hegemonic ideologies in relation to what constitutes a society’s understanding of what is ‘real’, ‘true’ and ‘moral’ which goes onto affect and govern actions, behaviours and lifestyles.

Foucault’s understanding of discourse, alongside his conceptions of social relations including power/knowledge have largely influenced the three approaches to be reviewed. In the field of applied linguistics, Norman Fairclough and other scholars working within Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) have identified discourse precisely as ‘parole’ or what other linguists may call ‘language use’ or ‘performance’ (Fairclough, 1992: 3). Although in structuralist language theory (see section 3.2.3) Saussure advocated that the subject matter for linguistics should be langue, Fairclough’s conception of discourse followed on from the many sociolinguists who critiqued the Saussurean position. Fairclough thus uses the term discourse to evidence “language use as a form of social practice, rather than a purely individual activity or a reflex of situational variables” (p.63). Here, discourse is not only considered to be “a mode of action” but also “a mode of
representation” (ibid). Other scholars, working in disciplines beyond linguistics, have also used and developed the concept of discourse with reference to Foucault’s understanding of the term. This is evident in the works of political theorists Laclau and Mouffe (1985) to progress a theory of radical democracy, namely that of Agonistic Pluralism (see section 3.2.4), and also in the work of social psychologists Wetherell and Potter (1992) who identified the need for a discursive conception of racism that comprised both social and psychological theories (see section 3.2.5). However, as stated above, the differences between the approaches are theoretically eclectic, especially in relation to how concepts such as ‘ideology’ are theorised vis-à-vis discourse and whether discourse is seen as fully constitutive of the social (and psychological) or not.

To do a discourse analysis, therefore, is something greater than what is simply visible or audible and is subsequently concerned with “the relationship between language and the social and cultural contexts in which it is used” (Paltridge, 2006:2). Discourse encompasses social life, social reality and social processes and practices. It is dependent on invisible forces, shared meaning, cultural influences, norms, expectations and representations.

3.2.1 Social Constructionism

Although there are theoretical differences between approaches to discourse analysis, one commonality is an underlying epistemological acknowledgement of social constructionism. Thus, a major underlying assumption of the approaches to be discussed in this chapter is “that our ways of talking do not neutrally reflect our world, identities and social relations but, rather, play an active role in creating and changing them” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002:1)

Social constructionism is best understood “in opposition to...positivism and empiricism in traditional science” where the world is viewed critically and where assumptions about the nature of reality are questioned and challenged (Burr, 2003: 3). This includes ideas that: knowledge is not treated as objective truth; the world is understood as culturally and historically contingent; and it is anti-essentialist in that the social world is constructed and not pre-determined (Burr, 2003). Although social constructionism is rooted within postmodern thought and therefore involves a “rejection of totalising and universalising
theories such as Marxism and psychoanalysis” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 6), not all approaches to discourse analysis neatly fit into a postmodern category; this is especially true for Critical Discourse Studies. Thus, Fairclough states how “CDA is a ‘moderate’ or ‘contingent’ form” of social constructionism (Fairclough, 2010: 5). In fact, the epistemological and ontological commitment of different versions of CDA is in flux, especially with regards to a postmodern commitment. For example, Fairclough’s ‘Dialectical-Relational’ approach (2010; 2016) can be classified as adopting a Critical Realist epistemology and ontology (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999; see also Bhaskar, 2008) and Reisigl and Wodak’s ‘Discourse-Historical’ approach has been described as anti-objectivist and experientialist (Reisigl, 2007), acknowledging that concepts such as ‘race’ and ‘nation’ are socially constructed, but nevertheless are presented to the world as if they are permanent and unchanging (Zotzmann and O’Regan, 2016). Alternatively, the Duisburg group, who are equally considered part of the CDS school, fully adopts a postmodern perspective aligning entirely with Foucault’s notion of discourse (Jäger 1993, 2001; Jäger and Maier, 2016).

3.2.3 Structuralist and Poststructuralist Language Theory

All approaches to discourse analysis to be reviewed here make reference to either structuralist and/or poststructuralist language theory. For this reason, a brief outline will now be presented.

The structuralist theory of language can be attributed back to Ferdinand de Saussure (1960) who advocated that language was a system detached from reality (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002). The main aspect of this theory of language was that signs could be divided in two separate parts: the ‘signifier’ and the ‘signified’. The ‘signifier’ is the word (sound or sound-image) which is the material component of the sign and the ‘signified’ is the mental concept, idea or description associated with that sign. Furthermore, according to Saussure (1960), the relationship between the ‘signifier’ and the ‘signified’ is arbitrary and this alone accounts for the existence of different languages around the world. The way in which individual signs gain meaning is “determined by their relation to other signs” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 10); therefore, the meaning of a sign is only known because it is different to other signs. This arbitrariness also applies to how the sign relates to reality, and this linguistic relativity is one of the main ideas that
both structuralism and poststructuralism share: “signs derive their meanings not through their relations to reality but through internal relations within a network of signs” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 10).

Another key aspect within Saussurean linguistics, is the division between langue and parole. With parole referring to speech acts and the way in which individuals use language, Saussure advocated that the study of linguistics should in fact be langue: “the [fixed] network of signs that give meaning to one another” and this was because parole was essentially thought of as existing because of langue (ibid). To explain this further, Saussure (1960) gave the analogy of a chess game. Langue can be thought of as the rules of chess, whereas parole constitutes an individual move which can be made within the limitations of the rules (i.e. langue). Structuralist analysis, therefore, involved the privileging of the structure in analysis (Saussure, 1960).

However, this fixed and totalising nature of langue, in particular, is one of the aspects poststructuralist theorists have critiqued about structuralist language theory. Although poststructuralism (which is distinct from but also related to postmodernism) has derived from structuralism, it departs on the grounds that it does not share the fixed and totalising conceptions advocated, which are linked to modern thought (see section 3.4.2). Nor do they wish to continue with the langue and parole separation, with langue at the core. Thus, within poststructuralism, there is a different perspective and treatment of ‘truth’ and/or knowledge. For structuralism, ‘truth’ may be uncovered from the analysis of structures. As Williams (2005: 2) elaborates: “in noting a repeated pattern of signs the structuralist science hopes to arrive at some secure understanding”. Even if patterns change, they should still be subject to the same form of analysis which places at its core something fixed and universal, such as langue. This is why structuralist analysis is also considered synchronic (or ahistorical). Thus, a structuralist analysis “start[s] with the norm and only then consider[s] the exception” (ibid). However, for poststructuralism ‘truth’ comes only via “the interaction of reader and text as a productivity” (Sarup, 1988: 3). This is because the core, in this case langue, cannot be considered “more reliable, significant and better known that its limits and outer boundaries” (Williams, 2005: 2). Knowledge cannot be obtained simply by analysing one thing in relation to a stable or
unchanging core because, according to poststructuralists, “the limit is the core...mean[ing] that any form of settled knowledge...is made by its limits and cannot be defined independently of them” (ibid).

Thus, although structuralism is based on an assumption that there is a fixed structure, poststructuralism problematises this by showing how words can have different meanings dependent on context. Moreover, meaning also changes over time, and is therefore diachronic (Williams, 2005). One of the ways in which this is exemplified is through Derrida’s (1978) reconsideration of the division between the signifier and the signified. Whereas Saussure advocated that the two concepts together formed a sign, Derrida (1978) disrupts this by basing his poststructuralist deconstruction on the basis that one signifier does not refer to a concept or idea (a signified), but instead another signifier (signifier → signifier).

Moreover, in poststructuralism, there is no logocentricity and the signifier does not represent an external idea/concept that is the signified, only another signifier (Anderson, 2003). The instability that is present between the original Saussurean conception of the signifier and signified goes back to the problem of establishing some concrete form of knowledge or truth. Therefore, in Derrida’s deconstruction, and other poststructuralist work, there cannot possibly be precise definitions of things, and knowledge of the world is therefore in constant flux (Sim, 1998).

Another tension between structuralism and poststructuralism lies with the conceptualisation of the subject, and the role of agency. Both structuralism and poststructuralism critique the Cartesian human subject, based on Descartes’ philosophy in which “I’ assumes itself to be fully conscious, and hence self-knowable” (Sarup, 1988: 1). In structuralism, the structure overrides agency: “The core of structuralism was the treatment of distinctively human domains as formal structures in which meanings were constituted not by conscious subjects but by relations among the elements of a formal system” (Gutting, 2000: 701). Nevertheless, despite structuralism’s analytical focus on structures that dissolve the subject, the primary understanding the subject remains rooted with Descartes’ conception (Sarup, 1988). This is where poststructuralism differs. The privileging of structure is controversial for poststructuralists, as this results in a determinism that is oppressive and denies agency (Sim, 1988). The subject is therefore reconsidered as something that is contradictory and multi-layered; it is
‘decentered’, and “reconceived as a multiple subjectivity constituted (and reconstituted) through the acquisition of multiple meanings” (Usher and Edwards, 1994: 12).

Although CDS, may at first appear to adhere to a structuralist analysis of discourse, especially in seeking to uncover manifest and latent ideologies from the linguistic analysis of texts, there are important poststructuralist elements that have helped to position the CDS school as an approach somewhere on the continuum between structuralism and poststructuralism (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002). The DHA, in particular, does not deny the role of history and/or context in its interpretation of meaning, neither does it deny voice or agency. However, in formulating an approach that places emancipation at the centre of its activity, it cannot deny that there are human universals in which a normative position must be based. Poststructuralist analysis demonstrates how different discourses compete for hegemony (as will be further articulated in section 3.2.4 below), but it is ultimately a relativistic approach where a concepts, ideas, values and beliefs are only true according to the relative contexts. A normative approach can therefore not be based on this and, in section 3.4.2, I will further elaborate the DHA’s connection to Habermas and his understanding of rationality that is underpinned by the universality of language.

Before I discuss the main theoretical and methodological underpinnings of CDS and the DHA in more detail, I will present a short review of two other approaches to discourse analysis with the aim of justifying my position as being situated within CDS. It should be noted that the accounts presented here are by no means exhaustive of the approaches they seek to review; however, they do aim to outline the main theoretical tenets and lines of thought that dominate. The approaches considered are: Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) Discourse Theory and Discursive Psychology (Edwards and Potter, 1992; Wetherell and Potter, 1992; Edwards, 1997). These approaches have been chosen because I consider them to reflect some of the major lines of thought with regards to the analysis of discourse.

3.2.4 Discourse Theory

Discourse Theory is a poststructuralist approach to discourse where a view is taken that “meaning can never be permanently fixed” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 6). Thus, in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 96)
explain how a “discursive structure” is an “articulatory practice”, which is entirely constitutive of the social. The concept of society moves beyond a Marxian understanding that pronounces divisions of base and superstructure. Instead, the base and superstructure are merged into one social field, which is realised only through discourse (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002). In this sense, there is no distinction between the discursive and non-discursive (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; 1987) and an ontological view is presented in which our sense of reality is mediated only through discourse: “every object is constituted as an object of discourse” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 108). This ontological position varies considerably from a CDS understanding of discourse in relation to society (see section 3.2.1).

To understand the way in which discourse operates and becomes seen as dominant or fixed, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) employ but also ‘radicalise’ Gramsci’s concept of hegemony (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002). Hegemony, in this sense, primarily revolves around an understanding that the power held by the ruling class is not simply economically determined (Gramsci, 1991). Rather, dominance is maintained in two ways: either by force/coercion or via consent/hegemony (Gramsci, 1991; Bates, 1975; Mouffe 1979). Thus, through the manufacturing of certain ideas in the superstructure (including through political, educational, religious and media11 institutions) “power relations can become naturalised and so much part of common-sense that they cannot be questioned” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 32). It is the term ‘common-sense’, which has become seen as the essence of what hegemony is (Wodak, 2015) with Mouffe stating “common sense is always something which is the result of political articulation” (quoted in Carpentier and Cammaerts, 2006: 967).

Despite an understanding that meaning is only ever partially fixed, Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 112) use ideas/tools from structuralism in order to highlight that certain discourses can become hegemonic, showing how signs become related to one another and how they are partially fixed around ‘nodal points’. This partial fixation, however, is only achieved through “the exclusion of all other possible meanings that the signs could have had” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 26-27). These excluded signs are known to exist as the ‘field of discursivity’ and

11 See Hermon and Chomsky (1988/2008) and section 3.3.5.
the hegemonic discourse is always in danger of being undermined by this. Mouffe outlines this relationship further in her democratic model of agnostic pluralism and has a belief that “Every hegemony can be challenged” (quoted in Carpentier and Cammaerts, 2006: 967). However, a complexity in this idea arises, as noted by Jørgensen and Phillips (2002: 27) when questions are asked about what actually constitutes the ‘field of discursivity’; is it “an unstructured mass of all possible constructions” or rather is it “structured by the given competing discourses”?

Although some have argued for the compatibility of Discourse Theory with CDS (Rear and Jones, 2013), the relativism posed by its post-structuralism means that it is incommensurable with most approaches in the CDS paradigm. If any discourse has the potential to achieve hegemony, discourse theory does not grant theoretical or methodological tools for an emancipatory agenda; not only to challenge hegemonic discourse but, also, to be able to evaluate it as immoral or unethical in the fight against inequality and social injustice. Moreover, in understanding discourse as entirely constitutive of the social field, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) fail to recognise the deep structures that shape our society and the social groups/formations that people are born into. Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) make this observation while advocating a CDS position, where discourse and society are viewed in a dialectical relationship – as mutually influential (see section 3.3). Thus, Laclau and Mouffe “overlook the fact that not all individuals and groups have equal opportunities” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 54).

3.2.5 Discursive Psychology

Discursive Psychology developed primarily in the late 1980s and early 1990s as a “paradigmatic challenge to cognitivism” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 97). In adopting ideas from poststructuralism and postmodernism, it moved away from the perceptualism of cognitive psychology, where categorisations of the world were considered to be “based on direct, empirical experience” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 98). Instead, discursive psychology argued that these processes of categorisation were “not universal, but historically and socially specific and...contingent” (ibid: 99) and culturally relative (Wetherell, 1982). The role of discourse was seen as not only reflecting lived experiences but also as constituting “subjective, psychological reality” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 102). In developing a method to explain the role of discourse, discursive
psychologists have focused particularly on ‘talk’ (te Molder, 2015: 1). More specifically, talk is not considered simply “a reflection of...inner thoughts and beliefs” rather it “is viewed as a social event designed to do something” (Goodman, 2010: 2), with emphasis placed on ‘action’ or ‘talk in interaction’ (see for instance: Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Edwards and Potter 1992; Edwards 1997). For this reason, there are also strong links made to Conversation Analysis (see Schegloff, 1968, 1991, 1997), where naturally occurring speech is favoured for empirical analysis (te Molder, 2015). Discursive psychology has therefore been described as “the study of psychological issues from a participant’s perspective” (te Molder, 2015: 1).

Although discursive psychology has been applied to a range of everyday and institutional settings such as police interviews, mealtimes and counselling, focusing on “the work that is performed by professionals so as to negotiate institutional access to the client’s state of mind” (te Molder, 2015: 7), it has also been applied in relation to the analysis of racism and the representation of immigrants (Wetherell and Potter, 1992; Goodman 2010). It is Wetherell and Potter’s (1992) Mapping the Language of Racism, where theoretical developments of discursive psychology are outlined specifically in relation to the way in which racism operates within society, presenting criticisms of cognitive explanations of racism.

Wetherell and Potter (1992) emphasise their departure from traditional, social psychological understandings of how to classify and explain racism. Their reasoning behind this revolves around the claim that “social psychology...has often played a double role – investigating racism but also sustaining some of the ideological practices of racist discourse” (ibid: 2). This is evidenced from focusing on three strands of social psychological research, namely: ‘the socio cognitive account’, ‘social identity theory’ and ‘authoritarian personality account of racism’ (ibid: 34). For example, although ‘Social Identity Theory’ (Tajful and Turner, 1979; Turner, 1982), explains conflict between groups due to ‘universal’ processes inherent within an individual’s understanding of their ‘social identity’ (the sense identity formed based on group membership), Wetherell and Potter (1992) see processes of ‘in-group favouritism’ and ‘out-group rejection’ as being not a universal human condition, but culturally relative and contingent, adopting a
poststructuralist view (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002). Moreover, they argue that social psychological studies have allowed for racism to be considered as a universal and natural psychological phenomenon, and although racism is still frowned upon, these studies appear “less ready to blame and castigate the racist” (ibid: 36). For Wetherell and Potter (1992: 4), discourse analysis involves identifying specific instances of language use in text and talk, and this is evidenced throughout their study by interviewing Pākehā New Zealanders. Discourse for them includes the “meanings, conversations, narratives, explanations, accounts and anecdotes” provided throughout the interview as rhetorical means to assert and justify racist claims about Māori New Zealanders, whilst maintaining the appearance of an anti-racist (ibid: 2-3).

Although they review, and agree (in part) with Robert Miles’ (1989) conception of racism as an ‘ideology’, they argue that it is, nevertheless, incompatible with discursive psychology. This is because of Miles’ roots in Marxist theory, meaning that essentially, ideology here is linked to a set of “false ideas”, hence as false consciousness (Wetherell and Potter, 1992: 58). Wetherell and Potter also question the fact that Miles’ form of ‘truth’ derives from scientific discourse. It is explained that in adopting a position that sees discourse as “actively constitutive of both social and psychological processes” their conception of “the psychological and social field – subjectivity, individuality, social groups and social categories – is constructed, defined and articulated through discourse” (ibid: 59). Due to this position, they are able to question the neutrality or ‘truth’ of science and they subsequently believe that “no scientific account of reality should be privileged or placed in some non-social realm of pure representation or pure description” (ibid: 65). However, it is this relativism that many scholars situated within the CDS paradigm question, including those adopting the DHA. If no discourse can be privileged, how can we evaluate one as moral and another as immoral?

In returning to ideology, it must also be questioned how ideology and ideological effects are viewed by Wetherell and Potter (1992) if ideology is not seen as something that mystifies or obscures the ’real’? Wetherell and Potter are sensitive to the fact that traditional understandings of ideology are linked primarily to false consciousness and dichotomies of true/false and
real/representation. In following more recent advancements of Marxism, such as Hall, Gramsci and Althusser, they believe that ideological discourse can have “constitutive and reflexive effects” (Wetherell and Potter, 1992: 60). However, they do also wish to highlight that not every instance of discourse is ideological: “We do not wish to argue that ideological means simply constructed knowledge or should be synonymous with discourse, signification or cultural phenomena in general.” (ibid: 62). It would seem that for Wetherell and Potter, the concept of ideology is important not for its falsity, but for the way power relations are constructed. The ways in which power is realised and practised within society becomes a tenet within their formulation of ideological effects. This is acknowledged not as “ideology per se” but “ideological practice and ideological outcomes” (ibid: 70). For Wetherell and Potter, racist discourse has:

...the effect of categorizing, allocating and discriminating between certain groups and, in the context of New Zealand, it is discourse which justifies, sustains and legitimates those practices which maintain the power and dominance of Pakeha New Zealanders.

This understanding of ideology appears closer to how many CDS scholars view the relationship of ideology to discourse and society (e.g. van Dijk, 1998), not only because ideology is linked with power. As van Dijk (1998: 8) explains:

In most (but not all) cases, ideologies are self-serving and a function of the material and symbolic interests of the group. Among these interests, power over other groups (or resistance against the domination by other groups) may have a central role and hence function as a major condition and purpose for the development of ideologies.

The next section will consider the role of ideology from a CDS perspective in more detail, alongside understandings of ‘discourse’, ‘power’ and ‘critique’ that are of crucial theoretical importance, but nevertheless conceptualised in different ways depending on approach.
3.3 Critical Discourse Studies

Critical Discourse Studies (CDS), formerly known as Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), is an eclectic paradigm within the broader landscape of Discourse Analysis (DA). As an umbrella term for a range of approaches, the unifying aspect relates to the fact that CDS scholars seek to investigate dominant ideologies and power structures that perpetuate inequality; its purpose is therefore emancipatory. Moreover, there are wide-ranging philosophical, theoretical and methodological orientations that are adopted within specific approaches to CDS. However, it is the addition of the premodifier ‘critical’, which is essential in beginning to recognise the primary difference between CDS and other forms of DA. As Wodak and Meyer (2016: 2) write, this primary difference “lies in the constitutive problem-oriented, interdisciplinary approach” of CDS (their emphasis).

The emergence of CDS/CDA developed from Critical Linguistics (CL), at the University of East Anglia in the 1970s (Hart, 2010). Two seminal works became the defining core of this Language and Control (Fowler et al., 1979) and Language as Ideology (Kress and Hodge, 1979). This started what has been labelled a ‘critical turn’ which saw the “cross-fertilisation between linguistics and the social sciences” (Wodak, 2004: xi). This was to be realised as CDA at a symposium in Amsterdam, where scholars such as Teun van Dijk, Ruth Wodak, Norman Fairclough, Theo van Leeuwen and Gunther Kress were able to discuss and detail the many different approaches arising from this critical turn (Wodak and Meyer, 2016). Moreover, with the establishment of the journal Discourse and Society, CDS/CDA as both a theoretical and methodological approach was grounded (ibid).

Due to its eclecticism, which is in itself celebrated, there are many different approaches within the broader paradigm of CDS (Wodak and Meyer, 2016). It is for this reason that CDA became known as CDS. This transition was based on a recommendation put forward by van Dijk (2013a), where he critiqued research that claimed it was using CDA as “a method of critical discourse analysis”. In pointing out the diversity of methods and approaches that are employed by ‘critical’ discourse analysts, he argued that scholars needed to be fully aware of the principles underlying different approaches, recognising that “CDA is as diverse as DA”. Thus, van Dijk (2013a) recommended “the term Critical Discourse Studies for the theories, methods, analyses, applications and other practices of critical
It is van Dijk’s *Socio-Cognitive Approach*, Fairclough’s *Dialectical Relational Approach* and Wodak’s *Discourse-Historical Approach* (DHA) that are considered the most influential or recognisable \(^{12}\), although such approaches continue to be modified or adapted for the purposes of approaching new research questions, or similar research questions from new perspectives. This includes, for example, the examination of visual and multimodal texts (Kress and van Leeuven, 2006; Jancsary, Hollerer and Meyer, 2016), social media (KhosraviNik and Unger, 2016), and what has become known as the ‘cognitive turn’ in CDS (Chilton, 2005; O’Halloran, 2005; Hart, 2010). Moreover, despite their differences, there are a core set of values underpinning the CDS paradigm, as outlined by Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 271-280):

- CDA addresses social problems;
- Discourse is a form of social action;
- Discourse does ideological work;
- Power relations are discursive;
- Discourse constitutes society and culture;
- Discourse is historical;
- The link between text and society is mediated.

In developing an understanding of what CDS is, it is equally important to address what it is not, and this is especially true when it comes to responding to criticisms (see section 3.3.4). Fairclough (2010: 10-11) outlines 3 main ideas in relation to this:

1. It is not just an analysis of discourse… it is part of some form of systematic transdisciplinary analysis of relations between discourse and other elements of the social processes.
2. It is not just general commentary on discourse, it includes some form of systematic analysis of texts.

\(^{12}\) Hart (2010) considers these three approaches, alongside ‘Critical Linguistics’, to be ‘mainstream CDA’.
3. It is not just descriptive, it is also normative. It addresses social wrongs in their discursive aspects and possible ways of righting or mitigating them.

It is subsequently clear that political positions are adopted in relation to text and discourse (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001). I will now present an overview of how ‘discourse’, ‘ideology’, ‘critique’ and ‘power’ are conceptualised across approaches and how they will be considered within this study.

3.3.1 ‘Discourse’ and ‘Ideology’

It is widely maintained that CDS scholars share a view in which the concept of discourse is seen as “language use in speech and writing” and that it is also “a form of ‘social practice’” (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 258). Moreover, in relation to discussions above concerning the constitutive nature of discourse, it is important to understand that CDS scholars mostly follow an understanding that there is “a dialectical relationship between a discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s), which frame it” (ibid). However, even within this broader understanding of discourse, there are important nuances between the approaches to note, especially in relation to the relationship between discourse and ideology.

Although in its everyday sense ideology tends to mean “a system of ideas and ideals” and is regularly used to describe the “basis of economic or political theory and policy” (Oxford Living Dictionaries, 2018b), the term ideology is theoretically and conceptually more complicated; this is especially true for the relationship between discourse and ideology. As Mills (1997: 29) explains, many cultural theorists have tended to avoid the notion of ideology within their work, especially since the 1990s when a more “pessimistic political climate” surrounded Marxism in the fall of communism. In the Marxian sense, ideology is formulated as ‘false consciousness’: an idea which suggests people (the proletariat) are misled over their social and economic conditions and that relations between classes are misrepresented “in a way which concurs with the interests of the dominant class” (Thompson, 1990: 38). The idea of false consciousness further seems to imply that there is a level of consciousness to be achieved that is not ‘false’ and that, in uncovering ideology, ‘truth’ can be sought. However, in a move away from ideology and towards the substitution of ideology with discourse, theorists such
as Foucault and Laclau and Mouffe (as discussed above) have asserted the constitutive nature of discourse, relying on the notion of relativism to explain dominant or hegemonic discourses (Mills, 1997). Mills (1997: 30) also explains, “[discourse] offered a way of thinking about hegemony...without assuming that individuals are necessarily simply passive victims of systems of thought”.

However, in considering the CDS perspective or position with regards to the relationship between discourse and ideology, scholars generally do not substitute one concept for another (except from the Duisburg group, see below). In turn, ideologies are investigated as part of discourse and one of the main reasons for this is that ideology is not seen is such a narrow or reductionist way as Mills (1997) discusses. As Wodak and Meyer (2016: 8) write, the type of ideology which actually interests CDS scholars is one considered “more hidden and latent inherent in everyday-beliefs”. Moreover, they also critique “the conflation of ‘ideology’ and ‘discourse’...[as] they tend to become empty signifiers” (ibid: 9). This section will now provide an insight into the relationship between discourse and ideology within four main approaches to CDS, before moving onto a discussion of how Thompson (1990) sees ideology, which is more than simply the idea of ‘false consciousness’.

van Dijk’s Sociocognitive Approach to discourse analysis sees the concept of discourse as belonging to a Discourse-Cognition-Society triangle (van Dijk, 2016). However, there is a separation between discourse structures and social structures, with a connection between the two mediated via mental representations (van Dijk, 1998). Despite this separation, the two are considered mutually influential, or dialectical, and there is a belief that they cannot be studied in isolation. The cognitive interface, which mediates discourse and social structures, is comprised of cognitive structures including memory, mental models and social cognition. In relation to the processing of discourse, van Dijk distinguishes between two types of mental models: 1) situation/semantic models which “account for the personal meaning or interpretation of discourse” and; 2) context/pragmatic models which “represent the dynamically changing communicative situation or experience...[and] define the appropriateness of discourse...” (van Dijk, 2016: 67). Social cognition moves beyond mental models as subjective and unique to individuals and discusses the way in which society or
specific groups produce and share knowledge, attitudes and ideologies (van Dijk, 2016). With knowledge defined as the “beliefs that meet that (historically developing) epistemic criteria of each community” (ibid: 68) it belongs to the shared understanding, or presuppositions that groups and communities hold (Polyzou, 2015). Attitudes are developed in these groups/communities and are “shared [evaluative] beliefs about more specific issues that are relevant in everyday lives” (van Dijk, 2011). Although attitudes develop within social groups, they are influenced and organized by larger, broader, underlying structures: ideologies. An example of the relationship between attitudes and ideologies is given by van Dijk (2016): “a racist ideology may control negative attitudes about immigration, affirmative action, quotas, ethnic diversity, cultural relations...” (p.69).

It is clear, therefore, that in relation to ideology, van Dijk does not link to a Marxian view and ideology here is not considered to be an instance of ‘false consciousness’. Being firmly rooted in socio-cognitivism, ideology is “defined as the basis of the social representations shared by members of a group” (van Dijk, 1998: 8). In relation to discourse, van Dijk’s analytical focus remains largely with the ideological structures of discourse, especially since it is through the ideas of discourse as a social practice in which dominant ideologies can be “acquired, used, and spread” (van Dijk, 2013b: 176). In the discourse component of the triangle, specific ideological structures are discussed which “tend to exhibit underlying attitudes and ideologies of dominant social groups” (ibid: 73). This includes items such as positive-self presentation and negative-other presentation (see Chapter 5).

In Fairclough’s most recent outline of his Dialectical-Relational Approach, although the term ‘discourse’ features as an analytical category it is clear that the term ‘semiosis’ is favoured to understand “meaning-making as an element of the social process” (2016: 87). It is also evident that this approach to CDS takes a more neo-Marxian position in relation to both its understanding of ideology, its conception of the social, and many of the topics that have been investigated in relation to neoliberalism and capitalism (Fairclough, 2010). The ‘dialectical’ and ‘relational’ components of CDS are brought to the fore in this approach (although are equally important within other approaches) alongside the necessity of
‘transdisciplinarity’ (Fairclough, 2010). Although interdisciplinarity is key to CDS, Fairclough’s focus on ‘transdisciplinarity’ works to emphasise a ‘dialogue’ between theories, ideas and methods (Fairclough, 2016: 87). There are two ‘dialectical relations’ that are focused upon within Fairclough’s approach namely larger structures and more specific events. It is the idea of practices that ‘mediate’ the relationship between the two (Fairclough, 2016).

In relation to analytical categories a range of ‘semiotic modalities’ can be investigated which go beyond simply the analysis of language (Fairclough, 2016). It is also explained that “[t]here are three major ways in which semiosis relates to other elements of social practices and of social events” namely as action, as the construal (representation), and part of the constitution of identities (ibid: 88). In relation to these are three ‘semiotic categories’: 1) Genres – “semiotic ways of acting and interacting”, 2) Discourses – “semiotic ways of construing aspects of the world”, and 3) Styles – which are “identities, or ‘ways of being’” (ibid: 88-89). Although semiosis replaces ‘discourse’ here, it does appear that there are times in which the terms are used interchangeably, and Fairclough maintains the dialectical-relational approach is a method of critical ‘discourse’ analysis. Another aspect continually emphasised within this approach is the importance of the dialectical relationship between semiotic/discursive and non-semiotic/discursive elements (Fairclough, 2010). Not only does the approach wish to analyse these both linguistically and multimodally, but it also seeks to identify and analyse interdiscursive relations evident in how genres, discourses and styles are combined and articulated (Fairclough, 2010). Such configurations might also be labelled an ‘order or discourse’ – “the totality of discursive practices within an institution or society, and the relationships between them” (Fairclough, 1992: 43). This is a term inspired by Foucault’s understanding of discourse or ‘discursive formations’ which are outlined by Fairclough to be “systems of rules which make it possible for certain statements but not others to occur at particular times, places and institutional locations” (Fairclough, 1992: 40). In this sense, Fairclough, following Foucault, conceptualises the notion of discourse as a count noun. This means that, for example, a ‘racist discourse’ could exist. This view diverges from other CDS scholars, namely van Dijk, Wodak and Reisigl, who all consider the term discourse as something more fluid, as language-in-use, and thus investigate the
discourse of/about certain macro-topics such as immigration, climate change and
national identity (as is this case in this thesis).

In a Foucauldian sense, Fairclough writes that there are two aspects that
need to be considered in relation to a discourse formation. Firstly, the constitutive
nature of discourse must be considered in relation to how subjects and objects are
situated: “discourse constitutes the objects of knowledge, social subjects and
forms of ‘self’…” (Fairclough, 1992: 39). Secondly, focus turns to the
interdependency of discourse formations, and the way in which they are related
and only exist by drawing upon other texts/discourses. Thus an ‘order of
discourse’ for Fairclough is related to both of these ideas, the constitution of
subjects and objects through the articulation of a discourse formation and the
articulation of this via a process of interdiscursivity. Despite Fairclough’s
utilisation of aspects of Foucault’s work, he cannot accept the idea that discourse
is entirely constitutive of the social. The primary reason for this is that this
“excludes active social agency” and, via the emphasis of a dialectical relationship
between discourse and subjectivity, Fairclough adopts a position “which sees
social subjects as shaped by discursive practices, yet also capable of reshaping and
restructuring those practices” (Fairclough, 1992: 45). This is also a criticism
Fairclough directs to Althusser’s ‘interpellated subject’ especially since it
“understates the capacity of subjects to act individually or collectively as agents”

Despite a rise in postmodern thought/research which has seen a decline in
the use of the term ideology, Fairclough strongly advocates not only the use of the
term and the investigation of ideology in power relations, but also defends the use
of social classes as a category for analysis (see also Block, 2015). Thus he states:

*My view is that capitalist societies like Britain are still class
societies...and that the analysis of power and class relations
requires the category of ideology because ideologies are a
significant element of processes through which relations of
power are established, maintained, enacted and transformed.*
(Fairclough, 2010: 25-26).
However, it is also the case the Fairclough’s work on ideology is not simply about ‘social cement’ or about ‘truth’. Instead Fairclough shares Thompson’s (1990) view which “focuses upon the effects of ideologies” and where “features of texts are seen as ideological in so far as they affect (sustain, undermine) power relations” (Fairclough, 2010: 27). Fairclough also draws upon Gramsci’s concept of hegemony stating: “Orders of discourse are viewed as domains of hegemony and hegemonic (ideological) struggle…” (Fairclough, 2010: 28). Although it is noted that this may be perceived as similar to Laclau and Mouffe’s understanding of hegemony and discourse, Fairclough argues that their position “rejects…the rootedness of hegemony in class” which is essential to Fairclough’s understanding (Fairclough, 2010: 62). In light of a Gramscian conception of hegemony, it is important to note how ideologies are perceived “in terms of their social effects rather than their truth values” and the role of ‘common sense’ comes into play when “ideologies become naturalised” (Fairclough, 2010: 64). Moreover, in light of the dialectical and relational nature of Fairclough’s approach, ideology is seen to belong to both structures and events:

*Ideology is located...both in structures which constitute the outcome of past events and the conditions for current events, and in events themselves as they reproduce and transform their conditioning structure.* (Fairclough, 2010: 58)

Although Jäger (1993, 2001) and Jäger and Maier (2016), as part of the Duisburg group, have also been positioned within the wider paradigm of CDS, they present a postmodern view with regards to the concept of discourse in ways that are similar to Laclau and Mouffe (1985). Despite this, their approach is very much part of the wider CDS cause, critiquing discourses that perpetuate inequality. Here, their main influences are Foucault (1980a, 1980b, 1996) and the development of Foucault’s ideas by Jürgen Link (1983). In the formation of a critical discourse and dispositive analysis, they seek to ask questions about the status of knowledge within society and the constitution of subjects in relation to this, rather than adopting a view or analytical methods for an ideological analysis (Jäger and Maier, 2016). Building upon Link’s (1983: 60) conception of discourse as “an institutionalized way of talking...that regulates and reinforces action and
thereby exerts power”, Jäger and Maier (2016: 111) explain that their understanding of a discourse also incorporates “non-linguistically performed acting”. Thus, discourse is understood as comprising both linguistic and non-linguistic elements and in doing so, discourses do not simply act as a social practice but work to establish and exercise power (Jäger, 2001). A discourse is also understood “societal flows of knowledge through time” (ibid: 46). However, unlike the dialectical relationship of discourse and society presented above in the work of van Dijk and Fairclough, discourse is seen to “shape and enable (social) reality” (Jäger and Maier, 2016: 112). It is clear therefore that this postmodern position views the relationship between discourse, society and reality in a similar vein to Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory as discussed in section 3.2.4. In this view, the role of ideology is absent, since discourse “has a material reality of its own” (Jäger, 2001: 36) and it is discourse that “produce[s] subjects and reality”. In being able to properly understand the functioning of a discourse within society, however, it is also necessary for Jäger and associates to explore Foucault’s concept of the ‘dispositive’.

Although it is easy to mistake the dispositive simply as the non-linguistic, it is in fact a heterogeneous concept that can be broken into three constituent parts, namely: linguistic practices, non-linguistic practices and materializations (Jäger and Maier, 2016). The dispositive is thus “the net that is spun between” these three parts (Jäger and Maier, 2016: 113). However, the way in which the dispositive is analysed is through discourse analysis (Caborn, 2007) and a toolkit is provided for this purpose, detailing items such as discourse strands, fragments and planes alongside collective symbols. Despite a postmodern view which denies the role of ideology in a more traditional CDS sense, the toolkit does also make reference to ‘discourse positions’, acknowledging that subjects do possess different ideological stances and that these still require investigation (Jäger and Maier, 2016: 124).

The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA), which is the approach to be adopted within this thesis, considers the notion of ‘discourse’ and ‘ideology’ in very similar ways to van Dijk, although they do not explicitly follow his sociocognitivism, and to Fairclough, although they do not follow his Foucauldian inspired concept of an ‘order of discourse’. Thus, the dialectical nature of
discourse and society, and the role of ideology are emphasised (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001; 2016). This is further highlighted in the way that Reisigl and Wodak (2016: 27) document their understanding of ‘discourse’:

- a cluster of context-dependent semiotic practices that are situated within specific fields of social action;
- socially constituted and socially constitutive\(^{13}\);
- related to a macro-topic;
- linked to argumentation about validity-claims, such as truth and normative validity involving several social actors with different points of view. (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016: 27)

Certain elements of this conceptualisation of discourse are distinct from the other approaches reviewed above, including a discourse’s situatedness in specific fields of action and how it is considered to be linked to argumentation; an aspect that Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) critique (see Chapter 5, section 5.2.4.3). It is also important to note the differentiation between a ‘text’ and a ‘discourse’. In the DHA, texts (regardless of type/genre) “objectify linguistic actions” and are seen as “parts of discourses” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016: 27).

The DHA also advocate the investigation and analysis of intertextual and interdiscursive relations between texts, genres and discourses in relation to other contextual considerations (which very much include to historical situatedness of organisations/institutions/discourses being studied). ‘Context’ is therefore considered as follows, with all elements being investigated in a “recursive manner” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016: 31).

a) The immediate, *language or text* internal co-text;

b) The *intertextual and interdiscursive relationship* between utterances, texts, genres and discourses;

c) The *extra-linguistic social/sociological variables and institutional frames* of a specific ‘context of situation’;

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\(^{13}\) Note that this point in particular is shared amongst most approaches to CDS.
d) The broader *socio-political and historical contexts*, within which discursive practices are embedded (Richardson and Wodak, 2009: 255).

This type of historical and contextual situatedness also relates to the DHA’s adoption and emphasis of the ‘principle of triangulation’ in the process of validation (see section 3.3.3). Intertextual and interdiscursive relationships to texts, genres and discourses are evident in *Figure 1*, however as Lamb (2011) notes, this image may inadvertently make it appear that only one text can belong to one discourse, which may not always be the case. In aligning with Lamb’s view, it is clear that “texts can contain/belong to many discourses at once” (ibid: 65). These relationships are analysed through an understanding of ‘fields of action’, which are considered to be small aspects “of social reality that constitutes a partial ‘frame’ of a discourse” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016: 28).

![Figure 1: Interdiscursive and intertextual relationships in the DHA](image)

Reisigl and Wodak (2016) make three main points about how ideology is conceived of in the DHA. Firstly, ideology is understood to be a ‘perspective’ or a ‘worldview’ held and shared by members of social groups. In this respect ideology is thought of as “a system composed of related mental representations, convictions, opinions, attitudes, values and evaluations” similar to van Dijk’s understanding outline above (ibid: 25). Secondly, the way in which large ideologies such as ‘communism’ or ‘conservatism’ fits into this system, is that they are considered to be “grand narratives”\(^\text{14}\) with three main components: 1) “a representational model of what society looks like”; 2) “a visionary model of what

\(^{14}\) A term introduced by Lyotard (1984).
society should look like”; and 3) “a programmatic model of how the envisioned society could be achieved” (ibid). Finally, ideologies are seen creating and shaping social identities and relations of power (especially unequal relations of power) and this conception, seemingly links to Thompson’s (1990) ideas (explained further below), also shared by Fairclough. However, it must also be noted that, “ideologies also function as a means of transforming power relations” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016: 25). The aim of the DHA is to analyse and critique the ideologies of discourses that have become hegemonic and it is about “deciphering the ideologies that serve to establish, perpetuate or resist dominance” (ibid). As has been evident in both Reisigl and Wodak's DHA, and Fairclough's Dialectical-Relational approach, the notion of ‘ideology’ has, to a certain extent, been informed by insights from Thompson (1990).

Thompson (1990) does not deny the centrality of Marxism to the concept of ideology but, instead, reminds us that even Marx's views were both complimentary and contradictory. In this respect, it becomes clear that, even for Marx, ideology was not solely conceptualised as ‘false consciousness’. Thompson (1990) therefore explains that only one aspect of Marxian theory is related to false consciousness as an “illusory form” based on an idea that, through scientific enquiry, these forms of consciousness could essentially be ‘unmasked’. This part of Marxian theory is labelled the ‘epiphenomenal conception’ (Thompson, 1990: 38). However, Thompson (1990) explains that another form of ideology was also discussed by Marx: the ‘latent conception’ 15. Whereas the ‘epiphenomenal conception’ of ideology relates to the illusion created via the concept of classes and social relations as determined by economic conditions, the ‘latent conception’ of ideology relates to “symbolic constructions” and to meanings created within society, not necessarily (but potentially) linked to class and that “constitute symbols and slogans, customs and traditions” (Thompson, 1990: 42). The ‘latent conception’ is the conception of ideology that Thompson (1990) goes onto fully elaborate upon and the one that seemingly relates to the DHA.

In rethinking the concept of ideology, Thompson (1990: 51) argues that in its development after Marx, via Lenin, Lukacs and Mannheim, a process of

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15 Although, it must also be noted that Marx never actually labeled this as 'ideology' – instead he referred to 'fixed ideas' or 'ghosts' (Thompson, 1990).
‘neutralization’ occurred and ideology became more and more about “systems of thought or ideas which are socially situated and collectively shared” and here any negative aspects of ideology were seemingly removed. Thompson suggests that, effectively, two types of ideology were being discussed: 1) the ‘neutral conception’ of ideology which “purport[s] to characterize phenomena as ideology or ideological without implying that these...are necessarily misleading, illusory or aligned with interests of any particular group” (p.53) and; 2) the ‘critical conception’ which did have a negative connotation and showed how ideology was “misleading, illusory or one-sided” (p. 54). However, Thompsons’ conceptualisation seeks a third view, counteracting the idea that ideology can be neutralized. This view works with and builds on Marx’s ‘latent conception’ of ideology and is “concerned with the ways in which symbolic forms intersect with relations of power” (p.56). In this case, Thompson (1990: 56) expresses: “to study ideology is to study the ways in which meaning serves to establish and sustain relations of domination”.

The way in which this conception of ideology is related to Marx, however, is only through his ‘latent conception’ of ideology. Within this new understanding, only one aspect of negativity is preserved, “namely, the criterion of sustaining relations of domination” (Thompson, 1990: 56). Thus, ideological forms can be, but do not necessarily have to be, illusory or misleading. It is therefore advised that the illusory aspect of ideology should be considered “as a contingent possibility” (ibid). There are two other ways in which this conception of ideology differs from Marx. The first is that there is no class or economic determination; Thompson views class as “only one axis of inequality and exploitation” (1990: 57) thus allowing for other relations of gender, culture, age etc. to be explored. The second way in which it is different is that it purports symbolic forms (or discourse) to be “continuously and creatively implicated in the constitution of social relations” (ibid: 58). This very much in the same sense of the dialectical, constituted and constitutive nature of discourse seen within approaches to CDS. Thus, this type of ideological analysis is about uncovering relations of power. Fairclough, Wodak and Reisigl cite Thompson (1990), and it is apparent that this line of thinking has at least partly determined their conceptualisations of ideology.
Moreover, it is clear that notions of ‘power’ and ‘domination’ are inherent to this understanding, and therefore will be explored in the next section.

3.3.2 ‘Power’

‘Power’, is another notion that is conceptualised differently within approaches to CDS. Whereas power is used in everyday discourse to discuss the “ability or capability to do something”, “to direct or influence the behaviour of other” or as “physical force” (Oxford Living Dictionaries, 2018c), when power is discussed within CDS, it is generally in relation to how certain structures (discursive or social) can assert, sustain or even resist domination. In particular, domination is conceived of “as power abuse of one group over others” (Wodak and Meyer, 2016: 9). However, most approaches to CDS are not only interested in the reproduction of social dominance but also “how dominated groups may discursively resist such abuse” (ibid). CDS as a whole has taken influence with regards to the conceptualisation of power from a number of scholars. Wodak and Meyer (2016: 10) list at least three strands of power that inform CDS scholars:

1. Power as a result of specific resources of individual actors (e.g. French and Raven, 1959).
2. Power as a specific attribute of social exchange in each interaction, depending on the relation of resources between different actors (e.g. Blau, 1964; Emerson 1962, 1975).
3. Power as a widely invisible systematic and constitutive characteristic of society (e.g. Foucault, 1975; Giddens 1984; Luhmann, 1975).

It is also the case that, in relation to Lukes (2005), power has different dimensions including that it may be: overt - as in the process of conflict and one side winning; covert - through the substitution or discounting of certain viewpoints; or power to shape desires and beliefs which may produce a hegemony, preventing conflict from occurring in the first place (cited in Wodak and Meyer, 2016: 10). However, even across different academic disciplines, a discursive conception of power has been sought and this is evidenced in the work of Holzscheiter (2005), who, in analysing non-governmental organisations (NGOs) recognises a need to conceptualise the discursive nature of power. This is related
specifically to how they might possess non-material power “as actors producing change and not only responding to it” (p. 726). Thus the role of discourse is important because it is through language and communication and not through ‘material power’ (see van Dijk, 2016) in which NGOs are able to acquire and sustain their own power.

Turning to van Dijk (2016: 71), it is clear that power is conceptualised “as a specific relationship of control between social groups or organizations” (and is seen as having both social and cognitive dimensions). Generally, this type of power can constrain certain social groups to remain inferior to powerful or elite groups. As a result, forms of inequality are constructed and perpetuated within society, some of which become hegemonic and, therefore, remain unchallenged. There is also a distinction between ‘material power’ which would include possession of assets and wealth and ‘symbolic power’ inclusive of a person’s education/intelligence, status or familiarity (as in fame) (ibid). In relation to an investigation of immigration and discourses which are based on or rely on social categories of ‘race’ or ‘ethnicity’, van Dijk goes on to explain that, in this kind of context, “symbolic power resources may be skin colour, origin, nationality or culture”. As van Dijk (2016: 71) explains, although there are aspects of power, which may be ‘legitimate’ as in the relationships between a teacher and their student or parents and their children, CDS is concerned with those illegitimate instances of power (abuse) “and the violation of social norms and human rights”.

Although Foucault’s relativism may appear at odds with the emancipatory agenda of CDS, it may appear that his conception of power could be more usefully incorporated in the understanding of how power structures work and how they are imposed or resisted (1980a, 1980b). This is because power is conceptualised by Foucault in relational terms; it is seen to be both repressive and productive (Mills, 1997). Moreover, Foucault (1978: 95) saw resistance as an inherent property of power stating, “Where there is power there is resistance”. The Duisburg group therefore adopts Foucault’s conceptualisation with Jäger and Maier (2016: 117) explaining how “Discourses exercise power because they institutionalize and regulate ways of talking, thinking and acting”. They also differentiate between Power of Discourse and Power over Discourse, where the former delineates discourse as being inherently powerful due to it possessing
knowledge that is “sayable, makeable and seeable” (p.117) and where the latter focuses on those individuals who may have “different chances of influence” (p.118). However, they also go on to say that, in relation to Power over Discourse, it is always the case that no individual possesses the ability to overcome hegemonic discourse: “Everybody is co-producing discourse, but no single individual or group controls discourse or has precisely intended its final result.” (ibid).

However, for Wodak (1996), this understanding of power remains mostly problematic: “Foucault’s answer is that some discourses become superficially more pleasant, less oppressive, but that in fact power continues to exist – and even better hidden than before” (Wodak, 1996: 27). In Wodak’s (1996) investigation into institutional discourse, it is found that via the process of deliberation, power structures and resultant inequality, for example in a doctor-patient relationship, can be significantly reduced via the process of discussion and deliberation. Subsequently, agency is attributed to the subject (the individual) in relation to the institution. Foucault’s dissolution of the subject means “power does not belong to particular agents such as individuals or the state...; rather power is spread across different social practices” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 12).

In Thompson (1990: 58) power is understood “as a socially institutionally endowed capacity which enables or empowers some individuals to make decisions, pursue ends or realize interests” and which seemingly focuses primarily on the individual; however, without denying the role of social institutions and the structures that regulate power. Within the DHA, Reisigl and Wodak (2016) recognise power to be something similar to the definition given by Thompson (1990) in which power is conceptualised as “an asymmetric relationship among social actors who have different social positions or belong to different social groups” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016: 26). Thus, whereas power relates to the individual, there is no denying that the individual belongs to certain social structures and institutions in which they shape but are also shaped by. They also state that “power is socially ubiquitous” and, like Foucault’s understanding they recognise its “productive” nature although emphasise that “it is often destructive” (ibid). As will be discussed further below, the DHA take much of their theoretical influence (especially with regards to critique) from critical theorist Jürgen
Habermas. In relation to language and power, Habermas states “language is... a medium of domination and social force. It serves to legitimise relations of organized power” (Habermas, 1967: 259 cited in Wodak and Meyer, 2016: 12). Thus, although language may not be inherently powerful (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016), “Language is entwined in social power” seen in the following ways:

- Language indexes and expresses power.
- Language is involved where there is contention over and a challenge to power.
- Power does not necessarily derive from language, but language can be used to challenge power, to subvert it, to alter distributions of power in the short and the long term.
- Language provides a finely articulated vehicle for the expression of differences in power in hierarchical social structures. (Wodak and Meyer, 2016: 12).

3.3.3 ‘Critique’

As discussed previously, one of the ways in which illegitimate conceptions of power abuse can be identified is through an analysis that is ‘critical’. The way in which critical research can be conducted is through the adoption and construction of “normative perspectives” which may then lead to emancipatory agendas (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 2). As Wodak and Meyer (2016: 7) explain: “Critical theories...want to produce and convey critical knowledge that enables human beings to emancipate themselves from forms of domination through self-reflection”. Establishing a normative perspective therefore involves working out how an ethics can be created, in relation to what may be conceived as good/bad within society. I will now consider some of the ways in which critique is conceptualised within CDS, and how justifications of critique for an emancipatory agenda can be formed.

CDS is a paradigm that continues to be explicit about the ways in which ‘critique’ is conducted. Although not all approaches to CDS follow the same understanding of critique, there is a strong conception of what it means to be critical in each of the approaches. As van Dijk notes: “The critical approach of CDS characterizes scholars rather than their methods” (2016: 63). This critical
orientation is not just something that emerges from the data (see criticisms below) but is “the raison d’être for analysis” (Billig, 2003). Wodak and Meyer (2016) explain that, in its conception, CL (prior to CDS) was concerned with how language could ‘mystify’ social relations and that an analysis of language could uncover illusions or ideology (in the Marxist sense). This kind of critique can be linked back to the work of the Frankfurt School and their extension and modification of Marxism within Critical Theory (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1944/1997; Habermas 1984, 1987; Thompson, 1988; How, 2003; Forchtner, 2010). It is also clear that many approaches within CDS continue to adopt the main objectives of Critical Theory which are said to be:

1) Critical Theory should be directed at the totality of society in its historical specificity.

2) Critical Theory should improve the understanding of society by integrating all the major social sciences, including economics, sociology, history, political science, anthropology and sociology. (Wodak and Meyer, 2016: 6).

Within CDS, these main objectives are apparent, especially in the way in which many perspectives consider themselves to be necessarily ‘interdisciplinary’ (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016) ‘multidisciplinary’ (van Dijk, 2016) or ‘transdisciplinary’ (Fairclough, 2016). These conceptions of critique come from an understanding developed within the Enlightenment period (c.1720-1820), related to understandings of ‘critique’ by Immanuel Kant who advocated “the use of rational analysis to explore the bounds of concepts and theories, including, the human use of reason itself” (Chilton, Tian and Wodak, 2010: 490). This type of analysis was applied by Marx in relation to the economy, and then further by the Frankfurt School in their analysis of society and culture (ibid). However, Sayer (2009) has suggested that in the postmodern era, social scientists have been more sceptical about employing the notions of ‘critique’. Even where ‘critique’ is carried out, it is seemingly more redundant, especially since “the word has become more widely used and devalued...it functions as a posh synonym for ‘criticize’” (Sayer, 2009: 768). As Jäger and Meier (2016) locate themselves within a postmodern epistemology, their conception of critique relies on an analysis of evaluations, contradictions and limitations of a discourse “and the means by which a discourse
makes particular statements, actions and things seem rational...even though they are only valid at a certain time and place" (p.119). They follow what Sayer (2009: 768) has labelled a “postmodern suspicion of normativity”. However, as mentioned previously, this type of relativism is not something that will be followed in this thesis. This is especially because such a contextualised and relative understanding of good/bad makes it particularly difficult to claim a discourse is discriminatory, and in particular, possessive of a racist ideology.

Sayer (2009) contends that Critical Social Research should engage in ‘critique’ more explicitly, arguing that it should be based “not only on the reduction of illusion but the identification of avoidable suffering” (p.769). Moreover, it is argued that critique for the purposes of ‘freedom’ is also not enough: “while freedom is fundamental, it is not sufficient” (p. 773). This is primarily because conceptions of freedom are seemingly also attached to notions of individualism and “fail to acknowledge that we are dependent social beings” and the value of collectivism (ibid). Moreover, in an interesting extension, Sayer (2009: 774) notes that “Not all forms of suffering derive from domination; some derive from a lack of care, that is, from refusal of responsibilities for and towards others”. I think this is a very important consideration to take up in CDS; however, in my opinion, it is not necessarily disconnected from power/domination. For, if an individual or a group are able to ‘refuse’ responsibility for others, they are already asserting an unequal power balance, where they have adopted a superior position.

Fairclough (2010), building upon the ideas discussed by Sayer (2009), discusses the notion of critique as being “grounded in values...of the ‘good society’ and of human well-being and flourishing” (Fairclough, 2010: 7). Although Fairclough also discusses the fact that “people have very different ideas of justice, freedom and need”, critique does not become redundant simply as a result of this, and critique is viewed as necessary as it allows us to “engage in debates over meaning...and other value related concepts” (Fairclough, 2010: 7). Fairclough (2010; 2016) distinguishes between two type of critique: 1) negative critique: which analyses and evaluates the way in which ‘social wrongs’ may be produced and sustained and; 2) positive critique: which considers the way in which these ‘social wrongs’ might be resisted in the form of ‘righting’ or ‘mitigating’ them.
The way in which ‘critique’ is conceptualised within DHA explicitly links to the *Frankfurt School* and Critical Theory. As Forchtner (2010: 20) explains, the DHA appear to be the only CDS approach that clearly “bases its critique on a foundational notion of emancipation”. Furthermore, there are three related aspects to critique:

1) ‘Text or discourse immanent critique’ aims to discover inconsistencies, (self) contradictions, paradoxes and dilemmas in text-internal or discourse-internal structures.

2) ‘Socio-diagnostic critique’ is concerned with uncovering – the particularly latent – persuasive or ‘manipulative’ character of discursive practices.

3) Future-related ‘prospective critique’ seeks to improve communication (e.g. by elaborating guidelines against sexist language use or by reducing ‘language barriers’ in hospitals, schools and so forth). (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016: 25)

Although the DHA make links to both the first generation of Critical Theory (Horkheimer, 1931), and the second generation (Habermas, 1984, 1987), Forchtner (2010) argues that it is the Habermasian view which is more commensurable with the DHA and this critique has been reworked into the DHA, evident in Reisigl (2014) and Reisigl and Wodak (2016).

While Critical Theory is adopted explicitly within the DHA, and to a certain extent in other approaches to CDS, Wodak and Meyer (2016: 7) explain how it seldom considers researcher positionality. In CDS, there is therefore an explicit understanding that the analyst is embedded within social and discursive structures; the researcher does not have a ‘privileged’ position in which they might be able to locate themselves as being outside of the social field, as is the case in the positivist paradigm (Wodak and Meyer, 2016; Holliday, 2016). It is through its rejection of positivism, therefore, that methodological principles such as reliability and validity are also (in theory) rejected (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002). However, this does not mean that a type of ‘validity’ (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 22), which aims “to minimise the risk of critical biasing” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 35), does not exist within CDS. Moreover, it is through the implementation of ‘reflexivity’ across CDS and the principle of ‘triangulation’ within the DHA.
specifically (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001; Wodak et al., 2009), that the analyst can be both politically committed and, at the same time, ensure that research is scholarly, rigorous, and theoretically and analytically sound.

Reflexivity in qualitative research is concerned with “the way in which researchers come to terms with and indeed capitalise on the complexities of their presence” (Holliday, 2016: 146). Not only does this require the analyst to critically acknowledge their own experiences and assumptions prior to and during the research (both in the analysis and in the write up – see Blackman and Commane, 2014; Bucholtz, 2001), as is practised widely for emancipatory purposes within CDS, but also about the way in which the analyst can maintain ‘radical doubt’ throughout the research process (Bourdieu, 1992: 235). This relates to the way in which a researcher maintains criticality through continual questioning and reassessment of theoretical and methodological position vis-à-vis the object of study. As Bourdieu (1992: 235) states, "A scientific practice that fails to question itself does not, properly speaking, know what it does". Moreover, in order for radical doubt to be operationalized, Bourdieu (1992: 238) states “you must retrace the history of the emergence of… problems”, with 'problems' here referring to the object of analysis and where history is conceptualised not in terms of “an antiquarian interest but by a will to understand why and how one understands” (ibid). As will be further elaborated below, the DHA incorporates this historical dimension within their analysis of discourse, and I have also attempted to trace (albeit in limited space) the emergence of a racist ideology within a discourse about immigration within the UK historically (see Chapter 2), and also the emergence of CDS in this present chapter.

As introduced above, the DHA also develop grounding for critique by employing the principle of triangulation, where a range of theoretical and methodological principles and tools are utilised in the examination of discourse(s) and discourse topics. Moreover, this is adopted “to avoid an excessively simplistic and one-sided perspective” and “to avoid simply politicizing, instead of accurately analysing” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 35). It is clear that in most approaches to CDS, inter-/multi-/trans-disciplinary research is advocated; however, in the DHA, the principle of triangulation ensures that analysis is also systematically based on political, historical, sociological and/or psychological theoretical insights, plus a
range of methodological tools that draw on a range of middle-range linguistic theories (see Chapter 5). This includes argumentation (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004; Wengeler, 2003; Rubinelli, 2009) and the representation of social actors (van Leeuwen, 1996). This theoretical and methodological approach to the research problem resonates again with Bourdieu’s wider understanding of reflexivity, where interdisciplinarity is favoured and “methodological monotheism” is rejected (1992: 226). As Sayer also suggests, we should continue to critique and problematize social situations and discourses, at the same time as being reflexive, so we do not end up “creat[ing] a space for dogmatism” (Sayer, 2009: 779). The next section will therefore consider criticisms directed towards CDS, in order to continue advocating the necessity of critique within discourse analysis.

3.3.4 Criticisms of CDS

There have been a number of criticisms directed towards CDS, especially in relation to its political orientation and systematicity of analysis. Two of the main advocates of such criticism are Schegloff (1997) and Widdowson (2004), with both of them suggesting that critical discourse analysts refrain from engaging in an exhaustive linguistic description. Schegloff’s argument, in particular, contrasts the methods employed in CDS and those employed in Conversation Analysis (CA). The latter is favoured because issues relating to concepts such as power, gender or ‘race,’ for example, are not considered or “postulated a priori in order to understand or explain ongoing talk”, that is of course, unless the participants engaged in talk-in-interaction make explicit reference to them (van Dijk, 1999). It is also the case that Schegloff does not believe that CDS analysts give enough descriptive/linguistic attention to the texts they are analysing and he states: “If, however, they mean issues of power, domination and the like to connect up with discursive material, it should be a serious rendering of that material” (1997: 183). Widdowson (2004) presents a similar criticism, especially in relation to how CDS scholars (including earlier forms of CL) draw upon Halliday’s (1994) Systemic Functional Grammar in a way that is not exhaustive: “CDA, then, does not involve the systematic application of S/F [systemic functional grammar] as a whole, but the expedient picking and choosing of whatever aspect of it seems useful for its purpose” (Widdowson, 2004: 97).
Both of these criticisms put forward the idea that exhaustive linguistic description is absolutely paramount for research to be considered ‘valid’. However, it would seem that such a view of description derives from positivist ways of thinking. As has been shown above, CDS scholars view their research as being anti-objectivist and experiential and, for this part, an argument can be made “that no research is objective, all scientific research is always subservient to interests” (Chilton, Tian and Wodak, 2010: 491). Furthermore, to not consider any social or political contexts or conditions a priori can be argued to be an epistemological naivety, especially since CDS analysts view both social and discursive structures to be in a dialectical relationship with one another (van Dijk, 1999). Moreover, Billig (2003: 38-39) argues that CDS analysts view “traditional linguistics and conversation analysis as being ‘non-critical’, because their perspectives seem to ignore connections between language and power”. This, however, does not mean that CDS is not systematic either, as many approaches, including the DHA, follow a systematic process of analysis and linguistic investigation, where I would argue a good “rendering” of the material is accomplished. However, as is the case with all qualitative research methods, attention is given not to numbers but to the themes that emerge (Holliday, 2016). Consequently, this leads to some aspects or parts of the text being focused on more closely than others. In this case, it would be completely impractical to apply, for example, the whole of systemic functional grammar to the text in question. Another response from Billig (2003: 39) also notes that to deny or to attack critical social research of any form is ideological in itself and “has the function of maintaining existing power relations”.

Other criticisms of CDS have come from scholars who would, nevertheless, identify their own research as belonging to the CDS paradigm. These scholars have maintained a critical eye and brought new perspectives and dialogues to the aims and objectives of CDS. The first of these to be discussed is Billig (2003), who discusses the successes of CDS as a global paradigm but warns CDS practitioners that its institutionalisation may, in turn, help to produce the very power structures of inequality it is examining. This warning reminds us of the importance of being self-reflexive throughout the research process. As part of this criticism, Billig (2003: 41) points out that acronyms such as ‘CDA’ may start to work as a
‘marketing strategy’. The use of acronyms such as CDS and the DHA in this study is practically oriented for ease of reading rather than as a marketing ploy, and I have acknowledged throughout that there are a number of different ways to do discourse analysis, and that these incorporate a range of theoretical positions. Furthermore, although I am openly adopting the DHA, I have done so with a critical eye. This will be addressed further in Chapter 5 (section 5.3), where I attempt to extend the DHA’s understanding of ‘evaluation’ and not just ‘representation’ in discourse.

A further criticism, put forward initially by Chilton (2005) and then by Hart (2010), regards the incorporation of Cognitive Linguistics and Evolutionary Psychology within CDS (Chilton, 2005; Hart, 2010), as this may help to explain why and not just how inequality and discrimination exists. Even though there have been calls for a biologically based theory to be connected to CDS, and that this has allowed for understandings of modules such as ‘cheater-detection’, I agree with Lamb (2011) that a study situated both politically and historically is equally able to explain why inequality exists and engage in ‘prospective critique’, without also adding a cognitive dimension.

3.3.5 CDS and the Media

Alongside the analysis of other ‘elite’ institutions (such as the government and education), CDS scholars continue to direct analysis and critique towards the media. This is not only in the representation and evaluation of immigration and the potential for implicit or explicit racist views to be disseminated to large audiences (van Dijk, 2000), but also in relation to the power and influence the media hold per se. As van Dijk (1991: 43) explains: “in present-day societies the mass media have nearly exclusive control over the symbolic resources needed to manufacture popular consent” and this is especially true in relation to “ethnic relations”. The media (with reference specifically to the UK context, but also globally), is omnipresent and does not only exist to inform the public, but also to entertain, persuade and some may even say strategically manipulate or suppress what the audience is exposed to (Hart, 2010). According to Herman and Chomsky (1988/2008), the mass media “serve to mobilize support for the special interests that dominate the state and private activity” and, as such, they believe that a primary aspect of the media revolves around a ‘propaganda function’, where
consent or hegemony is manufactured through strategic additions and omissions that serve political and ‘elite’ interests. By establishing a ‘propaganda model’ that forms a framework for analysis, Hermon and Chomsky (1988/2008: 2) evidence how the US media, in particular, involves a “pattern of manipulation and systemic bias”.

Despite this, Richardson (2007: 7), although not denying that “journalism is often entertaining [and] regularly reproduces the opinion of the powerful...[as] a saleable commodity”, also reminds us that, “journalism exists to enable citizens to better understand their lives and their position(s) in the world” (ibid). This comment is particularly powerful as it also acknowledges the democratic or social justice potential of media production. In my view, this is equally important and should not be side-lined in a study that wishes to critique discourse disseminated by the media. The media is evidently a powerful instrument to get voices and opinions heard, it “is one of the most pervasive and widespread discourses that people...are exposed to” (Caldas-Coulthard, 2003: 272-273); however, this poses a further question for critical discourse analysts, namely: ‘who’ and ‘what’ is represented and why?

The mass media incorporates many mediated channels, inclusive of film, radio, TV, newspapers (printed and online), magazines, advertisements and more recently social media, including social networking sites, blogs and wikis. This mass-mediated communication is socially, politically and institutionally situated and, it is therefore appropriate to discuss the representations and evaluations (written/spoken or visual) as ‘media discourse’ (Caldas-Coulthard, 2003; Richardson, 2007). In this section, focus will primarily be given to the role of the news, specifically the press, not only because of its “distributional power” (especially online), and its “social...political...and educational role” (Caldas-Coulthard, 2003: 273), but also because of the way in which it incorporates power “to control what is featured and how” (Hart, 2010: 17).

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16 Although Herman and Chomsky’s (1988/2008: 2) analysis is applied to the US media, their ‘propaganda model’ is equally applicable to the media within the UK. The model consists of five elements: 1) the size, concentrated ownership, owner wealth, and profit orientation of the dominant mass-media firms; 2) advertising as the primary income source of the mass media; 3) the reliance of the media on information provided by government, business, and “experts” funded and approved by these primary sources and agents of power; 4) “flak” as a means of disciplining the media and; 5) “anticommunism”as a national religion and control mechanism.
Richardson (2007) discusses the ethics of news reporting and the journalist’s view of ‘objectivity’. In ethical terms, there are four basic principles: 1) seeking and reporting truth; 2) acting independently, of sources and other journalists; 3) minimising harm; and 4) being accountable (ibid: 83). However, as with any list proposing rules or regulations, there are inevitable, internal philosophical contradictions, which need to be managed with care. In relation to this, Richardson (2007: 84) distinguishes between “categorical principles” (or deontological principles) that link to “rights, duties and moral absolutes” and “consequentialist principles” where benefits outweigh consequences in a utilitarian sense. Thus, to report the truth (or what is believed to be the truth) may (unintentionally) result in harm. For example, in relation to discourse about immigration, to report that some people live in the UK ‘illegally’, without the correct documentation (without acknowledging why this is the case), could in many respects add to or advocate racist views or anti-immigrant hostility. Likewise, reporting about the choice of clothing of a female MP may appear to be a ‘true’ representation, however, this could equally add to or advocate sexism in the sense that a male MP is not focused on in the same way. Therefore, Richardson (2007: 84) notes that “elevating the right to report without due consideration of potential harm can result in reporting that encourages social evils such as racism, sexism, homophobia and so on”. Although there are codes of practice established by bodies such as the Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO), scholars including van Dijk (1993; 2000) and Pitcher (2006) have evidenced examples of racism which “typically escape the media’s ethical censure” (Pitcher 2006: 537).

In relation to the latter idea of ‘objectivity’, Richardson (2007: 87) explains how ‘objectivity’ from the journalist’s perspective does not mean that reporting seeks to be ‘unbiased’. Richardson, turns to Tuchman (1972) to explain the techniques used in the production of what may be deemed an ‘objective’ report: 1) the use of sources in the verbalisation of (competing) truth-claims; 2) supporting evidence in the form of background or contextualising information; 3) ‘scare quotes’ to indicate a contentious truth claim; and 4) the inverted pyramid of news reporting and a narrative style that removes the authorial voice of the journalist (Richardson, 2007: 87). As Caldas-Coulthard reminds us, “news is the report or recontextualization of an event” (2003: 273 – their emphasis) and
“recontextualizations always add evaluation to the social practice they refer to” (ibid: 276). It is evident, that a news report can claim ‘objectivity’ while at the same time being intentionally biased.

This discussion of objectivity also relates to ‘what’ or ‘who’ is foregrounded/backgrounded, or included/suppressed in news. In terms of the topics addressed, it is widely documented and accepted that the news adheres to a set of values that make a story or event ‘newsworthy’ (Galtung and Ruge, 1965). News values\(^\text{17}\) are said to include negativity, closeness to home (proximity), recency, currency, continuity, uniqueness, simplicity, personality, expectedness (predictability), elite nations or people, exclusivity and size (ibid). In this respect, there are thousands of events, ideas, perspectives that will never reach the news and news reporting thus constrains the public’s access (to a certain extent) to what is ‘really’ happening all over the world. Related to this, Caldas-Coulthard (2003) also discusses a list of positive and negative legitimating values that are generally focused upon, presenting them as binary oppositions such as legality/illegality, moderation/extremism, peacefulness/violence, rationality/irrationality, fairness/unfairness, equality/inequality (ibid: 278). The importance of considering both representation and evaluation will be discussed further in Chapter 5.

Richardson (2007: 87) also discusses the ‘who’ component in relation to “who gets to speak in the news” and explains “access to the news is a power resources in itself”. Thus, in relation to discourse about immigration, it has been noted by many, including Berkeley, Khan and Ambikaipaker (2006), that asylum-seekers, refugees and migrants, and also the charities that seek to represent their views, have differential speaking rights to politicians and other institutional or ‘elite’ actors when it comes to their access to the press\(^\text{18}\). Also related to the ‘who’ component is the grammatical notion regarding who is included/excluded or foregrounded/backgrounded/suppressed in discourse (see Chapter 5, section 5.2.1). CDS and CL scholars have turned to Halliday’s concept of ‘Transitivity’ within Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) to explore this further. Probably the

\(^{17}\) Since Galtung and Ruge (1965), there has been much interest in news values and these have evolved and changed with time (see Bell, 1991; Richardson, 2007; Bednarek and Caple, 2012).

\(^{18}\) See also Fowler (1991: 21-22) for a more detailed outline of those social actors and institutions that seem to get preferential access to the media.
most cited example of how the grammatical positioning of social actors can convey different ideologies comes from Trew (1979), using the following headlines from stories that reported on the killings of eleven people from police fire on 2nd June 1975, in Harare, Salisbury:

POLICE SHOOT 11 DEAD IN SALISBURY RIOT (*The Guardian*)

RIPTING BLACKS SHOT DEAD BY POLICE AS ANC LEADERS MEET (*The Times*)

What Trew (1979) shows from these examples is that different ideologies can develop from the grammatical positioning of social actors in discourse. Whereas *The Guardian* presents their headline in the active voice, *The Times* presents theirs in the passive. By doing this, *The Times* makes ‘rioting blacks’ the focus and puts the “(syntactic) agents of the killing, ‘police’ in [a] less focal position” (Trew, 1979: 98) whereas *The Guardian* directs attention to the actions of the police. Moreover, although ‘riot’ appears in both headlines and “is a description which [nevertheless] legitimises police intervention”, in *The Times*, ‘riot appears as a verb ‘rioting’ and is attached to ‘blacks’. These two examples show how grammatical positioning can shift or focus responsibility onto or away from certain social actors. As will be shown in Chapter 5 (section 5.2.1), van Leeuwen (1996) has developed a method of analysing social actor representation in discourse and this will be utilised within the analysis.

In discussing the pervasive and persuasive role of the media, it is also necessary to consider the role of the audience. Since the publication of the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* by Critical Theorists Adorno and Horkheimer (1944/1997), the media, or in their terms the *Culture Industry*, has been critiqued with reference to the positioning of the public as passive consumers. If the audience are simply passive consumers of the media, this not only risks a lack of critical engagement, but according to Adorno and Horkheimer (1944/1997) also means that ‘happiness’ is only becomes equated with the consumption of goods. This idea, which is over 70 years old, still seems to stand with Koller and Wodak (2008: 6) expressing: “readers/receivers that constitute the audience are not
citizens but consumers” – they consume both the news and the products advertised within the press.

Richardson (2007: 77) distinguishes between “the audience as consumer and the idea of the audience as a commodity”. With reference to the audience as consumer, newspapers are seen as a commodity that needs to be sold and therefore “must be made attractive or appealing to a market of consumers” (ibid). In this respect, news outlets seek to profit from news distribution and this in turn can influence strategic choices of content. However, audiences are far from passive recipients of the news, and in trying to attend to all needs, interests and preferences, there has also been a ‘fragmentation’ of the audience and this, in turn, potentially “adversely affect[s] the quality of journalism” (ibid: 78). Related to this, or following on from fragmentation is the ‘segmentation’ of the audience usually in relation to demographic (ibid). As the printed press declines, and access to free digitized versions increase, alternative means of income are required (Boczkowski, 2005). Richardson (2007) notes that in relation to this, the audience are re-positioned not as consumers but as a commodity, newspapers are therefore “in the business of producing audiences. These audiences, or means of access to them, are sold to advertisers” (Owen and Wildman, 1992: 3 cited in Richardson, 2007: 79). The audience as ‘product’ are usually packaged according to social class (Richardson, 2007: 79). Related to this, Talbot (2007) suggests that news producers (journalists) have to “construct an imaginary person to speak to”. Thus, thinking about and portraying the world in essentialist, stereotypical and reductionist ways also becomes apparent, where journalists “are in a position to attribute values and attitudes to their addressees” presenting these as common-sense (Talbot: 2007: 47).

In the descriptions of the audience as passive recipients above, there is also the implication that the media is a one-way, unidirectional or ‘top-down’ channel. However, Gabrielatos and Baker (2008: 9) take a different view, arguing “the relation between the press and its readers is bi-directional”. Positing the audience only as consumer denies agency and potential resistance to the discourse(s) and corresponding ideologies that they are consuming. van Dijk (1991) also does not share this view suggesting, from a socio-cognitive perspective, that the audience have ‘personal models’ and that “the readers are not passive, but active processors
of information” (ibid: 43). Talbot (2007: 4) also agrees that with the continuous advent and modification of new technology “dialogue is increasingly possible” and says “for fruitful engagement with media discourse it is not particularly helpful to isolate either text or audience as the object of study, since clearly we need to focus on both” (ibid: 61). The next section will focus on this in more depth, exploring the affordances and dynamics related to social media.

3.3.6 CDS and Social Media

With the advent of the Internet and the development of social media, some scholars anticipated that the public's involvement could “serve as a democratic digital utopia” (Hughey and Daniels, 2014: 333). This was envisioned due to the changing and evolving nature of ‘participation frameworks’ – the “communicative environment” that encompasses not only the producers of texts but also the consumers (O'Keeffe, 2012: 449). Moreover, KhosraviNik and Unger (2016: 206) have noted “a new dynamic of communication” which “breaks away from the traditional linear flow of content from certain (privileged) producers to (ordinary, powerless) consumers”. However, they are also critical about positing social media as solely having emancipatory and/or democratic potential, pointing to the way in which new technologies have also allowed for ‘prosumption’: the mixing of production and consumption (Ritzer and Jurgenson, 2010) which effectively puts “consumers to work” (KhosraviNik and Unger, 2016: 207). Related to this is the fact that although the public have more space for interaction, there appears to be a lack of “online space” for dialogue between participants and journalists (Franquet, Villa and Bergillos, 2011: 239). Despite this, KhosraviNik and Unger (2016: 211) elaborate upon the communicative power and potential of social media in relation to its interactivity, multi-modality and user-centeredness informing that “the traditional dichotomy of powerful/powerless voices is eroding as more content is produced and consumed socially”. In relation to discussions of deliberative democracy (see section 3.4.2), it would seem that social media has at least enabled “some kind of participatory role to the individual communicator” (ibid: 211).

However, the openness and freedom in which the Internet allows has also contributed to the debate surrounding the democratic notion of ‘freedom of speech/expression’, especially when this allows for explicit hate crime and
discrimination (including racism, sexism and workplace/school bullying) online. Although there may be great support for the “fundamental right” of freedom of speech, which in turn allows for the “free flow of knowledge, ideas and information” to continue on the Internet (Banks, 2010:233), use of social media has become a “breeding ground for racists” and other advocates of discrimination “to spread their propaganda” (ibid: 234). It has since been reported that many online news sites now use “a variety of strategies to deal with vulgar and offensive comments” including users being able to report hate, discrimination or offense and an increase in surveillance and comment moderation (Hughey and Daniels, 2013: 333) with this type of moderation has also causing methodological dilemmas.

As this study also wishes to examine the public’s response to media discourse about immigration, it is necessary to consider the affordances and dynamics social media gives rise to, and the role of the ‘participant’ or ‘citizen’ journalist. Moreover, attention also needs to be given to the way in which this can be considered from a CDS perspective. It is clear that since the development of web 2.0, and subsequent rise of social media, many online platforms have allowed for citizen journalists to participate and be involved in reporting, debating and expressing opinions online (Hughey and Daniels, 2013: 332). These might be best conceptualised or viewed as ‘networked publics’, which are essentially “the imagined collective that emerges as a result of the intersection of people, technology and practice” (boyd, 2010: 39). In danah boyd’s account of networked publics, she considers them to be informed by structural affordances and common dynamics apparent from networked technology. These “configure the environment in a way that shapes participants’ engagement” (ibid) with technology (although which does not necessarily dictate participants’ behaviour). It is worth examining these here to begin to understand why discrimination (and even resistance to this) might be more prevalent online.

Affordances are the “features and potential functionalities which users perceive a technology to have” (Tagg, 2015: 239). To a greater or lesser extent, affordances may structure the type of participation that can take place or the experiences people have on social media (ibid). According to boyd (2010: 46) there are four main affordances: Persistence, Replicability, Scalability and
**Searchability.** Moreover, although they should not be viewed in a reductionist or deterministic way, “they can destabilize core assumptions people make when engaging in social life” (ibid).

**Persistence** refers to the way in which “online expressions are automatically recorded and archived” (ibid). This, of course, has implications for people posting comments that may potentially be perceived as racist, as comments are traceable and enduring. Following on from this, boyd (2010: 47) points out that what is originally produced in one context, may become visible in another context and “people [may not] interpret the content in the same way as they did when it was first produced”. This has implications for the way in which content, visual and linguistic, is recontextualized in social media. Georgakopoulou (2014) also considers the related process of process of ‘entextualization’ that involves: ‘decontextualization’ (taking the material outside of its original context), and then ‘recontextualization’ (modifying it to fit a new context). In many ways this is related to the second structural affordance, replicability.

**Replicability** concerns the way in which online material “can be [easily] duplicated” (boyd, 2010: 46). The process of entextualization, as explained above, is easily achieved through simple tools such as copy/paste and screen shots. This is significant for discourse analysis and for audience participation online because, as boyd (2010: 47) also explains: “content can be transformed in ways that make it hard to tell which is the source and which is the alteration”. Moreover, this proves that critical engagement with social media is necessary, not only from the analyst but also from the audience, especially in relation to the dissemination of discriminatory discourses to large audiences (Demetriou, 2015). This leads onto the consideration of the fourth affordance, scalability.

**Scalability** is concerned with “the potential visibility of content” (boyd, 2010: 46), however, it must be noted that even though content may be spread to vast audiences, it may equally remain in cyberspace without ever being viewed. boyd also explains how the type of content that is upwardly scaled, may be that for entertainment purposes or alternatively, to spread hate and discrimination stating, “what scales in networked publics is often the funny, the crude, the embarrassing, the mean, and the bizarre” (ibid: 48). Therefore, it is clear that boyd shares many of the reservations about social media and the audience's
engagement with it, as has been expressed by the Frankfurt School and Critical Theory (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1944/1997). Although social networking sites may have their own specific affordances, including the ability to ‘like’ or ‘share’ content, which increases the potential for scalability, it is equally apparent that the ability to search for people, places and things “has become a commonplace activity” (boyd, 2010: 48). This leads onto the final structural affordance, searchability and the fact that “content...can be accessed through search [engines]” (ibid: 46). Related to this are ethical implications about the way in which public content can be accessed and viewed via search for the purposes of research, and this will be discussed further in Chapter 5.

The structural affordances that boyd (2010) outlines also give rise to a set of dynamics that audiences are confronted with and have to manage. boyd (2010) focuses on three main dynamics. The first is invisible audiences, where participants of social media may or may not be aware of who can access or see the content they are (re)producing or sharing. Despite a range of privacy features/settings being available on different social media sites, the blurring of the public and the private means that what is (in)visible is not always clear. Moreover, I am fully aware that in analysing the corresponding public comments of online newspaper articles, I am part of this invisible audience (see Chapter 5). The second dynamic is collapsed contexts, which considers the fact that a range of groups, who may in private spheres never meet, become consolidated into (usually) one setting or space online. Thus boyd (2010: 49) writes of how “the lack of spatial, social, and temporal boundaries makes it difficult to maintain distinct social contexts”. In offline contexts this may only occur within specific occasions, for example, at weddings, funerals and other types of party or social gathering (Davis and Jurgenson, 2014). As mentioned previously, there is also the dynamic of the blurring of the public and private. In relation to this boyd (2010: 49) writes that “without control over context, public and private become meaningless binaries”. This blurring of the public and private therefore leads to implications about the way in which people have “control [over] access and visibility” (boyd, 2010: 52) and ethical implications for social media research (see Chapter 5).

It is also important to bear in mind that social media audiences are not always fully aware of the affordances and dynamics discussed above. As Tagg
(2015) writes, there is a degree of anonymity for the audience when engaging in the online world, or at least a perceived ‘sense’ of anonymity. When this sense of anonymity is combined with the openness and freedom of the Internet, there is always the potential for hate and discrimination to develop, and this has been seen with the rise of online trolls, and the fact that the Internet and social media has been an attractive place for extremist organisations (ibid). It may be, that these kinds of affordances and dynamics can foster a space in which deindividuation is more likely, with deindividuation being defined as a reduced sense of ‘Self’ or identity, and where a “cloak of anonymity…diffuses personal responsibility for the consequences of...actions” (Hogg and Vaughan, 2008: 422; see also Zimbardo, 1969).

When it comes to analysing social media discourse from a CDS perspective, Unger, Wodak and KhosraviNik (2016: 280) suggest that “the separation of the ‘online world’ as a strikingly different discursive arena, as advocated by early studies in computer-mediated communication (CMC), does not sit well theoretically with the socially-critical aspirations of CDS research.” Subsequently, social media discourses should not be treated independently of ‘offline’ or ‘traditional’ media genres. I also believe in keeping this methodological consistency when it comes to the analysis of online newspaper articles and their corresponding comments, and to this extent the theoretical and methodological underpinnings that for the DHA will be applied to both sets of texts. Moreover, Unger, Wodak and KhosraviNik (2016: 282) outline three aspects to consider in relation to the analysis of social media texts. These are outlined below 5:

1. As discourse analysts we consider of the social context of users and their communication;
2. As critical discourse analysts we are not satisfied with mere description of genre, content and communication;
3. As social-media scholars viewing the participatory Web as part of a media apparatus which is used by individuals in society, hence we do not treat digitally mediated texts as part of a “virtual” world that is separate from the physical world and “reality”, despite acknowledging that digitally-mediated contexts have specific features that may affect our analyses.
3.4 The Discourse-Historical Approach

The aim of this final section is to outline further particulars of the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA). As discussed above, the DHA is a distinct approach to CDS and thus follows its problem-oriented and political nature. Although research questions within the general field of CDS may appear presumptive or ideologically based (due to its primary interest in social inequality and injustices), the interdisciplinary basis of the DHA provides a framework that focuses on "intertextual knowledge and experience...including and elaborating a detailed historical dimension" (Wodak, 2006: 184). It is also highly reflexive due to the adoption of many systematic strategies. The DHA is also considered one of the most influential approaches with regards to 'Self' and 'Other' presentation (KhosraviNik 2010b: 110).

The DHA was developed by Ruth Wodak and associates at Vienna University in the 1990s. It emerged through a study that sought to trace “the constitution of an antisemitic stereotyped image...as it emerged in public discourse in the 1986 Austrian presidential campaign” (Wodak and Reisigl, 2001: 41). From here, the DHA was further developed within studies investigating 'Austria’s languages of the past' (Wodak et al, 1994), racist discrimination against immigrants from Romania (Matouschek, Wodak and Januschek, 1995) and within 'The Discursive Construction of National Identity' (Wodak et al., 1999, 2009). It is evident, therefore, that the DHA lends itself specifically to the analysis of discourse which is discriminatory, and this has particularly focused on 'nationalist', 'racist', 'prejudiced', 'fascist' and 'populist' ideologies. Significantly, it is the historical aspect of both discourse production and comprehension that is highlighted within the approach and forms the basis for the description, explanation and interpretation of discourses (KhosraviNik, 2010a: 174). As discussed previously (see Chapter 2), I also consider the historical and political aspect of immigration in Britain to play an important role in the production and comprehension of current discourse about immigration.

There are ten central characteristics, outlined by Reisigl and Wodak (2016: 31-32) that list the core principles of the DHA:
1) The approach is interdisciplinary. Interdisciplinary involves theory, methods, methodology, research practice, and practical applications.

2) The approach is problem-oriented.

3) Various theories and methods are combined, wherever integration leads to an adequate understanding and explanation of the research object.

4) Research incorporates fieldwork ad ethnography (study from the ‘inside’), if it is required for a thorough analysis and theorising of the object under investigation.

5) Research necessarily moves recursively between theory and empirical data.

6) Numerous genres and public spaces as well as intertextual and interdiscursive relationships are studied.

7) Historical context is taken into account in interpreting texts and discourses. The historical orientation permits the reconstruction of how recontextualization functions as an important process linking texts and discourses intertextually and interdiscursively over time.

8) Categories and tools are not fixed once and for all. They must be elaborated for each analysis, according to the specific problem under investigation.

9) ‘Grand theories’ often serve as a foundation. In the specific analyses, however, ‘middle-range theories’ frequently provide a better theoretical basis.

10) Application/applicability of results is an important target. Results should be made available to and applied by experts and be communicated to the public.

3.4.1 A Discourse Analytic Approach to Discrimination

Within *Discourse and Discrimination* (Wodak and Reisigl, 2001), there is an extensive overview of the DHA where its theoretical and methodological position is outlined and a number of alternative approaches to analysing discourse that is discriminatory are introduced and critiqued. Here, it is evident that (at least) four major discourse-analytic approaches to racism have influenced the DHA, but in its development, both theoretical and epistemological alterations have been made and elements from these previous approaches have consequently been rejected or retained. It is also apparent that other fields/schools have contributed to the
establishment of the DHA, including Hallidayan Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL), Social Actor Representation (Van Leeuwen 1996), Argumentation Theory (van Eeemeren and Grootendorst 1992; Kienpointer, 1996) and Critical Theory (particularly with reference to Habermas (1984, 1987) and his political model of deliberative democracy (Habermas, 1996).

The first discourse-analytic approach to have influenced the DHA was developed by Una Quasthoff (1978) and focused specifically on prejudices and stereotypes. Although the DHA aligns itself with Quasthoff’s “general sociopsychological assumptions of the social function of prejudices” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 31), it seeks to surpass Quasthoff’s sentence level approach, instead focusing on discourse from a CDS perspective where discourse is a dialectical “linguistic social practice” which both constitutes and is constituted by “discursive and non-discursive practices” (ibid: 36). From its basis within the field of CDS, the DHA also seeks to identify “latent and allusive meanings of discourse”, which thus extends Quasthoff’s approach (ibid: 31).

The second approach which the DHA shares similar research interests in is the work of Siegfried and Margret Jäger (1992) and the Duisburg group (as discussed in section 3.3). This work, which focuses on ‘Discourse Strands and Collective Symbols’, differs from many strands of CDS due to its postmodern/Foucaultian view of discourse and power (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001; 2016). Although the DHA aligns itself with many aspects of the Duisburg Group’s research agenda, including identifying collective symbols and metaphors within discourse that is discriminatory (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 31), and placing emphasis on an integration of social, political and historical contexts (ibid: 27), the DHA rejects its postmodern and relativist views of discourse and power. Postmodern views of discourse and power are critiqued by Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 31), as they believe them to “reify or personify language and discourse as autonomous, collusive actors which steer the speakers and hold the reins.” This means that the DHA also rejects the postmodern and relativist perspective found within the third approach to discourse and discrimination, namely the Discursive Psychology of Wetherell and Potter (1992). Despite this, there are two similarities between DHA and Wetherell and Potters’ Discursive Psychology (within Mapping the Language of Racism, 1992). The first is that they both share a (mostly)
constructivist approach and the second that they both “critique...universalising the conditions for racist discrimination” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 31).

Finally, van Dijk’s (1991, 1992, 1993, 1997, 2000) socio-cognitive discursive account of racism also influences the DHA. Therefore, many of the categories for analysis and strategies outlined by van Dijk, especially with regards to the ‘denial’ of racism apparent in ‘new’ or ‘cultural’ forms of racism (see Chapter 4, section 4.3.3) are retained. This is inclusive of the strategy of ‘positive self-presentation’ and ‘negative-other presentation’ (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001:31). In fact, as will be highlighted in Chapter 5, the categories of analysis, questions and strategies that comprise the methodological basis of the DHA feed into this larger understanding of the positive-‘Self’ and negative-‘Other’. Despite many influential aspects, there are also many things Reisigl and Wodak (2001) seek to distance themselves from in the discursive approach to discrimination they adopt. This is mostly with regards to van Dijk’s socio-cognitivism, but also in regards to their understanding of power and influence in society, which they consider to be less “monocausal” than what is proposed by van Dijk, stating: “we do not want to overemphasise a top-down causality of opinion making and manipulation...the complexities of modern societies can only be grasped by a model of multicausal, mutual influences between different groups of persons within a specific society” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 31-32). The next section deals with some of these complexities in more depth, exploring how the DHA utilises Habermasian concepts of deliberative democracy and the three validity claims, which form the basis of rationality.

3.4.2 Communicative Action and Deliberative Democracy: An Emancipatory Agenda

Consideration will now be given to the way in which the DHA can go onto future oriented ‘prospective critique’ from an anti-racist perspective. This is achieved through alignment with the language philosophy of Jürgen Habermas (1984; 1987) and the associated political idea of deliberative democracy (Habermas, 1996), which Reisigl and Wodak (2001) suggest should be implemented within society. As was discussed above, advocates of the DHA situate themselves with Critical Theory and although they sometimes discuss the enterprise as an undifferentiated collective (Forchtner, 2010), it is clear that they
mostly associate themselves with Habermasian views (Wodak, 1996; Reisigl and Wodak, 2001; Forchtner, 2010; Reisigl and Wodak, 2016). Furthermore, as expressed previously, advocates of the DHA do not situate themselves with the epistemological position of postmodernism. The postmodern era has denied the role of rationality that emanated from the Enlightenment believing “that concepts of reason and rationality are historically and culturally contingent” (Scherer and Patzer, 2011: 156). Thus, the claim that there can be objectively valid standards, or universals, is something that postmodernists deny; however, such a criticism of rationality leads to relativism, where the acceptance of a plurality of perspectives, all aiming to become hegemonic, prevents the acknowledgement or establishment of a normative position. Postmodernism, therefore, “rejects the idea of a universal justification of social norms” (Scherer and Patzer, 2011: 160) and is therefore “not capable of making statements about the direction of future social development” (ibid: 7). For this reason, Wodak and Reisigl (2001; 2009) and other CDS scholars have turned to Critical Theory, in particular to Habermas, in order to ground their normative position and the critique of societal ills, such as racism.

Habermas (1984, 1987, 1996) and advocates such as Benhabib (1996) who have argued against the postmodern position and claim that modernity is an “unfinished project” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 263). Thus, although modernity is often blamed for the rise of racism and conditions that gave rise to racism, namely the ‘scientific’ classification of humans that served as justifications for colonialism and slavery (see Chapter 4), Habermas has argued that modernity cannot be reduced to this, arguing for the “fair, humanist and cosmopolitan potential of the Enlightenment – including its self-reflective, self-critical and self-corrective capacity” which can subsequently be reconstructed in the form of deliberative democracy (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 263). Although Habermas is also critical of positivism, like postmodern theorists, he believes that the ideals of the Enlightenment can be realised via a different conceptualisation of rationality, which he reconstructs in order not to fall into relativism. This concept of rationality is one that moves away from Descartes’s Cartesian subject, where rationality is located in cognition (‘I think, therefore I am’), and instead locates
rationality in the intersubjectivity of communication (Eriksen and Weigård, 2003).

3.4.2.1 Communicative Action

‘Action theory’ is said to form the basis of the social sciences (Eriksen and Weigård, 2003). It can be attributed back to Max Weber and it involves thinking about actions and events in relation to individuals. However, in action theory, individuals are not seen as shaped by their social backgrounds, but as actors who think and act intentionally: “Human beings are agents whose intentions are of central importance in the explanation of events” (Albrow, 1990: 140). Key to the development of action theory, is the conceptualisation of different types of action, which are said to relate to “different understandings of rationality” (Eriksen and Weigård, 2003: 17). According to Weber, there are four different types: 1) Purposive rational, 2) Value rational, 3) Affectual, and 4) Traditional; however, only the first two are considered rational, with the latter two categorised as irrational (Albrow, 1990). Purposive rational action is seen as the Weber’s ideal type of rationality and involves actors who are fully aware of their subjective preferences and, subsequently, have a deep understanding of how to obtain goals or “choose their ends and the means which are necessary to achieve those ends” (Eriksen and Weigård, 2003: 21). Value rational action concerns an individual’s conscious beliefs that may be religious, aesthetic or ethical. However, this type of rationality does not assess whether any of these intrinsic values can ultimately lead to success (Eriksen and Weigård, 2003). Weber believed that modern societies followed purposive rational action, and that this was the basis of Western rationality, precisely because it allows for the consideration of ends and means, as well as the consequences of action. However, despite purposive rational action being proposed as an ‘ideal’ type, Weber also saw inherent problems with it, as it was seen to promote dehumanisation and nihilism (Albrow, 1990; Eriksen and Weigård, 2003).

Whereas postmodern theorists have questioned the legitimacy of rationality altogether, Habermas has sought to reconstruct it. However, Habermas does not believe that this reconstruction can occur on the basis of Weber’s typology, as it locates rationality within individual cognition. Instead, Habermas
believes that it is through the use of language, as a universal human system, that rationality is located - a rationality that comes from interaction between at least two subjects and, therefore, via intersubjectivity (Eriksen and Weigård, 2003). Moreover, in moving beyond a traditional understanding of an objective world, linked to positivism, and a subjective world, linked to the interpretivism of hermeneutics, Habermas identifies three worlds: the objective, the social and the subjective, which correspond to the validity claims that will be outlined below: ‘truth’ (objective), ‘rightness’ (social) and ‘truthfulness’ (subjective) (Habermas, 1984: 85-94).

Habermas develops a new form of action, *communicative action*, which exists alongside purposive rational action (Habermas, 1984, 1987). The main difference between the two types of action is that, “while purposive-rational action is coordinated by an orientation to success, communicative action is oriented to reaching understanding” (Eriksen and Weigård, 2003: 24). However, there is also one further difference; whereas, purposive rational action can be subdivided into non-social and social forms of action (with the latter involving a consideration of others and the former including only a solitary actor), communicative action is only a social form. Purposive rational action is also subdivided by Habermas (1984) into two forms: 1) *instrumental action* and 2) *strategic action*. Although both are examples of purposive rational action, instrumental action is non-social and strategic action is social (meaning that the latter is oriented towards a goal with the consideration of other perspectives).

Both of these forms of action are said to belong to what Habermas identifies as the *System*: the part of society that is oriented to success, one that is occupied by fixed structures and one that comprises two sub-systems: power and money (Habermas, 1987). It is within the system that capitalism grows and, although Critical Theorists such as Adorno and Horkheimer (1944/1997) are highly sceptical of it, Habermas’ view diverges in the sense that the system is seen as something that can “help hold society together” (Finlayson, 2005: 54). The system is oriented towards success (e.g. achieving results and goals) and according to Habermas, it is the part of society which comprises “the market economy and the political administrative apparatus” (Eriksen and Weigård, 2003: 87).
However, whereas purposive rational action is oriented to success, communicative action is oriented to understanding, and rationality here is located not in success but in consensus (Forchtner, 2010). For Habermas, the way in which we can judge if something is rational is by assessing the arguments for and against a claim (for further elaboration on argumentation see Chapter 5, section 5.2.3). But how and why can such an assessment be classed as rational? Habermas’ answer can be found in his concept of ‘formal pragmatics’ (formerly known as ‘universal pragmatics’), which articulates fixed structures of language use that all participants in a communicative setting tacitly adhere to (Habermas, 1984; Eriksen and Weigård, 2003). Via influences from Wittgenstein’s ‘language games’ (1968) and Austin’s ‘speech-act theory’ (1962), Habermas demonstrates that in any communicative setting oriented to reaching understanding, three implicit validity claims are raised: 1) that the statement is true; 2) that the speech act is right in relation to the normative context and 3) that the speaker’s manifest intention is meant as it is expressed (that it is truthful) (Habermas, 1984: 99). Habermas elaborates on this further by stating, “the speaker claims truth for statements or existential presuppositions, rightness for legitimately regulated actions and their normative context, and truthfulness or sincerity for the manifestation of subjective experiences” (Habermas, 1984: 99). Furthermore, it is clearer how the three validity claims connect to “the three worlds to which the actor takes up relations with [their] utterance”: 1) ‘truth’ linked to “the objective world (as the totality of all entities about which statements are possible)”; 2) ‘rightness’ linked to “the social world (as the totality of all legitimately regulated interpersonal relations)” and, 3) ‘truthfulness’ linked to “the subjective world (as the totality of the experiences of the speaker to which [they have] privileged access)” (Habermas, 1984: 100).

Moreover, Habermas explains that these three validity claims belong to “a culturally ingrained preunderstanding” that all competent language users share (Habermas, 1984: 100). Thus, speakers tacitly raise these claims in communicative scenarios that are oriented to reaching understanding. When these validity claims are raised, they may simply be accepted, or they may be questioned and/or criticised. If this latter scenario occurs, the speaker would be required to provide reasons to justify their claim; therefore, “it is exactly these
validity claims...as well as the speaker's commitment to meet them with arguments which gives language its rational action coordinating power” (Eriksen and Weigård, 2003: 37). Hence, communicative action represents a “procedural view of rationality...where it is not our conclusions but the manner in which we arrive at them which are permanent and in a way above criticism” (Eriksen and Weigård, 2003: 4). The very possibility of understanding, amongst of plurality of perspectives, is “built into the very structure of language” (Scherer and Patzer, 2011: 166). As Habermas (1984: 287) writes: “reaching understanding inhabits human speech as its telos”. Moreover, this conception of rationality forms the basis of Habermas’ concept of deliberative democracy, which will be further elaborated below (see section 3.4.2.1).

Furthermore, just like the separation of purposive rational action into two distinct types, Habermas separates communicative action into three types of action that link to the above validity claims: 1) Constative, 2) Norm-Regulated, and 3) Dramaturgical (Habermas 1984). Constative action, linked to ‘truth’, is derived from Austin’s (1962) constative speech-act where something can be declared ‘true’ or ‘false’. Norm-regulated action relates to the norms or values that are already inherent within a society or ‘culture’ and therefore linked to the legitimacy of ‘rightness’. Finally, dramaturgical action relates to notions of performance seen within Goffman’s (1959/1990) dramaturgical analysis of self-presentation, but specifically to whether performance/action is considered ‘authentic’ or ‘sincere’\(^\text{19}\) and hence whether it is ‘truthful’ (Habermas, 1984; Forchtner, 2010). Additionally, Habermas links communicative action to the Lifeworld\(^\text{20}\): the part of society that is linked to the way in which individuals are socialised and belong to shared groups, such as family and friends, comprising shared cultures, values and beliefs (Habermas, 1987; Finlayson, 2005). The lifeworld is seen as detached from the system, but one which, nevertheless, informs it (Habermas, 1987).

According to Habermas, the system and the lifeworld together make up society: “we conceive of societies simultaneously as systems and lifeworlds”

\(^{19}\) If an audience accepts this authenticity/sincerity, there is potential for this type of action to become Strategic.

\(^{20}\) Habermas’ concept of Lifeworld is influenced by Edmund Husserl and Alfred Schütz’s concept of the same name (or ‘Lebenswelt’). They believed in “a socially shared lifeworld...as a basis for human knowledge” (Eriksen and Weigård, 2003: 35).
(Habermas, 1987: 118). This also means that there are two main forms of rationality: purposive rational action and communicative action. According to Habermas, if these forms of rationality adhere to their corresponding sub-systems of society, purposive rational action to the system and communicative action to the lifeworld, then the concerns that Weber expressed about purposive rational action, including that this type of rationality could lead to dehumanisation and nihilism, should not, in theory, become manifest (Habermas, 1987). Moreover, unlike first-generation Critical Theorists Horkheimer and Adorno, Habermas believes that the system, the state and the market, are necessary components of how modern society deals with material reproduction. However, in alignment with Weber’s concerns, Habermas suggests that in the modern world, the system dominates and interferes with areas that should belong to the lifeworld (Habermas, 1987). Consequently, there are areas in society where purposive rationality is used instead of communicative rationality. As Eriksen and Weigård (2003: 101) explain: “Through this one-sidedness, the project of enlightenment has entered into a self-destructive course, in which the spread of a life form based on instrumental and success oriented reason is about to destroy its own social and normative basis.” Habermas (1987: 325) subsequently speaks of “the colonisation of the lifeworld by system imperatives” and, in this process of colonisation, the system is seen as an imperialistic force endangering the existence of the lifeworld. Examples of such an encroachment of the system into the lifeworld are documented by Vetlesen (1991 cited in Eriksen and Weigård, 2003: 101), including “forcing economic-administrative demands onto education...redefin[ing] the family sphere and leisure activities as markets with an insatiable need to consume entertainment articles” and “manipulatively obtaining support for political decisions that are made independently of a public exchange of opinions in which the voter participates with real influence”. The dangers this colonisation of the lifeworld by the system are labelled by Habermas as pathologies (1987: 143). Finlayson (2005: 57) summarises them as follows:

1. Decrease in shared meanings and mutual understanding (anomie)
2. Erosion of social bonds (disintegration)
3. Increase in people’s feelings of helplessness and lack of belonging (alienation)
4. Consequent unwillingness to take responsibility for their actions and for social phenomena (demoralization)
5. Destabilization and breakdown in social order (social instability)

A common theme unifying these pathologies is “the disregard of language as a medium of interaction” (Veitlesen, 1991: 6). Thus, Habermas goes onto to develop a concept of democracy where communicative and not purposive rationality is at its core. In ‘deliberative democracy’, it is consensus and not success that is sought in decision-making procedures that contribute towards establishing laws and policies.

3.4.2.2 Deliberative Democracy

Deliberative democracy is a theory of democracy which utilises the concept of communicative action as this basis of rational decision-making processes (Habermas, 1984, 1987, 1996). It is a normative theory that seeks to problematize but also enhance democracy and the normative structures of institutions/organizations (Chambers, 2003). Although, the theory of language and, in particular, communicative action postulates “an emancipatory, foundational, normative and cognitive” base for deliberative democracy (Forchtner, 2010), this type of democracy is not, however, “based on a simplistic and illusory image of a uniform public sphere, but on a differentiated model of an unhomogenenous, disparate and dispersed network of many and multiple publics” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 263). It therefore seeks to find consensus even amongst a plurality of perspectives, ‘cultures’, ‘traditions’ and worldviews. There is a dialectical relationship apparent, between on the one hand law and rights (rights foundationalism) and, on the other hand, democracy/communitarian theory and this is exemplified by Chambers (2003: 310) who states: “We are legal persons protected by rights only to the extent that we are authors of those laws. We are authors only to the extent that we are persons under the law.”

It is the way in which democracy is linked to Habermas’ concept of communicative action which helps to situate deliberative democracy in-between dominant traditions of liberal and republican democratic theory (Eriksen and Weigård, 2003). As communicative action is a procedural view of rationality, it is
not the conclusions themselves that are deemed moral, but the process in which they are reached. This process is based on the raising of universal validity claims that can then be subject to criticism and/or further justification. Thus, communicative rationality is about the “transformative capacity of discussions...[and] the claim that reasons make a difference in the world”. Thus, this notion of democracy is identified as ‘talk-centric’ rather than ‘voter-centric’ (Chambers, 2003: 308). Although it does not (and should not) replace suffrage, what deliberative democracy advocates is a process whereby laws, policies, rights and interests are articulated, debated, deliberated and most importantly justified according to non-fallacious and non-manipulative rules for argumentation (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001) which should occur prior to the process of voting (Chambers, 2003).

Although, in theory, such a deliberative process should occur under conditions where “all parties involved can participate equally” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001), conforming to an ‘Ideal Speech Situation’ (ISS), in practice this is unrealistic and such an idealisation has been subject to much criticism. Although unrealistic, it is seen as exactly that - an ‘idealisation’, that should be strived for. Deliberative democracy is therefore “a system within which citizens rule themselves through participation in legal institutionalised decision-making processes, and where only outcomes which are approved by everyone in an open debate are regarded as legitimate” (Eriksen and Weigård, 2003: 113). Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 264) outline who should be involved in this process, namely:

...different deliberative corporations and bodies of control acting within different areas of politics, especially a critical parliamentary opposition, a system of jurisdiction proceeding as impartially and rationally as possible...media that are as free, independent and critical as possible and, of course, critical, politically informed and engaged citizens willing to take clear positions and to participate with courage in the deliberative formation of a strong civil society.
There are four prerequisites for the ISS to be enabled, and Forchtner (2010: 26) lists them as: free access; equal rights; absence of coercion and; truthfulness (on side of participants). Moreover, although there have been a range of criticisms directed towards it, including from Mouffe (1999) who denies the very possibility of the ISS, and from Bourdieu (1982: 158) who claims it is not inclusive of “interclass linguistic difference”, these criticisms overlook the very fact that the ISS is, by its nature, an idealisation. When we communicate with another person, “we always use the model of the ideal speech situation” (Wodak, 1996) and assume that the other person in the conversation is not intentionally deceiving or manipulating us (Forchtner, 2010); the very nature of deception depends on this (Grice, 1975). Although the ISS is an idealisation, it does not stop discourse analysts from analysing discursive strategies used in the context of deliberation and debate with this normative model in mind. In doing so, analysts can describe, interpret and explain dominant ideologies and power structures that perpetuate inequality, the outcomes of which may promote “a false consensus about the validity claims made” (Wodak, 1996: 30).

3.5 Chapter Summary

This chapter has reviewed the theoretical underpinnings of discourse analysis and has positioned this study within the CDS paradigm by adopting the DHA. In line with this, I see ‘discourse’ and ‘ideology’ as separate ontological entities, where a discourse is studied as language (and semiotic modalities) ‘in use’, situated in a dialectical relationship with society and, ‘ideology’ is viewed as threefold: 1) as shared mental representations, 2) as ‘grand narratives’ and; 3) as symbolic forms that sustain relations of power and domination (as in the ‘latent conception’ of ideology). The way in which ideology is realised and shared is through discourse. Discourse as language in use, and as a social practice, does ideological work (Fairclough, 2010). Discourse is the mechanism through which ideas become shared and beliefs become naturalised and hegemonic. Discourses may be analysed to uncover ideologies, not in uncovering them because they are ‘false’, but because they are ‘hidden’ and accepted as mere common sense. Doing ‘critical’ discourse analysis means to problematize assumptions and bring to the surface inconsistencies and contradictions of the arguments and justifications used to legitimise certain ideologies. However, a CDS perspective is more than just
analysing discourse to discover ideologies. It is also about unpicking the power relationships that are inherent to these ideologies and about a critique that also attempts to be emancipatory, in this case anti-racist.

Through the implementation of the DHA, it can be shown how discourse that is discriminatory is manipulative and fallacious, and on the whole does not conform to rules for rational argumentation (see Chapter 5, section 5.2.3). Inherent to discourse that reveals a racist ideology may be a range of sweeping statements, generalisations, metaphors, and arguments that are contradictory and, even if they appear ‘rational’, they ultimately serve as means to cause human suffering and to justify/legitimise the denial of certain human rights. In most cases, this occurs through the construction of a foreign ‘Other’ and the process of ‘Otherization’. The next chapter will consider this in more depth. It will identify two dominant but distinct theories of representation that have produced ‘Others’ in discourse, Orientalism and Balkanism, and explore how the logics of racism are inherent to these representations.
Chapter 4 - The ‘Other’ and the logics of Racism

4.1 Introduction

In Chapters 2 and 3, it was apparent that discourse representing and evaluating immigrants and/or immigration are usually tied up with larger processes of defining the ‘Self’ against the ‘Other’. Moreover, as van Dijk (1993, 1997, 2000) and Reisigl and Wodak (2001; 2016) have evidenced, discourse which is discriminatory often follows a basic pattern of ‘positive self-presentation’ and ‘negative other-presentation’. The purpose of this chapter is to theoretically ground what is meant by the term the ‘Other’ and to explore how and why a process of ‘Otherization’ can be conceptually linked to racism. This will be achieved by focusing on two theories exploring dominant representations that work to construct the ‘Other’ in discourse: Orientalism (Said, 1978/2003) and Balkanism (Todorova, 1997/2009). Despite their distinct differences, which will also be elaborated in detail, I argue that a ‘syncrétic’ understanding of racism as an ideology (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001; Delanty, Jones and Wodak, 2008), which encompasses both inegalitarian and differentialist logics (Taguieff, 1987/2001; Miles, 1994; Wieviorka, 1994), is nevertheless present within both Orientalist and Balkanist representations.

This chapter will be structured as follows. Firstly, the concept of the ‘Other’ will be explored in relation to theories of Orientalism and Balkanism in section 4.2. Here, specific differences between Orientalist and Balkanist representations of the ‘Other’ will be detailed. Secondly, the concept of ‘racism’ will be discussed in section 4.3, where an overview of the term will be presented alongside a discussion of racism as an ideology that comprises both inegalitarian and differentialist logics. Finally, section 4.4 will provide a summary of the chapter.

4.2 The ‘Other’

Within studies that have analysed representations of immigrants (and other ‘minority’ groups) one of the key terms to emerge is the notion of the (foreign) ‘Other’. Principally, the term the ‘Other’ is used to identify an individual or a group as ‘different’ from the norm or the ‘Self’ (Holliday, Hyde and Kullman 2004; Riggins, 1997). Although it is debated whether the singular or plural form ‘Others’ should be used, as it has been argued that “the singular form tends to
reproduce...the stereotypical homogenization of other cultures and peoples that it seeks to overthrow” (Riggins, 1997: 4). I will continue to use the singular as I believe this signifies exactly the kind of essentializing force behind the term and the relationships often constructed between the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’. Within social sciences, a distinction can also be made between the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ Other, with the former referring “to the subconscious, a phase of the Self, or the experience of self-estrangement” (ibid) and the latter referring to “all people the Self perceives as mildly or radically different” (ibid). As I continue the discussion of the ‘Other’ I will be referring to what is known as the ‘external’ other.

Several scholars have analysed the positioning of the ‘Self’ against the ‘Other’ with regards to the ‘demonization’ of the ‘Other’. Holliday (2011: 69) discusses how the ‘Self’ is often constructed or imagined through and “idealized image” (us) against the ‘demonized image’ of the ‘Other’ (them). Similarly, Critical Discourse Analysts such as van Dijk (1997: 36), Reisigl and Wodak (2001, 2009) and KhosraviNik (2009) comment on this polarization by analysing how discourse which is discriminatory often reveals ‘positive Self-presentation’ against ‘negative Other-presentation’. These processes of the ‘Self’ against the ‘Other’ can be described as the process of ‘Othering’ and this, in turn, conforms to an essentialist view of social constructs such as ‘race’, ethnicity, culture and nationality, where individuals and groups are “defined and constrained” and allowing for the reification of such concepts (Holliday, 2011: 4) in a way that is “objectified as unalterable, basic parts of people’s natures” Goldberg (2009: 228). Holliday (2011: 70) outlines a sequence of ‘Othering’, which is useful to consider in the analysis of discourse about immigration:

1. Identify ‘our’ group by contrasting it with ‘their’ group.
2. Strengthen the constrained images of Self and Other by emphasizing and reifying respective proficient and deficient values, artefacts and behaviours.
3. Do this by manipulating selected cultural resources such as Protestantism or Confucianism.
4. Position Self and Other by constructing moral reasons to attack, colonize or help.
5. The Other culture becomes a definable commodity.
6. The imagined Other works with or resists imposed definitions.

It is Edward Said’s concept of Orientalism (1978/2003) that is regularly heralded as the most renowned example of the power relationships evident between the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’. Highlighted within Said’s work is how the ‘West’ created/constructed the ‘Orient’ dependent upon a “flexible positional superiority” which resulted in a Western “relative upper-hand” (Said, 1997/2003: 7). From a Derridean perspective, this type of unequal relationship is thought to be the case in the construction of all binary oppositions, and in turn, “represent a way of seeing” or interpreting the world around us (Sarup, 1988: 41). In oppositions such as the ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ (or for example good/bad, health/disease) it is the first term that “traditionally constitutes the privileged entity” (ibid). Orientalism will therefore be discussed in more depth within the next section as it provides valuable insight into the construction of the ‘Other’.

However, with Said’s work situated fundamentally within the postcolonial/postmodern paradigm, with it being conceptually linked to an ‘East’ or ‘Orient’ viewed as antithetical to what is considered ‘Western’ and/or ‘European’, there are a number of theoretical tensions in the application of this framework to the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) and to the analysis of texts/discourses that discuss and debate immigration from the EU countries. Firstly, Said (1978/2003: xii) does not see “ontological stability” in either the notions of the ‘Orient’ or the ‘West’ and this ontological position is not commensurable with the DHA view, especially since scholars of the DHA do not wish to deny societal structures which afford a certain amount of ‘fixity’ to items or concepts that they nevertheless also view as social constructions (e.g. ‘nation’ and ‘race’).

Secondly, it is also the case that epistemologically, Said’s postmodern and postcolonial account of Orientalism, which relies heavily on the work of Foucault, is at odds with the DHA’s alignment with Habermasian Critical Theory, language philosophy and the ideas of rational argument that derive from this. One of the main reasons there are such theoretical tensions, is due to the role of the Enlightenment in the establishment of a ‘racial’ classificatory system that perpetuated ideas of racial ‘superiority’ and ‘inferiority’ in the justification of colonialism, imperialism and slavery (as discussed in section 4.3.1). However, as
was discussed in Chapter 3, the role of the Enlightenment is also viewed as an ‘unfinished project’ and one where there is dialogical potential to tackle racism and discrimination via Universal Pragmatics and deliberative democracy, as advocated by Habermas (1984, 1987), Benhabib (1996) and the DHA (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001). Furthermore, Said himself has levelled strong criticism towards the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School, claiming it has been "stunningly silent on racist theory, anti-imperialist resistance, and oppositional practice in the empire" (1994: 278). As Allen (2016) has also outlined, Habermas' lack of engagement with postcolonialism is particularly notable due to his otherwise prolific engagement with globalization and human rights issues. As this thesis also does not engage with racism that is directly linked to imperialism and colonialism, I am not in a position to try to merge Habermasian Critical Theory with postcolonialism. However, it is my belief that the two racist logics discussed in section 4.3.3, that of inegalitarianism and differentialism (Taguieff, 1987/2001; Miles, 1994; Wieviorka, 1994) are inherent to discourses about 'racial', ethnic, cultural, national and religious 'Others' and there is at least some universal element to racism as an ideology. As such, there is the potential for a stronger theoretical connection to be made between Critical Theory and postcolonialism and this is evident already in the work of Allen (2016)\(^2\). It is also the case that scholars aligned with the CDS paradigm have utilised Orientalism within their own work (see Richardson, 2004).

Moreover, despite my belief in shared logics of racism, it cannot be denied that there are crucial differences between discrimination directed towards European immigrants and immigrants from other countries around the world. Historically, those categorised as 'Southeastern', or 'Eastern' Europeans have not experienced colonialism and imperialism to the same extent as African, Asian, South-American and Caribbean countries and, by employing Orientalism as framework to this thesis, it would perhaps be a dis-service to those who have (Todorova, 1997/2009). That is not to say, however, that countries and people situated in what might be labelled 'Eastern' or 'Southeastern' Europe, or the Balkans, have not experienced similar forms of discrimination via essentialist and

\(^2\) However, Allen's (2016) work concerns Adorno and Horkheimer’s Critical Theory rather than Habermas'.
stereotypical ‘myths’ about them, including “[a]ccusations of discord, immorality, savagery, violence and congenital backwardness” (Hammond, 2006: 8). In addition to this, Hammond (2006) also argues that similar forms of subjugation have been historically experienced, in both the rise and fall of the Byzantine and Ottoman periods, and even more recently from the Soviet Union and also the EU. In relation to the EU or the ‘West’, Hammond (2006: 7) points out that there has always been some sort of imperial mind-set directed towards the Balkan countries: “Great Powers have considered Western control of these peripheries essential for the preservation of peace on the continent”. He also views more recent EU expansion into ‘Central’ and ‘Eastern’ Europe as “gradual political and economic mastery”, quoting Burgess (1997) to suggest that there is a “new division of Europe, one half which enjoys the right to set targets for the other” (cited in Hammond, 2006: 7).

Thus, although some have called for an Orientalist interpretation of the discrimination faced by people of ‘Eastern’ European/Balkan countries, as is the case with Bakic-Hayden’s “nesting orientalisms” (1995), Maria Todorova (1997/2009) has instead argued for the presence and acknowledgement of Balkanism. Although, indebted to Said’s work, it nevertheless posits Balkanism as both ontologically and epistemologically different. Therefore, where Orientalism is a poststructuralist account, Balkanism is “an essentially historical approach and interpretation” where the ‘Balkans’ are constituted as a ‘real’ ontologically (Todorova 1997/2009: 194). It is this that makes Balkanism not only more appropriately connected with the study of Bulgarian and Romanian immigrants, but also which makes it commensurable with the DHA. Balkanism will be discussed in more depth in in section 4.2.2 and will be considered within the analysis of discourse about EU immigration because, as Hammond (2006: 8) writes, “the structures and power that balkanism supports are rarely explored”.

4.2.1 Orientalism

In Said’s ground-breaking publication of Orientalism, he argued that Western scholarship, both academic and literary, was far from a neutral activity (as it might have appeared), constructing an evaluatively derogatory perception
of the ‘Orient’ or the ‘East’ that was very much contrasted with the ‘Occident’ or the ‘West’. Despite Said not viewing the ‘Orient’ or the ‘West’ as possessing ‘ontological stability’, he nevertheless elaborated on the fact that Orientalist scholarship and Orientalism emerged as a result of “a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between “the Orient” and (most of the time) “the Occident”” (Said, 1978/2003: 1). To put it succinctly, Sayyid (1997: 32) summarizes the main points made by Said in Orientalism:

*Said argued that orientalism provides accounts of Islam (and the Orient) which are organised around four main themes: first, there is an ‘absolute and systematic difference’ between the West and the Orient. Secondly, the representations of the Orient are based on textual exegesis rather than ‘modern Oriental realities’. Thirdly, the Orient is unchanging, uniform and incapable of describing itself. Fourthly, the Orient is to be feared or to be mastered... All these narratives rest upon the assumption that Islam [the Orient] is ontologically distinct from the West.*

From this summary, it is also clear that construction of the ‘Orient’ manufactured “a timeless essentialism” (Carrier, 1992: 195). Moreover, as indicated above, the reason why Orientalism is beneficial to understanding the workings of both the representation and evaluation of the ‘Other’ is because of the way in which it sees the relationship between the ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ as in terms of a relationship linked to power - of domination and submission:

*The relationship between Occident and Orient is a relationship of power, of domination, of varying degrees*

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23 The ‘Orient’, although difficult to define, is generally a term meant to discuss the countries of the ‘East’ (specifically the ‘East’ of Europe). According to Said (1978/2003), up until the nineteenth century, the ‘Orient’ to the British and the French “meant only India and the Bible lands”. However, the concept of the ‘Orient’ has since inflated and become associated with Asia more generally. Thus, Said (1978/2003) also discusses the differences between American and British/French (and to a lesser extent Russian, Spanish, Portuguese, German etc.) understandings of the ‘Orient’.
of a complex hegemony….The Orient was Orientalized not only because I was discovered to be “Oriental”…but also because it could be – that is, submitted to being – made Oriental (Said, 1978/2003: 6).

Said also utilised the Gramscian concept of ‘hegemony’, in a similar vein to the DHA and other versions of CDS (e.g. Fairclough, 1992, 2010, 2016). Said therefore says: “It is hegemony, or rather the result of hegemony at work, that gives Orientalism the durability and the strength…” (Said, 1978/2003: 7). It is clear, therefore, that Said’s Orientalism is concerned with a similar focus to CDS: namely the critique of discursive structures of power, domination and inequality. However, the approach to ‘power’ is distinctly tied to Foucauldian themes with Said stating: “To have such knowledge of such a thing is to dominate it, to have authority over it. And authority here means for “us” to deny autonomy to “it”…” (1978/2003: 32). In this statement, the role of resistance or agency of the ‘Orient’ is unclear. As Sayyid (1997: 35) notes “Said’s main concerns are with the struggle against western intellectual and cultural imperialism”. Thus, the potential for the ‘Orient’ (or in Sayyid’s focus – Islam) to be able to “exist outside of the discourse of orientalism” is seemingly impossible, which in this respect is one of the main limiting aspects of the work. Sayyid also suggests that an idea of resistance or counter-discourse “threatens his project” (ibid).

Said argued that by the time of colonial rule, Orientalist representations were already at work because of the Orientalist scholarship of the previous centuries and the knowledge about the orient it produced: “colonial rule was justified in advance by Orientalism” (1978/2003: 39). Moreover, within his work, Said also acknowledged many stereotypical traits an Orientalist representation afforded to the ‘Orient’ such as being ‘irrational’, ‘devoid of energy and initiative’, ‘inveterate liars’, ‘depraved’ and ‘childlike’ unlike the ‘rational’, ‘virtuous’ and ‘mature’ European/Western (Said, 1978/2003: 38 – 40). Furthermore, traits revolving around themes of ‘sexual desire/promiscuity’ and ‘secrecy’ were also commonly attributed to the ‘mysterious’ ‘Orient’ (ibid: 222; Todorova, 1997/2009; Holliday, 2011). The ‘Oriental’ was also considered ‘exotic’ with the Middle-East conceptualised as a type of utopian place of escape, as Todorova (1997/2009: 13) writes: “as refuge from the alienation of a rapidly industrializing
West but also as a metaphor for the forbidden”. Finally, there were often links made to the ‘Orient’s’ tendency for “despotism and away from development” (Richardson, 2004: 6) and therefore all of this was (and is still very much thought of) in contrast to ideas of ‘progress’ emanating from very much Western/European ideals set out in the Enlightenment.

Although Said’s Orientalism has been extremely influential, there have been a range of criticisms from number of different perspectives. Although it is not possible to explore all lines of enquiry here, it is my understanding that many criticisms are primarily concerned with methodology. For example, whether Said was committed to an entirely postmodern reading of Orientalism is contested with Todorova (1994/2009: 9) asserting that Said’s adoption of Foucauldian discourse analysis was essentially “incompatible” due to “Said’s ambivalent loyalty to the humanist project” which went against the postmodern principles of anti-humanism and anti-realism. Moreover, Sayyid (1997: 34) suggests that the applicability of Said’s Orientalism to similar but somewhat different contexts “outside…of imperialism becomes strained” and this is because “Said has difficulty in explaining how orientalism continues to function outside these particular historical power structures”, which is one of the reasons why it is a difficult concept to employ in the current study.

Related criticisms come from Carrier (1992: 197) who suggests that Orientalism should be viewed “as a dialectical process”, resonating with ideas from the CDS school. As Carrier notes, Orientalism is not only about “political and economic relations between the West and Near East” as is suggested by Said (ibid: 196), but “Orientalist descriptions are produced by means of the juxtaposition of two opposed, essentialized entities” (ibid: 196). Thus Carrier argues for a dialectical view, similar to the Hegelian ‘master/slave’ dialectic:

...which helps us to recognize that it is not merely a Western imposition of a reified identity on some alien set of people. It is also the imposition of an identity created in a dialectical opposition to another identity, one likely to be equally reified, that of the West. (ibid: 197)
Similarly, Richardson (2004), who adopts *Orientalism* within his critical discourse analysis of broadsheet press and the way in which Islam is (mis)represented, notes how *Orientalism* has also been viewed through Hegelian lenses by Yeğenoğlu, where *Orientalism* therefore is about “the cultural representation of the West to itself by way of detour through the other” (Yeğenoğlu, 1998: 1 cited in Richardson, 2004: 7). In adopting this view, Richardson is therefore able to incorporate a theory of *Orientalism* into his theoretical framework that is more sympathetic to the theoretical position of CDS, where “the signification of categorical opposites simultaneously supposes and sustains the epistemological and ontological distinctions between ‘the West’ and ‘the East’” (Richardson, 2004: 7).

Despite criticism, Said’s *Orientalism* remains an influential text in light of events defining the 21st century: globalization, terrorism, forced and voluntary migration, and the racist representations of ‘Others’ that goes hand in hand with this. Much of what Said stands for is applicable to the analysis of discourse about immigration in the UK and, in relation to this, he is explicit about the role of technology and the media in the dissemination of discrimination as outlined in the preface to the 2003 edition of *Orientalism*: “In the demonization of an unknown enemy, for whom the label “terrorist” serves the general purpose of keeping people stirred up and angry, media images command too much attention and can be exploited at times of crisis and insecurity of the kind that the post 9/11 period has produced” (Said, 1997/2003: xx). *Orientalism* provided one of the most exhaustive accounts of the power, inequality and essentialism tied up with the representation of the ‘Other’. Although it continues to inspire my efforts with the analysis of European ‘Others’ within the UK, I require a framework that is more compatible with my chosen methodology and my topic of investigation. This is why it is now important to define, explain and elaborate upon Todorova’s notion of *Balkanism* and review the ways in which this has been adopted as an interdisciplinary framework for the investigation of the ‘Other’ within Europe.

**4.2.2 Balkanism**

In *Imagining the Balkans* (1997/2009), Maria Todorova presents her conception of *Balkanism*: a theory concerning the construction and operationalization of representations about the area of ‘Eastern’ or ‘Southeastern’
Europe known as the Balkans or the Balkan Peninsula. Although indebted to Said’s Orientalism, Balkanism is nevertheless conceptualised as distinct, worthy of further detailed investigation. The aim of this section is to present an overview of Balkanism and discuss its uniqueness. However, before outlining Balkanism in more detail, I will briefly consider the argument put forward by Bakić-Hayden (1995) which does not distinguish representations about ‘Eastern’ Europeans as being distinct or separate from Orientalism.

Bakić-Hayden (1995), in a critique of Todorova (1994), argues that it is necessary to explore the discourse of ‘Othering’ directed towards ‘Eastern’, ‘Southeastern’ or Balkan people as a derivative of Orientalism, as “it would be difficult to understand it outside the overall orientalist context since it shares an underlying logic and rhetoric with orientalism” (Bakić-Hayden, 1995: 920). ‘Nesting orientalisms’ are therefore considered as “…a pattern of reproduction of the original dichotomy upon which Orientalism is premised” (ibid: 918). As part of this, Bakić-Hayden (1995) explores how ‘nesting orientalisms’ emerged through the way in which ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ representations were formed after the fall of communism and the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Moreover, her work looks at the way in which new independent states utilised this discourse to position themselves vis-à-vis an ‘Other’, but “who [nevertheless] have themselves been designated as such in orientalist discourse” (ibid: 922). In an attempt to develop distinct national identities and to appear more ‘European’, Bakić-Hayden (1995) argues ‘nesting orientalisms’ emerged via the tracing of perceived “essences” of national/cultural/religious groups since before the formation of Yugoslavia. For example, a national discourse emerged in Slovenia and Croatia where lineage was traced back to the Austrian Hapsburg monarchy and not an ‘Oriental’ Ottoman rule, which was then “appropriated...as the product of their superior qualities, and western-like participation” (ibid: 924). Moreover, the perspective adopted here seems to be aligned with Holliday (2011: 82) who has also argued, “it may be the case that the psychology of Orientalism is simply being applied to the ‘foreign’ everywhere”. As I will go on to explore in the next section, I take the view that Orientalism and Balkanism present a distinct set of representations, but that there is an underlying ‘psychology’ – or ideology – that they both share: racism.
With this in mind, I will follow Todorova’s (1997/2009) main premise that Balkanism needs to be considered as something separate from Orientalism. Hammond also shares Todorova’s frustration with earlier works utilising Orientalism as a framework for the study of Balkan representations stating, “they became eclipsed by the sense of congruence between the two rhetorical traditions” (2007: 202). Moreover, in the introduction to Imagining the Balkans, Todorova (1997/2009: 3) explicitly justifies the necessity to focus on Balkanism as a marked form of ‘Othering’:

That the Balkans have been described as the “other” of Europe does not need special proof. What has been emphasized about the Balkans is that its inhabitants do not care to conform to the standards of behavior devised as normative by and for the civilized world. As with any generalization, this one is based on reductionism, but the reductionism and stereotyping of the Balkans has been of such degree and intensity that the discourse merits and requires special analysis.

Thus, in relation to this stereotype, Todorova discusses the presence of “frozen images of barbarity” and seeks to try and establish and “explain the persistence of such a frozen image” (ibid: 7). In responding to Bakić-Hayden (1995) and others who view the discourse about ‘Eastern’ Europe/Balkans as equated with or a version of Orientalism, Todorova (1997/2009) makes a strong case as to why Balkanism can be situated vis-à-vis Orientalism which is “a seemingly identical, but actually only similar phenomenon” (1997/2009: 11).

Firstly, Todorova does not deny ‘real’ existence to what she considers to be the Balkan region. Although there is debate about the countries may be included in this signification, Todorova (1997/2009: 29) makes a strong case for the following: Slovakia (but not the Czech lands), Hungary, Romania, the former Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and European Turkey 24. Moreover, this “concreteness of the Balkans” is contrasted to and viewed as “opposed to the intangible nature of the Orient” (ibid: 11), with Todorova critiquing this by

24 Although these designations are not simply clear cut and Romania in particular has contested this (Todorova, 1997/2009).
suggesting that “Said’s treatment is ambivalent” because he gives the ‘Orient’ a real or “genuine ontological status” at the same time as denying its ontological stability. From a DHA approach, although things can be recognised as socially constructed, such as ‘race’ and ‘nation’, there is equal recognition for them to be recognised as ‘ontologically stable’ and ‘real’ as they are appropriated and used discursively within society.

Secondly, in detailing particular stereotypical traits that form the basis of the representations, Todorova explains how there is nothing ‘mysterious’, ‘exotic’ or ‘Utopian’ about the Balkan ‘Other’. Instead, Balkanism is possessive of something more, ‘concrete’ and ‘impoverished’ and is far from “the oriental image [which] serves as escape from civilization” (Todorova, 1997/2009: 13). Furthermore, Todorova explains that, whereas Orientalism is feminine, Balkanism is masculine with “the standard Balkan male...[being] uncivilized, primitive, crude, cruel, and, without exception dishevelled” (1997/2009: 14).

The third and final difference pointed out by Todorova is linked to the transitional state in which the Balkans find themselves: one that is identified as in-between Europe and Asia. Here, in contrast to the presentation of the West and the Orient “as incompatible...antiworlds, but completed antiworlds”, the Balkans “have always evoked the image of a bridge or a crossroads” (Todorova, 1997/2009: 15). Consequently, the Balkans are in many respects not an “incomplete other” but, in fact, “an incomplete self” (Todorova, 1997/2009: 18). This is an interesting observation and one that is useful to consider in relation to the ‘Europeanization’ of ‘Eastern’ Europe in the same context as the Eurosceptic ideology being perpetuated by right wing parties and press in the UK. There are two main aspects to the incomplete transitional ‘self’ bestowed to the Balkans and this, according to Todorova, is related to concepts of religion and ‘race’.

Where Orientalism has always been linked to Islam and the imputed differences between Christianity and Islam (Todorova, 1997/2009; Sayyid, 1997), Balkanism is concerned with the contradictions and denominations of Christianity, specifically between Catholicism and Orthodoxy - with Orthodoxy seen as the “heretic deviation” (Todorova, 1997/2009: 18). However, this is not

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25 Although this is somewhat at odds with Wolff (1994) who suggested the Balkans were considered both ‘feminine’ and ‘irrational’ in comparison to a ‘masculine’ and ‘rational’ Western Europe.
to deny that Islam is also very much part of the Balkan region. Moreover, despite
frequent travel accounts discussing a mixture of ‘races’ in the Balkan region, which
as Todorova says “adapted itself neatly to the dominant racial discourse of the
twentieth century” (ibid: 19), this ‘mixture’ has nevertheless always been viewed
as a ‘type’ of ‘Indo-European’.

In reviewing these three main differences, it becomes clearer how
Balkanism can be differentiated from Orientalism. As is summarized by Todorova:
“It is my thesis that while orientalism is dealing with a difference between
(imputed) differences, balkanism treats the differences within one type”
(1997/2009: 19). Despite these differences, both theories define and locate
foreign ‘Others’ as inferior to a ‘Western’ and European ‘Self’, and it is my
contention that this is achieved via the presence of an underlying racist ideology.

Todorova’s notion of Balkanism has been taken up by many theorists who
have used it to explore Balkan identity and the utilisation of Balkanist
representations for a variety of political purposes. For example, in a similar vein
employ Balkanism (rather than ‘nesting orientalisms’) to explore the construction
of Croatia’s national identity. Evidencing how Croatia tried to construct a
‘European’ as opposed to ‘Balkan’ identity, Razsa and Lindstrom (2004) detail
how “Balkanist rhetoric was utilized to legitimise Croatia’s quest for
independence”, attesting their Europeanness in contrast to Serbia’s Balkanness.
The Croatian example is somewhat ironic, because not only did this strategy to
become part of what Razsa and Lindstrom (2004) identify to be a European Union
‘backfire’26, but in the course of their apparent prejudice against Serbs, Croatia
were also considered ‘Balkan’ in Western media discourse (ibid). Razsa and
Lindstrom also present three different ways in which Balkanist representations
were taken up, not all with the same (political) ideological position, but each
affirming some Balkan essence to a group of people nevertheless. For example, a
Balkanist representations were inherent to the successful political campaign of
Franjo Tuđman in 1997, with the adoption of the slogan “Tuđman, not the
Balkans”. In doing so, Tuđman sought to dismiss any Balkan signification from
Croatian identity and political moves he made also helped to concretise this,

26 With Croatian entry into the EU postponed until 2013.
including “banning Croatia's participation in Balkan associations” such as the South-east European Cooperation Initiative (SECI) (ibid: 641).

However, this was not the only way in which Balkanism was utilised for political purposes and Razsa and Lindstrom (2004) also explain how opposition criticised Tuđman for his “Balkan tendencies”, in relation to his policies that were considered anti-democratic and a violation of human rights. Moreover, critics of both the ruling and opposition parties also employed Balkanist representations in a different sense, with Boris Buden’s essay praising Serbian citizens for an uprising against Milošević, by “Juxtaposing the democratic demonstrations in Serbia with the complacency of Croatians towards the Tudman regime...argu[ing] that Zagreb, not Belgrade, [was] the true “Balkan Palanka”” (ibid: 643-644).

In a similar vein, Patterson (2003) discusses Slovenia and its relationship with a Balkan signification. Thus, despite it being part of (ex) Yugoslavia, Patterson (2003) points out that not even Todorova places it in her list of Balkan countries (1997/2009). However, the strength of its signification as ‘Central’ European rather the ‘Eastern’ or ‘Balkan’ is attributed to the same discursive processes as was apparent in Croatia (as outlined above), and Patterson draws on Stokes (1997), evidencing how this “idea has formed itself in part against a Balkan other” (Stokes, 1997 cited in Patterson, 2003: 112). The study traces Balkanist representations employed by a range of Slovenian texts in the differentiation process, where “Slovenian commentary is said to be securely rooted in traditions of democracy, pluralism and even multiculturalism” while at the same time “Slovenian opinion has frequently portrayed its counterpart, the Balkans, as a region sinking into disorder, violence, mismanagement, and authoritarianism” (Patterson, 2003: 116). Although Patterson is careful to note that not all discourse surrounding the position of Slovenia in Europe utilised such reductionism, there was nevertheless “a remarkable consensus...around the idea...[that] it was not really part of the Balkans” (ibid: 121).

Patterson (2003) also considers whether the neighbouring countries of Austria and Italy corroborated this idea of Slovenia being part of ‘Central’ Europe. Thus, in the Austrian context, Patterson (2003) found that the idea of Slovenia being part of ‘Central’ Europe was not contested and noted that: “One striking feature of Austrian commentary throughout the period in question...is the extent
to which the central European nature of Slovenian society is simply assumed, as something natural, self-evident and uncontroversial” (ibid: 122). Once more, this was related to their Habsburg rather than Ottoman legacy, which, inherent to the Austrian account, has left Slovenes “with some indelible central European stamp” (ibid: 122). Moreover, the Austrian discourse examined, “consciously or unconsciously dodge[d] the question of whether those people living just to the south [were] “Balkan” or not” (ibid: 127). However, in examining the Italian representation of Slovenia, it was found that the importance of claims to a ‘Central’ European identity was somewhat “ignored” (ibid: 129). However, there was evidence of Western stereotypes being drawn upon to discuss Slovenes, for example by journalist Dino Frescobaldi (1991), who “told his Italian readers that the Slovenes were “hard-working,” “diligent,” and “disciplined,”” (Patterson, 2003: 131). Although some also viewed these ‘Central’ European representations as overreaching, comical, even pathetic (ibid).

Hammond (2006) has explored the way in which Balkanist representations have been utilised in the framing of what may or may not be considered ‘European’ in two different contexts. In situating this particular study in what he has labelled a “profound crisis of identity” (p. 6), stemming from the fall of communism, Hammond has explored how “denigratory balkanism” has been evident in two periods: “Britain’s response to the nineteenth century decline of the Ottoman Empire and the EU’s eastern enlargement after 1989” (ibid: 8). Furthermore, as outlined above, Hammond differs from Todorova and puts forward an argument that both of these periods evidence “a sense of the Balkans as a borderland that requires Western supervision” (ibid: 8). Thus, in the nineteenth century context, where countries such as Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia did get independence from Ottoman rule during the ‘Eastern Crisis’ of the 1870’s, Hammond (2006: 10) has argued that the Great Powers (or the West) still denied these countries autonomy:

*The Berlin congress, in short, disregarded the wishes of native populations, effectively returning millions of Europeans to colonial rule and sowing the seeds for further national struggle in the region, including the Austro-Serbian rivalry that would trigger the First World War.*
One of the contributing factors for this denial of autonomy, according to Hammond (2006: 11, was the influence of Balkanist representations, emanating primarily from travel literature: “The accusations of semi-savagery, backwardness, ethnic strife and moral dissolution to be found in British travel writing not only suggested that such problems were an innate consequence of native deficiency, but also offered a triumphant vindication of foreign rule.”

In turning to the context of EU expansion in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, it was also evident that Balkan people were positioned as ‘Other’ whether they were viewed as victims of oppressive communism or liberated from it. Thus, Hammond has argued that sympathy from the West was apparent in the Cold War: “sympathy for the oppressed populations...cut off as they were from the freedom and prosperity of democratic Europe, as Cold War discourse had it” (p. 12). However, Hammond (2006: 13) goes on to point out that, with the fall of the Berlin wall and “initial euphoria...the post-communist peoples were quickly re-imagined as an uncontrollable mass – of criminal gangs, traffickers, prostitutes – that threatened the immanent destruction of Western stability”. These representations seemingly informed how EU expansion was to be achieved, where some EU accession countries were, and still are, required to prove observance to targets and European principles and values that original member states do not, despite their own “deficiencies in such areas as minority rights, asylum policy and institutional transparency” (ibid: 14). Although Hammond discusses economic instability in Eastern European countries as one of the legitimating factors for such targets, he also explains that “the West’s anxiety” about EU expansion extends further with “the real fear...[being] immigration from the CEECs and beyond” (ibid: 16). It is also pointed out that whereas the new accession states including A10 and A2 were required “to implement the Schengen agreement from the moment their applications were accepted”, established countries did not need to accept movement in the opposite direction for up to seven years via the transitional restrictions (ibid: 17).

Although not framed via the lenses of Balkanism, Papadimitriou and Gateva also write about the way in which Bulgarian and Romanian politicians claimed a type of ‘Balkan exceptionalism’, “in order to advance their European ambitions” (2009: 160). Phinnemore (2000: 96) too evidences a Romanian irritation at the
time prior to EU accession, where the country was portrayed as a “‘grey zone’ between west and east” and where this became “synonymous with the instability and uncertainty”. Specifically, in relation to the referent of ‘Balkan’, Romania also argued for its demarcation from it and for its recognition as part of Central or East-Central Europe to try and remove itself from being recognised as a ‘Balkan’ state (ibid: 97). However, Phinnemore (2000: 97) suggests that it still remained viewed as Balkan, especially since the category of ‘western Balkans’ appeared in EU discourse with “Romania, by implication [remaining] part of the ‘eastern Balkans’.”

Related to this is Curticapean’s (2011) study of political cartoons in Bulgaria preceding Bulgarian accession to the EU in 2007. In being careful not to claim that cartoons either simply reproduce or subvert Balkanist stereotypes (about the ‘Self’ on this occasion), she discusses how many of the cartoons chosen for investigation had multiple levels of interpretation. For example, the use of an animal such as a ‘donkey’ was considered self-ironic if it was read as related to a wider perception of a donkey being considered as being stubborn and unintelligent (Curticapean, 2011: 119). However, in a reading which invoked “a metaphor for ruralness” the donkey is linked to poverty and “as disadvantageous... vis-à-vis the Western European countries in terms of modernisation of the agriculture” (ibid: 120) and therefore Balkanist. Nevertheless, Curticapean (2011) came to the conclusion that, although all political cartoons invoked Balkanist representations to greater or lesser extremes, at least half of them challenged or subverted Balkanism.

Also affirming general positions advocated by Todorova and others about Balkanism, Vezovnik and Šarić (2015: 239) claim “that Europe’s historical signification of the Balkans as its Other reemerged precisely with EU enlargement, which allowed for the differentiation between old and new member states”. Although there is no differentiation in their study between the A10 and A2 accessions, I have argued in Chapter 2 that, in the British case, the reaction to Romanian and Bulgarian accession was markedly different.
4.3 Racism

This section will now consider how racism is conceptualised in relation to the theories of Orientalism and Balkanism, as discussed above. In everyday terms, ‘racism’ can be defined as, “prejudice, discrimination, or antagonism directed against someone of a different race based on the belief that one’s own race is superior” (Oxford Living Dictionaries, 2018d). However, in this section, I will be discussing how racism is considered theoretically, adopting the view that racism is an ideology, but one in which is nevertheless realised through discursive or behavioural means. As discussed above, although there are distinct differences between Orientalist and Balkanist representations, it is my belief that they nevertheless share an underlying racist ideology. This section seeks to explore how racism can be conceptualised in a way that is ‘syncretic’ (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001; Delanty, Jones and Wodak, 2008) to be inclusive of national, cultural, ethnic, religious and ‘racial’ differences between groups of people. As previously asserted, I believe that there are certain racist logics that are responsible for the perpetuation of racist ideology, that of differentialism and inegalitarianism and these will be further explored in section 4.3.3. However, to begin with, I will explore the connection between ‘race’ and racism, considering how and why this is linked to modernity and the Enlightenment period.

4.3.1 ‘Race’ and Racism

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the idea or belief in distinct human ‘races’ with biological and physiological differences has been scientifically discredited and it is generally accepted that “human beings are more genetically similar than they are different” (Caliendo and McIlwain, 2011: xxii). In this respect ‘race’ is a social construct that emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, not only to categorise people, but also to hierarchically structure human populations as more or less biologically inferior or superior dependent on ‘race’ (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001). In this sense, ‘race’ is a construct that has been used to legitimise discriminatory and exclusionary practices, including slavery and colonialism. It has also been a “tool to oppress and exploit specific social groups and to deny them access to material, cultural and political resources” (Reisigl and

27 Single quotation marks are used to acknowledge the contested nature of the term ‘race’.
Wodak, 2001: 2). Although, the idea of different ‘races’ was challenged and rejected even before its utilisation in the construction of a ‘pure’ Aryan ‘race’ in Nazi Germany (Miles, 1994), popular or common-sense understandings of ‘race’ still stand, especially within the UK (Miles 1994; Miles and Brown 2003; Reisigl and Wodak, 2001). For example, both the UK and the USA continue to discuss ‘race-relations’, despite the contested nature of ‘race’ and the fact that many other European countries refrain from classifying people in this way (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001). Thus, despite it being viewed as a contentious term elsewhere, the idea of ‘race’ still thrives in British (and American) public consciousness. However, the term ‘race’ has also been used by the groups/people that have been affected by racism in anti-racist political resistance (Miles 1993; Reisigl and Wodak, 2001), in the form of a ‘strategic essentialism’ (Spivak, 1990).

Although the term ‘race’ appeared before the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it was previously seen as a marker of decent/lineage rather than biological (phonotypical and/or somatic) differences (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001). Additionally, Walton and Caliendo (2011: 3) explain, “In the sixteenth century...racial classification was largely understood to differentiate humans from other species (i.e. “the human race”). Banton (2009) also adds to this by elaborating on how differences between people were discussed within the Old Testament: 1) differences of skin-colour “were all part of God’s design”; 2) differences were connected with “climate and environment and were irrelevant to the important questions of man’s obligations to do God’s will”; and 3) “it was sometimes argued that since the difference between Europeans, Africans and Asians were repeated in successive governments they must have held separate ancestors” (Banton, 2009: 56-57).

The Enlightenment period (c. 1720-1820), which has already been briefly discussed in relation to ideas of critique, rationality and reason (see Chapter 3), also saw a proliferation of terms used to categorise the world. As Garner (2017: 8) explains, this period of time saw how “a number of disciplines including biology, philosophy, history, economics and political science were transformed into a coherent body of thought on humankind’s place in the world, containing an elaborate typology of human beings”. For example, Linnaeus (1707-1778) believed that it was important to describe and classify people and animals because
“nature had been constructed on patterns discoverable...by human reason” (Banton, 2009: 58). In his publication of Systems of Nature, Linnaeus therefore identified four different ‘races’: European, Asian, American and African (cited in Garner, 2017: 11). Linnaeus also linked this classification to the four humors and included characteristics that were “clearly derived in large part from stereotypes already emerging in the travel literature” (Bernasconi, 2009: 86). During this time, Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752-1840) also established a way of categorising and differentiating people by developing a “concept of race as a means to distinguish human beings based on visually observable physical traits – skin color, cranial size, bone structure...” (McIlwain and Caliendo, 2011: 40). Subsequently, five ‘races’ were identified: the Caucasian (white race), the Mongolian (yellow race), the Malayan (brown race), the Negro/Ethiopian (black race) and the American (red race) (cited in Garner, 2017: 11).

As this ‘scientific’ enterprise continued, scholars from a variety of disciplines worked towards establishing “a universal definition of race” (Walton and Caliendo, 2011: 3). Thus, new areas of study emerged, such as craniology, where scientists such as Samuel Morton (1799-1851) “studied skull sizes of groups from all over the world and claimed to find a positive correlation between skull size and intellectual capacity” (Muck, 2011: 33). Moreover, by the 1850’s there were also detailed descriptions of categories of people even within ‘races’, for example Aryan, Slavic and Celtic classifications of white ‘races’ found in the work of Knox (1850) and Gobineau (1853-55) (Garner, 2017: 11). What these distinct and various categorisations show is that there was, and still is, no universally accepted agreement on how to classify the differences between people, especially in relation to ‘race’. However, even if a definition of different ‘races’ could not be agreed upon, Garner (2017: 11) explains that the belief in the superiority of some humans and the inferiority of others became what Bourdieu would call doxa28: “where the existence of unequal races passe[d] from the area of discussion, to the area of accepted facts...”. With this inegalitarian logic (Wieviorka, 1995; see section 4.3.3), it was easier to justify colonialism, imperialism and slavery.

28Bourdieu (1977: 164) used the term ‘doxa’ to denote something "that appears as self-evident" in "the natural and social world".
Colonialism and imperialism are sometimes regarded to be the main origin of ‘racial’ and racist thought: “There is a growing consensus that the origins of our modern conceptions of race and ethnicity can be traced directly back to the structures first established by colonial regimes” (Muck, 2011: 29). Moreover, it is often argued that the construction of an inferior ‘race’ enabled justifications for slavery in America, especially “to resolve the growing contradiction between the individual right to freedom and the practice of slavery” (ibid). However, without denying the role of colonialism/imperialism in the construction and perpetuation of ‘racial’ and racist thought, it should not be considered as the only factor or variable. By attributing racism solely to these origins, there is a danger of thinking about racism through ‘black’ and ‘white’ dichotomies, denying the nuanced and very multifaceted nature of racism especially in relation to groups who identify themselves as ‘people of colour’, or through religious rather than ‘racial’ markers, including Muslims or Jews. Related to this, Back and Solomos (2009: 10) suggest that there are “noticeable gaps in many contemporary texts on race and racism... [which fail] to examine the question of anti-semitism in a substantive fashion”.

Anti-Semitism is a term that “refers to the conception of Jews as an alien, hostile and undesirable group, and the practices that derive from, and support, such a conception” (Back and Solomos, 2009: 11). Although the term became significant from the nineteenth century onwards, especially since it was used to distinguish Jewish people by their ‘race’ (as Semites), Miles and Brown (2003) explain that this does not mean that the racialisation of the Jewish population directly caused discrimination. Thus, although a process of racialisation occurred within the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and did help to solidify beliefs in ‘racial’ difference and superiority/inferiority, religious anti-Judaism was already in existence and “religious anti-Judaism gave way to anti-semitism articulated in terms of ‘race’” (Miles and Brown, 2003: 30). Thus, even before the development of ‘race’ as a scientific idea, in “medieval Europe, there was [already] a discourse of the Other as a phenotypical and cultural deviant” (Miles and Brown, 2003: 26). In this respect, the development of racism as an ideology, especially conceptualised in a ‘syncretic’ form (see section 4.3.3), links back further than those ideas developed in the Enlightenment period. Thus, representations of ‘Other’ that existed prior to the existence of ‘racial’ and these included the ‘Others’
were identified as savage or barbarian – even as monsters (Miles and Brown, 2003). Representations and evaluations of the ‘Other’ in this way were not simply replaced by ‘race’; they provided the grounding or conditions for the development of the idea of ‘race’. Thus, they “predetermined the space that the idea of ‘race’ occupied, but themselves were reconstituted by it” (Miles and Brown, 2003: 40).

Although the term ‘race’ is now scientifically discredited, the process of racialisation in which groups are assigned ‘racial’ categories, nevertheless persists. As Delanty, Jones and Wodak (2008: 3) explain, racialisation is a discursive process and “migrants [have] often spoke of their racialization by members of the host society as a process that occurs through language as much as in any sense of real injustice.” As a consequence, many scholars interested in exploring the role and nature of racism within society have taken up and utilised the notion of ‘race’, which has been perceived as a necessary analytical category. This has included, Stuart Hall (1980) and the CCCS group (Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, 1982) who, although seeing ‘race’ as being a social construction, nevertheless saw the importance in retaining it as an analytical concept. This was because identities and communities were formed with this in mind and ‘race’ was seen to facilitate resistance to discrimination (Gilroy, 1987/2002). Others including Banton (1967) and Rex (1983) also adopted this position, advocating the study of ‘race relations’.

However, the utilisation of ‘race’ as an analytical category has also been critiqued, in particular by Miles (1989, 1993, 1994), who has suggested that focusing on ‘race’ unnecessarily reifies the term. Furthermore, Miles has argued that, since “the idea of ‘race’ has no biological object in the sense defined by nineteenth-century science”, the term is problematic for the purposes of analysis (Miles, 1994: 190). Additionally, the very presence of the term ‘race’ in UK law “assumes and legitimates as reality that each human being ‘belongs’ to a ‘race’” (Miles, 1993: 190). For example, ‘race’ is one of the protected characteristics in the 2010 Equality Act. In advocating the study of *racism* rather than ‘race relations’, Miles (1993: 48) has argued:

*Our object of analysis, the active determinant of exclusion and disadvantage, is therefore not physical difference itself, but the attribution of significance to certain patterns of, or the*
imagined assertion of, difference and the use of that process of signification to structure social relationships. The use of ‘race’ (and ‘race relations’) as analytical concepts disguises the social construction of difference, presenting it as somehow inherent in the empirical reality of observable or imagined biological difference.

In theory, this argument surrounding the concept of ‘race’ could equally apply to any social construct, especially some of the other characteristics found in the Equality Act (2010) such as ‘ethnicity’. Ethnicity is another very difficult term to define but is usually accepted to mean “belonging to a social group that has a common national or cultural tradition” (Oxford Living Dictionaries, 2018e) in everyday understandings. Although Miles and Brown (2003: 95) also recognise that ‘ethnicity’ can be equally “as problematic as the concept of ‘race’”, they go on to explain, “the mistake is to assume the existence of a finite number of discrete ethnic groups”. One of the main reasons the term ethnicity might be difficult or further contested is because of the way it has been used as a replacement for, or as interchangeable, with ‘race’ (Miles and Brown, 2003; Lentin 2005, 2008). Moreover, the term has on occasions been seen “as a politically correct code word for ‘race’” (Miles and Brown, 2003: 93). Nevertheless, Miles and Brown (2003: 95) do not conceptualise ethnicity in the same way as ‘race’ and believe that it can prove a useful term because “it can be used in a relational and contextually specific manner”. Moreover, Miles and Brown (2003: 95) quote Eriksen’s (1993: 12) definition and perspective of ethnicity, where ethnicity is seen as:

...an aspect of a relationship, not a property of a group...Ethnicity is an aspect of social relationship between agents who consider themselves as culturally distinctive from members of other groups with whom they have a minimum of regular interaction.

Important in Eriksen’s view is that ethnicity is not seen as inherent to all individuals (as ‘race’ assumes), and ethnicity can, in theory, become a self-ascription. As Miles and Brown (2003: 95) explain, this understanding means “it is not necessary to regard all human beings as ‘possessing’ an ethnicity nor to
produce a taxonomy of ethnic groups”. However, as Lentin (2005, 2008) has argued, this is not the way in which the notion of ethnicity has been employed.

Lentin (2005, 2008) discusses the process by which ‘ethnicity’ entered discourses of anti-racism and was favoured over ‘race’. Coming from a different angle to Miles (1993, 1994), Lentin (2005, 2008) does not advocate an anti-racist position that is removed from or does not at least historicize or politicize the role of ‘race’, even if it has been discredited as ‘pseudo-science’. Lentin’s work primarily focuses on the adoption of ‘ethnicity’ and the focus on ‘culture’ employed by UNESCO29, what she labels ‘the UNESCO tradition’ (2005, 2008). UNESCO endeavoured to eradicate racism, and by doing so, had two goals: “to disqualify the scientific validity of the ‘race’ concept, and to propose alternative ways of conceptualizing human difference that would not invoke the hierarchy implied by ‘race’” (Lentin, 2008: 107). However, Lentin’s main critique of this position was that, “[i]t had failed to deal with the important fact that, while race-thinking may have had its beginnings in the scientific or philosophical domain, it was through the medium of politics that it had been propelled to significance” (Lentin, 2005: 385).

It was the UNESCO tradition, via the work of anthropologist Lévi-Strauss (1952) who substituted ‘race’ with ‘ethnicity’ in a culturally relativist way, where cultures or ethnicities were perceived to be different but nevertheless equal. However, as a result of this approach, which also advocated the study of ‘ethnocentrism’ rather than ‘racism’, Lentin has argued that the “realities of racism” have still not been adequately addressed (2008: 108). Moreover, the shift to focus on ‘ethnicity’ or ‘culture’ rather than ‘race’ was (and continues to be) adopted by far-right groups including the British National Party (BNP) and the English Defence League (EDL) in an attempt to appear more credible, and hence not racist (Allen, 2011; Demetriou, 2013). By using cultural or ethnic markers to describe how foreign ‘Others’ are different, racist arguments have appeared in covert or coded ways, where on the surface they appear as “rational, justified, natural and, most importantly, not in any way racist” (Allen, 2011: 291). Moreover, the adoption of ethnic and cultural identity markers by these groups has not necessarily been based upon ideas of “explicit hatred and hostility” (ibid);

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29 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
instead, these have been used to signal cultural ‘differences’ amongst people, and
differences that aim to highlight that ‘Other’ cultures are “incompatible and alien
to ‘us’” (ibid). Lentin explains that related to this is the argument that “each culture
deserves its own homeland” (Lentin, 2005: 390) which has helped to legitimise
ideas of deportation and repatriation. Moreover, this ideology is representative of
a differentialist logic (Wieviorka, 1995), which will be discussed further in section
4.3.3.

4.3.2 Racism as Ideology

Following Miles (1989, 1993, 1994) and Miles and Brown (2003), this
thesis adopts a view where racism is seen as an ideology, where ideology is
considered to be one or all of the following: 1) shared mental representations, 2)
‘grand narratives’ and; 3) symbolic forms that sustain relations of power and
domination (as discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.3.1). The way in which this
ideology is operationalized can be through discursive and social (including
behavioural) means. When racist ideology is operationalized in this way, racist
ideology becomes racist discrimination. Moreover, it is my contention that
Orientalist and Balkanist representations discussed above can both be regarded
as realising a racist ideology. With racism being conceptualised as an ideology, it
may also be seen as possessing “a dialectical character insofar as the
representation of Other simultaneously refracts a representation of Self” (Miles
and Brown, 2003: 104). Moreover as ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ dichotomies by their nature
produce unequal relations, racism can also be thought of as “an ideology of
inclusion and exclusion” (ibid).

However, although this thesis understands racism primarily to be an
ideology, it does not view racism in the narrow sense that is advocated by Miles
and Brown (2003). To them, racism relates only to the process of racialisation and
discrimination directed towards of people as a result of this. Moreover, Miles
(1989, 1993, 1994) and Miles and Brown (2003) have critiqued perspectives that
attribute racism to be inclusive of national, cultural and or religious difference,
especially those that have argued for the existence of a ‘new’ or ‘cultural’ form of
racism (Barker, 1981). Thus, Miles and Brown (2003) would not technically view
Islamophobia as a form of racism. Although this will be further discussed below,
the main point Miles and Brown (2003) make is that, by viewing racism in this
way, racism has become inflated and potentially meaningless. However, this thesis adopts a position that considers racism as a necessarily multi-faceted concept, especially since racist ideology manifests itself in discourse in very strategic ways, in order to deny that it is racism at all (van Dijk, 1992, 1997, 2000). Thus, a view will be taken where racism as an ideology, and realised as discrimination via discursive or social structures, is considered to be ‘syncretic’ (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001; Delanty, Jones and Wodak, 2008). This will be further elaborated upon below.

4.3.3 ‘New’ Racism

In 1981, Martin Barker published a theory of racism, which was labelled *The New Racism*. According to Barker (1981), the rhetoric of the Conservative party developed in such a way during the 1970s, where a view was constructed and reinforced that it was somehow ‘normal’ or ‘natural’ for the British public to want to protect a “homogeneous way of life” (p.17). Barker (1981) argued that this discourse evidenced ‘new’ racism, and this had developed vehemently within the Conservative party since Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech (see Chapter 2, section 2.3.4). Although Powell was indeed suspended, Powellite themes remained and Barker (1981) evidenced how fear of the immigrant ‘Other’ was constructed and reflected in this ‘new’ type of racism. An example of this has already been evident in Chapter 2 (section 2.3.5) where Margaret Thatcher claimed that the “country might be rather swamped by people with a different culture” (cited in Hansen, 2000: 210).

According to Barker (1981), ‘new’ racism was not one that viewed groups of people as superior or inferior according to (pseudo) biological conceptions of ‘race’; indeed, this form of racism was categorically condemned. Instead, ‘new’ racism was one based on a fear of, or the need to exclude, ‘foreigners’. Although in previous contexts such a view may have been labelled as ‘xenophobia’, Barker (1981: 4) identified this as a form of racism because it too “sees as biological or pseudo-biological, groupings that are the result of social and historical processes”, meaning it could be inclusive of nationality, ethnicity, religion and culture. However, as racism was viewed as being one that asserted a belief that there were superior/inferior ‘races’, this ‘new’ form of racism was not recognised in the same way. Barker (1981: 4) therefore argued, “that the prevalence of a definition of
racism in terms of superiority/inferiority has helped conceal how common is a form of racism that does not need to make such assertions...”. As this ‘new’ form of racism still attributed (pseudo) biological significance to groups of people, not based on ‘race’, but other supposedly ‘natural’ markers of how people were different, a (supposedly) legitimate argument about the fear or concern of immigrant groups was able to form, and one that was based on genuine or ‘natural’ fears from ordinary people about a threat to their ‘way of life’ (Barker, 1981).

After Barker (1981), consideration was then given to how ‘new’ forms of racism materialized itself in discourse. In particular, van Dijk (1991, 1992, 1993, 1997, 2000) discussed many different discursive strategies that were employed across ‘elite’ institutions, including in government, education and media that were representative of ‘new’ racism. These strategies included: ‘positive-self presentation’ and ‘negative other-presentation’ (as discussed in Chapter 3); a denial of racism via the use of disclaimers; and a range of topics evident in discourse that focused on how immigrants were not only different but also deviant, focusing on crime and integration/social problems (van Dijk 1992, 1997, 2000). On many occasions, these strategies were presented in a form that “[did] not appear to be racist at all” (van Dijk, 1993: 6). In fact, even if it was identified as a form of racism, its focus on difference rather than superiority/inferiority, was seemingly enough to deny that it was really racism (Essed, 1991; van Dijk 1992, 2000). In recognising that the term racism was now extended, van Dijk (1993) contended that his “conception of racism also include[d] ethnicism...a system of ethnic group dominance based on cultural criteria of categorization, differentiation, and exclusion, such as those of language, religion, customs, or worldviews”. van Dijk (1993: 5) also argued that this type of racism was “possibly even more serious and insidious” because it could be found in “the everyday, mundane, negative opinions, attitudes, and ideologies and the seemingly subtle acts and conditions of discrimination against minorities”. This was also something that Essed (1991: 3) had studied and discussed as “everyday racism” which similarly was argued to include “systematic, recurrent, familiar practices...invol[ving] socialized attitudes and behavior”.

However, Miles (1994) has not been so accepting of Barker’s (1981) contention that a ‘new’ form of racism has been in existence since the 1970s. This
is because Miles (1994) highlights that, even within what may be presumed as ‘old’, ‘biological’ or ‘scientific’ conceptions of racism, there are not only divisions of superiority/inferiority. Inherent to the racism that resulted in atrocities such as the Holocaust was not only *inegalitarianism* and the belief that some ‘races’ may somehow be superior to others, but also *differentialism* in positing that these different ‘races’ even exist in the first place. Thus, Miles (1994) argues that racism has always incorporated the logics of *differentialism* and *inegalitarianism*, drawing on the work of Taguieff (1987/2001) where ‘new’ racism may not be as ‘new’ as suggested by Baker (1981).

In relation to this, Wieviorka (1994: 182) has proposed that two logics of racism should be identified on a continuum: “a classical, inegalitarian racism and a new, differentialist one”, extending the work of Taguieff (1987/2001). The *inegalitarian* logic is related to the processes of positioning one group of people as superior and the other as inferior. This type of logic is suggested to be inherent to ‘old’ or ‘biological’ conceptions of racism. However, Wieviorka (1994: 182) has also pointed out that where racism is based primarily (or only) on this logic, it does not necessarily exclude people from society; instead, it legitimises a view where people can exist within the same society but where “they can be exploited and regulated to do unpleasant and badly paid tasks” (i.e. slavery). On the other hand, the *differentialist* logic is related to processes of positioning one group of people as inherently different to the other group. This is what has been evidenced in conceptualisations of ‘new’ racism, including that there are perceived incompatible cultural differences (Lentin 2005, 2008; Allen 2011). As Wieviorka writes (1994: 182) this logic infers “that he/she has no place in society, that he/she is a danger, an invader, who should be kept at some distance, expelled or possibly destroyed.” Wieviorka thus comes to the conclusion that the way in which racism has been conceptualised by Barker (1981) was that “the new racism, sometimes also referred to as cultural racism, is the main one in the contemporary world, while the inegalitarian one becomes secondary” (1994: 182).

However, in relation to the argument by Miles (1994) presented above, rarely is it the case that only one of the logics, *inegalitarianism* or *differentialism*, is singularly present in racism. Thus, with reference once more to the Holocaust, Miles (1994) points out that Jewish people were not only considered an inferior
’race’ based on an *inegalitarian* logic, but that the final solution, which involved the mass killing of Jewish people and other ethnic groups including Romani gypsies, also involved a *differentialist* logic. As Wieviorka (1994: 183) also acknowledges this, it is proposed that there are not multiple racisms that can be divided into ‘old’ and ‘new’ forms but only one:

"In fact, in most experiences of racism, the two logics co-exist, and racism appears as a combination of them both. There are not two racisms, but one, with various versions of the association of cultural differentialism and social inequalitarianism."

Although Wieviorka (1994) and Miles (1994) both make a strong case for the existence of both *inegalitarianism* and *differentialism* in racism, it does not mean that a ‘newer’ coded and covert form of racism did not come into existence in the 1970/80s as articulated by Barker (1981). Thus, I would suggest that the very fact that, since the 1980s, discourse(s) about macro-topics such as immigration have been strategically transformed in such a way as to exert the same ideology, in this case racism, but in a way that mitigates or hides the fact that it is racism at all, evidences something that is indeed ‘new’. My view of racism therefore considers that it is a multi-faceted ideology, inclusive of what the layperson still interprets as ‘race’ but also inclusive of national, cultural, religious and ethnic markers. Instead of thinking of racisms in the plural, as is advocated by Goldberg (1993) and Garner (2017), I think of one racism, as an ideology, and follow Miles (1994) and Wieviorka (1994) where this ideology comprises the two logics of *inegalitarianism* and *differentialism*. This conceptualisation of racism may also be described as ‘syncretic’ (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 10).

**4.4 Chapter Summary**

This chapter has focused on how *Orientalist* and *Balkanist* representations work to construct the ‘Other’ in discourse. Although Said’s (1978/2003) *Orientalism* has inspired the work of many investigating the denigration of ‘Others’ in hegemonic discourse/s, I have argued that Todorova’s theory of *Balkanism* is more compatible, not only with the topic of investigation in this
thesis, but also theoretically more aligned with the DHA. Furthermore, I have evidenced how Todorova’s (1997/2009) *Balkanism* has been utilised in other studies examining the representation of ‘Eastern’ Europe/ans, including studies that have considered Romanian and Bulgarian EU accession.

In the second part of this chapter I argued that racism, conceptualised as a ‘syncretic’ ideology, is something that *Orientalism* and *Balkanism* share, despite their distinct differences. The role of the (pseudo) biological concept of ‘race’ was also considered in relation to racism, but it was argued that racism is conceptualised as inclusive of the discrimination directed towards of groups of people based on their nationality, ethnicity, religion and/or culture in this thesis. I also examined the presence of two logics of racism: *inegalitarianism* and *differentialism* in relation to ‘old’ and ‘new’ understandings of racism. Although Miles (1994) has pointed out that these distinctions may not be as pronounced as suggested by Barker (1981), I nevertheless see a place for the recognition of discursive structures that may be strategically covert as ‘new’ forms of racism. In the following chapter, the methodology that will be implemented in this thesis will be presented. Here, discursive analytical strategies will be presented in more depth alongside a reflective discussion of the data selected for the purposes of analysis.
Chapter 5 – Methodology

5.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to present three main aspects of the thesis that aid in the transition from the research questions (as outlined in Chapter 1) to the realisation of data chapters. The following items will therefore be discussed: 1) the linguistic tools/methods for data analysis; 2) data selection, collection and categorisation for the purposes of macro- and micro-analysis and; 3) ethical considerations.

I start by critically examining the five methodical questions and corresponding discursive strategies proposed by the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) in section 5.2, as they are utilised extensively within the analytical chapters. I then turn to examine Martin and White’s (2005) Appraisal Theory in section 5.3, outlining how evaluation can be systematically analysed alongside representation in an attempt to explicitly consider it as part of the DHA. Following this, a reflective discussion will be presented outlining the methods of data selection and collection in section 5.4, with the categorisation and organisation of data informed by the initial analysis of discourses and discourse topics. This section will also explain how a case study was formulated, specifically focusing on the implementation of welfare restrictions and the construction of a ‘benefit tourist’ (section 5.4.2). Ethical considerations will then be examined in section 5.5, with a summary of Chapter 5 being presented in section 5.6. Although the structure of this chapter may not be reflective of a traditional social sciences research methodology, I have based its construction on other theses utilising the DHA, including KhosraviNik (2010b) and Lamb (2011).

5.2 Methods in the Discourse-Historical Approach

Since the DHA was founded and developed via the analysis of discourse that was antisemitic, it incorporates a very strong set of analytical tools when it comes to the discursive analysis of texts, especially with regards to the representation of the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’. The reason that this is important for the analysis of discourse about immigration is because it channels into how ‘we’ represent and think of ‘them’ discursively. As KhosraviNik (2010b: 56) explains, the DHA, alongside van Dijk’s (1992, 1993, 2000, 2016) socio-cognitive approach,
place emphasis specifically on “qualities of prejudiced ideologies and hegemonic relations of ‘in’ and ‘out’ groups”.

For application of the DHA to a discourse in question, three analytical stages are encouraged: (1) identification of specific contents or topics of a specific discourse, (2) the investigation of discursive strategies, and (3) the examination of linguistic means and context-dependent linguistic realizations (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016: 32). Following this, the DHA poses five methodical questions:

1. How are persons, objects, phenomena/events, processes and actions named and referred to linguistically?
2. What characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to social actors, objects, phenomena/events and processes?
3. What arguments are employed in the discourse in question?
4. From what perspective are these nominations, attributions and arguments expressed?
5. Are the respective utterances articulated overtly, intensified or mitigated?

By posing these five questions, the approach does not overtly prescribe the specific linguistic items that should be analysed; however, each question does relate to a specific discursive strategy that is “adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic goal” within the text (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016: 33). The strategies are: 1) Reference/Nomination, 2) Predication, 3) Argumentation, 4) Perspectivization, and 5) Intensification/Mitigation.

5.2.1 Reference/Nomination

Referential or nomination strategies involve considering how social actors are referred to or labelled in discourse. Thus, considering referential strategies can allow for a demonstration on how social actors may be placed into and represented as in-groups and out-groups (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 45). Moreover, through the identification of referential strategies, divisions and dichotomies may become apparent and may be able to evidence discrimination in discourse. A brief discussion will now be presented on how referential/nomination strategies may be realised.
It is evident within *Discourse and Discrimination* (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001) that the referential/nomination strategies considered within the DHA are primarily adopted from van Leeuwen’s (1996) work on *The Representation of Social Actors*. As part of this, a ‘sociosemantic inventory’ illustrates how social actors can be represented in discourse. Within, van Leeuwen’s framework, the representation of social actors is considered firstly through an understanding of the “sociological and critical relevance” of the categories, and secondly by assessing how these might be realised linguistically (van Leeuwen, 1996: 32). Although KhosraviNik (2010a) critiques van Leeuwen’s (1996) approach by suggesting that it oversimplifies the relationship between discourse and society, the socio-semantic model has proved an effective type of grammar to identify ideological representations of the ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ (Hart, 2014: 33).

One of the primary aspects of van Leeuwen’s (1996) framework is to consider whether social actors are *included* or *excluded* from discourse. Where they are included, social actors can be categorised or classified in a variety of ways (explored below); however, where social actors are excluded from discourse, questions can be raised in relation to ‘who’ is excluded and ‘why’ are they excluded? Although exclusions may partly be ‘innocent’, or due to presupposed understandings between text producer and text consumer, much exclusion occurs because of strategic purposes (as discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.3.5). As Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 47) demonstrate, the exclusion of social actors can have “clearly discriminating effects”, and they give the example of the generic use of the masculine form in languages such as English and German, which “linguistically exclude women”. However, they also go on to point out that linguistic inclusion does not always mean a fair or equal representation and that this can also have a “disguising, relativizing or averting function” (ibid). Within van Leeuwen’s framework, two types of linguistic exclusion are identified: *suppression* and *backgrounding*. When social actors are suppressed in discourse, there is no reference and the actor cannot be inferred from elsewhere in the text. However, although *backgrounding* is also a form of linguistic exclusion, the social actor in question will nevertheless be present or inferable elsewhere in the text.

When it comes to social actors being included in discourse, one of the most central ideas revolves around the type of ‘role’ they may adopt. van Leeuwen
(1996: 43) emphasises that, even though discourse can represent the same ‘reality’, the choices we make with regards to who is, for instance, ‘Actor’ and who is ‘Goal’, can be particularly powerful (as discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.3.5). Moreover, social actors can be placed in either active or passive roles, determining not only their presence but also their force in the discourse. Activation is realised when “social actors are represented as the active, dynamic forces in an activity” (Van Leeuwen, 1996: 43). Alternatively, passivation occurs when social actors “are represented as ‘undergoing’ the activity, or as being ‘at the receiving end of it’” (ibid: 44). Moreover, this can be uncovered through transitivity analysis in through examining where processes (verbs) position participants (social actors) (Halliday, 1994; Hart, 2014). Despite the similarity between this social concept and the grammatical concept of active and passive voice, it must be noted that activation and passivation could occur both in the active voice, “the dog attacked the boy” and the passive voice “the boy was attacked by the dog”. Note that in both examples the dog was activated and the boy passivated. When it comes to passivation, a further distinction becomes necessary: that between a social actor who is subjected and one who is beneficialised. Where a social actor is subjected via passivation they “are treated as objects in the representation” (ibid); however, if they are beneficialised, social actors would be seen as benefitting (either positively or negatively) from some kind of event. When it comes to discourse about immigration, common instances revolve around the activation of actors such as the ‘government’ or ‘us’ and the passivation of ‘immigrants’, who are also commonly subjected (ibid: 45).

Social actors may also be defined in either generic or specific ways. However, this is not simply a distinction between groups and individuals as groups may also be specified. For example there is a difference between the representation of ‘students’ as either a generic or specific group in the following examples: “students are expected to attend all classes” (generic) and “The students were running late to their class” (specific).

With reference to groups and individuals, van Leeuwen (1996: 48) distinguishes between assimilation and individualisation, respectively. There are two types of assimilation within van Leeuwen’s framework, that of aggregation and collectivisation. Where social actors are aggregated, they are grouped as
“statistics”, and as was evidenced within previous chapters, this is a common strategy in discourse about immigration (e.g. 85% of the public want to close the borders). Furthermore, van Leeuwen (1996: 49) also writes: “aggregation is often used to regulate practice and to manufacture consensus opinion”. Alternatively, collectivisation is where reference to groups occurs, but not in numerical forms. Within collectivisation, deictics plays a crucial role, especially with reference to ‘us’ or ‘we’ against ‘them’. Chilton (2004: 56) outlines different dimensions of deixis where three types of indexical can be identified: spatial (considering the ‘here’ and ‘there’); temporal (considering the ‘now’ or ‘then’); and social (considering the ‘we’/ ‘us’ and ‘them’).

In examining how social actors are specified in discourse, there are some slight variations between van Leeuwen’s (1996) sociosemantic framework and the DHA’s application, which I wish to clarify here. With regards to van Leeuwen’s framework, when social actors are nominated, this refers to their unique identity and when they are categorised, this is with reference to their shared social identities and functions. However, the difference in approaches comes with regards to categorisation. Thus, within van Leeuwen’s framework there is a further distinction between: functionalisation “when social actors are referred to in terms of an activity, in terms of something they do” e.g. occupation (p.54); identification “defined, not in terms of what they do, but in terms of what they...are” (p.54); and appraisement where social actors are “referred to in interpersonal, rather than experiential terms” (p.58). The DHA, however, takes a view of identification in “a broader sense...taking it as a hyponym for all forms of persona reference by nomination”. Additionally, where classification is one type of identification (alongside relational and physical identification) in van Leeuwen’s framework, Wodak and Reisigl (2001: 47) apply it only to “social class membership”.

Representations of social actors are also realised in the following ways: indetermination where “social actors are represented as unspecified ‘anonymous’ individuals or groups” and would include indefinite pronouns such as ‘somebody’ or ‘someone’ (Van Leeuwen, 1996: 51); differentiation where a social actor is “explicitly” positioned as different “creating the difference between ‘self’ and
‘other’; and **(im)personalisation** where social actors are either recognized as ‘human beings’ or not.

Finally, social actors may be **associated** or **dissociated** within discourse. Association refers to social actors that may be positioned in a way that they form their own group (whether this is immediately obvious to the reader is another thing). The most common way in which this is realised is through parataxis, as seen in the following example provided by van Leeuwen (1996: 50): “the immigration program existed for the benefit of politicians, bureaucrats, and the ethnic minorities, not for Australians as a whole”. Thus, parataxis is used here to signal *politicians*, *bureaucrats* and *ethnic minorities* are associated to form one group. The example also highlights how another group become dissociated, namely, *Australians* (van Leeuwen, 1996: 50).

### 5.2.2 Predication

When analysing predication, the DHA focuses upon how attributes and qualities are assigned to a range of phenomena, including people (as individuals and groups), things, practices, events and processes. Furthermore, by analysing predication, the DHA seeks to identify evaluative, positive and/or negative attributions, alongside stereotypical traits afforded to both the ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, 2016). Predication is linked to referential/nomination strategies, depending on the denotative and connotative meanings of the particular reference. However, predication is also realised by *attributes* such as *adjectives*, by *predicative nouns/adjectives/pronouns*, by *collocations* and by *rhetorical figures* such as euphemisms and by *metaphors*, *metonymies* and *synecdoches* (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 54-55). Although the analysis of predication is essential in uncovering ideologies about the ‘Self’ and ‘Other’, the DHA has not elaborated on or utilised a systematic framework to analyse the extent to which certain predications can be identified as more or less evaluative. Unlike its adoption of van Leeuwen’s (1996) socio-semantic framework for the analysis of referential strategies, and the adoption of *topoi* and Pragma-Dialectics (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004) for the analysis of argumentation, a systematic framework for the analysis of evaluation has not, to the best of my knowledge, been drawn upon.
Considering that *evaluation*, which deals with “the way speakers...convey various kinds of subjective opinion in discourse and in so doing attempt to achieve some intersubjective consensus” (Hart, 2014: 43), is equally as important as *representation*, I wish to adopt a model for the analysis of *evaluation* and explicitly integrate it into the DHA (within each of the five strategies). The model that will be drawn upon is Appraisal Theory (Martin and White, 2005). Although one aspect of the theory, ATTITUDE, can be explicitly connected to *predication* (as well as *nomination* and *argumentation* to certain extents), the two remaining sub-systems GRADUATION and ENGAGEMENT are also seemingly compatible with the DHA in connection to *perspectivization* and *intensification/mitigation*. The Appraisal Theory will be outlined fully in section 5.3, where its compatibility with the DHA will also be explained.

5.2.3 Argumentation

Inherent to the representation of the ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ are discursive strategies that assert claims and those that legitimise, defend and/or justify certain positions. These types of propositions are characteristic of argumentation. Argumentation here differs from the general, everyday use of the term, which is so often connotes, anger, aggression and perhaps even violence, and instead refers to:

...a verbal, social and rational activity aimed at convincing a reasonable critic of the acceptability of a standpoint by putting forward a constellation of propositions justifying or refuting the proposition expressed in the standpoint.

(van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004: 1)

Alongside nomination and predication, argumentation is also one of the main areas that the DHA focuses upon. Argumentation, although not viewed as a speech act in its own right (Reisigl: 2014) is viewed as “a linguistic as well as cognitive pattern of problem-solving that manifests itself in a...sequence of speech acts” and “serves the methodical/systematic challenging or justification of validity claims” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016: 35). This understanding of argumentation is based on
the work of Kopperschmidt, and Habermasian validity claims of truth, truthfulness and normative rightness (Reisigl, 2014; see Chapter 3, section 3.4.2).

Although the analysis of argumentation appears within different approaches to CDA, the DHA is the only approach that has explicitly embedded argumentation within its methodological framework as an analytical tool (Ihnen and Richardson, 2011). In this respect, argumentation is analysed as a separate discursive strategy (Reisigl, 2014). This is notably different to Fairclough and Fairclough’s (2012: 24) approach to argumentation, where argumentation is not “viewed as a ‘discursive’ strategy in itself” because ‘strategies’ are seen as belonging to “theories of action, not within theories of discourse”. In following the DHA’s understanding of both ‘discourse’ and ‘discursive strategy’, argumentation can be analysed from the following combination of perspectives:

a. The functional, formal and content-related analysis of argumentation;

b. The analysis of the macro- meso- or micro- structure of argumentation;

c. The analysis of the representation (coverage, report, quotation, etc.) of argumentation in contrast to the performing of argumentation;

d. The analysis of sound in contrast to fallacious argumentation.

(Reisigl, 2014: 74)

Furthermore, it is the analysis of a range of topoi that has proved particularly useful in the analysis of argumentation within the DHA, especially when dealing with the de/legitimisation of discrimination.

5.2.3.1 Topoi

Via the concept of topos (singular, topoi plural), realisations of argumentative patterns or schemes can be made explicit. The DHA therefore focuses extensively on this notion when examining text/s and discourse/s. Topoi are said to be both “warrants which guarantee the transition from argument to conclusion” and “search formulas which tell you how and where to look for arguments” (Wodak, 2015: 51 based on Kienpointner: 2011). A deeper
understanding of the role and nature of topoi is apparent through an exploration of the differences between functional, formal and content-related analysis of argumentation. Firstly, with regards to a functional analysis of argumentation, the DHA refers to the model of argumentation as proposed by Toulmin (2003). In his work, Toulmin seeks to identify not the different types of justificatory arguments that can be produced, but rather “how far they can all be assessed by the same procedure” (Toulmin, 2003: 14). With regards to this, Toulmin identifies six main parts to any argumentation scheme. The first three provide the basic structure:

1. **Claim (C):** the original assertion (sometimes also referred to as the conclusion) which needs to be justified.
2. **Data (D):** the data (or grounds), which provide facts or evidence as backing for the original claim.
3. **Warrant (W):** a hypothetical proposition which signifies a step or bridge between the original claim and the data. Effectively, justifying the link between the two. Usually these can be represented as conditional or causal statements such as “if x then y” or “y because x”.

The following three elements, however, are necessary in order to “add some explicit reference to the degree or force” with regards to the validity of the *claim, data* or *warrant* (Toulmin, 2003: 93). They include:

4. **Modal Qualifiers (Q):** signalling the strength of the warrant.
5. **Rebuttal (R):** signalling why the warrant is not credible or authoritative.
6. **Backing (B):** a general statement as to why the warrant should be accepted.

These elements can be viewed *Figure 2:*
From a functional perspective, therefore, topoi can be understood as warrants. For this reason, topoi are often reformulated as causal or conditional statements.

With reference to the formal analysis of argumentation, the DHA takes inspiration from the work of Kienpointner (1996). Here, the focus is reduced through the analysis of “the structure of argumentation as syllogism” (Reisigl, 2014: 19). In this respect, the warrant (or conclusion rule) becomes the central point for discussion, and it is here where it is also known as a topos or locus. Moreover, it is through Kienpointner's formal analysis that topoi are explicitly acknowledged to “justify the transition from arguments to the conclusion” (Reisigl, 2014: 19). With this in mind, Kienpointner focuses on identifying nine formal (content-abstract) argumentation schemes following Aristotle’s taxonomy (Wodak, 2015: 52). These include, for example, the topos of authority, the topos of example, the topos of the part and the whole, and the topos of comparison. In the same way as Toulmin’s warrants can be identified, topoi may be realised via causal or conditional constructions. Reisigl elaborates on the topos of authority:

The scheme or topos of authority can rely on epistemic authorities that are introduced to justify a claim of truth or on deontic authorities that are referred to in order to justify a claim of normative rightness. This scheme or topos can [be] formalized as follows:

CR: If authority X says that A is true/ that A has to be done, A is true/A has to be done.

(Reisigl, 2014: 21)
However, the DHA does not simply follow the premise that topoi are inherently content-abstract. With this in mind, advocates of the DHA seek to identify a series of specific ‘content-related’ topoi that may be used to justify and legitimise discrimination. This is supported by a belief that “argumentation is always topic-related and field-dependent” (Reisigl, 2014: 22) and that certain argumentation schemes recur as part of common sense reasoning about things (Wodak, 2015: 52). In this respect, the DHA draws on the work of Wengeler (2003) and Rubinelli (2009), both of whom make clear that argumentation does not only have to be viewed via functional or formal lenses. Thus, it is emphasised within Reisigl (2014) and Wodak (2015) that even Aristotelian understandings of argumentation may not always view a topos as a formal or functional element. Moreover, Wodak (2015: 52) clarifies that “topoi are linked to the subject of dialectic, called endoxon” where endoxon refers to the presumed or accepted beliefs of the public, albeit ones that may belong to traditional knowledge rather than true knowledge (Boukda, 2013: 18 cited in Wodak, 2015: 52). Where common-sense argumentation strategies are used, they may often be based on fallacies and therefore considered fallacious (see below). However, common-sense argumentation schemes are often taken at face-value and remain unchallenged, achieving a hegemonic status in discourse. There are a number of different content-related topoi, which are employed by scholars using the DHA (for example in Wodak et al., 1999, 2000; Reisigl and Wodak, 2001; KhosraviNik, 2009, 2010b; Wodak, 2015). Although each study may focus on slightly different formal and/or content-related topoi, depending on research questions and aims, Reisigl (2014: 23) makes it clear that the choice of formal and/or content-related topoi is not simply a random selection and that ‘hypolepsis’ is employed: “the principle to grasp the unknown by systematically connecting it with the known” (ibid). Thus, when it comes to the analysis of discourse about immigration and the representation and evaluation of Romanians and Bulgarians, it is possible to predict that the formal and content-related topoi in Table 1 may be evident. This is based on the kind of arguments and perspectives about immigration that were elaborated upon in Chapter 2 and the topoi evident in Reisigl and Wodak (2001) and Wodak (2015).
Table 1: Selected List of Topoi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topos</th>
<th>Warrant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Topos of people</td>
<td>If the people favour/refuse a specific action, the action should be performed/not performed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topos of advantage/usefulness</td>
<td>If an action under a specific relevant point of view will be useful, then one should perform it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topos of disadvantage/uselessness</td>
<td>If one can anticipate that the predicted consequences of a decision will not occur, then the decision has to be rejected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topos of danger/threat</td>
<td>If there are specific dangers or threats, one should do something against them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topos of burden/weighing down</td>
<td>If a person, an institution or a country is burdened by specific problems, one should act in order to diminish those burdens.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topos of finance</td>
<td>If a specific situation or action costs too much money, one should perform actions that diminish those costs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topos of reality</td>
<td>Because reality is as it is, a specific action/decision should be performed/made.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topos of numbers</td>
<td>If the numbers prove/don't prove a specific standpoint, a specific action should be performed/not carried out.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topos of saviour</td>
<td>If danger is to be expected because of X and if A has saved us in the past, the A will be able to save us again.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topos of history</td>
<td>Since history teaches that specific actions have specific consequences, one should perform or omit a specific action in a specific situation (allegedly) comparable with the historical example referred to.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topos of definition</td>
<td>If an action, a thing or a person (group) is named/designated as X, they carry (or should carry) that qualities, traits, attributes contained in the (literal) meaning of X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topos of humanitarianism</td>
<td>If a political action or decision does/does not conform with human rights or humanitarian convictions and values, one should/should not perform or make it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topos of responsibility</td>
<td>Because a state or group is responsible for the emergence of specific problems, it or they should act in order to find solutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topos of law/right</td>
<td>If a law or an otherwise codified norm prescribes or forbids a specific politico-administrative action, the action has to be performed or omitted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topos of authority</td>
<td>If authority X says that A is true/ that A has to be done, A is true/A has to be done.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topos of abuse</td>
<td>If a right or an offer for help is abused, the right should be changed or the help should be withdrawn or measures against the abuse should be taken.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.2.3.2 Pragma-Dialectics and Fallacies

If arguments and/or specific topoi are deemed to be unreasonable, and therefore not ‘sound’, the DHA labels them as fallacies. This is in accordance with the Pragma-Dialectic approach to argumentation (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004), with whom the advocates of the DHA align with in order to provide a normative and therefore ‘critical’ basis for the analysis argumentation (Reisigl, 2014). If, for example, an argument that adopted the *topos of danger/threat* was found not to be a sound argument, the DHA would label the argumentation as a fallacy, either as the *fallacy of danger/threat*, or as on of a series of ‘pragmatic fallacies’ such as *argumentum ad baculum* (verbal intimidation by appealing to fear and/or violence) or *argumentum ad hominem* (verbal attack on personality) (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001). Although fallacies are sometimes considered to be argumentation “that seems to be valid but that is not valid” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004: 158), the Pragma-Dialectic approach to argumentation extends (but also restricts) this concept. Thus a fallacious argumentation is one that is deemed to occur if any part of an argument scheme is deemed to be ‘unreasonable’. The way in which this can be determined, is via reference to the ten rules of rational arguing formulated within the Pragma-Dialectic approach, in which Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 71) state “should form the basis of a discourse ethics on which a political model of discursive, deliberative democracy...can be grounded”. Moreover, by following these rules, sound argumentation schemes can be differentiated from fallacious ones on normative grounds. The ten rules are as follows:

1. *Discussants may not prevent each other from advancing standpoints or from calling standpoints into question* (freedom rule).
2. *Discussants who advance a standpoint may not refuse to defend this standpoint when requested to do so* (obligation-to-defend rule).
3. *Attacks on standpoints may not bear on a standpoint that has not actually been put forward by the other party* (standpoint rule).
4. *Standpoints may not be defended by non-argumentation or argumentation that is not relevant to the standpoint* (relevance rule).
5. Discussants may not falsely attribute unexpressed premises to the other party, nor disown responsibility for their own unexpressed premises (unexpressed-premise rule).

6. Discussants may not falsely present something as an accepted starting point or falsely deny that something is the accepted starting point (starting-point rule).

7. Reasoning that in an argumentation is presented as formally conclusive may not be invalid in a logical sense (validity rule).

8. Standpoints may not be regarded as conclusively defended by argumentation that is not presented as based on formally conclusive reasoning if the defense does not take place by means of appropriate argumentation schemes that are applied correctly (argument scheme rule).

9. Inconclusive defenses of standpoints may not lead to maintaining these standpoints, and conclusive defenses of standpoints may not lead to maintaining expressions of doubt concerning these standpoints (concluding rule).

10. Discussants may not use any formulations that are insufficiently clear or confusingly ambiguous, and they may not deliberately misinterpret the other party's formulations (language use rule).

(van Eemeren and Grootendoorst, 2004: 190-196)

5.2.3.3 Criticisms of Argumentation in the DHA

In recent years, most of the criticism that has been directed towards the DHA has been surrounding its application of argumentation. Here, I will briefly consider three main criticisms from Žagar (2010), Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) and Forchtner and Tominc (2012).

Žagar (2010) has argued that advocates of the DHA have misused the concept of *topoi* and three main points are raised in relation to this (see also Reisigl, 2014). Firstly, Žagar (2010: 9-10) points out that even though *topoi* are identified within analysis, the overarching argument is seldom reconstructed. Thus, Žagar (2010: 11) calls for at least a basic reconstruction, such as the following example, to be utilised when pointing out *topoi* evident in texts/discourses:
1) If a specific action costs too much money, one should perform actions that diminish costs. (*Topos* connecting argument with conclusion)

2) EU enlargement costs too much money. (Argument)

3) EU enlargement should be stopped/slowed down... (Conclusion)

Most advocates of the DHA have taken on board this suggestion, clearly evident in the work of Reisigl (2014) and Reisigl and Wodak (2016). However, subsequent criticisms have not been as readily welcomed (Reisigl, 2014), and it has since become clear that these criticisms may have emerged from “misunderstanding, misreading and non-reading” (ibid: 86).

The second and third criticism from Žagar (2010) involves the way in which a *topos* is conceptualised. It is evident that, for Žagar (2010), a *topos* is only considered as a formal or functional concept, and in this respect the DHA’s incorporation of content-related *topoi* is interpreted as problematic. Moreover, as content-related *topoi* have also been described “as reservoirs of generalised key ideas” Richardson (2004: 230), this potentially gives an impression that they are somewhat removed from argumentation. Reisigl (2014), however, responds to this by stating that even when a content-related *topos* is discussed and analysed “it simultaneously remains a functional concept, for a *topos* serves as a conclusion rule (warrant) that connects an argument with a claim” (p. 86). Thus, although content-related *topoi* play a large role in the DHA, they are not separated from formal and functional argumentation.

Related to this second point is the third criticism, which accuses the DHA of utilising the concept of *topos* as a recurring theme or literary motif (*’leitmotif’*), rather than as argumentation. However, although literary *topoi* are included within the DHA, this is done so with argumentation in mind and to highlight how such literary *topoi* are utilised for the purposes of argumentation. For example, in *The Discursive Construction of National Identity* (1999: 38-39) literary topoi such as the *locus amoenus* (*’pleasant place’*) and the *locus terriblis* (inversion of the former) are referred to in the analysis of political discourse. In relation to this example, Žagar (2010: 21) claims: “These two topoi have nothing to do with connecting arguments to conclusions but are literary *topoi per excellence...*”. However, as Reisigl (2014: 87) points out, it is this example where there is evidence of misreading or non-reading, for Wodak et al. (2009: 97) go on to
explain the utilisation of literary *topoi* in more detail, explicitly connecting them with argumentation:

*We do not view locus amoenus, however, as a literary topos in a narrow sense, as one which paints an Arcadian idyllic landscape with green, lush meadows...but rather as a 'beautiful landscape' often mentioned in a more general sense to refer to the common national territory or serving to depict a rather abstract ideal political place where human beings live together happily, in affluence...without conflicts.*

However, there may also be examples where it would appear as though specific *topoi* are identified as recurring themes. This is because, as Gabrielatos and Baker (2008: 22) explain, words that frequently collocate together can generate specific “semantic prosodies...[which] can help create, reinforce, or exploit a *topos* without the need for any explicit argumentation”. When this occurs, the reader/listener of a specific text/discourse “is more likely to attend to the connotational rather than the denotational level of particular frequent collocations” (ibid). For example, when certain metaphors are used “readers may accept the metaphor, and the premise conclusion shortcut (*topos*) triggered by the metaphor, rather than engage critically with either of them”. Furthermore, Gabrielatos and Baker (2008: 22) provide the example of the *topos of burdening/weighing down* in relation to ““quantity” or “group” collocations, particularly those expressed through emotionally charged metaphors (e.g. flood/river/tide/wave of refugees...”). Thus, the metaphors discussed earlier found within discourse about immigration including those of ‘disaster’ and ‘container’ (Charteris-Black, 2006) can also invoke *topoi* such as the *topos of burdening/weighing down* and the *topos of danger/threat* without explicitly being an example of argumentation.

Fairclough and Fairclough (2012), direct three main criticisms towards the DHA, not only in relation to their application of argumentation strategies, but also towards the methodological status of the approach as a whole. The first criticism is directed towards the DHA’s orientation towards five questions and corresponding discursive strategies, which includes argumentation strategies. To Fairclough and Fairclough (2012: 22), this presents what is described as a
“classificatory or taxonomical” approach with “a rather atomistic view of politics and political discourse as a series of parts, without a coherent account of the character of the whole”. Part of this criticism lies in the DHA’s use of topoi, which Fairclough and Fairclough (2012: 25) state:

...can lead to an enormous proliferation of categories of analysis, which may be so particular and detailed that they prevent a synthetic grasp of the nature of the object of study rather than facilitating it.

However, in Reisigl’s (2014) response to this particular point, he clarifies that the DHA should be seen as a ‘typology’ and not as a ‘taxonomy’. The word ‘taxonomy’ wrongly associates the methodological aspect of the DHA as being too static and therefore does not allow for “the intersection of categories, multiple membership and functional polyphony of discursive means and elements” (Reisigl, 2014: 87).

The second criticism put forward by Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) is that argumentation seems to be considered on the same level as the other discursive strategies discussed by the DHA (referential/nomination, predication, intensification/mitigation and perspectivization). However, Reisigl (2014) points out, “the five groups of discursive strategies are placed at different levels of linguistic organization and complexity”. Thus, intensification/mitigation and perspectivization are considered ‘meta-strategies’ (see below). Furthermore, Fairclough and Fairclough (2012: 23) also do not consider it to “be possible to see argumentation as a strategy”. Thus, they go onto explain their own conception of argumentation:

Argumentation (a central analytical concept in our approach) is a verbal, social activity, in which people attempt to criticize or justify claims; it is a complex speech act whose intended perlocutionary effect is convincing an interlocutor to accept a standpoint. Moreover, it would not be possible to see argumentation as an object of the same order, or the same kind, as ‘reference’ or ‘predication’, nor place the latter categories at the same level as (or compare them with)
‘perspectivation’ or ‘intensification’, within the same taxonomy as ‘kinds of’ strategy. What we would say instead is that, in arguing, as in any other (simple) speech acts (assertions, directives, etc.), people refer to individuals and objects and predicate properties of them: speech acts have a propositional content (as well as having an illocutionary force).

(Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012: 23)

However, I would suggest that positioning argumentation to a different level to referential and predicational strategies risks seeing referential and predicational strategies as subordinate. By discussing referential, predication, and argumentation as strategies, it provides analysts with ability to view the complex relationships between them and also merits their individual importance.

The third criticism is one that has already been discussed surrounding the way in which arguments are reconstructed for the purposes of analysis. Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) therefore also suggest that there is no argumentation reconstruction apparent within the DHA, and because of this there is no “basis for analysis and evaluation” including that of “normative or explanatory critique” (ibid: 23). However, this is something that has clearly been addressed (as explained above). Moreover, the argumentation analysis that is provided within the DHA is both ‘normative’ and ‘explanatory’ due to its reference primarily to Pragma-Dialectics (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004) and an understanding of politics via the Habermasian concept of deliberative democracy (1996). Furthermore, this is something the DHA shares with the approach to argumentation that is advocated by Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) despite their ‘technical’ differences.

The final criticism to be outlined in this section regards a theoretical contradiction in the employment of Pragma-Dialectics within the DHA. Forchtner and Tominc (2012), although being advocates of the DHA, nevertheless argue that there is an “epistemological flaw” in the combination of both Pragma-Dialectics and Habermasian Critical Theory and language philosophy. Thus, it is argued “the status of pragma-dialectics within the DHA contradicts the central epistemological and normative positions at the paradigm core of DHA” (ibid: 32). The main reason
for this contradiction is because Pragma-Dialectics has roots in Popperian Critical Rationalism, founded upon a critique of ‘positivist verificationism’ where ‘falsification’ advocated instead (Forchtner and Tominc, 2012). Whereas positivist verificationism demands empirical evidence to support claims to knowledge, falsification instead “aims for the steady improvement of scientific knowledge...through continued criticism of existing theories” (Forchtner and Tominc, 2012: 34). Falsification is subsequently given elevated status in Critical Rationalism and is seen as “the only rational approach towards knowledge” (ibid).

However, there is a fundamental issue with falsification that makes it incompatible with the underlying social and political commitment of CDS, namely that this type of “trial and error is a subjective choice” in itself, and is the product of an “irrational faith in reason” (Forchtner and Tominc, 2012: 34). In a similar vein to discussions about relativism in Chapter 3, such a subjective and irrational starting point or grounding means that, ultimately, anything could be proven ‘true’ or reasonable, even forms of discrimination and inequality that CDS seeks to uncover and resist. For this reason, many scholars practising CDS have sought to ground their criticism normatively, and in the DHA this is accomplished with reference to Habermasian language philosophy and Critical Theory (Habermas 1984, 1987, 1996). As discussed previously (see Chapter 3, section 3.3.2), Habermasian communicative rationality and associated ideas of deliberative democracy and the ideal speech situation provides a strong theoretical and normative grounding for CDS.

In turning to examine Pragma-Dialectics more specifically, Forchtner and Tominc (2012: 39) highlight the connection to Popperian Critical Rationalism through the way in which the approach advocates “steady progression by means of critical testing of claims and through...a critical discussion”. However, this type of ‘critical discussion’ is normatively grounded through the implementation of the ten rules for rational discussion (as outlined above). Thus, it is this normative component which is therefore attractive for the DHA. However, it is the implementation of these rules where there is also a problem: for the ten rules of rational discussion refer to argumentation between a protagonist and an antagonist. According to Pragma-Dialectics, violation of rules occurs “if the discussants do not abide by the rules” (Forchtner and Tominc, 2012: 40).
Subsequently, a very important point is made that “effects on third parties, i.e. people affected by the discussion of the protagonist and the antagonist, are not considered” (ibid). This also means that “[t]he ‘true’ and/or ‘good’ are thus not central to Pragma-Dialectics...” (ibid), for if both parties agree, it could potentially lead to discriminatory premises being concluded as sound. Therefore, according to Forchtner and Tominc (2012: 45-46):

*Pragma-Dialectics, in accordance with critical rationalism, does not adopt a strong emancipatory notion of rationality and, as such, what is immoral to DHA can be acceptable to Pragma-Dialectics if put forward as a logically valid argument.*

However, although Reisigl and Wodak (2001; 2016) do use the ten rules for rational discussion to determine sound and fallacious argumentation, there is no specific mention of them using this model specifically to determine that sound argumentation is not discriminatory. Moreover, within the analysis presented in *Discourse and Discrimination* many *topoi* are identified which arguably contribute to discrimination that are not in themselves considered fallacious. So it is clear that although sound and fallacious argumentation can be identified via these rules, *topoi* that may be sound may equally be discriminatory or produce discriminating effects. Even so, Reisigl (2014) agrees with Forchtner and Tominc’s (2012) suggestion that a more explicit connection can be made to Habermas. This is partly achieved through the extension of some of ten rules for rational discussion outlined here (Reisigl's emphasis):

- **Rule 1:** Parties must not prevent each other from advancing or casting doubt on standpoints. *Parties must be aware that non-present third parties affected by the issue in question may advance and question standpoints as well.*

- **Rule 2:** Whoever advances a standpoint is obliged to defend it if asked to do so. *Parties must be aware that non-present third parties concerned or affected by the issue in question may ask to defend a standpoint as well.*
• Rules 1, 2 and 4 relate to Habermas’s claims for free access, equal rights and absence of coercion.

• Rules 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 all relate to various aspects of truthfulness/sincerity, even though the concept of truthfulness may include further aspects that are not yet grasped by the rules. Whoever tries to be truthful, however, will try to avoid the violation of these seven rules.

• Rule 7: The arguments used in a discourse must be valid or capable of being validated by the explicitization of one or more unexpressed premises. It is obvious that the question of logical validity does not just relate to the ‘local logic’ of arguers involved in a specific discussion, but to commonly established rules of logic, although it is clear that ‘everyday argumentation’ and even scientific argumentation is often enthymemic and hardly ever strictly follows the rules of formal logic. However, rule 7 asks that at least the explication of enthymemic argumentation should not contradict logic.

• Rule 8: A standpoint must be regarded as conclusively defended if the defence takes place by means of arguments in which a commonly adapted scheme of argumentation is correctly applied. A standpoint must not be considered to be conclusively defended if the defence has not taken place by means of argumentation schemes which are plausible and correctly applied. Here, the two passages can be interpreted as indicating that rule 8 is rooted in common agreement based on social conventions, habits or routines of arguing that transcend their purely local context.

(Reisigl, 2014: 83-84)

5.2.3.4 Argumentation and Recontextualization

Within the context of examining selected newspaper articles and their corresponding public comments, one further category that will be considered in relation to argumentation specifically (but also in relation to referential and predicational strategies where necessary) is recontextualization. Recontextualization can be defined as “appropriating other discourses and bringing them into a special relation with each other for the purposes of their
selection, transmission and acquisition" (Bernstein, 1990: 183-184 cited in Wodak & Fairclough, 2010: 23) and is especially interesting to consider from a discourse-historical perspective as it may become clear how argumentation strategies surrounding immigration within the UK are re-used and/or recycled. Recontextualization is therefore linked to intertextuality and interdiscursivity, and in relation to “past discourses”, Martin and Wodak (2003: 7) consider recontextualization to involve the “formulating and reconstructing [of] the past in different genres and discourses, overtime”. Moreover, media texts, inclusive of online newspaper articles and public comments, will allow for the exploration of recontextualized arguments and, potentially make visible the reproduction and/or resistance of dominant discourses and ideologies about immigration from Romania and Bulgaria. Thus, Flowerdew (2003: 204) has suggested that it is possible for recontextualization to “have ideological impact on the way the texts are presented and interpreted”. Flowerdew (2003: 204) also discusses mechanisms by which texts and discourses can be recontextualized in order to invoke or promote a “preferred reading”. This can occur through the employment of the following processes: additions, deletions, substitutions, repetitions and double voicing. As Flowerdew (2003: 204) elaborates:

There may be additions, which represent more information than it might be expected according to an "objective" reading and therefore elaborate on preferred meaning. On the other hand, there may be deletion, where information might be expected in a given context but is absent, again to maintain preferred readings. Then, there may be substitutions, the representation of a given text or topic in an unexpected place or manner. There may also be repetitions, "to draw attention to preferred meanings and to enhance construction of such meanings in mental models and their memorization in ongoing persuasion attempts or later recall" (van Dijk, 2007: 35). Finally, there may be what I refer to as double voicing...where different readings may be juxtaposed or embedded one within the other...making the preferred reading ambiguous.
5.2.5 Perspectivization and Intensification/Mitigation

In considering strategies of *perspectivization* and *intensification/mitigation*, it becomes clear that their function and realisation in discourse is on a meta-level in comparison to nomination/referential, predication and argumentation. This means their presence is ubiquitous. I therefore consider these strategies as resources for explicitly or implicitly presenting and clarifying stances as discursively realised via strategies of nomination, predication and argumentation.

Perspectivization is best understood as a resource for positioning text producers and consumers as more or less involved or detached from any discourse (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001). Although all instances of language are in this sense perspectivized, KhosraviNik emphasises that “CDA is only interested in the ‘strategic’ choices” (2010a: 58). The analysis of perspectivization can be achieved by employing a range of tools. These include Goffman’s concepts of ‘participation framework’, where a relationship between the spoken or written text and its creator is defined: the *navigator* being the person who produces or voices the utterance; the *author* as the person who originally created or conceived of the utterance; the *principal* as the person responsible for the utterance and; the *figure* as the person portrayed through the utterance (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 82; Goffman, 1981). Alongside this, Goffman’s concepts of ‘frames’ (schemas of interpretation) and ‘footing’ (the way speakers position and arrange themselves with others) also directly relate to perspectivization (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001). Perspectivization is also related significantly to the area of ‘discourse representation’ (Fairclough, 1992) including whether voices are expressed through *direct speech, indirect speech, free direct speech* or *free indirect speech*. Furthermore, Reisigl and Wodak (2001) also briefly discuss *strategies of involvement* which express “inner states, attitudes, feelings or degrees of emotional interests” according to Tannen (1989), and *strategies of detachment* “realised by discursive means of encoding distance” as in the work of Georgakopoulou and Goutsos (1997). In this respect, perspectivization is very much connected to ENGAGEMENT within Appraisal Theory (Martin and White, 2005), and for this reason, ENGAGEMENT will be considered as part of *perspectivization* (see section 5.3.2).
**Intensification** and **mitigation** are strategies by which linguistic realisations can be focused upon or emphasised in strong ways (**intensification**) or where they can be softened, lessened and perhaps even side-lined (**mitigation**). Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 81) thus regard these as strategies that “qualify and modify the epistemic status of a proposition, the degree of certainty, and to modify the speakers’ or writers’ expressiveness as well as the persuasive impact on the hearers and readers.” It is also suggested that **intensification** is often linked to involvement with discourse and that **mitigation** is linked to detachment (however, this is not always the case) (ibid: 82-83). In the case of involvement, **intensification** is realised via: **prosodic features** such as pitch, stress, volume and intonation; **repetition** of morphemes, words, collocations, phrases or even at the level of discourse; **non-verbal** facial gestures; and **verbal** expressions including the use of superlative adjectives, particles which emphasise or amplify (‘really’ ‘absolutely’), and many other linguistic realisations which fulfil exaggerating or intensifying expressions (including metaphors, irony, hyperbole) (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 83). In examining detachment, a range of **mitigation strategies** are identified and categorised: **macro-mitigation** involving linguistic realisations such as modal verbs, verbs of saying/feeling/thinking, strategies of anonymisation and impersonalisation, and forms indicating certain reservations; **indirect micro-mitigation** where questions are used strategically instead of assertions, and assertions are made with pronouns such as ‘we’/ ‘one’/ ‘it’ to replace ‘you’ or ‘I’; and **direct micro-mitigation** including items such as vague expressions, tag questions, the subjunctive mood, negation, hesitations, false starts and repetitions (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 84). As will be presented below, all these realisations of **intensification** and **mitigation** also appear within Appraisal Theory’s sub-system of **GRADUATION** (Martin and White, 2005).

Strategies of **perspectivization** and **intensification/mitigation** are used in discourse about the ‘Self’ and Other’, especially when it comes to the positioning of certain groups of people as the ‘Other’ and discriminating against them. In this way they not only help to pronounce or proclaim stances, but also aid in the development of subtle and covert racism seen through denials and disclaimers (van Dijk, 1992, 1993, 2000). It is within Appraisal Theory (Martin and White, 2005), via the ENGAGEMENT and GRADUATION sub-systems, that such strategies
are also realised and a further list of strategies are also identified that can also be considered within the DHA, as will be discussed now.

5.3 Methods in Appraisal Theory

In recent years it has become apparent that the topic of immigration has become overtly politicised, mediatised and via a rise in ‘populist’ discourse, it has clearly become a political topic based on ‘feelings’ (Wodak, 2015). Although the current situation is both similar and different to historical attitudes and reactions to immigration (as outlined in Chapter 2), it has become clear that emotions and feelings characterise political decisions, judgement, and public support to a very large extent.

When I first started to investigate representations of Bulgarian and Romanian immigrants to Britain, I had not fully anticipated the extent to which the text, co-text and context would also reveal highly charged emotional and attitudinal feelings about immigration. It was within a pilot study conducted, in the form of a conference presentation (Demetriou, 2016), where I realised that representation could not be removed from evaluation and that evaluation needed to also be analysed in a systematic way. Within this pilot, it became clear that the topic of immigration, especially in relation to the expansion of the EU in Eastern Europe, generated emotional arguments and stances, some which could be labelled as ‘populist’ (Wodak, 2015) and others acting as defences within an overall communitarian frame of protectionism (Balch and Balabanova, 2016). It also became clear that public comment responses were not only directed towards immigrants – but also towards the government and the EU. I also started to appreciate that my investigation of the representation (and now evaluation) of Bulgarian and Romanian immigrants to Britain would also be an investigation of the role, relationships, positions and stances of other social actors. These actors included the government, the EU, and the British public with regards to how they were represented and evaluated in relation to EU (Bulgarian and Romanian) immigrants, alongside how they were emotionally connected or disconnected from politics, and the politics of immigration in particular.

Although the DHA has been employed in a range of studies that examine representations of the ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ in discourse, the orientation towards five methodical questions/strategies seems to place greater emphasis on the analysis
of representation than that of evaluation, where representation is linked to Halliday’s ‘ideational’ metafunction and evaluation with the ‘interpersonal’ metafunction (Hart, 2014). Although evaluation does, of course, play an especially large role within the DHA, especially when it comes to the determining of positive/negative ‘Self’ and ‘Others’ within nomination, predication and argumentation strategies – the systematic analysis of evaluation is not present as it is with representation in discourse. Consequently, discourse analysts who label a referential or predicational strategy as more or less evaluative do so from within their own subjectivity. In this respect, I argue for the incorporation of Martin and White’s (2005) Appraisal Theory within the DHA. I believe that it is compatible, not only because of its direct link to Halliday’s (1994) systemic functional grammar (in similar ways to van Leeuwen’s (1996) ‘socio-semantic’ framework), but also because there are clear similarities between its sub-systems of ATTITUDE, ENGAGEMENT, and GRADUATION, and the DHA’s five strategies of nomination, predication, argumentation, perspectivization and intensification/mitigation.

In departing from an approach to the ‘interpersonal’ metafunction, based solely on the system of MODALITY (Hart, 2014), Martin and White (2005) develop a system of APPRAISAL that focuses on the positions and stances embraced by text producers with regards to the people they communicate with and the material (text/discourse) they present (2005:1). APPRAISAL is formed through the interaction of three sub-systems including: ATTITUDE, which focuses on feelings and emotions (via affect), assessments of behaviour (via judgement), and aesthetic evaluation (via appreciation); ENGAGEMENT, with respect to the recognition of voices (heterogloss or monogloss) and the expansive or contractive nature of heteroglossic voices in particular, and; GRADUATION, which examines how phenomena are graded in terms of amplification (as in intensification or mitigation) and also with regards to the focus of categorisation (Martin and White, 2005: 35). In the following three sections, each sub-system will be outlined. However, it should also be noted that the relationship between these sub-systems is similar to the relationships between strategies in the DHA, in that ENGAGEMENT and GRADUATION are viewed as resources for the realisation of ATTITUDE at a similar meta-level that was presented when it comes to the DHA’s
connection between strategies of nomination, predication and argumentation in relation to perspectivization and intensification/mitigation. Figure 3 outlines the main system of appraisal as evident in Martin and White (2005: 38).

Figure 3: Appraisal System

5.3.1 Attitude

As was indicated above, the sub-system of ATTITUDE is central to the Appraisal Theory. Above all, it centres upon how feelings are mapped and realised as affect (focusing on emotion), judgement (focusing on ethics) and appreciation (focusing on aesthetics). Moreover, Hart (2014: 69) shows how ATTITUDE is key to “the systemized analysis of the lexicogrammatical means available for positive self-representation and negative-other representation”. For this reason, I also believe that the sub-system of ATTITUDE can be incorporated into the DHA’s understanding of predication (and at times within nomination and argumentation) as a means of systematically identifying evaluations in discourse. In the following three sections, affect, judgement, and appreciation will be outlined but, prior to this, it is worth pointing out that that both judgement and appreciation are considered by Martin and White (2005: 45) to be “institutionalised affect”, in the sense that the feelings here are formalised and regulated in ways that form community values and consensus: judgement through the establishment of laws and rules, and appreciation through the establishment of forms of recognition such as awards.
5.3.1.1 Affect

Affect is primarily linked to the emotions that text producers portray. In this sense, it is about the emotional evaluation of things, processes, events and people according to the implicit or explicit elaboration of positive or negative feelings towards them. Due to its omnipresent nature in discourse, affect is manifest across a number of linguistic realisations and crosses the boundaries of lexical and grammatical categories. Thus, it can be realised as; ‘quality’, either describing emotion of participants, attributing feeling to participants or referring to the manner of processes; ‘process’, whereby processes can be inherently affective (mental and behavioural); ‘comment’ with reference to items such as modal adjuncts; and via concepts such as ‘grammatical metaphors’ which include nominalisations (Martin and White, 2005: 46; Hart 2014: 47). In order for affect to be classified, Martin and White (2005: 46-48) consider five different factors as questions.

1. Are the feelings popularly construed by the culture as positive (good vibes that are enjoyable to experience) or negative ones (bad vibes that are better avoided)?
2. Are the feelings realised as a surge of emotion involving some kind of embodied paralinguistic or extralinguistic manifestation, or more internally experienced as a kind of emotive state or ongoing mental process?
3. Are the feelings construed as directed at or reacting to some specific emotional Trigger or as a general ongoing mood?
4. How are the feelings graded – towards the lower value end of a scale of intensity or towards the higher valued end; or somewhere in between?
5. Do the feelings involve intention (rather than reaction), with respect to a stimulus that is irrealis (rather than realis)?

Finally, emotions are grouped into three major sets for the purposes of analysis. Although it is acknowledged that this is not an exhaustive list of all human emotions, it does prove suitable for the analysis of linguistic realisations:

- un/happiness – to do with “affairs of the heart”.
- in/security – “emotions concerned with ecosocial well-being”.

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- dis/satisfaction – “emotions concerned with telos (the pursuit of goals)” (Martin and White, 2005: 49).

5.3.1.2 Judgement

Judgements play an integral role in the perception and evaluation of not only ‘Others’ but also the ‘Self’, and this is especially true when it comes to political decisions made by the government with respect to immigration. Through a system of judgement, Martin and White (2005) evidence how evaluations are made not only about a person’s character or disposition, but also about their behaviour. In this respect, judgement occurs either via ‘social esteem’ or ‘social sanction’.

Social esteem is to do with socially and culturally shared understandings of ‘normality’ (“how unusual someone is”), ‘capacity’ (“how capable they are”), and ‘tenacity’ (“how resolute they are”) (Martin and White, 2005: 52). It is suggested that judgements of social esteem are usually acquired orally within a society through speech genres such as ‘gossip’ and ‘jokes’ (ibid). When analysing judgements of esteem, it is again possible for them to be evaluated either positively or negatively in terms of the group/culture/society in which they are found. In this respect social esteem allows for the analysis of “traits we admire alongside those we criticise” (ibid).

Judgements of social sanction are identified as those linking to concepts such as ‘veracity’ (“how truthful someone is”) and ‘propriety’ (“how ethical someone is”) and in contrast to sanctions of esteem, these judgements are usually “codified in writing, as edicts, decrees, rules, regulations and laws” (Martin and White, 2005: 52). When it comes to the analysis of discrimination such as racism or sexism, a point has to be made here about the ways in which laws have developed in order to try and ‘police’ these. Ultimately, if we think about discriminations such as racism and sexism, they reveal judgements of social esteem, but when someone is accused of racism or sexism, this would be a judgement of social sanction. Judgements of social sanction can equally be viewed in positive and negative ways and in this sense can be expressed as, “behaviour we praise alongside that we condemn” (ibid).

Martin and White (2005: 54 – 56) show how Halliday’s concepts of mood, modality and interpersonal metaphor can be easily linked to judgement within appraisal. In particular, they reveal how the types of judgement outlined above fit
into the system of modalisation: normality/usuality (as in ‘He’s often naughty’); capacity/ability (as in ‘She can go’); tenacity/inclination (as in ‘I will go’); veracity/probability (as in ‘He’s certainly naughty’); and propriety/obligation (as in ‘You should go’).

5.3.1.3 Appreciation

The last aspect within the ATTITUDE sub-system is appreciation. Whereas affect and judgement are mostly related to the evaluation of ‘people’ in terms of feelings and behaviour, appreciation is concerned with the evaluation of material, semiotic and natural ‘things’ (including, for example, art, performance and natural phenomena) (Martin and White, 2005). Evaluations of things can be sub-divided into the following: REACTIONS, with reference to how effective things are in relation to whether “they catch out attention” or if “they please us”; COMPOSITION, consideration of the construction of things in terms of balance, complexity and functionality; and finally VALUATION, with respect to authenticity and worth (Martin and White, 2005: 56). Although these might be realised across a number of lexico-grammatical boundaries, it has been suggested that they can be related to mental processes: REACTION in relation to affection, COMPOSITION in relation to perception, and VALUATION in relation to cognition.

5.3.2 Engagement

In moving on to discuss the next two aspects of the Appraisal Theory, ENGAGEMENT and GRADUATION, focus turns to the way text producers and consumers agree or align with (or disagree or disalign) themselves from certain stances and viewpoints. In this sense, I follow Martin and White’s view that “all utterances are seen as in some way stanced or attitudinal” (2005: 92). In this respect, through the analysis of ENGAGEMENT and GRADUATION, there is also the possibility of identifying evaluative value placed upon certain propositions in newspaper articles (despite the fact that, on the surface, they may not appear to be overtly evaluative). Specifically, when it comes to ENGAGEMENT, Martin and White’s view is clearly influenced by Bakhtin and Voloshinov’s ideas of dialogism and heteroglossia. For Voloshinov, the word “is a two sided act”, moreover:

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30 Suggestion made by Suzanne Eggins (cited in Martin and White, 2005: 57).
A word is precisely the product of the reciprocal relationship between speaker and listener, addressee and addresser. Each and every word expresses the ‘one’ in relation to the ‘other’.


Thus a dialogic relationship is evident, something that is inherent to Bakhtin’s thought: “There is no existence, no meaning...no word...or thought that does not enter into... ‘dialogic’...relations with the other” (Morris, 1994: 247). Although this is, in many respects, linked to the DHA’s understanding of intertextual and interdiscursive relationships between texts, the adoption of ENGAGEMENT alongside perspectivization is, in this study, key to understanding not only whose voices or which texts are being included/excluded in discourse, but also how a text aligns or distances itself from certain voices and value positions. In this respect, Martin and White (2005: 93) note:

*We are interested in whether they present themselves as standing with, as standing against, as undecided, or as neutral with respect to these other speakers and their value positions.*

Moreover, by analysing ENGAGEMENT in this way, it is also possible to gain an understanding of whether certain voices are positioned as ones that are considered to be common sense or “taken for granted for this particular audience” (Martin and White, 2003: 93), or whether they are positions put forward because they are “likely to be questioned, resisted or rejected” (ibid). This is especially important in the analysis of ideology and power, especially following Martin and White’s (2005: 95) ideas that:

*...when speakers/writers announce their own authorial positions they not only self-expressively ‘speak their own mind’, but simultaneously invite others to endorse and to share with them the feelings, tastes or normative assessments they are announcing.*
In this respect, there is a focus on alignment/disalignment with text and discourse. In pursuing this, there is also focus on ‘solidarity’ – where ‘solidarity’ is viewed not as just those we agree with but solidarity which shows “tolerance for alternative viewpoints” (Martin and White, 2005: 96).

Although ENGAGEMENT is linked somewhat to Reisigl and Wodak’s (2001) adoption of strategies of involvement and strategies of detachment within perspectivization, Appraisal Theory will help to provide a more explicit account of how attitudes and value positions towards texts and ideas are demonstrated within discourse.

5.3.2.1 Monoglossic and Heteroglossic Utterances

Even though a view is adopted in alignment with Voloshinov and Bakhtin that “all verbal communication occurs against a heteroglossic backdrop” (Martin and White, 2005: 99) it is clear that, through a speaker/writer’s use of bare or categorical assertions, there are many occasions within texts and discourses that a single viewpoint (sometimes considered factual) is put forward. In this respect, utterances are considered ‘monoglossic’ which on the surface looks as though it “has no dialogistic alternatives” (ibid).

A distinction between ‘monoglossic’ and ‘heteroglossic’ utterances can therefore be made. A ‘monoglossic’ utterance occurs when there is no reference to other voices and, as mentioned above, usually in bare or categorical assertions. The example given by Martin and White (2005: 100) is “The banks have been greedy”. This is in contrast to a ‘heteroglossic’ utterance where there is at least a form of recognition for other voices. Consider the equivalent example: “In my view the banks have been greedy”.

However, even within heteroglossic expressions, Martin and White (2005) explain that utterances can be more or less dialogically expansive or contractive (see Figure 4); this will now be considered below.

5.3.2.2 Dialogical Contraction

When an utterance is dialogically contractive, although other voices may be recognised, there is an effort made to ‘challenge’ or ‘restrict’ alternative viewpoints. There are two main categories of dialogic contraction: to disclaim and to proclaim.
A proposition designed to disclaim a viewpoint is realised when an alternative voice is rejected. There are two ways in which this can occur: either as denial or as counter. Denials have been analysed extensively in relation to immigration before, especially in critical discourse analysis and van Dijk’s (1992) work on Discourse and the Denial of Racism. Denials occur when an alternative voice is raised, only to then deny its authority. However, Martin and White (2005: 119) point out that denials do not always have to be used in a ‘confrontational’ way. The second form of disclaim is to counter. This is where a proposition substitutes something that might have been expected, with something else. There are many linguistic realisations of countering including conjunctions and connectives (although, however, yet) and adjuncts (even, only, just, still). There are also times when a counter proposition is used in conjunction with a denial, as in “even though he had taken all his medication, his leg didn’t look any better” (Martin and White, 2005: 120).

Propositions can also be dialogically contractive through the category of proclaim. The reason proclaiming a thought or idea can be dialogically contractive is because it confirms the utterance to be “highly warrantable” thereby “the textual voice sets itself against, suppresses or rules out alternative positions” (Martin and White, 2005: 98). There are three ways in which this is realised: concurrence, endorsement and pronouncement. To concur is to show alignment with a proposition/utterance and this is realised via items such as of course, naturally, certainly. To endorse is to approve external voices (such as in reported speech) showing how they are “correct, valid, undeniable or otherwise maximally warrantable” through a series of verbs such as show, prove, demonstrate (Martin and White, 2005: 126). Finally, to pronounce a proposition as factual, or as the truth such as “I contend...”, is to highlight that although the speaker/writer aligns with certain positions, such proclamations also “imply the presence of some resistance” (Martin and White, 2005: 28).

5.3.2.3 Dialogical Expansion

Dialogical expansion is to do with the way an utterance can evidence or open up to other viewpoints or propositions. Just like contraction, there are two sub-forms of expansion: entertain and attribute.
Entertain, as a form of dialogical expansion, involves a proposition which entertains alternative positions within utterances and “to greater or lesser degrees, makes dialogical space for these possibilities” (Martin and White, 2005: 104). In moving away from traditional treatments of semantic domains such as epistemic modality and evidentiality, a view is taken that “such locutions are seen actively to construe a heteroglossic backdrop for the text by overtly grounding the proposition in the contingent, individual subjectivity of the speaker/writer...” (Martin and White, 2005: 104). Therefore in an example such as “He was probably a shy child” the modal adjunct probably is not seen as a “lack of commitment to truth value” (ibid: 105) but, instead, “to signal recognition that there may well be some who will not precisely share the writer’s views...” (ibid: 105-6). Entertain is realised through the use of the following linguistic items: epistemic modal auxiliaries (e.g. may, could), modal adjuncts (e.g. probably, definitely), first-person mental processes (verbs) (e.g. I think, believe, suspect) and certain evidentials (e.g. it seems, it suggests that) (Hart, 2014: 54). When it comes to the treatment of deontic modal auxiliaries, however, it is worth pointing out that they entertain “relationships of control and compliance/resistance rather than the offering of information and viewpoints” (Martin and White, 2005: 110- 111). This is an important distinction to recognise, especially in examining power and ideology.

The second sub-form of dialogical expansion is that of attribution, which is concerned with how external voices are presented by the speaker/writer. We have already seen with dialogical contraction that such external voices can be endorsed, and thus present some form of agreement between authorial voice and external source. In respect to endorsement, it is also possible to see how such propositions can link to the argumentation scheme that employs the topos of authority. However, with attribution, Martin and White discuss two possibilities where speakers/writers can either acknowledge or distance to make the utterance/text dialogically expansive. If the speaker/writer acknowledges an external source this is where “there is no overt indication...as to where the authorial voice stands” (Martin and White, 2005: 112). This can be realised by common verbal and mental processes associated with reported speech such as: said, state, declare, believe and think. Acknowledgements are dialogically expansive because they “overtly construe the communicative setting as
heteroglossic” (Martin and White, 2005: 112-113). If the speaker/writer distances themself from the source, they therefore decline “to take responsibility for the proposition” which in turn exploits “the space for dialogistic alternatives” (ibid). The most common way in which distancing is realised is “by means of the reporting verb, to claim and by certain uses of ‘scare’ quotes” (ibid: 113).

**Figure 4: Engagement System - heteroglossic contraction and expansion**

### 5.3.3 Graduation

Whereas ATTITUDE and ENGAGEMENT allow for exploration of speaker/writer intersubjectivity, GRADUATION works as a “modulating system” which up/down scales intersubjective evaluations (Hart, 2014: 56). In this respect it is similar to the strategy of intensification/mitigation within the DHA. Moreover, GRADUATION deals with “the speaker/writer’s intensity, or the degree of their investment in the utterance” (Martin and White, 2005: 135-136). The way in which authors are able to align/disalign with certain propositions is examined across two axes of scalability, that of FORCE and FOCUS (Martin and White, 2005; Hart 2014).
5.3.3.1 Focus

The first axis of scalability to be discussed here is that of FOCUS. Within graduation, focus relates to the ‘prototypicality’ of certain categories, which are not scalable, instead operating at a taxonomical level. FOCUS therefore operates at two levels: it may either sharpen (up-scale) a prototypical category or it may soften (down-scale) which contributes to marginalisation from the original category. In other words, Martin and White (2005: 137) explain how there are differences between qualifications (traditionally viewed as intensifiers) such as true, real, or genuine (as in “He’s a true friend”) and locutions (traditionally viewed as vague language) which mitigate this focus such as sort of, kind of, and the suffix -ish (as in “We’ll be there at five-o-clock-ish”). In relation to ATTITUDE, Martin and White (2005) explain how sharpening is often seen as positive in value and softening as negative (but not always the case and of course dependent on context and co-text). With respect to the relationships between text producer and text consumer, sharpening can indicate strong alignment with a value position and softening to show a lower investment (but again this is not true of all articulations).

5.3.3.2 Force

The second axis of scalability is known as FORCE, which can be further, sub-divided into ‘intensification’ and ‘quantification’. Intensification is primarily adopted to modify qualities (‘slightly foolish’, ‘extremely foolish’), processes (‘this slightly hindered us’, ‘this greatly hindered us’) or forms of modality (‘it’s just possible that’, ‘it’s very possible that’) (Martin and White, 2005: 140). Furthermore, in examining ‘intensification’, there are two possibilities: they can either be isolated or infused. Intensification that is isolated occurs when the up/down scaling “is realised by an isolated item, which solely, or at least primarily, performs the function of setting the level of intensity” with examples including; ‘somewhat miserable’, ‘very often’, ‘most probable’ (Martin and White, 2005: 141-142). Alternatively, where intensification is infused, it is realised as a single term, where “scaling is conveyed as but one aspect of the meaning of a single term” (ibid: 143). For example certain qualities, processes and modalities can be scaled in themselves, consider the choice of ‘contented’ over ‘happy’; the choice of ‘it startled me’ in comparison to ‘it terrified me’; and the choice of ‘probable’ over
'certain' (ibid: 144). Intensification can also occur as a result of repetition and the use of metaphor.

Quantification is where the up/down scaling is realised according to amounts, including size, weight and number. It is also realised in relation to the “scope” and “proximity in time and space” (Martin and White, 2005: 149). Quantification may become complicated because it is possible to relate it to both concrete and abstract entities: “Often these abstract entities will convey attitudinal meanings” (ibid). Therefore an example such as “I have many worries about your performance” relates to affect and an example such as “There is vast corruption in this government” relates to judgement (ibid). The reasons complication can arise is because these abstractions are what Halliday (1994) terms ‘grammatical metaphor’. According to Martin and White (2005: 150)

What this means is that formulations such as a huge disappointment/ a slight concern involve quantification when viewed from the perspective of the lexicogrammar…but intensification when viewed from the perspective of the discourse semantic meanings being made.

In Appraisal Theory, however, preference is given to the lexicogrammatical conception of quantification as a phrase such as ‘a huge disappointment’ is differentiated from ‘hugely disappointing’ the former signally quantification and the latter signalling intensification (ibid). Although quantification is usually realised as an isolated term used as a pre-modifier, there are times when it can be realised as an infused entity, very often in the form of a metaphor (e.g. ‘a mountain of a man’) (ibid: 152).

5.4 Data Selection and Collection

The purpose of this section is to outline and explore the methods of data selection and collection. Here, categorisation and organisation of the initial corpus will be discussed alongside the presentation of a macro-analysis and overarching discourse topics and sub-topics. This section will also explain how a case study was formulated for the purposes of micro-linguistic analysis, specifically focusing
on the implementation of welfare restrictions and the construction of a ‘benefit tourist’ (section 5.4.2).

When initially examining the research field, I considered an assortment of online national newspapers, namely: The Sun, Daily Express, The Independent, Mail Online (Daily Mail), Daily Star, The Guardian, The Telegraph and The Times, in order to gain a deeper understanding, not only of the texts available for analysis, but also greater comprehension of site functionality and user engagement. It became apparent that not all online newspapers enabled the same functionalities with regards to the way the public could post, respond/reply, or view comments. For a number of sites, even though commenting was enabled, public responses were minimal (notably evident on tabloids such as The Sun and The Independent). However, there were two sites - Mail Online (centre-right, middle-market/popular press) and The Guardian (left-wing, quality press) - that proved especially popular, generating hundreds if not thousands of user comments. As these two newspapers were comparable in terms of their online features, but reflected contrasting political ideologies, I found them to be particularly interesting and directed my attention towards them. In terms of public comments, these two sites shared similar affordances and dynamics, which enabled comments to be viewed according to reader preference. On both sites, it was possible to view either the oldest or newest comments first; this was not always an option elsewhere. On The Guardian site, threads (replies) could be expanded, collapsed or unthreaded and, although the Mail Online site did not provide this option, it was possible to expand replies manually (by clicking ‘view replies’). Both sites also allowed for all comments to be viewed (or a smaller number if preferred), instead of limiting or restricting the amount.

Due to their user popularity, similarities in affordances and dynamics, and contrasting political alignments, the online versions of the Mail Online and The Guardian were chosen as the most suitable data source. In terms of public comments, I decided that in order to maintain consistency and in order to manage a vast amount of data, only the first 100 comments would be considered (inclusive

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31 For example, The Express did not allow for alternative options and comments were only ordered by most recent first.
of the replies/threads which were expanded) and the oldest comments would be shown first (as this would evidence the initial reactions to the article).

Although Wodak and Meyer (2016: 21) explain that “there is no CDS-way of collecting data” and some discourse analytic approaches that “do not explicitly explain or recommend data sampling procedures”, in research projects analysing newspaper articles, keywords are chosen as search terms for the interface or database. Moreover, Reisigl and Wodak (2016: 38) also recommend specific criteria that should be focused on in relation to the systematic collection of data, which includes (but is not limited to):

- specific political units...or language communities;
- specific periods of time relating to important discursive events;
- specific social and political actors;
- specific discourses
- specific fields of political action;
- specific semiotic media and genres.

Considering these recommendations, I decided to outline a specific time period where my data collection would be focused. The time period selected covered 13 months, from January 2013 to January 2014, as this was one year prior to the uplifting of transitional restrictions for Romanian and Bulgarian citizens, which in this sense is a discursive event. However, through engagement with debates preceding this, a range of other discursive events were evidently interdiscursively related and needed to be considered, if not for the purposes of analysis, then for the purposes of contextual awareness. For example, in January 2013, articles in the Mail Online and The Guardian focused on political activity concerned with certain ‘preparations’ that needed to be put in place for when restrictions were uplifted. This included whether or not there would be an official estimate of how many Romanians and Bulgarians would migrate, and discussions focusing on a proposed advertising campaign that would discourage Romanians and Bulgarians from moving to the UK. Sample headlines from this period of time included:
Thousands of Bulgarians and Romanians 'plan to flood UK in 2014' as employment restrictions relax

*Mail Online* (Craven and Arbuthnott, 2013)

Immigration: Romanian or Bulgarian? You won't like it here

*The Guardian* (Syal, 2013)

Furthermore, it was also on 22nd January 2013, that Prime Minister, David Cameron announced that there would be an in/out EU referendum if the Conservative Party won the following general election (Cameron, 2013a). Thus, from this time onwards, it became clear that immigration, EU expansion, and the expiration of transitional restrictions for Romanians and Bulgarians were inextricably linked.

Due to the fact that it was necessary for user comments to be collected with the corresponding article, it was clear that the data could not be sourced simply through accessing an online interface such as Nexis UK. It was also apparent that when online newspapers articles were downloaded, saved or printed, comments would not necessarily be included/visible. For this reason, the qualitative research software NVivo was used. Although the primary purpose of NVivo is to code and categorise themes for qualitative analysis, it also provides a variety of tools for importing data. Through the employment of the 'N Capture' tool, I was able to download a version of the webpage (inclusive of both article and comments), which was then accessible offline and could be analysed. It was also possible for this document to then be exported as a PDF version from the NVivo software, inclusive of all comments.

As *The Guardian* and *Mail Online* sites differed with regards to functionality, it was not possible to simply search for keywords within the time period chosen. Although *The Guardian* site did provide a search bar, this was a Google search bar limiting results to ten pages and only providing options of ordering by 'relevance' or 'date'. From this tool, I was unable to view all the relevant articles from my chosen time period. However, I was able to search for articles within the time period through a series of 'topics' that were already established on the site. With regards to my specific research questions, the topics that I chose to take articles from were ‘Immigration and Asylum’, ‘Romania’, ‘Bulgaria’, ‘Europe’ and
‘European Union’. However, it was clear that most of the articles relevant to the research questions were generated from the ‘Immigration and Asylum’ topic. In contrast to *The Guardian*, the *Mail Online* site did allow for specific search terms to be used. In this case, ‘immigration’ was the term, which generated the most articles. Following this, ‘Romania’, ‘Bulgaria’, ‘Romanian and Bulgarian’, ‘Europe’ and ‘European Union’ were also used to maintain consistency with *The Guardian* search.

In total, 1288 articles were downloaded covering the time span of January 2013 to January 2014 (see Table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month/Year</th>
<th>Mail Online: Number of Articles</th>
<th>The Guardian: Month/Year</th>
<th>The Guardian: Number of Articles</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 2013</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>January 2013</td>
<td>60</td>
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<tr>
<td>February 2013</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>February 2013</td>
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<td>March 2013</td>
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<td>January 2014</td>
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<td>January 2014</td>
<td>81</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>709</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>631</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This large corpus was constructed due to my initial intentions of conducting mixed-method study, where CDS would be combined with approaches to corpus linguistics. However, as the project evolved and my knowledge of CDS and the DHA improved, I started to fully understand and appreciate how this approach to discourse analysis needed to be operationalized. In choosing only two articles to analyse for the purposes of a pilot study (Demetriou 2016), I realised that the systematic application of the DHA was a time consuming endeavour but that the analytical insights generated from focusing specifically on the five questions and corresponding discursive strategies was extremely rich, exposing discursive patterns that directly related to my research questions. I also gained a greater awareness of the value and purpose of qualitative discourse analysis and, although a mixed-method approach is possible evident in the RASIM project discussed in
Chapter 2 (Gabrielatos and Baker, 2008; KhosraviNik, 2009) such an undertaking was very ambitious and beyond the scope of this thesis. In reconsidering my main goals and research questions, and through consulting the criteria that should be focused upon when selecting texts within the DHA (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016: 38), I re-examined articles published in December 2013. This was not an arbitrary choice as it was the month preceding the expiration of transitional restrictions and, in a study conducted by the Migration Observatory about the language used in the press about Romanians and Bulgarians (as discussed in Chapter 2, section 2.5.5), this month was not considered as part of the study because the “busy period” may have “unintentionally skew[ed] the results” (Allen and Vicol, 2014: 3). Although this may have been the case for a quantitative study that utilised corpus linguistics as the main method, I believed this “busy period” might reveal interesting qualitative insights that should not be ignored. In performing a close reading of the articles and public comments already collected within this time frame, it became clear that there were two overarching themes emerging from the data. The first theme, which I labelled ‘restriction and control’, related to the political debates surrounding not only the transitional restrictions that have been discussed, but also calls for these restrictions to be extended, proposals to ‘cap’ EU migration to a certain number per year, and the implementation of new welfare restriction. The second theme, which I labelled ‘anticipation and expectation’, concerned ‘who’ might arrive after the 1st January 2014 and ‘why’ they might chose to migrate to the UK. As part of this second theme, it was clear that that anti-social, criminal and abusive behaviour attributed to Romanians and Bulgarians was debated, discussed or challenged, and motivation to migrate to the UK was considered not only in relation to finding employment, but also in relation to the practice of ‘benefit’ or ‘health tourism’. As I wanted to explore the discourse topics related to these issues in greater detail, I expanded my data-set by two weeks to cover a six-week period, tracing some of these most significant discursive events to between 24th November 2013 to 5th January 2014. Thus, the 24th November 2013 marked the first reporting of new welfare restrictions to be implemented for EU migrants, and the 5th January marked an statement from Labour leader Ed Miliband that British people would potentially ‘lose out’ due to immigrant labour. Thus, these
specific discursive events helped to re-evaluate and reconsider the data, and through the establishment of more concrete parameters, my analytical focus was narrowed down but strengthened for the purposes of qualitative discourse analysis.

5.4.1 Macro Analysis: Discourse Topics

Once these new parameters were enforced the data set was narrowed to a total of 214 articles: 111 from *Mail Online* and 104 from *The Guardian*. Following this downsizing, I proceeded to consider the first analytical stage of the DHA, which was to identify the main discourse topics of a specific discourse (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016). Here, I analysed the headlines and standfirsts of the 214 articles selected, as evident in Appendix 1. This macro-analysis enabled the identification of the most significant discourse topics across the two newspapers. However, in order for a systematic application of the DHA to take place, I was also aware that the data set would need to be further downsized. In essence, I recognized that in order to fully understand the representation and evaluation of immigrants vis-à-vis other social actors (RQ1), and to assess whether discourse of immigration could be classified as racist (RQ2), the best approach was to formulate a detailed case study (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016).

The focus on headlines and standfirsts are important in the analysis of media texts. As demonstrated in Chapter 3 (section 3.3.5), headlines can position social actors and discourse topics in a variety of different ways. The purpose of a headline, and also the standfirst, is therefore not only to persuade or encourage the reader to read on, but it is also ideological (Trew, 1979; Richardson, 2007). Thus, the consideration of these as independent entities from the rest of the text is a common part of a CDS analysis. For the purposes of this study, however, the analysis of headlines and standfirsts was only concerned with the identification of dominant discourse topics in discourse about immigration, as it was necessary to

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32 A macro-analysis of public comments was not performed in the same way as the purposes of this analysis was to gain an in depth understanding of the dominant discourses and discourse topics in which the public would be responding to. Once the data was further downsized and a case study constructed, public comments were then included for the purposes of micro-linguistic analysis.
get an overview of inter-discursive relations prior to the downsizing of the corpus.33

During this macro analysis, it became apparent that a selection of articles could be removed as they related to discourse topics about immigration outside of the scope of this thesis. Consequently, articles about asylum seekers/refugees and non-EU migration were excluded from the data set. Other articles about the EU were also removed if they did not relate explicitly to the expiration of transitional restrictions for Bulgarian and Romanian workers. Furthermore, I also chose to exclude certain genres such as satirical cartoons and letters from the public, as these were not consistent across the two newspapers and would potentially require different methods for analysis (see Appendix 1). Consideration was therefore given to traditional news reports, opinion pieces and editorials.

After the analysis of discourse topics related to specific discourses, a number of patterns started to emerge with reference to the characteristics of the immigration debate in the lead up to the expiration of transitional restrictions for Bulgarian and Romanian workers, and the ways in which each newspaper reported on and positioned themselves ideologically in relation to a series of issues, events and topics. This included that the discourse on immigration was interdiscursively linked to a range of other discourses, as documented in Figure 5:

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33 During this analysis, it also became clear that there were some differences between the papers. Thus, whereas The Guardian appeared to follow the traditional headline and standfirst format of print papers, the Mail Online adopted a less traditional format for the content of their standfirsts. Instead of a single line that summarised part of the story, the standfirsts were comprised of a series of bullet points that summarised most of the key points raised within the main article. In essence, the main body of the story was a repetition and elaboration of these key bullet points. There were also some headlines in the Mail Online that seemed to be substantially longer than would be expected in a print equivalent. It would therefore appear that there are some stylistic differences between the online and print versions of the Daily Mail, which may or may not be apparent in other newspapers. However, there is limited empirical research on such differences.
Following the identification of these discourses, it became apparent that there were three that played a significant role (see Figure 6). These were the discourses on welfare, employment and crime and their prominence is evident through the number of times they were coded (see Appendix 1):
With reference to the way in which each of the newspaper articles identified with these specific discourses, it was apparent that all three were characteristic of the Mail Online’s representation and evaluation of the immigration debate; however, The Guardian primarily focused on the discourse on immigration in relation to discourses on welfare and employment. Once these three discourses were identified in relation to the discourse on immigration, I proceeded to detail the discourse topics evident in each, evident in Figures 7 – 10 below:

**Figure 7: Discourse on Immigration - Discourse Topics**
Discourse on Welfare
(shared discourse topics):
- new benefit restrictions (enforcement + evaluation)
- 'benefit tourism'
- EU benefit rules preventing discrimination between national and EU citizens
- Tests for claiming benefits in UK

The Guardian (specific)
- Responsibility for the payment of benefits

Mail Online (specific)
- British citizens on welfare
- Exportation of child welfare

Figure 8: Discourse on Welfare - Discourse Topics

Discourse on Employment
(shared discourse topics):
- Workers from Romania and Bulgaria (political and public reaction)
- Protecting British workers (jobs)
- Restricting EU workers
- EU free movement of workers
- Work related taxes
- Labour shortages in the UK
- Exploitation of workers

The Guardian (specific)
- Roma community entering labour markets
- Romanian parents working abroad

Mail Online (specific)
- EU citizens looking for work in the UK (UK most attractive)
- Reasons for British unemployment
- Union membership
- Selling the Big Issue
- British job adverts in Romania
- Jobs requiring only a basic understanding of English

Figure 9: Discourse on Employment - Discourse Topics
Having conducted a macro analysis of the new data set, it became clear that there was potential for a number of case studies to be constructed. Furthermore, within the macro analysis, it was also evident that one newspaper article could be interdiscursively connected to all three of the main discourses: welfare, employment and crime. In transitioning from macro analysis, to the construction of a case study for the purposes of micro-linguistic analysis, I once again re-evaluated how this might be systematically approached. In the first instance, I considered the two dominant themes identified previously, that of ‘restriction and control’ and ‘anticipation and expectation’. It became clear to me that in many of the articles coded for the three main discourses on employment, welfare and crime, there emanated a conceptual link between the ‘restriction and control’ being enforced or discussed and the ‘anticipation and expectation’ of ‘who’ will
arrive after January 1st 2014. Thus, these themes were not as ‘independent’ as I had initially thought. Moreover, it increasingly became clear that discourses on welfare, employment and crime were also very much tied with the debate surrounding new welfare restrictions employed to deter ‘benefit tourists’. Although the idea of ‘welfare chauvinism’ has been investigated previously (Balch and Balabanova, 2016), to the best of my knowledge, a CDS analysis had not been conducted specifically in relation to the way in which immigrants were represented as ‘benefit tourists’, which in my view helped to legitimise the implementation of welfare restrictions (Demetriou, 2018). Moreover, this specific discursive event proved to be particularly interesting to investigate as, on the surface, it may easily be dismissed as a ‘necessary’ and or ‘reasonable’ measure to enforce, in order to prevent abuse. However, as will be discussed in detail for the remainder of the thesis, there are a number of discriminatory, and I would even argue racist, ideologies that form this construction of the ‘benefit tourist’.

5.4.2 Micro Analysis Case Study: Welfare Restrictions and ‘Benefit Tourists’

5.4.2.1 Welfare Magnet Hypothesis

As demonstrated in Chapter 2, immigration to the UK has been inextricably tied to the topic of “welfare and social rights” (Geddes, 2003: 150). Moreover, as was discussed by Hayes (2002), this connection can be traced back to the advent of the welfare state and a perception of it being constructed for ‘our own’. It has also been evident that political, media and public discourse surrounding this matter heightened during the 1990s, where the discursive construction of asylum seekers and refugees focused on themes of ‘distrust’ and ‘abuse’ of the system (see Chapter 2, section 2.4). Thus, the discourse about the ‘benefit tourist’, or the ‘bogus’ asylum applicant, clearly became prominent in the 1990s. Not only did policy changes of the time continue dominant understandings of immigration as needing to be controlled, but it also seemed to have long lasting effects on public perception in regards to motivations to migrate to the UK.

It appears that debates which link immigration to welfare have come to surface primarily because a political contradiction inherent within the neoliberal

34 An earlier version of this case study has been published in Communications: The European Journal of Communications Research.
model, where the pressures for EU expansion, open markets, and a demand for both high and low skilled labour across the EU is merged with the perception/belief, of a ‘burden’ or ‘strain’ on public (Geddes, 2003). This links to the topos of burdening/weighing down which Reisigl and Wodak (2001) explain is often present in arguing against immigration. Furthermore, it has seemingly become a widespread belief that “immigrants move to countries with generous welfare and receive social benefits without sufficiently contributing to the system” (Giulietti and Wahba, 2012: 2). This is evidenced in the 2009 Eurobarometer, where 51% of those surveyed believed that immigrants benefitted from the services and assistance they received more than they contributed to the system (Giulietti and Wahba, 2012: 2; see European Commission, 2010).

In examining scholarly work surrounding the connection between immigration and welfare, not only in the UK but also around the world, it is clear that studies have been conducted primarily in the fields of political and economic science. Moreover, a large body of work has sought to establish whether the ‘welfare magnet hypothesis’ exists. This theory became prominent in the late 1990s, and it was the work of Borjas (1999) that significantly contributed to this. Borjas’ (1999: 607-608) main concern was that there was not only a rise in the number of immigrants receiving welfare assistance in the US, but also that some states in particular had become a “magnet”. One of the main reasons for such a claim was that immigrants “are a self-selected sample of persons who have chosen to bear the fixed costs of the geographic move” and thus are more likely to choose to move to those states that have the best welfare provisions (ibid: 609). Borjas’ research ultimately concluded that “immigrant welfare recipients are much more likely to be geographically clustered than immigrants who do not receive welfare and are also much more clustered than natives” (ibid: 635). The state in question was California and it was found that “45% of newly arrived welfare participants lived there” (ibid). Although, Borjas (1999: 635) acknowledged that there could be other motivations, or, “alternative stories that explain” the concentration of welfare receiving immigrants in certain states, for example, that California was also “home to a large refugee population”, it was ultimately concluded “that the wealth-maximization hypothesis generates a number of interesting and empirically testable implications of welfare magnets” (ibid: 620).
Since this study, many have questioned Borjas’ ‘welfare magnet hypothesis’ and have sought to demonstrate its limitations. For example, Giulietti and Wahba (2012: 9) point out that although the hypothesis “explains the potential role of welfare in attracting immigrants” there are other motivations that are seemingly ignored. One of these is the presence of ‘social networks’ in the host country as they not only provide familiarity, but can also provide financial support that may greatly “reduce the cost of migration” (ibid). A second factor, which Giulietti and Wahba (2012: 9) point to is the immigration policy of the host country. Others, including Nannestad (2006: 16) state that other factors are also ignored including the “size and skill composition of immigration flows” and “individual attitudes towards risk”.

It is also unclear whether the ‘welfare magnet hypothesis’ is transferable to a European context since much of Borjas’ worked focused on immigration to the US. In presenting a comprehensive review of work within the US, Giulietti and Wahba (2012: 10) explain that in Borjas and Trejo (1991) it was found that recent immigration to the US used “the welfare system more intensively than earlier cohorts” and in Borjas and Hilton (1996) it was evidenced that “immigrants are more likely to receive cash benefits than natives”. But as they also point out, other studies conclude this is unfounded, including Levine and Zimmerman (1999) who “found no substantial evidence of welfare migration”.

Turning to studies that have examined the European context, again it becomes clear that results are mixed. In a Swedish context Hansen and Lofstrom (2003) found that “welfare participation [was] higher among immigrants than among natives” (cited in Giulietti and Wahba, 2012: 11) but that their need for welfare assistance reduced with time living in Sweden. Moreover, De Giorgi and Pellizari (2009) concluded, “welfare generosity influences migration decisions, albeit the effect is small” (cited in Giulietti and Wahba, 2012: 13). Despite this, Pederson et al. (2008) found no support for the ‘welfare magnet hypothesis’. However, these studies primarily concerned migration from non-European countries.

Focusing on intra-EU migration, it is evident that the construction of the ‘benefit tourist’ has amounted from a fear or belief that, since the transformation of EU regulations regarding social security and welfare which now “prohibits
national legislation discriminating against other member states” (Martinsen, 2005: 1030), welfare migration would occur as a result. This view is evident in the work of Sinn (2002) who examines and makes predictions about the future of the welfare state in light of the EU enlargement. Within the article, it is not only predicted that “a massive westward migration” (ibid: 104) would occur after enlargement, but the paper makes the assumption that western EU member states would encounter a large ‘fiscal burden’. However, in studies that have tested the consequences of EU enlargement empirically, it is evident that findings generally do not support the ‘welfare magnet hypothesis’. For example, in Giulietti et al. (2011: 12), found that “immigration within the EU does not respond to unemployment benefits”. Moreover, in relation to how immigration has affected the UK labour market, Blanchflower and Lawton (2008) highlight their evidence does not suggest that immigrants have had a negative effect on the labour market or even on unemployment within the UK, stating that the ‘A10’ accession “came to work and not to claim benefits” (p.188). Finally, in relation specifically to whether EU migrants place a ‘burden’ on the welfare state of the UK, Dustmann and Frattini (2014) would suggest that such a fear is unfounded, as it is concluded that EU migrants have actually made a positive contribution in relation to “what they pay into the fiscal system versus what they receive in benefits and transfers” (p.F628). Moreover, the figures for immigration to the UK show that the positive net contribution was £5 billion for A10 immigrants and £15 billion for other EEA migrants. Thus, EEA migrants, consistently made a positive fiscal contribution, despite Sinn’s (2002) concerns, and despite the recession years where “the amount of public expenditure on natives [was] larger than natives’ fiscal payments” (p.F617). Dustmann and Frattini (2014) also disprove the ‘labour lump fallacy’ (the idea that the number of jobs available within a country is fixed), “as even though the UK population increased by 11.1% the total number of jobs increased by 12.8%” (P.F609).

From the above review concerning immigration and the ‘welfare magnet hypothesis’ it becomes apparent that within an intra-EU context at least, these beliefs remain unfounded. However, motivation to migrate for the purposes of receiving social welfare assistance was clearly a dominant discourse topic in relation to discussions of immigration to the UK from the EU (or to rephrase, in
relation to discussions about EU free movement). Before outlining the specific articles that will be focused on within Chapters 6 and 7 for the purposes of micro linguistic analysis, I will provide a political contextual overview of the welfare restrictions discussed and finally implemented in December 2013 prior to the uplifting of transitional restrictions on 1st January 2014.

5.4.2.2 Welfare Restrictions: Context

On November 26, 2013, Prime Minister David Cameron published an article in the Financial Times entitled: “Free movement within Europe needs to be less free” (Cameron, 2013b). Here, he made a number of statements that inextricably linked EU free movement to welfare, including: “We are changing the rules so that no one can come to this country and expect to get out of work benefits immediately” (Cameron, 2013b). The new plans included:

- No EU migrant would be entitled to out-of work benefits for the first three months;
- No newly arrived EU jobseekers would be able to claim Housing Benefit;
- From January 2014, no EU migrant would be able to claim Jobseeker’s Allowance for more than six months unless they could prove that they had a genuine prospect of employment;
- A new minimum earnings threshold would be introduced before benefits such as Income Support could be claimed.

(Cameron, 2013b; Parliament, House of Commons, 2015)

Alongside these specific announcements with regards to benefit restrictions, other restrictions and controls were also discussed in the Financial Times article, these included:

If people are not here to work – if they are begging or sleeping rough – they will be removed. They will then be barred from re-entry for 12 months, unless they can prove they have a proper reason to be here, such as a job...We are also clamping down on those who employ people below the minimum wage. They will pay the price with a fine of up to £20,000 for every underpaid
employee – more than four times the fine today.

(Cameron, 2013b)

Although David Cameron maintained that the new benefit restrictions targeted all benefit claimants from the EEA (Parliament, House of Commons, 2015), these plans were outlined in direct relation to the uplifting of restrictions for Bulgarian and Romanian workers:

On January 1, the people of Romania and Bulgaria will have the same right to work in the UK as other EU citizens. I know many people are deeply concerned about the impact that could have on our country. I share those concerns.

(Cameron, 2013b)

Furthermore, this article was to start parliamentary discussions resulting in the implementation of a number of new welfare measures, introduced from December 2013 onwards, with the aim to: “ensure our welfare system is not taken advantage of” (Parliament, House of Commons, 2015: 3). Subsequently, at least three things can be discussed in relation to political discourse about immigration from Romania and Bulgaria that directly link to the focus of this study.

Firstly, I would suggest there was an implicit but strategic construction of a ‘benefit tourist’ from Romania and/or Bulgaria, although the referent ‘benefit tourist’ was not actually used by Cameron (2013b). However, this was at least inferred through the implementation of these welfare restrictions. Furthermore, I would suggest that these welfare restrictions and subsequent discussions of ‘benefit tourism’ (as will be evident in Chapters 6 and 7) was based on a Balkanist stereotype, highlighting deviant characteristics of the ‘Eastern’ European alongside inferring themes such as impoverishment, which automatically positioned this Balkan ‘Other’ as inferior to the British ‘Self’. Secondly, as the claims made about the potential practices of EU migrants were not grounded in any supporting evidence, such an argument would appear to be unreasonable and representative of the fallacy of petitio principii (or ‘begging the question’). Here, the circular reasoning involved in the legitimisation of the new welfare restrictions is one that is based on a starting point that, in itself, “is controversial
and in question” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p. 73). Finally, in announcing and working towards the implementation of such restrictions only six weeks prior to the uplifting of transitional restrictions for Romanian and Bulgarian citizens, the government was able to initiate another kind of ‘moral panic’.

5.4.2.3 Micro-Analytical Focus: Mail Online

The final aspect to consider in regards to the construction of the case study is the selection of articles that will be analysed and my justification for this. Once more, a recursive and reflective approach was adopted, where I thought about the data in relation to my research questions and how these linked to the theories, concepts and themes discussed in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. Initially, sixteen comparable articles were chosen, eight from the Mail Online and eight from The Guardian. These articles followed the debates and developments in relation to the announcement of welfare restrictions from November 24, 2013 to their implementation on December 18, 2013. In addition to this, 1475 comments were chosen35, 699 from the Mail Online and 776 from The Guardian (see Tables 3 and 4).

35 Although the first 100 comments were collected, some articles did not reach 100 comments.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article Number</th>
<th>Headline + Date</th>
<th>Total Number of Comments</th>
<th>Comments for Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Cameron prepares for showdown with Europe over benefits for Romanian and Bulgarian Migrants (24th November 2013)</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Coalition split over plan to curb benefits for new EU migrants: Lib Dem minister says he 'needs to be persuaded' while Boris backs restrictions (25th November 2013)</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>I DO share your concerns on migration, declares Cameron days after Mail’s explosive poll: PM unveils sweeping new restrictions on access to benefits (27th November 2013)</td>
<td>1.4k</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The immigration backlash: Germany and France join PM in call for crackdown on benefit tourism as Hungarian eurocrat brands UK the ‘nasty country’ of Europe (27th November 2013)</td>
<td>1.2k</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>‘Cameron is making Britain the nasty country of Europe’: Eurocrat accuses PM of not telling ‘the truth’ on migrants (27th November 2013)</td>
<td>1.1k</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>PM’s plan vs reality: Will Cameron’s crackdown stop anyone coming here? (28th November 2013)</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>DAILY MAIL COMMENT: How can it be nasty to stand up for Britain? Opinion Piece (28th November 2013)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Benefit controls rushed through: EU migrants will now have to wait three months before they can claim out-of-work handouts (18th December 2013)</td>
<td>1.5k</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4: The Guardian (Online) Data: Welfare Restrictions and ‘Benefit Tourists’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article Number</th>
<th>Headline + Date</th>
<th>Total Number of Comments</th>
<th>Comments for Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Michael Gove: defying EU on new migrants is just practical politics (24th November 2013)</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Lib Dems resist Tory benefit plans for Romanian and Bulgarian migrants (24th November 2013)</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>EU migrants: David Cameron sets out more benefit restrictions (27th November 2013)</td>
<td>1,222</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>UK claims growing support over migration in clash with Brussels (27 November 2013)</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Migration plan risks UK being seen as nasty country, says EU commissioner (27th November 2013)</td>
<td>1,496</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Benefit restrictions on EU migrants: will they work? (27th November 2013)</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Cameron’s ‘benefit tourism’ crackdown is fact-free political rhetoric Opinion Piece (27th November 2013)</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Tories rush through curbs on benefits access for Romanians and Bulgarians (18th December 2013)</td>
<td>931</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, although I proceeded to analyse Mail Online articles and The Guardian articles plus their corresponding public comments, the thesis effectively became a comparative study examining four separate sets of data. Not only did this amount to a task that was beyond the scope of the thesis, I also felt that this comparison distracted from my main goals and research questions. The primary goal of this thesis has always been to examine if racism is apparent in the representation and evaluation of EU migrants (in particular Bulgarians and Romanians). As such, this thesis has always intended to examine and critique discursive structures that may be racist (in either overt or covert forms), following some of the major influences from CDS including from van Dijk (1991, 1992, 1993, 1997, 2000), Reisigl and Wodak (2001), and Wodak (2015). Although it was clear that The Guardian also utilised linguistic items that have been considered discriminatory towards immigrants, including the adoption of ‘water’ and ‘natural
disaster’ metaphors such as ‘wave’ and ‘influx’ (Demetriou, 2018), the primary ideological position of the newspaper was (and still is) pro-EU and pro-immigration. It was also evident from the headline and lead paragraph analysis, discussed in section 5.4.1, that many articles pertained to and advocated an anti-racist position. Although it is equally important to consider the role of anti-racist discourses and to critique these (as displayed by Lentin, 2005, 2008), I considered this to be outside the main research agenda of this thesis. I therefore proceeded to examine the selected articles outlined above from the Mail Online plus their corresponding public comments, which made up the main analytical focus of the case study (see Appendix 2). There are many reasons why the discourse from the Mail Online should be considered from a ‘critical’ perspective and these will be further outlined below, as I examine the Mail Online’s background and reach.

The Mail Online is the online version of the Daily Mail; a British newspaper originally founded by brothers Alfred and Harold Harmsworth in 1896. By 1902, its popularity rivalled leading global newspapers, including the New York World, due to circulation surpassing one million (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2017). In 1922, the Daily Mail and General Trust was “established to manage the family’s newspaper interests” (DMGT, 2017). The newspaper can be categorised as a middle-market tabloid, falling somewhere in between traditional notions of ‘tabloid’ and ‘broadsheet’ press (Reah, 2002), and is published daily with the Sunday edition entitled The Mail on Sunday. The paper is well known for its conservative, right wing stance and is viewed as “representing “Middle England” and its traditional values” (Meyer, 2010: 20). This stance is reflected in readership voting patterns, with an Ipsos MORI survey showing that 59% of its regular readers voted for the Conservatives in 2010, 16% for Labour and 16% for the Liberal Democrats (Ipsos MORI, 2016-2018b). The paper has also been described as “virulently Eurosceptic” (Anderson, 2004) and has a “staunch anti-immigration position” (Meyer, 2010:20). The Daily Mail’s online newspaper, Mail Online, was launched in 2003 and by 2012 insights by comScore revealed that it was the most read online newspaper in the world attracting 50,067,000 unique visitors in October 2012 Radwanick (2012). The online edition maintains a conservative right wing stance, but has additional features including what has also been labelled as the misogynistic ‘sidebar of shame’ – the “Unofficial nickname for the
right-hand column on the *Mail Online* website, which specializes in picture-led items about female celebrities and the state of their bodies and/or relationships” (Harcup, 2016).

Within the literature examined in both Chapters 2 and 4, it became apparent that scholars examining media discourse have suggested that there has been something ‘distinctive’ about the *Mail Online’s* reporting of immigration. Thus, Barker (1981) discussed the paper in relation to ‘new’ forms of racism and Kaye (2001) explained how the Daily Mail’s use of collocates such as ‘bogus’ and ‘asylum-seeker’ was not only apparent in reported speech, but also used frequently in their editorials. Buchanan and Grillo (2004) also discussed something similar, where the Daily Mail articles they analysed failed to contextualise and properly reference quotations when discussing asylum in the 1990s. More recently, the *Mail Online* (alongside other newspapers such as *The Sun* and the *Daily Express*) have been targeted by anti-racist campaigns such as Stop Funding Hate (2017). For these reasons, alongside the extensive reach the newspaper has across the world, especially since the establishment of the *Mail Online*, I made a decision that further ‘critical’ examination was warranted, necessary and an appropriate selection for the research agenda of this thesis.

The main findings from the analysis of *Mail Online* articles plus their corresponding public comments will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 7; Chapter 6 focusing on the selected articles and Chapter 7 on the public comments. Examples considered will be presented using a simple coding system, where the number of the example will precede the abbreviation MA for *Mail Online* articles, and MPC for their corresponding public comments (e.g. 1.MA or 1.MPC). In relation to the public comments, all typos and/or spelling mistakes have been included, as there are strategic misspellings, which are key to the representation and evaluation of certain social actors. Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 will follow the same structure beginning with the representation and evaluation of key social actors in the welfare restrictions debate. These social actors include: UK political, UK public, EU political and EU migrants (Romanians and Bulgarians). It is expected that the examination of these social actors will provide a greater understanding of how both the newspaper and the public represent and evaluate Bulgarians and Romanians vis-à-vis other social actors in relation to RQ1 and, at the same time,
demonstrate how they also align/disalign with certain ideological positions, that may or may not be overtly or covertly racist, in relation to RQ2:

RQ1:
How are EU migrants, in particular Bulgarians and Romanians, represented and evaluated vis-à-vis other social actors in discourse about immigration?

RQ2:
Can discourse about immigration surrounding the representation and evaluation of Romanians and Bulgarians be considered racist, and to what extent is this apparent in the selected online newspaper articles and their corresponding public comments?

However, as outlined in Chapter 1 (section 1.3) it was also necessary to ask a further question in this particular case study, especially in relation to whether welfare restrictions were legitimised or delegitimised in Mail Online articles plus their corresponding public comments. Thus, following an examination of social actors, argumentation strategies will be discussed and it will be assessed whether these argumentation schemes contribute to the positioning of Romanians and Bulgarians as the ‘Other’, as related to RQ3:

RQ3:
How are new welfare restrictions de/legitimised in Mail Online articles and their public comments, and to what extent might this contribute to the representation and evaluation of Romanians and Bulgarians as the ‘Other’?

5.5 Ethical Considerations
Before drawing the methodology to a conclusion, one area that should be discussed and that continues to be debated and contested is the ethical dimension to online research. This is due to the fact that much of the data collected from online sources is “from or about individuals in the absence of face-to-face co-presence” (British Psychological Society, 2013: 3) and this is certainly true with respect to the public comments collected for analysis. Alongside this, there have (until recently) been limited resources that offer guidelines for researchers. As Herring (2011: 153) states in an article about ethical and scholarly considerations
in computer-mediated communication (CMC), when this area of research was first established, scholars “had no choice but to make up rules and procedures”. More recently, however, both The British Psychological Society (2013) and the Association of Internet Researchers (AoIR) (2012) have compiled guidelines for Internet research. It has consequently been suggested that three of the major tensions and considerations in online research involve: 1) human subjects; 2) the public/private debate and; 3) data (text)/ persons (AoIR, 2012: 6-7).

With regards to the ‘human subject’ and ethical procedure, it is widely known that experiments and research involving human participants have to go through full ethical review to assess the extent of human imposition or the possibility of harm. However, as is documented in AoIR (2012: 6), the notion of the human subject in research “has been long critiqued for being ill-suited for models of inquiry that follow non-biomedical procedures for interacting with people”. Furthermore, the suitability of the term ‘human subject’ for online research “has never been a good fit”, something further complicated by the public/private debate (ibid).

The private/public debate stems from the fact that on the Internet, it can be difficult for both researchers and users to determine which sites are publicly accessible and which are private and have restrictions (such as password protection), thus “the distinction between public and private space becomes increasingly blurred” (British Psychological Society, 2013: 6). Additionally, people may hold different perceptions, definitions or expectations of what ‘privacy’ is whilst operating online (AoIR, 2012: 6). Although the removal of names/pseudonyms/images for anonymity can aid in the protection of the human subject in research, due to the nature of the Internet and data aggregators such as search engines, “altering participants’ names may be insufficient to protect confidentiality” (Bowker and Tuffin, 2004: 232).

The last of the three major tensions with regards to Internet research also links into previous discussions of ‘human subject’ and ‘private/public debate’ and is concerned with the data collected and the person who produced it (AoIR, 2012). Within this consideration, the AoIR ask questions such as “Is an avatar a person?” and “Are we working with human subjects or not?” (ibid: 7). For some, the Internet therefore presents us with a whole new reality - a virtual reality - and in some
cases data collected online may be skewed by online personas which may or may not ontologically exist in the ‘real’ or ‘social’ world. However, as outlined earlier, a CDS perspective does not necessarily view social media in this way instead seeing it as “a media apparatus which is used by individuals in society” (Unger, Wodak and KhosraviNik, 2016: 279).

I justify the use of comments firstly in terms of consequentialist ethics: the potential of a consequentialist benefit of social justice. However, I am aware that ethical judgements are a balancing act between consequentialist and deontological ethics; it is for this reason that I have decided to anonymise comments and will be considering the comments only (and not any additional demographic information about respondents).

5.6 Chapter Summary

This chapter started by reviewing the discursive strategies of the DHA, namely: Reference/Nomination, Predication, Argumentation, Perspectivization, and Intensification/Mitigation (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, 2016). In doing so, each strategy was outlined in depth and argumentation in particular was considered in relation to a number of criticisms (Žagar, 2010; Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012; Forchtner and Tominc, 2012). Despite these criticisms, argumentation remains a crucial aspect of the analysis of discourse/s, especially in the examination of ideologies that may or may not be deemed as racist. This chapter also presented a view that the discourse strategies outlined above related primarily to representation in discourse and only marginally to evaluation. After identifying the need to examine evaluation in a more systematic way, I argued that Martin and White’s (2005) Appraisal Theory could be successfully incorporated within the DHA. As a result, the strategies of ATTITUDE, ENGAGEMENT and GRADUATION were considered in depth and in relation to the discursive strategies of the DHA.

Following on from here, a reflective account of the data selection and collection process was outlined. Although both the Mail Online and The Guardian were initially considered, this part of the methodology evidenced how and why both newspapers were only considered for the purposes of macro-analysis and the identification of discourses and discourse topics. Moreover, as the study progressed and the research objectives and aims were re-evaluated, I made a case for the micro-linguistic analysis of 8 Mail Online articles and 699 corresponding
public comments. These were chosen in order to construct a case study that focused specifically on the implementation of welfare restrictions and the construction of EU migrants as ‘benefit tourists’. Finally, ethical considerations of online research was also considered, where a fine balance between consequentialist and deontological ethics was presented. The next two chapters will present a micro-linguistic analysis of the articles selected (Chapter 6) and their corresponding public comments (Chapter 7).
Chapter 6 - Mail Online: Articles

6.1 Introduction

After the initial macro-analysis presented in Chapter 5 (section 5.4), it was found that the discourse on immigration was interdiscursively connected to discourses on welfare, employment and crime. Moreover, two overarching themes with regards to the expiration of transitional restrictions on 1st January were identified: ‘restriction and control’ and ‘anticipation and expectation’. For reasons outlined in Chapter 5, eight articles plus 699 corresponding public comments were chosen from the Mail Online in the construction of a case study related to the implementation of welfare restrictions for EU migrants.

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the findings from the micro-linguistic analysis, exploring the eight Mail Online articles selected. The first part of the chapter, section 6.2, will consider the representation and evaluation of EU migrants vis-à-vis other social actors, as related to RQ1. In order for this to be achieved, four sets of social actors will be considered in the following order: UK political, UK public, EU political and EU migrants (Romanians and Bulgarians). The order of analysis is not an arbitrary choice and has been constructed in this way to reflect that welfare restrictions were discussed and implemented by UK political actors in response to the UK public’s ‘concerns’ about EU immigration. By focusing on these sets of social actors to begin with, I aim to evidence how the Mail Online position UK political actors (in section 6.2.1) and UK public actors (in section 6.2.2) in relation to EU immigration (particularly from Bulgaria and Romania). In many respects, these sets of social actors will also evidence the representation and evaluation of the ‘Self’. Furthermore, the development of positive and/or negative representations and evaluations of these UK social actors will help to show if particular ideologies, including racism (in relation to RQ2), are evident and endorsed or resisted in the articles.

Following on from here, the representation and evaluation of EU political actors (in section 6.2.3) and EU migrant (Romanian and Bulgarian) actors (in section 6.2.4) will be considered. In some respects, this may relate to the construction of an ‘Other’ or ‘Others’ in Mail Online articles. As will become apparent in the analysis, EU political actors are included within the articles
because they either endorse/entertain or counter/discredit the welfare restrictions discussed and implemented by the UK government. Thus, by examining how Mail Online articles represent and evaluate EU political social actors (in section 6.2.3), I will be able to evidence how they are positioned in relation to EU immigration. However, with EU political social actors also being positioned as the ‘Other’ (at times), the representation and evaluation of these social actors can also be considered vis-à-vis the UK actors, or the ‘Self’. The same is therefore true for the representation and evaluation of EU migrants (Romanians and Bulgarians). However, it is EU migrants (Romanians and Bulgarians) in particular that are the central, although unvoiced, actors in this discourse on the implementation of welfare restrictions, as the supposed ‘benefit tourists’. Thus, attention will be given to the way in which this construction is reproduced and/or resisted.

The second part of the chapter, section 6.3, relates entirely to RQ3, which was constructed for the purposes of this case study. It is here, where argumentation strategies both legitimising and delegitimising the welfare restrictions will be considered in relation to the representation and evaluation of EU migrants (Romanians and Bulgarians) as the ‘Other’. Moreover, it will become clear how both arguments legitimising and delegitimising welfare restrictions can construct immigrant ‘Others’, especially when arguments are linked to voices that also argue for the restriction and control of immigration per se. Finally, this chapter will conclude with a summary in section 6.4.

6.2 Representation and Evaluation of Social Actors

6.2.1 UK Political

This first sub-section will focus on the representation and evaluation of UK political social actors across the eight articles chosen for analysis. Starting with prime minister, David Cameron and the Conservative Party as the main advocates for the implementation of welfare restrictions, consideration will then be given to the Liberal Democrats (the coalition partners), the Labour Party and the UK Independence Party (UKIP).

With regards to referential strategies, it is clear that David Cameron is nominated formally with the use of his first and last name, or simply via the use of
his surname ‘Cameron’. At other times, he is *categorised* according to his occupation (*functionalis*ation) where ‘Prime Minister’ affords him with status. This comes in three forms either as apposition ‘Prime Minister, David Cameron’ or simply as ‘the Prime Minister’ or as the acronym ‘the PM’. At times a title ‘Mr’ is also added as a pre-modifier as in ‘Mr Cameron’ thus maintaining formality (see Table 5). Although these referential strategies do not necessarily in themselves reflect a positive representation/evaluation, and are indeed common practice within newspaper reporting, they are still worth noting especially when it comes to how they compare with public comment referential strategies in Chapter 7, section 7.2.1.

Table 5: David Cameron - Referential Strategies (Articles)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UK Political Social Actors</th>
<th>Referential Strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>David Cameron</td>
<td>Cameron, Prime Minister, PM, David Cameron, his, i, he, Mr Cameron, British Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By examining predicational strategies via the processes David Cameron is involved in, it can be shown how a positive image develops. Where David Cameron is *activated*, he is predicated as someone who is highly involved in and actively responding to the anticipated or potential abuse of the welfare system by ‘benefit tourists’, a response to the more general ‘concern’ which is seemingly evident amongst the public, as the following examples illustrate:

1.MA: **David Cameron is set to defy** European rules... *Article 1*

2.MA: **The Prime Minister will insist that he shares** the public's 'concerns' about a renewed wave of migration from Europe. *Article 3*

3.MA: **...he will declare** that the founding EU principle of ‘free movement’ for workers has gone too far. *Article 3*

4.MA: **Mr Cameron will say he understands the concerns of voters** worried that incomers should not be allowed to take advantage of Britain’s benefits system and public services. *Article 8*
In all of the examples above, the processes seemingly promote a positive representation/evaluation; especially verbal processes such as ‘insist’ and ‘declare’ which are up-scaled versions in comparison to an alternative choice such as ‘say’. In this respect, they show infused intensification reinforcing what I would interpret to be a positive evaluation. It is also possible to suggest that, through continued repetition of the modal verb ‘will’\(^\text{36}\), the *Mail Online* seek to promote a view that constructs a positive judgement in relation to his ‘tenacity’ where he is positioned as being determined. As Cameron is primarily *activated*, this also links to an overall judgement of his ‘capacity’, seeing as he is depicted in taking an active leadership role. Moreover, the mental process ‘understands’ in example 4.MA, which is presented as indirect speech from David Cameron’s *Financial Times* article (Cameron, 2013), reinforces and reproduces a consensual feeling the prime minister has intended to construct between him and the public; one which relates to feelings of dissatisfaction and insecurity about immigration from the EU to the UK. In example 1.MA, where the relational process ‘is set’ and the behavioural process ‘to defy’ are joined, it becomes clear that the *Mail Online* are positioning David Cameron (and by extension the UK) in a dichotomous relationship with the EU (although the EU here are referred to as ‘European rules’). It is a relationship where David Cameron is presented as holding power over the EU\(^\text{37}\), thus is also an indication of the tension evident within *Mail Online* articles with regards to the UK’s relationship with the EU.

There are a few examples where David Cameron is *passivated*. However, even when this is the case, the *Mail Online* continues to show alignment and generally a positive evaluation of the prime minister. For example, where he is represented as being ‘motivated’ by his voters, a behavioural process which generally evokes positive connotations:

5.MA:...the **prime minister is motivated** by mounting pressure from his own voters to guarantee strict control over Bulgarian and Romanians... *Article 1*

David Cameron is also *passivated* in relation to the criticisms made by EU

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\(^\text{36}\) Especially prominent within Article 3.

\(^\text{37}\) Instead of the reverse which is often the case in the negative representation and evaluation of the EU, evident in section 6.2.3.
Commissioner, Laszlo Andor about the welfare restrictions. Once more, a dichotomous relationship is constructed between UK and EU political actors, helping to construct an anti-EU ideology:

6.MA: A European Commissioner today launched a devastating attack on David Cameron’s plans to curb benefits for migrants, accusing the Prime Minister of not telling the truth and fuelling ‘hysteria’. Article 4

Here, it is evident that David Cameron is subjected to an apparent ‘attack’ from Laszlo Andor, and true to the often sensationalist nature of the Mail Online, this is intensified with the adjective ‘devastating’. Such an articulation does not seemingly predicate the prime minister as ‘weak’ but rather as subjected to an EU ideal where the EU (via Laszlo Andor) is portrayed as a more powerful political opponent and predicated negatively, even as far as threatening, especially through the article’s use of the material/verbal process ‘attack’. In the same example, we also see certain negative evaluations directed towards the prime minister from Laszlo Andor, linked primarily to judgements of ‘veracity’ and ‘normality’. However, the fact that scare quotes are used around ‘hysteria’ shows a distancing from the newspaper with regards to these claims. This will be further elaborated upon below when EU political social actors will be considered in section 6.2.3.

In responding to the same criticism from Laszlo Andor, an opinion piece (Article 7) represents and evaluates David Cameron using a slightly different tone. Here, although the article maintains a generally positive representation/evaluation of the prime minister, the implementation of welfare restrictions is seemingly questioned (to be explored further in section 6.3).

7.MA: Is EU employment commissioner Laszlo Andor so little ashamed of his country’s past and present that he feels entitled to insult Britain over David Cameron’s all-too-modest attempts to control our borders? Article 7

8.MA: This is the true meaning of ‘nastiness’. And it has nothing to do with the motives behind Mr Cameron’s almost laughably restrained efforts to restrict mass immigration from Bulgaria and Romania after January 1. Article 7

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38 See section 6.2.3 for more details.
9.MA: Mr Cameron's first duty is surely to us – and the 970,000 young Britons out of work. *Article 7*

Thus in examples 7.MA and 8.MA, David Cameron’s actions are down-scaled and predicated as ‘all-too-modest’ and ‘almost laughably restrained’; therefore, the tone is not as optimistic as seen within the previous articles. Without overtly criticising the prime minister, it becomes evident that this article adopts a position that seeks the implementation further restrictions and controls on EU migrants. Furthermore, it will become clearer in section 6.3 that both the endorsement of David Cameron and the welfare restrictions in articles 1-5 and also the criticism of him and the restrictions in articles 6 and 7 is part of the same ideological frame, one that is anti-EU, anti-immigration (*per se*) and nationalist/communitarian. In example 9.MA, the author uses the dialogically contractive proclamation ‘surely’, which pronounces a populist communitarian view in relation to an ethical judgement made of the prime minister (his ‘propriety’), where a view is taken that British people need to be considered as his first (and only) priority. This constructs also a dichotomy between British people and migrant ‘Others’, where British people become ‘victims’ (to be explored further in section 6.2.2).

In Article 6, when welfare restrictions themselves are evaluated and critiqued by the newspaper, doubt surrounding the ‘capacity’ of David Cameron does appear to emerge, seen for example in the adverb ‘hastily’ which predicates the prime minister as being rushed:

10.MA: David Cameron has hastily put together a package of measures to deter benefit tourists. *Article 6*

Other criticisms directed towards the prime minister specifically are also evident in two further examples below:

11.MA: Mr Cameron insisted he was sending a clear message that Britain was no soft touch but he was criticised for again refusing to predict how many Romanians and Bulgarians will come to Britain when temporary controls are lifted on January 1. *Article 5*

12.MA: Yvette Cooper, Labour’s shadow home secretary, said: ‘Labour called for these benefit restrictions nine months ago. Yet David Cameron has left it until the very last minute to squeeze
**this change in.** Why is the Government leaving everything until the last minute.’ *Article 8*

However, both examples 11.MA and 12.MA also fit into the anti-immigration, anti-EU and nationalist ideological frame discussed above. In 11.MA, David Cameron is *activated* as being non-compliant though the verbal process ‘refusing’, this choice again being an example of infused intensification. In example 12.MA, criticism is put forward by Labour’s Yvette Cooper (see below), and it is clear that the prime minister’s ‘capacity’ is judged via intensification strategies focusing on his ability to implement something on time and the material process ‘squeeze’ reinforces this.

Despite these criticisms, the *Mail Online* appear to reinforce a generally positive representation/evaluation of the prime minister, one where he is depicted as mostly responding to and addressing the public’s ‘concerns’ on immigration. Such an alignment with the prime minister further reinforces and endorses the ideological construction of EU migrants (Romanians and Bulgarians) as potential ‘benefit tourists’.

Moving on to consider the representation/evaluation of David Cameron’s party, the Conservatives, it is evident that the *Mail Online* similarly constructs what might be interpreted as positive representation/evaluation. Moreover, due to the *Mail Online’s* political position, it is not surprising that they focus on and align with several social actors from the Conservative Party, not only in relation to welfare restrictions, but also immigration control *per se*\(^{39}\). This is particularly pronounced when it comes to strategies of perspectivization and ENGAGEMENT, where there is alignment with their authoritative voices.

In terms of referential strategies, Table 6 evidences the *inclusion* of many Conservative social actors in comparison to those from other parties. Although this might be expected, considering the Conservative Party are the main advocates for the implementation of welfare restrictions and also in calls for the extension of transitional restrictions for Romanians and Bulgarians, it will be shown below that those *included* and *activated* are not necessarily representative of the party

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\(^{39}\text{When immigration } \textit{per se} \text{ is discussed, this is generally with reference to immigration from the EU (or in other words, EU free movement). However, in some instances immigration } \textit{per se} \text{ may also be extended to immigration from non-EU countries too...although this is not something that is specifically discussed or analysed.}
as a whole, focusing on and favouring MPs adopting anti-immigration and anti-EU ideological positions.

**Table 6: UK Political Social Actors - Referential Strategies (Articles)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UK Political Social Actors</th>
<th>Referential Strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>33 backbencher Tory MPs, a group of Tories, Andrea Leadsom, Chris Heaton-Harris, Tim Loughton, Tory Eurosceptics, Boris, Boris Johnson, London Major Boris Johnson, one Tory minister, Tory Education Secretary Michael Gove, ministers, Mr Cameron's official spokesperson, the spokesman, Tory MPs, 46 Tory MPs, Home Secretary Theresa May, Former Minister Sir Gerald Howarth, Tory MP Charles Walker, Home Secretary, Philip Holloborne another Conservative, Jacob Rees-Mogg MP for North East Somerset, Mrs May, MPs, future Tory government, London Major Boris Johnson, 46 Tory backbenchers (and counting), Work and Pensions Secretary Iain Duncan Smith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Labour, Yvette Cooper the Shadow Home Secretary, her party, the Labour Government, they, the last government, Labour's shadow home secretary Yvette Cooper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democrats</td>
<td>Lib Dem minister, Scottish Secretary Alistair Carmichael, Lib Dems, Mr Carmichael, Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg, the Liberal Democrats, they</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKIP</td>
<td>UKIP leader Nigel Farage, UKIP, we</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Furthermore, it is clear that Conservative social actors are both *individualised* and *assimilated*. Where they are *individualised* they are also *nominated* and *functionalised* as in examples 13.MA to 16.MA below, reinforcing professionalism, authority and greater alignment with the positions/arguments they are adopting:

**13.MA:** Andrea Leadsom, Chris Heaton-Harris and Tim Loughton, from the Fresh Start Project, have identified at least five major changes to EU treaties they say should be at the heart of Britain’s renegotiation. *Article 1*

**14.MA:** But Tory Education Secretary Michael Gove also backed Mr Cameron’s position yesterday. *Article 2*
15.MA: Lib Dem minister says he ‘needs to be persuaded’ while Boris backs restrictions Article 2

16.MA: Jacob Rees-Mogg, MP for North East Somerset, said: ‘The free movement of people is no longer working in the interests of this nation, so why do Her Majesty’s Government lack the political will to change the law?’ Article 5

In each of the examples above, the Conservative social actors individualised were all known for their anti-EU stance. Moreover, example 15.MA in particular, evidences a dichotomous relationship built by the Mail Online that gives the Conservative Party a more favourable view in relation to their Liberal Democrat coalition partners. In referring to Boris Johnson (Mayor of London at the time) by his first name, a sense of affinity is constructed and reinforced. This is an affinity that also becomes important in arguments for the implementation of restrictions and controls (this is despite Boris Johnson not actually being an MP at the time).

Although political parties are generally collectivised when represented in this discourse, it is important to note that in the Mail Online it is a certain group of Conservatives that are focused upon and both included and activated in relation to the welfare restrictions. These are labelled the ‘Tory backbenchers’ and the ‘Tory Eurosceptics’. Particularly relevant is the fact that these social actors are also at times aggregated for the purposes of showing, across articles, how the numbers adopting such a position continue to rise in the weeks preceding the uplifting of transitional restrictions, from ‘33 backbencher Tory MPs’ (Article 1) to ‘46 Tory backbenchers, and counting’ (Article 7).

17.MA: His proposed curbs are still likely to be challenged in the European Court, tame and ineffective though they promise to be. So if we’re to be sued anyway, why not listen to the public – backed by 46 Tory backbenchers, and counting – who demand all restrictions should be retained after January 1?’ Article 7

Exploring predicational strategies employed in relation to Conservative social actors, it becomes clear that processes used by the Mail Online again show infused intensification in relation to FORCE. In doing so, judgements are constructed with regards to their ‘tenacity’. This is especially true when it comes to verbal processes, and an example of this can be seen above 17.MA where the
'46 backbenchers’ are predicated to ‘demand’ that transitional restrictions should remain for Bulgarian and Romanian workers. This is again the case in example 18.MA where it is shown that MPs ‘urged’ the prime minister to consider further action:

18.MA: But some of the MPs who called for an extension of controls on Romanian and Bulgarian migrants urged Mr Cameron to do more – and risk EU fines. Article 5

It will become clear below (section 6.3) that such referential and predicational strategies function alongside other topoi in order to legitimise welfare restrictions and simultaneously to delegitimise the EU. However, it also needs to be pointed out that not all Conservative party members share this Eurosceptic ideology that is being promoted. It seems a strategic choice by the newspaper to exclude and, furthermore, suppress most of these social actors apart from the then Home Secretary, Theresa May who is only included in Article 5. Moreover, where she is included it is in her relation to a warning that welfare restrictions may ‘lead to conflict with Brussels’ (Article 5). In relation to this, example 19.MA shows how another Eurosceptic MP evaluates Theresa May’s position and supposed ‘in-action’ through an evaluation that draws upon idiomatic language, judging her ‘tenacity’. Through suggesting that she should ‘find her inner lion or tiger…’, MP Charles Walker subsequently infers that unless further restrictions and controls are enforced, the Home Secretary and by extension the government, are weak:

19.MA: In angry exchanges in the Commons, Tory MP Charles Walker urged the Home Secretary to ‘find her inner lion or tiger and extend transitional controls until 2019’… Article 5

It can also be noted that, although Martin and White (2005: 112) would label the attribution of someone else’s words in discourse as dialogically expansive because it constructs “the communicative setting as heteroglossic”, clearly if the attributions only include those social actors who adopt a specific stance (in this case priority given to Eurosceptic Conservative social actors) this type of discourse representation can have a dialogically contractive effect on the reader, one that fits with their anti-immigration, anti-EU and nationalist
ideological stance.

In moving to consider the representation and evaluation of the other main political parties, it can be seen that, generally, a strategy is employed in which they are negatively represented/evaluated. This is especially true in relation to the Liberal Democrats and the Labour Party; however, UKIP are neither positively nor negatively represented/evaluated as they are only included across the eight articles on one occasion. Here, Nigel Farage, the party leader is only included in relation to his argument delegitimising the welfare restrictions in Article 4 (see section 6.3.2). This is despite UKIP’s popularity and their anti-EU and anti-immigration ideological stance. Nevertheless, UKIP and particularly party leader Nigel Farage, feature highly within Mail Online public comments (see Chapter 7, section 7.2.1).

With reference to the Liberal Democrats, it is clear that apart from the inclusion of individualised social actors Nick Clegg (party leader and deputy prime minister), and MP Alistair Carmichael, they are otherwise collectivised as ‘Lib Dems’, ‘Liberal Democrats’ or ‘they’. It would appear that they are represented/evaluated in mostly negative ways, for example the Mail Online articles predicate Alistair Carmichael to be ‘unsure’ in the standfirst of Article 2:

20.MA: Scottish Secretary Alistair Carmichael is unsure about David Cameron’s proposals
But Boris Johnson said ‘it’s time for the UK to take back more control Article 2

In this instance, it is possible to suggest that the attribute ‘unsure’ can link to judgements of Alistair Carmichael’s ‘tenacity’, portraying him as being more hesitant and undecided than, in this case, Boris Johnson who is shown to ‘back’ and therefore support the proposed welfare restrictions:

21.MA: However, London Mayor Boris Johnson backed the Prime Minister’s calls for restrictions... Article 2

There is quite clearly a dichotomy created here between Liberal Democrats and the Conservative Party introduced in example 20.MA, via a dialogically contractive ‘but’ showing the Mail Online’s alignment with Boris Johnson on this occasion. Moreover, Article 2 is set up from the start to show the instability of the coalition,
especially since the headline starts with: ‘Coalition split over plan to curb benefits for new EU migrants...’.

Although Nick Clegg, does go on to state his support for welfare restrictions, seen in example 22.MA, evaluating them as ‘sensible and reasonable’, it is clear that the Mail Online articles do not place much significance on his voice. His comments are therefore only included within the last paragraph, conforming to the inverted pyramid structure that places the least significant information at the end of the news story (see Bell, 1991; Richardson, 2004).

**22.MA: Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg** said: ‘These are sensible and reasonable reforms to ensure that the right to work does not automatically mean the right to claim.’ Article 3

Finally, in examining the representation/evaluation of the Labour Party it is clear that they are also largely collectivised, for example as ‘Labour’, ‘the Labour Government’, ‘they’ and ‘the last government’. This is apart from inclusion, individualisation and functionalisation of ‘Yvette Cooper, the Shadow Home Secretary’ who is activated in relation to her position in favour of welfare restrictions, for example:

**23.MA: Yvette Cooper, the Shadow Home Secretary, yesterday said her party had suggested** nine months ago it was in favour of transitional limits on benefits for Romanians and Bulgarians moving to Britain... Article 2

Although in this particular case, it is clear that a weaker verbal process ‘suggested’ is used, and Yvette Cooper’s voice is not elevated to the level of many of the Eurosceptic and anti-immigration Conservative MP voices discussed previously.

It also becomes clear that the Labour Party are represented/evaluated by the Mail Online as the party to blame for the ‘problems’ surrounding immigration to the UK from the EU. This is evident in example 24.MA below where the idiom to ‘raise eyebrows’ is drawn upon as metonymy for ‘disapproval’ to reinforce and remind the readers that it was the past Labour government who did not enforce transitional restrictions when the EU expanded in 2004. In relation to this, it is clear how the Labour party are activated and predicated to have ‘refused’ similar controls. Here, the verbal process ‘refused’ is again demonstrates infused
intensification, which is reinforced with the material process ‘flung open’, negatively evaluating the actions of the previous Labour government. It is also an example of a ‘house’ metaphor (which conceptually links to the ‘container’ metaphor), where the nation state and its borders are conceived of as ‘gates’ or ‘doors’ that can be opened and closed to welcome or to refuse certain people. Moreover, these discursive strategies help to construct a view of the party in which they are seen as dishonest and hypocritical.

24.MA: The comments will, however, raise eyebrows, because Labour refused to impose similar controls in 2004 when the borders were flung open to migrants from Poland and elsewhere in the EU. Article 2

Blaming Labour is also a strategy employed by David Cameron (2013b) in his Financial Times article, and the Mail Online ensures that this sentiment is repeated in Articles 3, 4 and 5. Quantification, as in ‘monumental mistake’, is employed to form a negative evaluation:

25.MA: 'They had the right to impose a seven-year ban before new citizens could come and work here, but – almost alone in Europe – Labour refused it. That was a monumental mistake,' Mr Cameron writes in an article for the Financial Times today. Article 3

6.2.2 UK Public

Exploring the referential strategies of UK public social actors, it is clear that in every instance they are assimilated (see Table 7). As part of this process of assimilation, they are both collectivised: ‘voters’, ‘people’, ‘the public’, and ‘the British’; and also aggregated especially when the figures are large or show significant statistics in support of welfare and/or immigration restrictions: ‘970,000 young Britons out of work’ (Article 7), and ‘82 per cent did not want citizens of the two countries to gain free access’ (Article 1).
Table 7: UK Public Social Actors – Referential Strategies (Articles)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UK Public Social Actors</th>
<th>Referential Strategies</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>voters, 82 per cent, 85 per cent, 76 per cent, 44 per cent, more than four in five people, they, your, the public, people, polls, British public, the British, constituents, our, us, 970,000 young Britons, British youngsters, British workers.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The way that UK public social actors are represented/evaluated within the *Mail Online* is primarily in relation to emotions of ‘concern’ and ‘fear’ which, in terms of affect, signal overarching and consensual feelings of dissatisfaction and insecurity in relation to immigration from the EU. The intensity of these feelings is also reinforced through via quantification and intensification, where the adjective ‘deep’ (quantification) and adverb ‘deeply’ (intensification) is used repeatedly to predicate the anxiety/concern, seen in examples 26.MA and 27.MA.

**26.MA:** A poll for the Mail identified **deep public anxiety**...

*Article 1*

**27.MA:** Mr Cameron will say Labour’s record of failure meant **many people are ‘deeply concerned’** about what will happen when the transitional restrictions come to an end, adding: ‘I share those concerns.’ *Article 3*

The issue with positioning the public as anxious, concerned or even fearful in relation to immigration is that this is a view both presupposed and further asserted by the newspaper (and also by Cameron, 2013b). Although the *Mail Online*’s poll (conducted earlier in November) does indeed signal dissatisfaction with immigration, dissatisfaction and fear are very different types of emotion. In the following example 28.MA, the *Mail Online* predicate the public to ‘fear’ immigration, introduced via a verbal process and thus perspectivized in the form of indirect speech:

**28.MA:** 85 per cent said they feared schools and hospitals could not cope *Article 1*
However, in sourcing the original questions administered as part of the survey, it becomes apparent that the public were not asked if they ‘feared’ immigration, see example 29.MA:

**29.MA** Is immigration putting too much pressure on public services such as schools, hospitals and housing? *Mail Poll 19-20 November 2013*

Thus, it may be that this public ‘fear’ is partly manufactured. In relation to Flowerdew (2003: 204), it is clear that this is an example of an *addition* which is used to help construct ‘preferred reading’ of the recontextualized discourse.

It is also the case that there is no direct speech included from UK public social actors across the eight articles. However, this does not stop the public from being *included* in relation to their apparent ‘fears’ ‘anxieties’ and ‘concerns’. This is the case in example 30.MA where this presupposition remains unchallenged and in 31.MA where ‘growing anxiety’ is categorically asserted:

**30.MA:** The Prime Minister will insist that he shares the public’s ‘concerns’ about a renewed wave of migration from Europe. *Article 3*

**31.MA:** There has been growing anxiety about the impact of restrictions on Romanians and Bulgarians being lifted in January. *Article 4*

Due to such unchallenged presuppositions and bare assertions, the belief about the public's anxieties and concerns is one that is monoglossic in nature. This also means that any UK public social actors who may have a different opinion (in that they might not be concerned about immigration, or even if they have concerns they do not fear it) are therefore *excluded*. As these feelings are not disputed within the *Mail Online*, they seemingly promote a dominant view of immigration, one that is linked to ‘fear’. However, it is also the case that the public are not represented to be worried about the idea of ‘benefit tourism’ *per se*. Thus even when arguments are founded to legitimise control, based on the *topos of people*, this is in relation to concerns about immigration control *per se* and not ‘benefit tourism’ (see section 6.3 for further details).
The UK public are *passivated* when it comes to Laszlo Andor's criticism of the welfare restrictions, as is evident in example 32.MA:

**32.MA: Claims the British public are not given the 'full truth'**

About migration *Article 4*

According to Laszlo Andor, the UK public are subjected to misinformation about immigration by the UK government (who in this example are *backgrounded* but still inferred). However, the reporting verb ‘claims’ here is dialogically expansive and indicates that the *Mail Online*’s position towards Laszlo Andor’s comments is distanced. This is furthered through the incorporation of scare quotes around ‘full truth’. In relation to the comments made by the EU Commissioner, the *Mail Online* also puts forward the suggestion that he:

**33.MA:...is likely to fuel growing public anger** at the rules imposed by the EU on border controls. *Article 4*

This is another example of where a dialogically expansive proposition is utilised, via the modal adverb ‘likely’, and entertains the idea of a rise in ‘public anger’. It is also clear that an oppositional dichotomy between EU and UK social actors is again reinforced via this existentially presupposed ‘public anger’.

The final thing to be discussed in surrounding UK public social actors is the way in which they are represented as ‘victims’ of immigration. It is clear, that in the process of *assimilation* and in the presentation of a range of monoglossic propositions surrounding the extent to which the UK public are ‘concerned’ about immigration, this has already been discussed. However, there are also other examples, which further this ideological construction of the British public as ‘victims’, especially when the discourse on employment is adopted, and British workers ‘affected’ by immigration are those predicated to be ‘young’:

**34.MA: 76 per cent said young Britons could lose out on jobs’**

*Article 1*

**35.MA: Mr Cameron’s first duty is surely to us – and the 970,000 young Britons out of work.** *Article 6*

**36.MA: British youngsters – there are one million out of work – will face even greater competition to find jobs.** *Article 7*
In each of these cases, it is also clear that aggregation is used as a form of FORCE (quantification) where a large percentage (as in example 34.MA), or an extremely large number ‘one million’ is used. Although immigrants are not explicitly nominated in the examples above, it appears to be the case that the UK public are constructed to be disadvantaged in relation to immigration from within the EU. However, it is interesting to note that although the primary discourse topic of articles chosen for the purposes of this micro-linguistic analysis has been in relation ‘welfare' restrictions and ‘benefit tourism', it would seem that it is not the ‘benefit tourist’ which ultimately poses the most threat – with many of the above constructions indicating that, in fact, it is the immigrant ‘worker' that should or needs to be restricted (from the point of view of the Mail Online). Although this may work towards disproving the ‘benefit tourist’ fallacy, it is also the case that the UK public are positioned in a clear dichotomous relationship with the immigrant ‘Other’ and these constructions at least invoke the topos of disadvantage and the topos of danger/threat especially in example 36.MA where ‘British youngsters’ are activated in relation to the ‘even greater competition' they ‘will face'. This is intensified through the employment of the adverb ‘even’, and adjective ‘greater’, to ensure this victim-victimiser reversal strategy is accepted.

6.2.3 EU Political

Unlike the discussion of UK political social actors above, this section cannot be neatly divided into political parties and discussion of them respectively. Thus for the purposes of analysis, I will be looking at the European Union (EU) as a collectivised social actor and will subsequently comment on individualised member states, politicians and EU institutions where they are included/excluded in relation to discourse on immigration and the restrictions and controls being implemented/debated (see Table 8).
Table 8: EU Political Social Actors – Referential Strategies (Articles)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Political Social Actors</th>
<th>Referential Strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>EU rules, Brussels, EU laws, member states, the EU, Germany, Denmark, Spain, the commission, other countries, the European Commission, Europe, European Union members, EU principle of 'free movement', the single market, we, EU member states, European Union, France, Europe, Angela Merkel, Francois Hollande, Angela Merkel’s new coalition government, Francois Hollande’s socialist government, European Commission president José Manuel Barroso, European Commission</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Examining how the EU is represented/evaluated in a genericised way it is clear that in terms of referential strategies, apart from when ‘the EU’ is nominated using the common acronym, the EU is also nominated via metonymy (37.MA) and synecdoche (38.MA and 39.MA):

37.MA: Cameron prepares for showdown with Europe over benefits... *Article 1*

38.MA: Mr Cameron will say free movement is key to his attempts to carve out a looser relationship with Brussels ahead of an in/out referendum on EU membership by 2017. *Article 3*

39.MA: Mrs May told MPs the measures would lead to conflict with Brussels, which is already taking Britain to court over an existing 'right to reside' test applied to determine migrants’ right to welfare.’ *Article 5*

In example 37.MA, ‘Europe’ is used metonymically to stand for European Union. Despite this being a very common substitution, the choice of ‘Europe’ in many ways implies a sense of ‘difference’ between the UK and the rest of Europe (not only the EU). Although phrases such as ‘hopping over to Europe’ are heard frequently in everyday discourse, this nevertheless pertains to nationalist or communitarian rather than cosmopolitan views of society and one where the UK is not seen as belonging to Europe nor the EU.

In a similar sense, the synecdoche ‘Brussels’ in examples 38.MA and 39.MA is also found repeatedly. It would appear that the use of ‘Brussels’ signals something even more interesting: a centralisation of power to a specific location, which is evidently not in the UK. Moreover, example 39.MA once again signals
‘conflict’ between Britain and Brussels, which is another example of a ‘war’ metaphor being used to conceptualise the relationship between the UK and the EU as one that is at odds or incompatible. This is all in relation to the rights of EU migrants within the UK.

In assessing predicational/attitudinal strategies attributed to the genericised EU, it is clear that a series of processes confirm this centralisation of power and assists in the construction of a negative representation and evaluation of the EU. This is evident in examples 40.MA to 42.MA below:

**40.MA:** EU rules ban discriminating between citizens and migrants’ hand-outs *Article 1*

**41.MA:** The extraordinary remarks by a senior Brussels official directly attacking the British Prime Minister is likely to fuel growing public anger at the rules imposed by the EU on border controls. *Article 4*

**42.MA:** Ministers insist they are powerless to prevent a potential influx of workers from the two countries because of EU rules. *Article 3*

Thus, in examples 40.MA and 41.MA, the EU is *activated* in relation to behavioural processes ‘ban’ and ‘imposed’. It is evident that such choices further demonstrate the power the EU holds over the UK and again demonstrates infused intensification (especially ‘imposed’), which helps to construct a negative image. It will be shown later on how this also links to arguments for the restriction of immigration *per se*, suggesting the UK has to regain ‘control of its borders’. In example 42.MA, it is clear that ‘ministers’ are *passivated* and predicated as ‘powerless’ because of ‘EU rules’. Thus, the EU is represented as being to blame for an apparent loss of ‘power’ or ‘control’ within the UK. This kind of judgement of social esteem, despite portraying the EU as holding power, is evidently constructed for the purposes of negative evaluation – as it is seen as a loss of control.

I will now turn to examine how EU institutions, member states and politicians are represented and evaluated. Starting with the European Commission, it is clear that similar negative constructions are apparent as evident in example 43.MA. Here, it is the fact that UK ministers are predicated as being
‘furious’, which highlights their anger in relation to the actions being carried out by the European Commission (and in this sense are at least implied to be unfavourable).

43.MA: Ministers are already furious that the European Commission has taken legal action to try to prevent welfare curbs on non-British EU citizens Article 1

In this example, the European Commission is also activated through behavioural processes ‘to try’ and ‘to prevent’, indicating their position on the welfare restrictions is at odds with the UK.

Individual member states are also included within the articles. At times, these member states are discussed generically and collectively, for example as ‘other countries’, ‘European Union members’ and ‘member states’. However, it is apparent that when certain individuals or states have differences of opinion in regards to the implementation of welfare restrictions, a Balkanist representation can be seen to emerge. Not only does this construct ‘eastern’ European migrants (such as Romanians and Bulgarians) as the ‘Other’, but also constructs ‘eastern Europe’ as an internal ‘Other’ (Todorova, 1997/2009). As will be discussed further in section 6.3, the topos of authority is employed in the legitimisation of welfare restrictions, especially in regards to the support shown by countries such as France and Germany. Example 44.MA shows how these ‘western’ EU member states are positively predicated as ‘powerful’ to ensure that their voices appear credible:

44.MA: Sources claim he is encouraged by powerful nations such as Germany, Denmark and Spain also vocalising concerns over the influx of eastern European immigrants. Article 1

Furthermore, in example 44.MA, it is evident that ‘eastern European immigrants’ are positioned as inferior to, or at least below, ‘powerful’ EU countries, through the adoption of the prepositional phrase ‘over the influx’.

However, this ‘western’ vs. ‘eastern’ divide also becomes pronounced through the way in which EU Commissioner, Laszlo Andor is represented and evaluated in the Mail Online articles, in response to the way he criticises and delegitimises the welfare restrictions (see Table 9).
Although he is nominated formally with the use of his name ‘Laszlo Andor’, *titulat ed* as ‘Mr Andor’, and *categorised (functionalised)* according to his occupation as ‘the European Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion’, there are other referential strategies that work to position him in a negative way. I would suggest these representations and evaluations not only to promote an anti-EU ideology from Article 4 onwards, but also work to ensure a *Balkanist* representation is perpetuated about eastern European countries within the EU (especially pronounced within Article 7). With reference to the perpetuation of an anti-EU ideology, there are occasions where Laszlo Andor is *functionalised* using the term ‘Eurocrat’, a common portmanteau for EU Commissioners, often used as slang and subsequently known for its derogatory connotation:

**45.MA:** But Downing Street rejected the accusations from the **£212,000-a-year Eurocrat.** Article 4

**46.MA:** ...as Hungarian eurocrat brands UK the ‘nasty country’ of Europe' Article 5

In the above examples, it is also clear that the nomination ‘Eurocrat’ is premodified with personal information including the EU Commissioner’s wage and also his nationality, which I believe to be non-essential pieces of information in this context and seemingly strategic *additions* for the purposes of negative evaluation. Moreover, such premodifiers are not used in the nomination of Angela Merkel or Francois Hollande where they are *included*, as in example 47.MA:
47.MA: Both Angela Merkel and Francois Hollande’s governments are looking at introducing similar restrictions. Article 5

In turning to examine when Laszlo Andor is activated, the strategy of negative-other representation/evaluation is reinforced. Although some of the same verbal processes as David Cameron and other ministers are used, for example ‘insists’, here such processes work with other verb choices to construct further negative evaluations the commissioner:

48.MA: But Commissioner insists influx from Poland caused no damage to Britain Article 4

49.MA: A European Commissioner today launched a devastating attack on David Cameron’s plans to curb benefits for migrants, accusing the Prime Minister of not telling the truth and fuelling ‘hysteria’. Article 4

50.MA: Hungarian Laszlo Andor claimed action to deter foreign benefits claimants risked presenting the UK as a ‘nasty country’...

51.MA: The European Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion boasted that massive immigration from Poland had ‘did not cause damage’ to Britain but actually helped the economy to grow. Article 4

52.MA: But Mr Andor tore into Mr Cameron’s plans, accusing the Prime Minister of not giving the British public the truth about immigration. Article 4

In the examples above, the verbal processes ‘insists’, ‘claimed’, ‘accusing’, ‘boasted’, and ‘tore into’ are all used within close proximity. This builds a negative portrayal of the EU Commissioner, based on undesirable judgements of social esteem. The verb ‘boasted’ is a particularly notable choice, considering the negative connotations it invokes of self-satisfaction, and how it is used to introduce one of Laszlo Andor’s criticisms where he refutes a common belief that immigration may have ‘damaged’ the UK. It is also evident that the reporting verb ‘claimed’ is used again as a distancing strategy. Moreover, in example 49.MA, a sensationalist reporting style is used where Lazlo Andor’s criticism is presented through the use of the adverb ‘devastating’ to intensify and also to show authorial
distance from the criticism presented. These are interesting lexical choices considering that, later on in Article 4, when direct speech from Laszlo Andor is included, the criticism he presents is mitigated with ‘kind of’ as can be seen in example 53.MA:

53.MA: 'Unilateral action... is not really helpful because it risks presenting as a kind of nasty country in the European Union.' Article 4

From the examples presented above, it becomes clear that the Mail Online seek to promote a negative view of the EU alongside a critique of Laszlo Andor’s response delegitimising welfare restrictions. Although representations and evaluations analysed thus far have been biased towards anti-EU, anti-immigration and nationalist ideologies, the adoption of a Balkanist representation evidences how a racist ideology also becomes apparent (albeit in a subtle or covert form). This is further evident in Article 7 (an opinion piece).

In Article 7, an opinion piece entitled ‘How can it be nasty to stand up for Britain?’, the representation and evaluation of Laszlo Andor intensifies and becomes more personal. Thus, through an examination of the first two paragraphs, examples 54.MA and 55.MA, it becomes clear how Laszlo Andor and his criticism is represented/evaluated negatively vis-à-vis the positive self-presentation of Britain:

54.MA: With our proud history of fighting for liberty and championing the oppressed, Britain needs no lectures on tolerance and decency from even the most virtuous of nations. Article 7

55.MA: But when the accuser who brands us a ‘nasty country’ comes from Hungary, notoriously Europe’s most bigoted nation, the hypocrisy gauge shoots off the scale. Article 7

Moreover, in 54.MA, it becomes clear that the topos of history and the topos of comparison (difference) are employed to argue for and represent Britain as a tolerant country and as a strategy to denigrate Laszlo Andor and refute his claims. However, this is achieved through essentialism, for Laszlo Andor is not only seen as being an EU Commissioner, he is now portrayed as being ‘from Hungary’ (and earlier as ‘Hungarian’) a country that is predicated in example 55.MA as
‘notoriously Europe’s most bigoted nation’. Clearly, the judgement displayed here and directed towards the EU Commissioner evolves from being one of social esteem to one of social sanction, pointing out that in terms of ‘propriety’, Hungary is unethical and ‘bigoted’. As a consequence of this, it must be the case that Laszlo Andor is a ‘hypocrite’ and further, his criticism can be refuted on these same grounds, as is displayed in the reconstructed argument below:

**Argument**
Britain is tolerant and not ‘nasty’.

**Conclusion**
So, Laszlo Andor’s claims are not warranted.

**Topos of History**
Since history teaches us that Britain is tolerant, Britain does not need advice on tolerance.

**Topos of Comparison (Difference)**
Since Hungary is a ‘bigoted’ nation, it is therefore not tolerant (unlike Britain).

Although I will be examining the de/legitimisation of restrictions and controls in more detail in section 6.3, it is important to include this argument as it evidences the way in which the denigration of Laszlo Andor occurs. Moreover, it is also apparent that this is fallacious as it personally attacks the Commissioner for being ‘Hungarian’ (*argumentum ad hominem*) and it completely ignores many historical and present day examples where Britain has also not displayed tolerance (*ignoratio elenchi*)\(^{40}\). Moreover, this is further intensified in example 56.MA, where Laszlo Andor is predicated as a ‘socialist’ and the *topos of history* is again combined with the *topos of comparison (similarity)* in an attempt to associate

\(^{40}\) Although this suggestion does not imply that Hungary is more or less tolerant than the UK, and does not wish to suggest that there are not discriminatory or unjust practices occurring within Hungary. Only to point out that even if this is the case, it cannot be singularly attributed to Laszlo Andor to delegitimise or refute his claims – which of course are made on the behalf of the EU and not Hungary.
Hungary, and more specifically Laszlo Andor with Hitler, and by implication the horrors of Nazi Germany:

56.MA: ...it was from the Socialist commissioner’s homeland that Hitler drew some of his most brutal henchmen. Article 6

6.2.4 EU Migrants (Romanians and Bulgarians)

In turning to consider the representation and evaluation of EU migrant social actors, it is clear that although Romanians and Bulgarians are focused upon in relation to restrictions and controls, referential strategies can be sub-divided according to: a) Romanians and Bulgarians, b) EU migrants (genericised but mostly with regards to Eastern Europeans), and c) Polish immigrants (in relation to immigration from 2004 onwards) as can be seen in Table 10. Although the Mail Online avoids overtly negative and/or racist nominations of EU migrants in the eight articles chosen for analysis, this does not mean that there are not constructions of ‘Otherness’ or that a Balkanist (and therefore racist) representation is not apparent.
Table 10: EU Migrant Social Actors - Referential Strategies (Articles)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Migrant Social Actors</th>
<th>Referential Strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Romanian and Bulgarian Migrants</td>
<td>Romanian and Bulgarian migrants, new arrivals, Romanian and Bulgarian communities, Bulgarian and Romanian immigrants, they, new EU members Romania and Bulgaria, people, Romanian and Bulgarian immigration, new EU migrants, newly-arrived migrants, immigrants, Romanians and Bulgarians, newcomers, new migrants, people, renewed wave, Romanian and Bulgarian workers, poverty migration, population of Transylvania, 50,000 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Migrants (genericised)</td>
<td>immigrants, people, children of migrant workers, EU citizens, migrants, non-British EU citizens, immigration, a sizeable influx, some, EU migrants, existing migrants, their own citizens, those, migration, workers, population movements, arrivals, EU jobseekers, beggars and vagrants, EU workers, new EU members, one million people, new EU member states, new citizens, new entrants, no one, them, EU national, they, surges of immigration, inflow, foreign benefit claimants, number (of migrants), current movement, benefit tourism, free movement, 13,000 migrants, anyone, arrivals, numbers, Roma, gipsy villages, inhabitants, demographic upheaval, would-be migrants, benefit tourists, incomers, newcomers, Eastern European states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish Migrants</td>
<td>migrants (from Poland), influx (from Poland), immigration (from Poland)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the table above, it is evident that all EU migrant social actors (inclusive of Romanian, Bulgarian and Polish citizens) are only ever assimilated. As was the case with the UK public, they are either collectivised for example as ‘im/migrants’, ‘new arrivals’ or ‘EU jobseekers’, or they are aggregated as in ‘50,000 people’ and ‘one million people’. Despite EU migrants being discussed in mostly genericised ways, there is a clear focus on Romanians and Bulgarians evident through the inclusion and foregrounding of these commonly collocated nationyms and clear emphasis on ‘new arrivals’ with the backgrounding of other nationalities. Thus, although Polish migrants are discussed to some extent, through the inclusion of prepositional phrases such as ‘from Poland’, ‘Polish’ as a nationym is not apparent, and the focus remains on restrictions and controls being enforced to ‘prepare’ for immigration from Bulgaria and Romania. As EU migrants (generically) and Romanians and Bulgarians (specifically) are always discussed via
a process of assimilation, I would suggest that this grounds the representation and evaluation of them as ‘Others’, alongside the repeated use of the social indexical ‘they’. Although assimilation was also apparent in the representation and evaluation of UK public social actors, I believe this helped in the construction of the UK Public as ‘victims’ of immigration. As will be evidenced further below, this is not what happens in relation to EU migrants.

Although research from Allen and Vicol (2014) showed, that one of the most common numbers was 29 million (the combined population of both Bulgaria and Romania), this number did not feature within the eight articles chosen for the purposes of analysis. Furthermore, references to EU migrants in aggregated forms were not as prevalent as expected, although this does not mean that fewer examples are not interesting or important to consider analytically. Moreover, even without frequent aggregated nominations, it is made clear that immigration from Bulgaria and Romania is expected on a very large scale, demonstrated in the following examples:

57.MA: But yesterday, Mr Carmichael voiced concerns at imposing tougher conditions on EU migrants amid fears about the number of Bulgarians and Romanians expected to come to the UK from January. Article 2

58.MA: ...it has nothing to do with the motives behind Mr Cameron’s almost laughably restrained efforts to restrict mass immigration from Bulgaria and Romania after January 1. Article 7

59.MA: No, this is all about the sheer weight of numbers from abroad... Article 7

In example 57.MA, the nominalised use of ‘fears’ works to delete the agent (e.g. the public or politicians), resulting in the portrayal of ‘fears’ as ubiquitous. Such a construction does not only work to reinforce a negative consensus about immigration per se, but to emphasise that certain fears exist specifically about Romanians and Bulgarians. In turning also to examples 58.MA and 59.MA, it is clear how immigration is up-scaled in relation to quantification, with the use of the adjective ‘mass’ and the noun phrase ‘the sheer weight of numbers’ to place further emphasise on the dominant view expounded, that immigration from the
two countries will occur on a large scale. This view is furthered in 60.MA below, where the use of the present tense (instead of future tense ‘will be’) is combined with the adverb ‘rapidly’ to highlight the immediacy of immigration from the two countries.

60.MA: David Cameron is set to defy European rules by announcing a tough new set of obstacles for immigrants as Britain’s Romanian and Bulgarian communities rapidly grow. Article 1

It would appear that one of the reasons why numerical figures are seldom used is because no official estimation was made in regards to how many Romanians and Bulgarians would move to the UK after January 1st 2014 (see Chapter 2). Although this is reflected within the Mail Online through the lack of aggregated nominations, where estimation is included, there is no acknowledgement as to where this figure is sourced:

61.MA: With an estimated 50,000 people moving to the UK each year, further pressure will be placed on schools, hospitals and roads. Article 6

However, this is precisely the estimation given by the anti-immigration think-tank MigrationWatch, who in this case is entirely suppressed. This was one of the largest estimations at the time, and is also an example of how Article 7 draws upon the topos of numbers in combination with the topos of burdening/weighing down to delegitimise welfare restrictions and instead argue for the implementation of restrictions and controls on immigration per se (as will be discussed in section 6.3.2).

In continuing to focus on the ‘number’ of immigrants expected to arrive after the 1st January 2014, it would appear that this is also connected to the use of ‘water’ metaphors evident in examples 62.MA to 64.MA:

62.MA: Sources claim he is encouraged by powerful nations such as Germany, Denmark and Spain also vocalising concerns over the influx of eastern European immigrants. Article 1

63.MA: He said the last government's refusal to impose controls on new EU members in 2004 led to a surge in immigration. Article 4
**64.MA:** The Prime Minister will insist that he shares the public's 'concerns' about a **renewed wave of migration from Europe.**

*Article 3*

Thus, 'influx', 'surge' and 'wave' link immigration to 'water', and further conceptualises immigration from the EU as a form of 'natural disaster'. Although it is unclear whether the use of these water metaphors are present as a form of indirect speech, as recontextualizations from other interviews/press conferences David Cameron has given, or whether they are included by the *Mail Online* because their dominant status within the discourse about immigration, they are nevertheless used within *Mail Online* articles in an uncontested way. Conceptualising immigration like this also reinforces the view that immigration is dangerous and subsequently something to be 'feared'.

Moving on to consider the more controversial notion of 'benefit tourism', it is clear that where *Mail Online* articles discuss this explicitly, it appears as a term or referent that it is not disputed or challenged, remaining an uncontested issue. For example 65.MA and 66.MA:

**65.MA:** Hours after David Cameron outlined a crackdown on benefit tourism *Article 5*

**66.MA:** David Cameron has hastily put together a package of measures to deter benefit tourists. *Article 6*

However, it is apparent that the referent 'benefit tourists' is only *included* once in Article 6 and the practice of 'benefit tourism' is only referred to in Article 5. Despite this, there are a number of subtler constructions, which encourage a view that EU migrants will move to the UK for the purposes of seeking welfare assistance as their primary motivation. This is evidenced in examples 67.MA and 68.MA:

**67.MA:** People wishing to enter Britain will have to prove they have lived here for a year ... *before they can receive benefits.*

*Article 1*

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41 As argued in Chapter 5.
**68.MA: ... there should be controls to ensure immigrants do not come here from Eastern Europe purely to live a life on benefits.**

*Article 2*

Thus, in example 67.MA, it is presupposed that ‘People wishing to enter Britain’ would want to claim benefits. Moreover, although the referent ‘people’ may, at first, give an impression of a more inclusive agenda, it is also the case that these ‘people’ are activated via the mental process ‘wishing’, subtly constructing the UK as a type of idyllic place. Therefore, in this example, there is at least an implicit construction of the positive ‘Self’ (the UK) vs. the negative ‘Other’ (immigrants). Example 68.MA further evidences how a belief that the primary motivation for migration is to claim benefits. However, in this example, it is ‘Eastern European’ migrants in particular who appear to engage in this practice. Although implicit, the inclusion of ‘Eastern European’ migrants and the subsequent suppression of other EU migrants (whether conceptualised as ‘Western’ or ‘Southern’) espouses a view that conforms to a Balkanist stereotype. Thus, it becomes clear that it is ‘Eastern Europeans’ in particular who are ‘benefit tourists’ and, in the words of Maria Todorova, it is ‘Eastern Europeans’ who are therefore predicated as people who “do not care to conform to the standards of behavior devised as normative by and for the civilized world” (1997/2009: 3). This view is further cemented and intensified through the employment of the adjective ‘purely’, despite welfare restrictions being outlined in relation to all EU citizens (who are not also UK citizens).

Another way in which the practice of ‘benefit tourism’ is foregrounded is through the way in which the welfare restrictions are first outlined in detail. Thus, in Article 3 where the Mail Online initially reports on the measures detailed in David Cameron’s (2013) Financial Times article, it is clear that certain items are not included in the report, such as the £20,000 fine that employers would pay if they were found to be exploiting people by not paying minimum wage. Also apparent is the way in which David Cameron’s words become recontextualized. For example, where David Cameron (2013b) discusses the removal of “people...if they are begging or sleeping rough” the Mail Online report:

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42 Although this information is included in Article 5.
69.MA: Beggars and vagrants from EU countries will be removed and barred from re-entering Britain for 12 months. Article 3

Thus, the ‘people’ being discussed by David Cameron become ‘beggars’ and ‘vagrants’ in the Mail Online and they are also passivated highlighting the power that will now be held in the UK. At the same time, however, the use of the passive voice foregrounds the ‘beggars’ and ‘vagrants’ deleting those social actors who would be responsible for their repatriation.

While a Balkanist representation is not as explicit within these eight articles in comparison to other articles published by the Mail Online in the lead up to the expiration of transitional restrictions on the 1st January 2014 (as discussed by Polyzou and Demetriou, 2018), Balkanist representations enter through the inclusion and alignment with certain authoritative voices. As was demonstrated earlier, the Mail Online appear to positively represent Eurosceptic Conservative social actors, especially mayor of the time Boris Johnson. In doing so, it becomes evident that the paper also aligns with these views. Thus, essentialist and stereotypical predications are perpetuated about Romanians and Bulgarians in the Articles 2 and 5; however, they are via the words of Boris Johnson. Examples 70.MA and 71.MA evidence this:

70.MA: ‘I am in favour of immigration by talented and hard-working people, but the present system is mad: cracking down on Australians, New Zealanders and high-spending Chinese students and tourists, but completely incapable of dealing with a sizeable influx from within the EU, some of whom show no sign of wanting to work.’ Boris Johnson, Article 2

71.MA: ‘At the moment we are claiming to have capped immigration by having a 60 per cent reduction in New Zealanders, when we can do nothing to stop the entire population of Transylvania – charming though most of them may be – from trying to pitch camp at Marble Arch,’ he said. Boris Johnson, Article 5

In example 70.MA, Boris Johnson employs two dialogically contractive denials to create a dichotomy between different ‘types’ of immigrant. On the one hand, there are ‘Australians’ and ‘New Zealanders’ who, apparently, do not require further qualification as to why they are favourable. One may only assume that there is an implicit belief inherent to these nationyms, which triggers an image or
a stereotype of a white, 'Western' and therefore culturally closer person who also speaks English. In fact, it appears that it is solely their nationality that qualifies them as ‘hard-working’. Chinese people are also predicated as favourable; however, this is only the case if they are 'high-spending' and if they are ‘students’ or ‘tourists’, suggesting that once the money is spent, they will return to China. On the other hand, there is a 'sizeable influx' from the EU. Once again, ‘influx’ links to ‘water’ metaphors that conceptualise immigration as a ‘natural disaster’, and this influx is pre-modified with the adjective ‘sizeable’, reinforcing the scale of immigration via quantification. It is also claimed that ‘some’ EU migrants ‘show no sign of wanting to work’, and it can be inferred that these people would therefore be seeking to claim benefits. Although ‘some’ provides a form of mitigation, there is a clear dichotomy presented here between ‘desirable’ and ‘undesirable’ immigrants, with ‘new’ and EU migration seemingly problematic.

The final example, 71.MA, explicitly draws upon a Balkanist representation in the discussion of the uplifting of restrictions from Romania and Bulgaria. Once more, Boris Johnson reasserts his dismay at restrictions for New Zealanders in comparison to the freedoms granted to EU citizens, which will, after 1st January 2014, also include Romanians and Bulgarians. Moreover, there is emphasis on the large number expected to arrive; however, this time Boris Johnson strategically makes reference to ‘the entire population of Transylvania’, not only as a form of intensification but also clearly to associate Romanians (and Bulgarians by extension) with vampires. Although there appears to be some denial or mitigation to the racism inherent to this statement, through the evaluation of ‘most of them’ as ‘charming’, Boris Johnson nevertheless proceeds to activate Romanians (and Bulgarians) as attempting to ‘pitch camp at Marble Arch’. At the time in question, Marble Arch was an area in London where many homeless Roma were sleeping and there were a number of controversial orders put in place to aid in their removal. The association of the ‘entire population of Transylvania’ with a group of homeless Roma in London, is not only purposefully essentialist, seeking to demonise the two nations, but it also lacks professional empathy in relation to the poverty, suffering and discrimination experienced by Roma in the UK (and across Europe).
6.3 Argumentation Strategies

In this section, I will consider some of the main argumentation strategies that are found within *Mail Online* articles in relation specifically to the welfare restrictions. Moreover, this section will be divided into arguments *legitimising* the new welfare restrictions (section 6.3.1) and then those *delegitimising* them (section 6.3.2). However, it will become clear that the argumentation employed by the *Mail Online*, which are mostly in the form of recontextualized quotations from UK or EU political social actors, may not always be about the welfare restrictions explicitly. Thus, the following sections will also show how arguments, which link to the anti-immigration and Eurosceptic ideologies identified above, are also utilised to both *legitimise* and *delegitimise* the welfare restrictions. They also further position EU migrants (generally) and Romanians and Bulgarians (specifically) as the ‘Other’.

6.3.1 Legitimising Welfare Restrictions

It has already been pointed out in Chapter 5 that the main argumentation strategy legitimising the implementation of welfare restrictions is based on the *topos of abuse*. This can be reconstructed as follows:

**Argument**

Immigrants from the EU (may be) moving to the UK to abuse the welfare system (‘benefit tourists’).

**Topos of Abuse**

If the welfare system is being abused, measures should be taken to withdraw of restrict benefits.

**Conclusion**

Welfare restrictions should be enforced.
Within the analysis presented above, it is clear that through the uncontested nature of ‘benefit tourism’, the *Mail Online* also draw upon this argumentation scheme to legitimise welfare restrictions (and even when the restrictions are critiqued and delegitimised, the claim that such abuse exists is not questioned). Therefore, there are specific examples of this *topos* being utilised in *Mail Online* articles, as demonstrated in examples 72.MA and 73.MA below:

72.MA: ‘But when it comes to new migrants from accession countries in the EU, we need to look properly at the benefits system to make sure **people are coming here to work and contribute, not to take advantage of what is rightly a generous welfare system.**’ *Michael Gove, Article 2*

73.MA: ‘The hard-working British public are rightly concerned that **migrants do not come here to exploit our public services and our benefits system,**’ Mr Cameron said. *David Cameron, Article 8*

In examples 72.MA and 73.MA, it is clear how the *topos of abuse* is presented via recontextualized quotations from Conservative social actors whom I argue are positively represented and evaluated within *Mail Online* articles. In this respect, their arguments appear to be endorsed. More specifically, example 72.MA also represents a positive-Self image through an appreciation of the British welfare system as ‘generous’ and the adverb ‘rightly’ is used to intensify such a qualification. In example 73.MA, it is also the case that the possessive determiner ‘our’ pertains to a welfare chauvinist ideology. Again the adverb ‘rightly’ is used, but this time it is used to further legitimise the public’s concerns, and in a Habermasian sense, that these claims/concerns are at least ‘right’ and ethical. However, despite the *topos of abuse* being utilised as the basis for the legitimisation of welfare restrictions, I argue that it is fallacious on the basis that it is an *ad hominem* attack on EU migrants (generally) and Romanians and Bulgarians (specifically through *association*), even though its connection to Bulgarian and Romanian migration is denied by David Cameron (2013b). Furthermore, as there was no empirical evidence to suggest that ‘benefit tourism’ exists, or that the UK had been financially disadvantaged as a result of migrants accepting more benefits than they had contributed to the fiscal system, it can be
argued that this argumentation scheme is representative of the fallacy *petitio principii* (see Chapter 5, section 5.5.4).

The *topos of abuse* is also evident in example 74.MA:

74.MA: The reluctance to impose restrictions by the Lib Dems comes despite even Labour accepting there should be controls to ensure immigrants do not come here from Eastern Europe purely to live a life on benefits. Article 2

However, this example is also indicative of how other *topoi* help to further legitimise welfare restrictions. In this case, it is the *topos of authority* used in combination with the *topos of abuse*. The *topos of authority* is reconstructed below and in 74.MA, it is clear that this authority is the Labour party. Moreover, the addition of the adverb ‘even’ is more than a strategy of intensification, as it presents a conventional implicature, where ‘even’, in this context, infers something that is “contrary to expectation” (Yule, 1996: 45). Thus, the employment of this implicature strengthens the *topos of authority* and, used in combination with the *topos of abuse*, is able to argue that the welfare restrictions are, indeed, reasonable and warranted.

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43 A conventional implicature can be inferred from single words alone without being aware of a specific context. They are implicatures that “are not based on [Grice’s 1975] cooperative principle or the maxims” (Yule, 1996: 45).
The *topos of authority* does not only appear in this form, however, as there are other ways in which this *topos* is presented or can be inferred. For example, it can be inferred from the *inclusion* of any quotation and/or social actor that supports/legitimises the welfare restrictions and, in this sense, it can be argued that examples 72.MA and 73.MA also invoke this *topos*. On most occasions, the authoritative voices endorsed by the *Mail Online* are Conservative social actors (for instance comments made by Boris Johnson in examples 70.MA and 71.MA, section 6.2.4), but there are examples when politicians from other parties are *included* for authorisation. This was the case with the comments presented from Yvette Cooper (seen above in example 23.MA, section 6.2.1) and where Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg is quoted to evaluate the restrictions as ‘sensible and reasonable’ (see section 6.2.1, example 22.MA). Moreover, the *topos of authority* is present in Articles 1 and 5 when the other ‘powerful’ and ‘western’ EU countries are said to support welfare restrictions, as evident in examples 75.MA to 77.MA:

**75.MA:** Sources claim he is **encouraged by powerful nations such as Germany, Denmark and Spain also vocalising concerns** over the influx of eastern European immigrants. *Article 1*

**76.MA:** Both Angela Merkel and François Hollande's governments are looking at **introducing similar restrictions** *Article 5*

**77.MA:** François Hollande's socialist government said the 'social dumping' of people from poor Eastern European states amounted to 'a threat to the economic and social fabric of France'. *Article 5*

I would suggest that there is an attempt from the *Mail Online* to strategically present arguments involving the restriction and control of immigration *per se* in close proximity to (or vis-à-vis) arguments specifically concerned with welfare restrictions to as a way to further legitimise them. For example in 75.MA, the *topos of authority* is evident from the inclusion of a list of EU nations. However, although Article 1 is reports on the introduction of welfare restrictions to the public, the ‘concerns’ evident in 75.MA do not necessarily appear to be about ‘benefit tourists’, but instead ‘the influx of eastern European
immigrants'. Thus, ‘influx’ here infers these concerns are about the ‘number’ of immigrants that might arrive rather than the potential for ‘benefit tourism’.

There are many other examples of how the employment of arguments about the control of immigration *per se* are used to further legitimise welfare restrictions and these will be discussed further below. However, in keeping with the discussion of the *topos of authority* it is clear that another strategy is employed by the *Mail Online*. This seemingly further legitimises the welfare restrictions, but is potentially more misleading. Thus, in example 76.MA, the *topos of authority* is invoked with reference to France and Germany’s governments. Here ‘Angela Merkel’ and ‘Francois Hollande’ are *activated* in relation to the measures they will also be implementing. Not only does this draw on the *topos of authority* but it also draws on the *topos of comparison (topos of similarity)* to provide more authority and backing. Although, further background research confirms that Germany did also debate ‘benefit tourism’ (which was framed as ‘poverty migration’) (Hewitt, 2014), the same is not entirely true for France’s position. Consequently, in example 77.MA, where a statement from the French government has been strategically recontextualized, it may appear that ‘social dumping’ which is presented as ‘a threat to the economic and social fabric of France’, is equivalent to ‘benefit tourism’. Moreover, presenting ‘social dumping’ as a threat also seemingly draws on the *topos of danger/threat* to argue for the implementation of welfare restrictions. However, ‘social dumping’ is not equivalent to ‘benefit tourism’ and is instead a “…practice, which allows a worker from another member state to temporarily work while still being covered by their home country’s social security…” (Barbière, 2018). In this sense, ‘social dumping’ is actually the reverse or opposite of ‘benefit tourism’ and highlights the exploitation faced by migrant workers rather than the migrant exploiting the welfare system. For this reason, I would suggest that the *inclusion* of this recontextualized quotation is an unjustified appeal to an authority and representative of the fallacy *argumentum ad verecundiam*.

Just like example 75.MA, there are other arguments presented within the articles that call for further immigration control *per se* on migration from Romania and Bulgaria. At times, these are used vis-à-vis specific arguments legitimising welfare restrictions, and in doing so I believe they help to reinforce the need for
welfare restrictions. The examples below detail the way other topoi are therefore employed:

78.MA: On Friday, a survey for the Mail showed more than four in five people did not want unrestricted access to the UK for Romanians and Bulgarians, and said they were concerned the NHS and schools would be put under too much pressure. Article 2

79.MA: He has responded with an emergency package of measures within days of a Daily Mail poll, published last Friday, which revealed more than four in five people do not want unrestricted access to the UK for Romanians and Bulgarians. Article 3

80.MA: One Tory minister said: 'Everyone knows we've got to do something. And something big.' Article 2

In examples 78.MA and 79.MA, it becomes clear that a poll carried out by the Mail Online (as seen in example 29.MA) is referred to, in order to legitimise further restrictions and controls. Here, the topos of people is used as a legitimisation strategy. In each case the topos of numbers is also employed, as the specific statistic ‘more than four in five people’ is able to highlight the public demand, and in 78.MA specifically, the topos of burdening/weighing down is also employed to reinforce that the ‘concern’ relates also to burdens on other social services such as the NHS and education (see reconstruction below). Thus, the combination of these topoi seemingly legitimises restrictions and controls on immigration within the Mail Online and it is especially clear how they are used in association with welfare restrictions, particularly in example 79.MA. It is also the case that the topos of people is employed in example 80.MA, where the use of ‘everyone’ is an example of indetermination and is purposefully vague to reinforce the ‘common sense’ nature of restrictions.

Although it may be argued that the above argumentation strategies and concerns are legitimate, they also seemingly work to promote an anti-immigrant view, and immigrants become the scapegoat for other apparent problems. Alternative viewpoints from a wider demographic that might acknowledge that the NHS and education may indeed benefit from migrant doctors and teachers, or that the burden on these social services comes from a lack of funding are clearly
suppressed and not included in these *Mail Online* articles. Moreover, the arguments presented above pertain to communitarian/nationalist perspective, where British nationality overrides and takes precedence over EU citizenship and the freedoms this grants. Thus, although it is not explicitly evident, Euroscepticism is also inherent to these arguments.

**Argument**
There should be restrictions on immigration from Bulgaria and Romania (including welfare).

**Conclusion**
Restrictions should be enforced.

**Topos of People + Topos of Numbers**
Because four out of five people surveyed want restrictions, restrictions should be enforced.

**Topos of Burdening/Weighing Down**
If immigration from Romania and Bulgaria will burden the UK, the UK should act in order to diminish the burden.

In another example, there is a more strategic recontextualization of an argument surrounding the restriction of immigration *per se* intertwined with the legitimisation of welfare restrictions. This is evident in example 81.MA:
81.MA: Cabinet sources say that **gaining the right to ‘shut the door’ on benefits for** newcomers and existing migrants who have not lived here for a minimum period – possibly around six months – would be top of the list. *Article 2*

Here, it would appear that an argument drawing upon the metaphor of the UK as a ‘house’ (and a conceptual link to the ‘container’ metaphor), ‘shut the door’, one of which is used to legitimise immigration *per se*, has been strategically **associated** with the welfare restrictions by placing it next to the prepositional phrase ‘on benefits for newcomers and existing migrants’. By attributing this particular quote to ‘Cabinet sources’, it seems to make the construction purposefully vague, and subsequently does not allow for an investigation into whether the phrase ‘shut the door on benefits for newcomers’ was ever uttered by a particular source. However, it is highly unlikely that ‘shut the door’ would be used in relation to welfare restrictions specifically and for this reason I argue that it is representative of the *straw man fallacy* where a “distorted picture” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 73) is presented of the arguments used for two very different issues (one restricting immigrants *per se* and the other restricting access to welfare).

It becomes clear that between Articles 1 to 5, welfare restrictions are generally legitimised although they are clearly associated with arguments restricting immigration *per se*. However, the tone changes in Articles 6 and 7 where they are delegitimised. In some respects there is a transitional moment apparent in Article 5, when the *Mail Online* includes a range of arguments from Eurosceptic Conservative social actors, starting with example 82.MA:

**82.MA:** Former minister Sir Gerald Howarth said the proposals were ‘incredibly robust’ but **said even at this late stage ministers should ’contemplate extending the transitional arrangements so that we have another two or three years to prepare’**. *Article 5*

Thus, despite welfare restrictions being evaluated as ‘incredibly robust’, there is a dialogically contractive denial, which presents the transitional moment where there is a realisation that the implementation of welfare restrictions will not prevent immigration from Romania and Bulgaria. Again, there is also a sense of vagueness, as it is not entirely clear what is meant by ‘so that we have another two or three years to prepare’; however, it might be suggested that in these two or
three years there would have been an EU referendum and this, in itself, might have prevented EU free movement. From this moment in Article 5, a range of related arguments can also be seen including example 83.MA, where the *topos of people* is again invoked in relation to the *topos of burdening/weighing down*, arguing against immigration from Romania and Bulgaria:

83.MA: Philip Hollobone, another Conservative, said: 'My constituents take the view that this country is full, and that we should not open our borders to Romania and Bulgaria.' *Article 5*

### 6.3.2 Delegitimising Welfare Restrictions

From the analysis above, it has become clear that *Mail Online* articles start to adopt a position that delegitimises the welfare restrictions from Article 5 onwards, although the practice of ‘benefit tourism’ remains unchallenged. This will be explored in more depth below. However, the *Mail Online* does not ignore pro-immigration/pro-EU arguments countering or delegitimising welfare restrictions, with some of these included within Articles 1-4. I will initially explore these perspectives and show how the *Mail Online* disaligns from them.

One of the ways welfare restrictions appear to be delegitimised is to focus on the way in which they discriminate between UK and EU citizens. Although this is presented in Article 1, it is not formulated as argumentation *per se*. However, there are statements that inform the audience that EU laws prevent restrictions such as these from being enforced, as is evident in 84.MA:

84.MA: *EU rules ban discriminating between citizens and migrants’ hand-outs* *Article 1*

Nevertheless, as Euroscepticism is also evident, such articulations do not carry any persuasive weight. This is also the case in counter perspectives which appear to delegitimise welfare restrictions presented by Liberal Democrat MP, Alistair Carmichael and EU Commissioner, Laszlo Andor, who are negatively represented in the *Mail Online*:

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44 The referendum did subsequently occur on 23rd June 2016 where the UK voted to leave the European Union.
85.MA: ‘Potentially it might put us on the wrong side of the rest of the European Union. It’s something that we should be discussing with them, certainly.’ Alistair Carmichael, Article 2

86.MA Hungarian Laszlo Andor claimed action to deter foreign benefits claimants risked presenting the UK as a ‘nasty country’ and could be the start of the ‘slippery slope’ towards the collapse of the single market. Article 4

In example 85.MA, Alistair Carmichael draws upon the topos of disadvantage (see below for reconstruction) arguing that the implementation of welfare restrictions will make Britain disaligned from the values of the EU. However, like the above, such an argument does not carry much weight in a newspaper that promotes a Eurosceptic ideology. Moreover, any argument delegitimising the welfare restrictions presented by Alistair Carmichael is seemingly refuted through the inclusion and positive representation of Boris Johnson, and the dialogically contractive denial ‘But Boris Johnson said ‘it’s time for the UK to take back more control’ (as was evident in example 20.MA, section 6.2.1).

In example 86.MA it is clear that the Mail Online also disaligns with Laszlo Andor’s views. This is not only achieved through the reporting verb ‘claimed’ but also by the way in which aspects of his argument such as ‘nasty country’ and ‘slippery slope’ are recontextualized as scare quotes. It is clear that the topos of disadvantage is also apparent here; however, this topos is clearly only invoked if the protagonists are come from a pro-EU stance. Thus, what is perceived to be a negative by Laszlo Andor, ‘the collapse of the single market’, is advantageous to a Eurosceptic.
Laszlo Andor also draws upon other *topoi* to delegitimise the welfare restrictions; however, the negative and *Balkanist* representation of the EU commissioner (as evident in 6.2.3) means the articles are subsequently distanced and disaligned from these arguments:

**87.MA:** Mr Andor insisted the issue *was not* ‘immigration’ but *the free movement of workers* which applies to every EU member state. *Article 4*

**88.MA:** He added that there are existing EU rules and safeguards against *‘so-called benefit tourism’*. *Article 4*

**89.MA:** The European Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion boasted *that massive immigration from Poland* had *‘did not cause damage’ to Britain* but *actually helped the economy to grow*. *Article 4*

In example 87.MA, it is reported that Laszlo Andor employs the *topos of definition* in his criticism. Although it is not the welfare restrictions *per se* being discussed here, this is the very first voice to suggest that this entire debate (surrounding the uplifting of transitional restrictions) is not about migration but of the freedoms EU members are entitled to (hence EU free movement). His criticism and delegitimisation also continues in 88.MA where the *topos of law/right* is employed.
to acknowledge that welfare restrictions are not necessary as the EU already have laws protecting member states. It is interesting how, in this example, Mr Andor refers to ‘benefit tourism’ with the pre-modifier ‘so-called’ suggesting that he also views this as a contested or inappropriate term. However, in all eight articles examined, this is the only time that ‘benefit tourism’ is questioned via the addition of the adjective ‘so-called’. Finally, Laszlo Andor also employs the *topos of advantage* where it is argued that immigration from EU states (such as Poland in this case) saw economic benefits to the UK. However, as was explained above, the inclusion of verbal processes such as ‘boasted’ clearly position the *Mail Online* as being disaligned from the EU commissioner’s views. Laszlo Andor’s views and arguments are also evaluated as being ‘extraordinary’ and ‘likely to fuel growing public anger at the rules imposed by the EU on border control’ (as is demonstrated in example 41.MA, section 6.2.3).

There is also another example in article 4 where welfare restrictions are delegitimised. This is evident in example 91.MA, where Nigel Farage is directly quoted:

91.MA: UKIP leader Nigel Farage said: ‘UKIP has driven the agenda in terms of **warning of the dangers of opening up our doors to EU nations like Bulgaria and Romania** next year and now we see Cameron and Clegg trying to recover from the UKIP surge.

...’

‘These measures fall way short of **what the British public want though.** Our borders will remain open. Migrants will still be entitled to out of work benefits after just three months. It isn’t nearly good enough.’ *Article 4*

This is the only time Nigel Farage is *included* in the debate surrounding the welfare restrictions in *Mail Online* articles. In this example, it is clear how welfare restrictions are delegitimised via the *topos of danger/threat* and the *topos of people*. Although UKIP was not discussed in depth previously, it is clear that in this example, the party are *activated* in relation to their ‘warnings’ about ‘EU nations like Bulgaria and Romania’. To include the simile ‘like Bulgaria and Romania’ implies that there are specific ‘dangers’ related to these countries specifically, and I would suggest this is a reference to the discourse on crime that was evident
within the global analysis (see Chapter 5, section 5.4.1). I would argue that the use of 'dangers' here is purposefully vague and is a strategic attempt to attribute an essentialist qualification to all Bulgarians and Romanian citizens, whilst at the same time encouraging 'fear' to be felt about immigration from the two EU nations. Moreover, focusing on what 'the British public want' via the *topos of people* also implies that the current government are not engaged in democratic practice. Not only are welfare restrictions delegitimised, but further restriction and control on immigration *per se* is argued for. This is evident in the reconstruction below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Argument</th>
<th>Conclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welfare restrictions will not prevent immigration from Bulgaria and Romania.</td>
<td>Immigration from the EU (specifically Romania and Bulgaria) should be stopped.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Topos of Danger/Threat**
If there are specific dangers from Romania and Bulgaria, one should do something against them.

**Topos of People**
If the people want immigration reduced, immigration should be reduced.

Moving onto examining how *Mail Online* articles explicitly delegitimise welfare restrictions, it becomes clear that this occurs in a more pronounced way in Articles 6 and 7 (with Article 5 acting as a transition point). Moreover, in article 6 there is a distinction/division created between the PLAN (the specific restriction
announced) and the REALITY. In a way, this formulates a macro-argumentation strategy that runs through the entire piece, invoking the *topos of reality*:

**92.MA: PLAN:** Migrants who currently get jobseeker’s allowance after less than a month will have to wait three months before claiming.

**REALITY:** Mr Cameron claims emergency legislation is needed but, under the habitual resident test, **newcomers can already be forced to wait up to three months.** Cases are decided by officials at job centres. The EU objects to the rules and is already mounting a legal challenge. *Article 6*

In Article 6, it becomes clear that many of the ‘new’ welfare restrictions being discussed are already in place either within the UK (as part of the ‘Habitual Residence Test’) or through EU laws that stipulate what is meant by EU free movement, the right to reside, and the rights to welfare\(^ {45} \). This is something that was also highlighted by Laszlo Andor when he discussed ‘existing rules and safeguards’ (in example 88.MA above). The headline of Article 6 also asks: ‘Will Cameron’s crackdown stop anyone coming here?’ and I believe this is an indication that although welfare restrictions may have originally been legitimised and seen as an effort to reduce migration in the *Mail Online*, there is now a realisation that welfare restrictions will not prevent or reduce immigration from the EU, or Romania and Bulgaria specifically. This is not because the notion or practice of ‘benefit tourism’ is challenged, but because of the *Mail Online’s* anti-immigrant and anti-EU ideological position. Thus, the *Mail Online’s* challenge is not to ‘benefit tourism’, but to immigration *per se* from the EU. Once it is acknowledged that immigration will not be reduced, the discourse subsequently begins to intensifies and I would suggest becomes explicitly discriminatory, as evident in example 93.MA:

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\(^ {45} \) The Habitual Residence Test (HRT) has been present in the UK since 1994 to determine whether EEA nationals are eligible for benefits: “The purpose of the test is to show whether you have the right to live in the UK (known as the right to reside)” (Citizens Advice, 2018). In 2013, prior to the announcement of welfare restrictions, the EU commission took the UK government to court on the basis that certain welfare provisions that all EU nationals were entitled to were not awarded to those who had failed the test. In 2015, it was ruled that the HRT was not ‘discriminatory’ (Bowcott, 2015).
93.MA: PLAN: Beggars and vagrants from EU countries will be removed and barred from re-entering Britain for 12 months.

REALITY: Migrants who make no attempt to find work are considered not to be exercising their EU Treaty rights and can be kicked out. However, this depends on already-stretched immigration officials finding out who they are – and having the resources to boot them out. There are doubts over the ability of border guards, who have allowed terrorists to slip into the country, to stop anyone who has been removed simply getting on the next coach or plane back to Britain.

*Article 6*

This can be seen via the phrasal verb (material process) 'kicked out' which seems to trivialise or make acceptable the process of repatriation and there is clearly also an unjustified association of immigration to terrorism. The establishment of such a connection attends to an anti-immigration view and draws upon the *topos of danger/threat* to construct an overarching argument that the public should fear immigrants, not only because of large numbers and a strain on public services, but also because they may be dangerous.

*Article 6* concludes with example 94.MA, delegitimising welfare restrictions by focusing specifically on the restriction of immigration from Romania and Bulgaria. Moreover, immigration from the two countries is not positioned in relation to 'benefit tourism' at all; instead the 'real' issue becomes migrant 'workers'. This example therefore evidences how the *victim-victimiser reversal* is employed to direct attention away from 'benefit tourism' and towards the disadvantages of immigration for the UK public. This is further achieved through the repetition of the *topos of burdening/weighing down* and the *topos of disadvantage (to us)* and the *topos of numbers* all in one final concluding statement.

94.MA: There is nothing in the package to address the real issue: the lifting of restrictions on Romanians and Bulgarians coming to the UK to work from January 1.

With an estimated 50,000 people moving to the UK each year, further pressure will be placed on schools, hospitals and roads. British youngsters – there are one million out of work – will face even greater competition to find jobs. *Article 6*
Although general concerns about youth employment can be perceived as legitimate, in this example they are founded upon a dichotomous relationship between the ‘British youngster’ and the ‘50,000 people’ migrating to the UK in combination with the economic fallacy (‘labour lump fallacy’) that presupposes there is a limit to the number of jobs available. This kind of construction reinforces a fear of immigrants, positioning immigrants as the ‘Other’.

As discussed previously, Article 7 is an opinion piece, and here the welfare restrictions come under some quite severe scrutiny (although the practice of ‘benefit tourism’ still remains unchallenged). In example 95.MA, the welfare restrictions (via David Cameron’s efforts) are evaluated as ‘laughably restrained’. However, it is also interesting how the author of Article 7 views the welfare restrictions as associated primarily in relation to the control of immigration per se. Thus, there is a real sense that if the welfare restrictions were proposed to stop immigration, they will not be successful (although ‘benefit tourism’ is still not denied).

95.MA: And it has nothing to do with the motives behind Mr Cameron’s almost laughably restrained efforts to restrict mass immigration from Bulgaria and Romania after January 1. Article 7

Delegitimisation continues in Article 7 when the author presents arguments drawing upon the topos of numbers with the topos of burdening/weighing down to refocus the audience, not on the ‘problem’ of ‘benefit tourism’ but on ‘mass immigration’. The addition of adjectives such as ‘sheer’ and ‘appalling’, and the superlative ‘most dramatic’, also evidence strategies of intensification and a communitarian view is once again presented through the use of the possessive determiner ‘our’, as evident in example 96.MPC:

96.MA: No, this is all about the sheer weight of numbers from abroad, which has already imposed appalling strains on our schools, hospitals, housing and other services since Labour embarked on the most dramatic demographic upheaval in our history. Article 7
6.4 Mail Online Articles: Chapter Summary

The discussion presented here has shown that, generally, the Mail Online articles analysed supported welfare restrictions proposed by the government, on the grounds that they were a starting point in the restriction and control of immigration per se. This was evidenced through the way in which David Cameron and Eurosceptic MP's (in particular) were represented and evaluated in section 6.2.1 in comparison to political social actors from the other main parties who were represented and evaluated in more negative terms. This was apart from Nigel Farage and UKIP, who were neither positively nor negatively represented, despite their increased popularity with the public and the anti-immigration and anti-EU ideological stance (that seemingly fits with the Mail Online’s position). Moreover, even where doubt was raised concerning the effectiveness of welfare restrictions in preventing immigration from the EU, welfare restrictions are nevertheless welcomed in Article 8. Thus, it was clear that the notion of ‘benefit tourism’ remained an accepted and unchallenged construct.

It has also been apparent that the Mail Online primarily positioned UK public social actors as people who ‘fear’ immigration, thus sustaining the Mail Online’s bias towards an anti-immigrant stance. Moreover, there was no evidence of a counter or resistant discourse where the public might be represented as not ‘concerned’ about immigration. However, it was also found that this was not a concern about ‘benefit tourism’ but rather immigration per se. Moreover, UK public social actors were represented as ‘victims’ of immigration.

Via the examination of EU political social actors, there was a strong sense that the UK was seen as different to and removed from the EU, with centralisation of power represented within the EU (via the synecdoche ‘Brussels’) to the detriment of the UK. It was also within the representation and evaluation of EU political social actors that a Balkanist stereotypes were apparent and a dichotomy between ‘eastern’ and ‘western’ EU member states was constructed and reinforced demonstrating ‘eastern’ European inferiority.

This ‘eastern’ and ‘western’ dichotomy that was evident via Balkanist representations also informed the way in which EU migrants (Romanians and Bulgarians) were represented and evaluated in Mail Online articles. However, it was also the case the Bulgarians and Romanians were foregrounded, especially in
relation to the potential for 'benefit tourism', anti-social behaviour and crime. It was also apparent that immigration from Romania and Bulgaria was anticipated on a very large scale, reinforced specifically through the incorporation of 'water' metaphors, and by extension the conceptualisation of immigration as a 'natural disaster'. A Balkanist stereotype was also constructed via recontextualized quotations (e.g. from Boris Johnson) meaning racism was apparent, albeit in more subtle and covert ways (thus reflecting 'new' racism discussed in Chapter 4, section 4.3.3).
Chapter 7 - Mail Online: Public Comments

7.1 Introduction

In Chapter 6, the representation and evaluation of EU migrants vis-à-vis other social actors was considered alongside the de/legitimisation of welfare restrictions in Mail Online articles. This will be repeated here; however, this time it will concern the 699 corresponding public comments (as identified in Chapter 5, section 5.4.2). Although it is not a contention of this thesis that the corresponding public comments will in some way evidence the influence or power of the media may have on the public regarding their formation of views on immigration, it will nevertheless highlight that similar discursive structures and ideologies are reproduced, including racism. Moreover, it will become clear that where racism is apparent in the public comments, it appears in more explicit and overt forms.

To maintain consistency, this chapter will follow the same structure as Chapter 6. Thus, the first part of the chapter, section 7.2, will consider the representation and evaluation of EU migrants vis-à-vis other social actors, as related to RQ1. The analysis of social actors will also be presented in the same order and for the same reasons discussed in Chapter 6. UK political actors will therefore be examined in section 7.2.1, and UK public actors in section 7.2.2. However, there are some nuances with regards to whether these UK actors are considered as part of the ‘Self’. Thus, when the UK public are discussed by the respondents, there is clearly a sense that the ‘Self’ is being discussed in relation to EU immigration; however, when UK political actors are being discussed, it is primarily in relation to how they appear as disconnected or unconcerned about the UK public's wants or needs. The representation and evaluation of EU political actors, in section 7.2.3, and EU migrant (Romanian and Bulgarian) actors, in section 7.2.4, will be then be considered, with these EU social actors clearly representing an ‘Other’ or ‘Others’. Once more, attention will focus on the reproduction or resistance of EU migrants (Romanians and Bulgarians) as ‘benefit tourists’ and evidence how certain representations and evaluations may be considered racist (in relation to RQ2).

The second part of the chapter, evident from section 7.3 onwards, will then
go onto answer RQ3, which was constructed for the purposes of this case study. It is here, where argumentation strategies both legitimising and delegitimising the welfare restrictions will be considered in relation to the representation and evaluation of EU migrants (Romanians and Bulgarians) as the ‘Other’. Moreover, it will become clear how arguments legitimising welfare restrictions are in a minority and where most of the argumentation strategies employed focus on the delegitimisation of welfare restrictions, primarily on the grounds that they do ‘restrict’ or ‘control’ immigration to the extent that is deemed necessary by the respondents. Moreover, within section 7.3, it will also become apparent that the online public comment sections provide a space for alternative solutions, proposals or demands, many of which continue to display overtly racist themes. Finally, this chapter will conclude with a summary in section 7.4.

7.2 Representation and Evaluation of Social Actors

7.2.1 UK Political

In this section, the representation and evaluation of UK political social actors will be revisited in relation to Mail Online public comments. Beginning once more with prime minister, David Cameron, and the Conservative Party, the analysis will then move on to discuss the Liberal Democrats, the Labour Party and the UK Independence Party (UKIP).

The public comments corresponding to the eight articles chosen for analysis show extremely high levels of dissatisfaction directed towards David Cameron and his proposals for welfare restrictions. However, this is not due to public resistance or a challenge to the construction of the ‘benefit tourist’. Rather, it is the reverse: evidencing not only complete distrust in the prime minister, but also extremely high levels of anti-immigrant sentiment, Euroscepticism and racism in calling for further levels of restriction and control to be implemented.

In terms of referential strategies, although the prime minister is often categorised and functionalised according to his occupation e.g. ‘Prime Minister’, ‘PM’, or titulated as ‘Mr Cameron’ (similar to the referential strategies seen within the article analysis) there are a number of other referents employed to both represent and evaluate him in a negative way. It becomes clear, in fact, that many of the referential strategies that are used are themselves infused with overtly
negative evaluation, relating to judgements of both social esteem and social sanction (see Table 11):

Table 11: David Cameron - Referential Strategies (Public Comments)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UK Political Social Actors</th>
<th>Referential Strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>David Cameron</td>
<td>Cameron, Camy, EU-lover, EU Dave, Coneron, he, him, PM, ‘Call me Dave’, a pupit [sic], Mr Cameron, Dave, your, David Cameron, conman cameron, this fool, you, the one, the guy, a yellow bellied rat, a euro fanatic, CaMORON, Captain Camoron, the puppet, the puppet, this man, leader, waste of space, Mr camoron, a very smart Tory Eaton educated bloke, Prime Minister, the Camaprat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nominating the prime minister via his surname ‘Cameron’ is one of the most common referents; however, on many occasions a satiric misspelling shows how this referential strategy can be infused with negative evaluation. Example 1.MPC evidences how the misspelling incorporates the prefix ‘con-’ to represent and negatively evaluate the prime minister as a liar (a judgement of ‘veracity), and example 2.MPC uses capitalisation to emphasise the misspelling where the derogatory referent ‘moron’ is added as a suffix (a judgement of ‘capability’):

1.MPC: If our only defense against this wave of benefit grabbing euro parasites is Coneron we may as well just leave piles of cash at every airport… Comment 19, Article 1

2.MPC: CaMORON is doing nothing to address the genuine concerns of hardworking UK taxpayers in relation to the millions of migrants swamping the already grossly overcrowded UK. THE MEASURES ANNOUNCED BY CaMORON this week are hogwash - the usual spin and waffle by a toffeenosed tory who is wholly out-of-touch with reality. Vote UKIP to end this nonsense. Comment 37, Article 6

Example 2.MPC also evidences further negative predicational/attitudinal strategies that centre upon judgements of the prime minister. For example, the adjective ‘toffeenosed’ which is an informal expression meaning to be ‘superior’ or ‘snobby’, indicates that the respondent feels the prime minister is not taking the UK public seriously about their concerns on immigration. These concerns are elaborated here by representing and evaluating immigrants negatively (as will be
further explored in section 7.2.4) drawing upon the *topos of numbers* ‘millions of migrants’ in association with the *topos of burdening/weighing down* ‘swamping the already grossly overcrowded UK’, to reinforce or prove Cameron's apparent inaction.

The negative representation and evaluation of David Cameron via judgements of social sanction and social esteem is extremely prominent within the public comments. For example, 3.MPC and 4.MPC show judgements with regards to ‘tenacity’, with 3.MPC drawing upon the adjective ‘wimpy’ and example 4.MPC drawing upon idiomatic language ‘backbone’ and ‘guts’ to emphasise his weakness.

3.MPC: **Not enough wimpy Camy** we don't want them in more do we want to keep the ones you have let in…*Comment 7, Article 1*

4.MPC: **NO BENEFITS FOR ANY OF THEM, CAMERON NEEDS TO FIND A BACKBONE AND SOME GUTS**…*Comment 76, Article 8*

Moreover, another dominant theme is the way in which the prime minister is predicated to be a 'liar', a negative judgement of ‘veracity’, as seen above in example 1.MPC, but also evidenced in example 5.MPC:

5.MPC: **cameron prepares to tell more lies in a bid to fool** the public into thinking he’s doing domething well cameron,we won't get fooled again. *Comment 14, Article 1*

This negative representation and evaluation continues to be reinforced through the way in which derogatory referents are appropriated. Thus, in 6.MPC the prime minister is nominated as ‘this waste of space’, and in 7.MPC the metaphorical referent ‘the puppet’ highlights the perceived power struggle and/or imbalance in the relationship between the UK and the EU (for it can be presumed that the ‘secret master’ stands metonymically for the EU). As will be explored further in section 7.2.3, the EU is viewed as holding power and this is something that is not welcomed by the public in the *Mail Online* comments.

6.MPC: **...no wonder the people of this country are worried, this waste of space has yet to come out with a policy that works**... *Comment 57, Article 6*
7.MPC: Its not his incompetence, he is competent, he is following the goals his secret masters desire. He is merely a puppet... Comment 2, Article 6

It is also clear that a change in genre (from article to public comments) indicates a different register in relation to formality levels, with the comments evidencing colloquial expressions and heightened emotion. Thus in 8.MPC, David Cameron is nominated via the nickname ‘Dave’ and in example 9.MPC, ‘Call me Dave’ is an intertextual reference back to an interview in 2006 where David Cameron was quoted to have said “Lots of people call me Dave...” 46.

8.MPC: Dave you obviously do not listen to the voters up and down the country... Comment 49, Article 1

9.MPC: "Call me Dave", has never carried out any of his promises!! Comment 39, Article 1

In both 8.MPC and 9.MPC, negative judgements continue to be directed towards the prime minister primarily connected to ‘veracity’ and ‘propriety’ with the adverb ‘obviously’ also heightening the level of intensity. Despite the nickname ‘Dave’ being used, this informality is not about affinity (as was seen with Boris Johnson in Chapter 6, section 6.2.1). Instead, these referential terms indicate dissatisfaction, disrespect and distrust towards a prime minister who should, in the view presented in the majority of comments, be ‘doing more’ to halt immigration and remove the UK from the EU. Thus, there are many occasions where David Cameron is activated in the discourse according to his inaction, with judgements negatively evaluating his ‘capability’ as the prime minister:

10.MPC: Blah blah blah. He'll say anything but will do absolutely NOTHING. Well, apart from sell us all down the river. Comment 52, Article 3

11.MPC: This is such a serious problem and Dave just wants to talk talk talk and not do do do... Comment 82, Article 6

In the examples above, strategies of intensification, including capitalisation (10.MPC) and repetition, signal public dissatisfaction with the proposed

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46 ‘Call me Dave’ was also featured as the title of the controversial biography ‘Call me Dave: The Unauthorised Biography of David Cameron’ by Michael Ashcroft published later in 2015.
restrictions with blame being attributed back to Cameron. In example 11.MPC, it is also clear that either immigration or ‘benefit tourism’ is considered ‘such a serious problem’ to which there is apparent inaction (despite welfare restrictions being implemented that day).

Despite this, there are a few comments that support the prime minister and positively represent his capabilities. Moreover, as was evident within the *Mail Online* articles, it is clear that *Mail Online* public comments follow the same ideological structure. Thus, regardless of whether there is support or criticism of the prime minister, these are always based on anti-immigrant, anti-EU and (at times) racist premises. This is evident in example 12.MPC where praise is directed towards the prime minister, ‘well done’, and where ‘other leaders’ also become activated by ‘following’ Cameron’s lead, thus elevating the prime minister to a more powerful position:

12.MPC: Well done David Cameron for starting the ball rolling, it needed someone to speak out about this and it looks like you were the one, now other leaders are following your lead and not before time so who cares what the others say I know I don’t that’s for sure? *Comment 86, Article 4*

Related to this ideological structure is also the way in which David Cameron is associated with other former prime ministers in an apparent collective failure as all have appeared to evidence a pro-EU stance, as evidenced in 13.MPC:

13.MPC: David Cameron/Tony Blair/Gordon Brown, hold your heads down in shame. It’s no wonder people are voting UKIP due to your constant failings of looking after the rest of Europe and not YOUR own people *Comment 87, Article 8*

Thus, through the analysis of the representation and evaluation of David Cameron, a dominant anti-immigration and Eurosceptic view is evidenced. In fact, there is only one comment where David Cameron is included and activated which acts as a form of resistance to this prevailing ideology. This can be seen in example 14.MPC where the respondent points out that Cameron’s evaluation of the
immigration policy implemented by the previous Labour government as a ‘monumental mistake’ refers to real people:

14.MPC: So Cameron is telling 1m people they are a monumental mistake - I hope they will reply at the ballot box.
Comment 6, Article 5

Moving on to consider the representation and evaluation of the Conservative party, it is clear that social actors in the public comments are mostly collectivised. Conservative social actors are therefore nominated via their affiliation with the party rather than individualised to the same extent as Mail Online articles. This is especially true in relation to those Eurosceptic MP’s discussed in Chapter 6 (section 6.2.1), who are subsequently backgrounded in the public comments. Referents therefore include examples such as ‘the Tories’, ‘the Conservatives’, ‘the ruling party’, ‘Tory Boys’ and deictic expressions such as ‘they’.

Table 12: Conservative Party - Referential Strategies (Public Comments)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UK Political Social Actors</th>
<th>Referential Strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>the Tories, Conservative, you, Thatcher, Boris, they, the Conservatives, Boris Johnson, Party, they, Major, Tory, people, the nasty party, Tory boys, the ruling political party, Margaret Thatcher, IDS (Iain Duncan Smith)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conservative social actors are also criticised and negatively represented and evaluated, in a similar way to the discussion of David Cameron above. The restrictions and controls being suggested by certain Conservative social actors (as documented in Chapter 6, sections 6.2.1 and 6.3.2) are perceived as not going ‘far enough’ and this conforms to the prevailing anti-immigration and Eurosceptic ideology discussed above. Negative representations and evaluations of the party as a collective are evident in examples 15.MPC and 16.MPC, where ‘blame’ is attributed to the Conservative party either solely or in association with the other main parties:

47 Although this comment incorrectly implies that EU citizens would have the right to vote in elections.
15.MPC: the only people to blame are the tory's themselves, you broke your promises where was our referendum Comment 94, Article 3

16.MPC: Simple answer NO they have all signed up for this madness the Tories, Liebour and the Lib Dims there is no hope while we vote for any of this lot. Comment 18, Article 6

In example 16.MPC, the ‘Simple answer NO’ is a response to the headline of Article 6: PM’s plan vs reality: Will Cameron’s crackdown stop anyone from coming here? In this sense, the ‘madness’ that is discussed stands metonymically for ‘immigration’ and this ‘madness’ is blamed on all three of the main political parties. Thus, both 15.MPC and 16.MPC evidence dissatisfaction with the Conservative party. Clearly, the public are attributing ‘blame’ not only to the Labour party, as evident within David Cameron’s (2013b) Financial Times article and in the Mail Online article analysis (Chapter 6), but also to the Conservatives.

Although it is limited, some support for the party is evident as can be seen in example 17.MPC, where the ‘Tories’ are activated in relation to their ‘hard work’. However, there is a defensive tone behind this qualification and it is clear that any criticism directed towards the party is not condoned (with reference here to ‘nasty party’). This comment also indirectly legitimises the welfare restrictions, through the endorsement and support of the party:

17.MPC: it's just a pity it's always left to the Tories to do the 'hard work' ,then they get called the nasty party,and more than likely kicked out next election for doing what should have been done years ago. Did the Labour party do all this ,of course not. They want to be seen as the party giving out all the free goodies. Comment 21, Article 8

Although Mail Online articles give more space to the voices of Eurosceptic Conservative MP’s, this does not mean that some Conservative social actors are not included and individualised in the public comments. Thus, my attention will now focus on four other Conservative social actors: Boris Johnson, John Major, Iain Duncan Smith and Margaret Thatcher. Firstly, in relation to Boris Johnson, it is clear that his appearance in the comments relates to when he is directly quoted in articles 2 and 4. Comment 18.MPC shows an explicit example of a respondent
endorsing Boris Johnson’s comments, similarly evaluating EU immigration as ‘mad’ by recontextualizing and repeating Johnson’s words while, at the same time, negatively evaluating the Liberal Democrat party:

18.MPC: Yes Boris, you're right, it is mad but then so are the LIBDems. Comment 9, Article 2

However, in example 19.MPC it is also the case that Boris Johnson’s opinion and authoritative presence within Mail Online articles is questioned. Although this does not explicitly challenge his words, it does appear to show a type of ‘distancing’ from his claims, making the space dialogically expansive:

19.MPC: Correct me if I am wrong, but why in this matter is Boris Johnson’s opinion in this matter more valid than yours or mine? After all he is not a member of the coalition or even an MP. Comment 77, Article 2

Work and Pensions Secretary of the time, Iain Duncan Smith is only nominated once in the public comments using the acronym IDS, as is evident in example 20.MPC:

20.MPC: If IDS wants to reduce peoples reliability on the welfare benefits then he should arrange repatriation for all migrants who do not work Comment 19, Article 8

However, in 20.MPC it is clear this respondent is also dissatisfied with the implementation of welfare restrictions. Thus, an alternative suggestion is provided (to be further explored in section 7.3) via the deontic modal verb ‘should’, linking to judgements of social sanction in regards to what is perceived of as ‘right’. Clearly, in this case, it is repatriation that is signalled as the preferred choice and something considered ‘right’.

Margaret Thatcher, who was the Conservative leader between 1975 and 1990 and the prime minister from 1979 onwards, is also included in examples 21.MPC and 22.MPC:

21.MPC: Thatcher predicted all this. Comment 85, Article 1

22.MPC: The last person to truly stand up and speak out for this country was none other than Margaret Thatcher, there is
no one willing to do what she did for us even if she did become unpopular with many, now our leaders are unpopular without even doing anything for this country because they are all more than useless. Comment 6, Article 7

In both of these examples, it is clear that the processes used to activate the former prime minister relate to her being remembered as a resolute leader who stood for what she believed in, unlike the current government. Thus verbal processes ‘predicted’ and ‘speak out’ are used to demonstrate this alongside the behavioural process ‘stand up’. Furthermore, her actions are intensified via the adverb ‘truly’ in example 22.MP and they are legitimised, despite her unpopularity.

Finally, one respondent makes reference to John Major in an interesting attempt to retrace ‘blame’ back to a previous Conservative government and away from the Labour party, as is evident in example 23.MPC:

23.MPC: What? It was Major's government who signed up to free movement of labour protocols in 2004. Not Labour!
Comment 9, Article 3

However, whomever ‘blame’ is attributed to, what remains clear is that there is a very strong conviction apparent that immigration, and by extension the EU is ‘problematic’ and needs to be addressed by the government. Thus, Conservative social actors are also negatively represented and evaluated because of public dissatisfaction and this is also directed towards coalition partners, the Liberal Democrats.

As with Mail Online articles, the Liberal Democrats are mostly collectivised although Nick Clegg, Alistair Carmichael and Vince Cable are individualised. Whereas a subtly negative representation and evaluation of the party was seen within the article analysis in Chapter 6 (section 6.2.1), this negative portrayal is more explicit within the public comments, with dissatisfaction and anger directed towards the party. Subsequently, there are no comments within the data that show support or a positive representation/evaluation of the Liberal Democrats. Thus, although collectively the party is nominated using (neutral) referents such as “LIBDems”, “the Liberal Party” and “LD”, satirical misspellings such as “LibDims” and “LibDumb” are also apparent (see Table 13).
24.MPC: ...and your solution is? Tory? LibDumb? Which do you prefer, frying pan or fire? Get off the LibLabCON merry-go-round! Comment 88, Article 3

Example 24.MPC also poses a rhetorical question which invokes the *topos of danger/threat*. This is achieved via the comparison of both the Conservative and the Liberal Democrats via the metaphor ‘frying pan or fire’. Thus, both political parties, who subsequently form the Coalition government, are perceived to be a threat to the UK, and there is a clear sense within the public comments that an alternative party is sought for leadership, namely UKIP (as will be discussed further below).

Table 13: Liberal Democrat Party - Referential Strategies (Public Comments)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UK Political Social Actors</th>
<th>Referential Strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democrats</td>
<td>LD, LIBDems, Cleggys boys, Carmichael, Clegg, Cable, the Liberal party, Alistair Carmichael, he, him, Lib-Dems, they, Mr Carmichael, you, dummy, idiots, LibDims, these Scottish ministers, LibDem prevaricator, the Scottish Secretary, politician, this clown, LibDumb,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When Liberal Democrat social actors are *individualised*, it is to further denigrate their position as pro-EU. Subsequently, a range of referential and predicational strategies are employed, with reference made to ‘clowns’ on more than one occasion. The dissatisfaction is evident primarily in the public comments responding to Article 2, as seen in example 25.MPC:

25.MPC: Why am I not surprised by the buffoon Carmichael utterances on this subject, politicians are not afraid of the voters they are afraid of the EU. We must remove clowns like Carmichael, Clegg & Cable immediately the country is ruined let’s try and stave off this latest catastrophe. Comment 15, Article 2

Here, Alistair Carmichael is predicated as a ‘buffoon’ and this further links to the referent ‘clowns’ used as a simile to represent and evaluate all three *individualised* Liberal Democrat politicians. Dissatisfaction is further intensified through the deontic modal ‘must’ being used to reinforce what the public are supposedly obliged to do at the next general election (namely ‘remove’ these ‘clowns’ from the
government). Like representations and evaluations of David Cameron and the Conservatives above, they are equally predicated to be in a powerless position in relation to the EU, and here this is shown through the way they are activated via the behavioural process ‘afraid’. Moreover, the ‘country’ (the UK) is viewed as being ‘ruined’ by these particular social actors, and this comment is tied to larger representations of the UK as being metaphorically ‘damaged’ or ‘killed’ by both its government and by mass immigration.

Considering the representation and evaluation of the Labour party, a very similar pattern emerges (see Table 14). Once again, the party is included mostly as a collectivised social actor although there is inclusion of a select of few who are individualised. Nominations for the Labour party as a collective include, ‘Labour’, ‘the Labour party’ and ‘Labour politicians’; however, there are also instances of a negative representation/evaluation through infused referents such as ‘buffoons’, and satiric misspellings such as ‘Liebour’ (as was seen above in example 16.MPC).

Table 14: Labour Party - Referential Strategies (Public Comments)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UK Political Social Actors</th>
<th>Referential Strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Labour, Blair, Milliband, buffoons, the Labour party, previous governments, supporters, Mr Blair, the Blair administration, Liebour, Labour politicians, Labour heroes, Yvette Cooper, Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, Brown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Labour party as a collective referent is primarily activated in relation to historical decisions: namely not implementing transitional restrictions for A8 EU accession countries in 2004. As has been documented so far, the large amount of immigration that resulted from this is overwhelmingly portrayed as something negative, both in Mail Online articles and their corresponding public comments. Subsequently, the Labour party is seen as being the ones to ‘blame’ for the apparent ‘problems’ of immigration. This is evident in example 26.MPC, where this is conceived of as a ‘labour led betrayal’ and 27.MPC where support is shown to David Cameron and the government by pointing out that this ‘mess’ (which metonymically stands for immigration from the EU) happened over the course of ‘thirteen years’:
26.MPC: What can we say that already has not been said? The majority of Brits want severe immigration controls put into place now. We are a sinking island who fought 2 world wars to protect our borders, it is a disgrace to the memory of our fallen to allow this labour led betrayal to continue. Make a note of the MPs who cannot grasp this and vote them out at the next election. Comment 11, Article 2

27.MPC: Labour took thirteen years to make this mess. You really expect it to be cleared up in three? Comment 29, Article 3

However, there are a few examples where the Labour party are not ‘blamed’, and this ‘blame’ shifts (as was seen above in example 23.MPC). In example 28.MPC, ‘blame’ shifts from the Labour party to the EU (or more specifically ‘EU rules’), and this is just another example of EU dissatisfaction which appears to be rife in the public comments, regardless of political affiliation:

28.MPC: He waits until the end of November!!! There has been no let up in immigration to the UK since the Tories came to power putting a lie to the fact it’s all Labours fault, it’s the EU rules!!! Comment 25, Article 1

Labour social actors who are individualised within the public comments are: Tony Blair, Ed Miliband, Yvette Cooper and Gordon Brown. Out of these social actors, only Yvette Cooper is activated in Mail Online articles in relation to her criticism of the welfare restrictions not being implemented sooner. Despite Cooper showing her support of the restrictions, this is viewed unfavourably by those public comments that refer to her, as is evident in example 29.MPC. Here, the respondent asserts this dissatisfaction through the imperative ‘pipe down’ and once again ‘blames’ the Labour for the immigration ‘mess’. Yvette Cooper is therefore predicated as a hypocrite in relation to her comments.

29.MPC: Pipe down Yvette Cooper. It’s because of Labour that we’re in this mess. Your hypocrisy is nauseating. Comment 65, Article 8

Ed Miliband, the Labour leader of the time, is only nominated twice in the public comments, and on both occasions this is with regards to the respondent’s dissatisfaction of the Labour leader:
Former prime ministers, such as Tony Blair and Gordon Brown are only included within the public comments in relation to the ‘blame’ being attributed to the Labour party. However, although they are included, this is only ever in association with other former prime ministers as is evident in examples 31.MPC and 32.MPC (and was seen above in example 13.MPC). Where former prime ministers are grouped together like this, it appears to reinforce the public's dissatisfaction with the three main parties (Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats) and how they have responded to both immigration and the UK's relationship with the EU:

31.MPC: Don't be deluded folks, our country is in the hands of the EU as not the PM as it should be. Both Blair and Cameron have made this once green and pleasant land into the monstrosity it is today...Comment 62, Article 1

32.MPC: David Cameron/Tony Blair/Gordon Brown, hold your heads down in shame. It's no wonder people are voting UKIP due to your constant failings of looking after the rest of Europe and not YOUR own people Comment 87, Article 8

In example 31.MPC immigration is viewed as being destructive for the UK, with the *locus amoenus* (literary topos of idyllic place) being invoked to emphasise this. The responsibility and perceived failure of former prime ministers is also emphasised in example 32.MPC, where the respondent once again uses an imperative ‘hold your heads down in shame’ to reprimand them for their actions (or inaction). A clear division between the UK public and ‘Europe’ (which stands metonymically for the EU) is apparent, and these apparent failings are seen from a communitarian (nationalist/protectionist and anti-EU) perspective. Moreover, these failings are seen as the reason many of the public appear to be endorsing/supporting UKIP.

Finally, this section concludes by analysing the representation and evaluation of UKIP, who are a collectivised social actor, and their party leader Nigel Farage, who is the only UKIP member individualised within the public comments.
In Chapter 6, section 6.2.1, UKIP was not discussed as this political party was almost entirely suppressed by Mail Online articles. This was apart from Article 4, where Nigel Farage’s argument delegitimising welfare restrictions was included to support the Mail Online’s overarching anti-immigration and Eurosceptic ideology (see Chapter 6, section 6.3.2). However, the presence of UKIP within the public comments presents an entirely different picture and the party is viewed, by a majority of the respondents, as one that may ‘save’ the UK, from the destruction and devastation mainstream parties, EU membership and immigration has brought.

Table 15: UK Independence Party (UKIP) - Referential Strategies (Public Comments)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UK Political Social Actors</th>
<th>Referential Strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UKIP</td>
<td>UKIP, Nigel Farage, a man, Nigel, MPs, Farage, a party, he, MEP Candidate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Through an examination of the referential strategies, there is nothing overtly positive or negative infused in the referents themselves, although the way in which Nigel Farage is functionalised as the ‘MEP Candidate’ and also the way in which only his first name ‘Nigel’, or surname ‘Farage’, is used signals a more positive evaluation. Moreover, in considering predicational/attitudinal strategies, it becomes clear that a more positive representation/evaluation develops, with many respondents feeling that Nigel Farage is the only politician they can ‘trust’. This can be seen in example 33.MPC, where ‘Nigel’ is nominated via his first name to show affinity and he is activated via the verbal process ‘tells the truth’ (a judgement of ‘veracity’):

33.MPC: I am still voting for Nigel...he tells the truth... Comment 60, Article 6

It is also the case in example 34.MPC that Nigel Farage is nominated as ‘a man who can’ via a conditional clause proposing that, in the event where David Cameron fails (‘he’ in this example), Nigel Farage will be there to implement restrictions. Nigel Farage is therefore judged with regards to his ‘capability’ via the modal verb ‘can’. This example also shows political support for UKIP and a
nationalist argument is included, ‘in order to reclaim my country from European interference’, showing explicit Euroscepticism and communitarian values through the utilisation of the possessive determiner ‘my’:

34.MPC: Well, if he doesn’t put a stop to it, we all know a man who can. I’ll be voting UKIP in order to reclaim my country from European interference. Comment 73, Article 1

Although the Mail Online articles appear to be supporting/endorsing the Conservative party and (at least at first) supports and legitimises the welfare restrictions, respondents in the comments do not seem politically aligned with the newspaper. The readership therefore is somewhat politically disconnected, and although many respond to this via a criticism of the Conservative party (and other political parties) the following comment (example 35.MPC) directs their criticism towards the newspaper:

35.MPC: Cameron is a pro-EU Quisling. Expecting him to stand up for the interests of the British people is a pipe dream. If the Daily Mail want a Prime Minister who does that, they’d better start supporting Farage. Comment 4, Article 7

Moreover, it is clear that many of the respondents use the comments as a way of canvassing a vote for UKIP. Thus ‘UKIP’ are included in the discourse via a series of imperatives stating ‘vote UKIP’, as is evident in examples 36.MPC and 37.MPC:

36.MPC: This political experiment called the EU has failed on so many fronts. Time to consign it the historical dustbin. Vote UKIP...it's our only hope! Comment 16, Article 2

37.MPC: Smoke and mirrors, he will not stop them, we have one choice. Vote UKIP Comment 41, Article 6

It is also the case that UKIP are predicated as the ‘only’ party willing to act and the ‘only’ party willing to put tighter restrictions and controls in place to stop or minimise immigration, especially from the EU. Thus, many respondents believe that voting for the party is the only option, as demonstrated in 36.MPC and 37.MPC

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48 This was primarily in relation to the European Parliament elections, which were held in May 2014.
above. Notice in both these examples how the UK public are called upon through the utilisation of pronouns such as ‘we’ and ‘our’ (to be discussed further in section 7.2.2). It is also the case that many of the respondents believe that a vote for UKIP is the ‘right’ thing to do, as is expressed in example 38.MPC. Notice that in this example, intensification via the repetition of words such as ‘please’ and ‘right’ make the current political situation appear to be desperate and the vote for UKIP absolutely necessary. Example 38.MPC also makes use of a very personalised and emotive stance, referring to their ‘kids’. I would argue that this forms an unjustified appeal to the masses via emotive language and is therefore representative of the fallacy *argumentum ad populum*:

**38.MPC:** Please please everybody vote ukip. Cameron is powerless to the EU. even those who say UKIP are a protest vote or voting for ukip will get labour in I really don’t care anymore I’d rather do what’s right and vote UKIP even if it means labour get in as a result, just for the principal and so I can tell my kids at least I stood up and did what was right. Comment 28, Article 4

It would appear that there is a macro-argumentative strategy at work in the representation and evaluation of UKIP and more specifically Nigel Farage, which invokes the *topos of saviour* – i.e. they are the ones who can ‘save’ the UK. However, the *topos of saviour* is traditionally a variant of the *topos of history*, realised through the conditional: *If danger is to be expected from X and if A has saved us in the past, A will be able to save us again.* In this case, UKIP as a party and leader Nigel Farage has not shown that they have ‘saved’ the country in the past, but they are nevertheless constructed as a ‘saviour’. In this sense the *topos of saviour* can be modified to eliminate the historical component, following this conditional: *If danger is to be expected because of X, and if A proposes the only solution to save us, A should be supported as a saviour.*

**7.2.2 UK Public**

Exploring the referential strategies used to nominate UK public social actors is interesting, particularly because it explores the way in which the public perceive the ‘Self’, or at least the society to which they belong. Although referents mostly appear in *assimilated* forms, there are some instances where certain UK
public actors are *individualised* and *specified* as will be elaborated upon below\(^{49}\). As with the article analysis, UK public actors are mostly *included* via *collectivised* terms. This includes referents such as: ‘the public’, ‘the masses’, ‘the British people’, ‘the voters’, ‘the UK electorate’, ‘the British taxpayer’, and ‘the British worker’ (see Table 16).

Table 16: UK Public Social Actors - Referential Strategies (Public Comments)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UK Public Social Actors</th>
<th>Referential Strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>people, we, the public, those, the people of the UK, our, the British people, their, the voters, tens of thousands of Brits, 20 million, folks, I, my dad, millions of people, themselves, Brits, everybody, indigenous, British public, us, native Brits, the majority, our own, your, you, the population, the UK electorate, taxpayer, nationals, UK national, 200 pensioners, one million young people, mine, poll, 89%, British staff, the British taxpayer, the British worker, employer, own community, local beggars, British people, British, Europeans, ourselves, friend of mine, 19 year old, man, the masses, ladies and gentlemen, the hand that feeds, the British sheep, British citizens, school leavers, a million young people, the general public, the sick, the vulnerable, the elderly, the English, the rest of us, the British indigenous people, the UK, the average DM reader, me, the private landlord, the electorate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, it is also the case that *specification* via *identification* as ‘British’ (or at times ‘English’) is particularly prominent. Not only does this work as a strategy to define ‘us’ from ‘them’, but also the *inclusion* of the ‘British’ public in comments presents a collective voice, that is overwhelmingly anti-immigration and Eurosceptic. On many occasions, identification as British (or English) suffices, and no further qualification is necessary; however, there is also a ‘racial’ or ethnic sense which is inherently essentialist, and there is a clear belief in a ‘native’ or ‘indigenous’ Brit, as evidenced in examples 39.MPC and 40.MPC:

**39.MPC: Us native Brits can take some action:** never vote for a "daft leftie" MP never give to a Roma beggar complain to the police about Roma beggars *Comment 10, Article 2*

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\(^{49}\) It is also the case that some respondents reply to comments and may include the username and/or tag the original author of a post. I am not including these instances in the analysis and have removed the usernames for ethical reasons outlined in Chapter 5, section 5.6.
40.MPC: The only way people will stop coming to the UK is that Cameron puts in place the legislation to stop them. The real question is does he have the guts to do so? So far it looks like the answer is NO and the British indigenous people don’t like that answer. Comment 74, Article 6

Also inherent to both examples presented above is a clear dissatisfaction about a perceived inaction on immigration by the government (as was demonstrated in section 7.2.1). Moreover, example 39.MPC is almost like a call to arms, where ‘nativeBrits’ are asked to use their democratic freedoms to change the current course of action. I would argue that this is a populist appeal to the masses and representative of the fallacy argumentum ad populum, where there is an unjustified appeal to emotions apparent through the way in which ‘Roma beggar/s’ are beneficialised and left-wing politicians are evaluated as ‘daft’.

The ‘us’ and ‘them’ distinction is also apparent through the way in which pronouns, possessive determiners and deictic expressions are utilised. Examples 41.MPC and 42.MPC, demonstrates this highlighting the differentiation between UK Public and EU Migrant social actors:

41.MPC: Negotiate? It’s our country and we don’t want them here. Comment 98, Article 1

42.MPC: The ones that come we must make them feel so unwelcome they would rather go home. Comment 83, Article 6

In each of these examples an ‘us’ and ‘them’ distinction is explicit and a clear dichotomy is created between British people and migrants. In example 41.MPC, the possessive determiner ‘our’ is used to assert ownership of the UK, and the tone exemplifies a communitarian (nationalist/protectionist) ideological position. The social indexical ‘them’ clearly has differentiating value and the temporal indexical ‘here’ adds to this. Not only is there clear differentiation but also dissociation through the use of the exclusive pronoun ‘we’ which also activates an entire collective (the British public) as being anti-immigration. This is further intensified in example 42.MPC, which includes similar structures, but the deontic modal ‘must’ is utilised to legitimise discriminatory (or at least distasteful/disrespectful) behaviour directed towards EU migrants: ‘we must make them feel so unwelcome’. When the UK public are activated, this is primarily in relation to what they need ‘to
do’ and what they ‘want’ as a collective to ensure immigration is prevented or controlled and to argue against EU membership.

However, the ‘us’ and ‘them’ distinction is not only evident between UK public and EU migrant (Romanian and Bulgarian) social actors, but also between the UK public and UK political social actors, and the UK and EU more generally. The next example evidences how an ‘us’/‘them’ distinction is constructed between UK public and UK political social actors. The politicaldisconnect that is evident is primarily in relation to Eurosceptic and anti-immigrant views being adopted by the majority of the respondents, which are presented as being at odds with the policies and procedures adopted by the government and the three mainstream parties (which are seen also as being subservient to the EU). Thus, in example 43.MPC the public are passivated as not being ‘listened to’ by the prime minister. This was evident in section 7.2.1, but is equally important to stress here as it repeats and reinforces the construction of UK Public social actors as victims (as seen in Mail Online article analysis – section 6.2.2). The exclusive use of the pronoun ‘we’ continues to speak on behalf of the entire British public, and here the topos of disadvantage in combination with the topos of burdening/weighing down is drawn upon not only to argue against further immigration (as is discussed in section 7.3), but also to highlight that it is indeed to public and not the politicians who face such struggles:

43.MPC: It’s about time Cameron took his head out of the sand and listened to the majority of the UK electorate, we have enough immigrants in our country legal or otherwise and to allow thousands more will cripple our infrastructure altogether. We already suffer from the austere cuts to the NHS, Police, Fire Services, Armed Forces, etc. and to let thousands more into our country is simply ludicrous, Romania and Bulgaria should be sent a message that there is no more money for benefits unless immigrants have worked and paid tax for at least five years, and while you’re at it tell Cloud Nine Clegg and his Euro Zealots to Naff Off. Comment 46, Article 2

In relation to the ‘us’/‘them’ distinction, there is also a more general division presented of the entire UK against the EU, as is evident in example 44.MPC. Here, the repetition of the possessive determiner ‘our’, which again highlights ownership and protectionism, signals the force behind such a
conviction. The collective and exclusive ‘we’ is also apparent, activated in relation to the mental process ‘want’, as if the entire British public ‘want’ to exit the EU. All the examples that have included the possessive determiner ‘our’ also highlight high levels of chauvinism; however, this is not only welfare chauvinism (specifically) as discussed in Chapter 2, section 2.5.4) but chauvinism per se.

44.MPC: It’s our money, it’s our system we decide. Fine or sanction the UK, who cares. We want out anyway. Comment 61, Article 4

Related to this is how respondents identify as ‘British’ to reinforce their nationality as a priority in this debate. This signals communitarian and not cosmopolitan values, as is seen in example 45.MPC:

45.MPC: We are British first, Europeans second Comment 17, Article 5

In relation to the dichotomies discussed above, it is also clear that a victim ideology develops and the UK public social actors are on many occasions passivated as powerless subjects, as evident in 46.MPC:

46.MPC: ... it is not just benefits it housing, schools NHS it everything we do not have enough for people who are here. Cameron is forcing people out of their homes so these immigrants can have them. Comment 2, Article 1

Here, there is a clear belief that ‘people’, who are by implication British, are viewed as being subjected to undeserved treatment because of immigration, and the blame is one again attributed to the prime minister. This is further reinforced through the adoption of the topos of burdening/weighing down which is combined with the topos of disadvantage. This construction of the UK public as being disadvantaged because of immigration is also evident through the way in which the public are predicated as ‘suffering’, evident in example 47.MPC. This example also invokes the topos of danger/threat to further emphasise this, activating immigrants as ‘destitute gangs’:

47.MPC: ...The long suffering British public would then be in double jeopardy, with destitute gangs roaming the land and
preying on them as well as living off them legally at the end of the qualifying period... *Comment 5, Article 2*

Even when UK public social actors are *activated*, there are occasions when this also highlights their subservient position as passive agents, as can be seen in the metaphorical construction of the UK Public as ‘sheep’ who ‘just bleat’ in example 48.MPC:

48.MPC:...He [David Cameron] and Blair before him are Traitors, working for the same goal, the subjugation of the UK, *and the British sheep just bleat, softly* *Comment 2, Article 6*

Examining how UK public actors are *aggregated* within the public comments, it is clear that the ‘masses’, ‘thousands’ or ‘millions’ of people are discussed in relation to a large amount of people being disadvantaged by immigration. However, it is interesting that when *aggregated* nominations are employed, the discourse is not solely about welfare and the potential for abuse or burdening of the social welfare system. Instead the discourse shifts to employment, and the public are subsequently concerned about competition for jobs. This is evident in examples 49.MPC and 50.MPC:

49.MPC: Just no entry. *We have > 20million on job related benefits - we must get these people back into work* before even thinking about expanding the available work force. *Comment 60, Article 1*

50.MPC: The only sure way of limiting immigration is to shut the borders and now is the time, not 2017 after a referendum. *We have one million young people unemployed which will only continue with more immigration*. We need out of the EU and we need UKIP to do it. Cameron will bottle it like he always does. *Comment 72, Article 2*

Moreover, the public are also nominated via statistics such as ‘89%’ will be discussed further below in relation to how the *topos of people* is employed to argue against immigration (see section 7.3.2).

Finally, there are many occasions in which the UK public are present via the use first person ‘I’, and personal accounts/narratives are presented arguing against immigration from the EU, either through sharing personal responses of
disadvantage, or by calling on others to act by voting for UKIP (as demonstrated in section 7.2.1). For example 51.MPC:

51.MPC: Well, I don’t move in right wing circles yet I have yet to speak to any one who supports the mass immigration policies of political elite...Comment 19, Article 3

This example is particularly interesting as it starts with a disclaimer and the respondent actively aims to distance themselves from ‘right wing circles’. Yet immigration is still perceived negatively, primarily because immigration is perceived to occur on a large scale. It is also the case that in all the discussions had thus far it is immigration being discussed and not the notion of EU free movement. EU free movement, which would apply to both British citizens and any other EU member state, is subsequently backgrounded in the discourse.

7.2.3 EU Political

As in Chapter 6, section 6.2.3, I will be discussing the European Union (EU) as a collectivised social actor and will comment on individualised member states, politicians and EU institutions where they are included (see Table 17).

Table 17: EU Political Social Actors - Referential Strategies (Public Comments)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Political Social Actors</th>
<th>Referential Strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>EU laws, the EU, Europe, the house of cards, masters, Brussels, EU rules, Sweden, poor countries, political experiment, other European countries, paymasters, the Big Bad Wolf, the blood sucking leeches, human rights law, they, Luxembourg, EU legislation, EU states, fat cats, parasitic organisation, the single market, institution, their, the EU planet, the EU elite, it, Brussels bureaucrats, your union, an organisation, a united European, idiots, EU citizen, Brussels desk-wallahs, the war machine, the EU project, countries (of Eastern Europe), Merkel, Hollande, dictatorships, the French socialist government, trading nations, France, Germany, the Germans, the French, Brussels dictators, the EU foundation, the leaders, (EU) masters, muppets, the E.U., parasitic countries, EUssr, the new communist bloc, the others,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, starting with the EU, it is clear that, references via metonymy (as in ‘Europe’) or synecdoche (as in ‘Brussels’) are also evident within the public comments. This can be seen in example 52.MPC, where the inclusion of ‘Europe’ appears to be a
continuation from the headline of Article 1 (‘Cameron prepares for showdown with Europe over benefits for Romanian and Bulgarian migrants’) and example 53.MPC, where the utilisation of 'Brussels' again appears to link to the centralisation of power, much to the dissatisfaction of the respondent (intensified through the satiric misspelling of Westminster as ‘Wastminster’):

52.MPC: Yes - come on Cameron - show us what you're made of and stop pandering to Europe. When has this country ever been afraid of Europe, what they think or what they are doing - until now! Comment 6, Article 1

53.MPC: ...agree with everything you have said, except the democracy bit. We are ruled by Brussels, not Wastminster. Comment 67, Article 3

However, it is interesting to note that in example 1, the respondent sees the relationship between ‘Cameron’ and ‘Europe’ in a different sense to that portrayed in Article 1 (Chapter 6, section 6.2.1). Whereas David Cameron was represented as a powerful social actor, confronting the EU throughout Article 1, here the reverse is suggested through the way in which ‘Cameron’ is activated via the behavioural process ‘pandering’. This choice of verb suggests that he is attending to the wishes of the EU, potentially for self-glorification, but to the detriment of the public. Thus, not only does this process help to represent the EU or ‘Europe’ here as in a more powerful position, it also highlights the disconnect and perhaps disregard of the public’s EU dissatisfaction. In example 54.MPC, the centralisation of power within the EU not only lies with the synecdoche, but also through the activation of ‘Brussels’ and the passivation of ‘we’ (the exclusive British public) who are subjected to rule of Brussels.

Moreover, in considering other referential strategies used to nominate the EU, it is clear that many are infused with negative affect and emotions of insecurity, dissatisfaction, and unhappiness, are foregrounded in the discourse, which is overwhelmingly anti-EU. Some examples include:

54.MPC: ...If we come out of the EU the house of cards will collapse and eventually we will all go back to being our own countries! Though poorer as a country but at least our MEP’S and MP’S will be ok! Comment 7, Article 1
55.MPC: ...Time to get rid of this morbid, and unnecessary fear of the Big Bad Wolf, the EU... Comment 32, Article 2

56.MPC: Keep our borders closed on the grounds of national security. There will be riots if another few million benefit immigrants are shoehorned into already seething ethnic communities. We are best able to decide what is right for our country not the bloated and corrupt EUssr and it's toadies. Comment 14, Article 7

Furthermore, although there are references to ‘the EU’ and ‘EU laws’ throughout which do not show such infused negative intensification; there is not one example within Mail Online public comments that could signal a positive representation of the EU when predicational strategies and the wider context are also considered. Looking closely at the examples above, it is clear that in example 54.MPC, the use of parataxis indicates that the ‘EU’ here is also nominated as ‘the house of cards’, a metaphorical referent that highlights the perceived instability of the union and therefore suggesting feelings of insecurity as a result. Moreover, in the remainder of this example, it becomes clear that a communitarian (nationalist) ideology is evident and is preferred as the ideal; clearly this is preferred even if it results in economic disadvantage. Example 55.MPC similarly uses the strategy of parataxis to nominate the EU via metaphorical means, and this time it is as the ‘Big Bad Wolf’, an intertextual reference to the fairy tale Little Red Riding Hood. This fairy tale depiction constructs the EU as a threat to the UK and this is further intensified through the way in which ‘fear’ again appears to be omnipresent and predicated as ‘morbid’ and ‘unnecessary’ signalling both feelings of unhappiness and dissatisfaction specifically.

Example 56.MPC also nominates the EU in a way that is infused with negative evaluation as ‘EUssr’. This is evidently a portmanteau of the ‘EU’ and the ‘USSR’, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, otherwise known as the Soviet Union. Although the negative evaluation clearly comes from the adjectives ‘bloated’ and ‘corrupt’, which at the same time as showing dissatisfaction also reinforces an unethical judgement upon the EU, the portmanteau itself is also seemingly infused with negative evaluation, especially since this constructs the EU as being the same as the USSR. There are extremely negative connotations associated with the USSR, which is mostly perceived as a political and
humanitarian failure, and it is clear that this portmanteau is constructed to make parallels to the way in which the EU operates. Examining how this referent sits within the larger argument put forward in example 56.MPC, it is clear how EU dissatisfaction is inextricably linked to EU expansion and immigration. As will be demonstrated further in section 7.3, it is very common for the public comments to put forward suggestions in the form of demands, and it is true in this example with the imperative ‘Keep our borders closed on the grounds of national security’. Here, the *topos of danger/threat* is invoked to argue for border control and the argument is furthered with referenced to ‘riots’ and ‘seething ethnic communities’, constructing immigration and by extension multiculturalism as something particularly dangerous. Moreover, this example also draws upon the *topos of people ‘we are best able to decide’*, to argue against the EU.

In example 56.MPC, there is also a reference to EU politicians as ‘toadies’, a derogatory term meaning someone who is obsequious or flattering to others of a higher position or status. Here, I will further example the representation/evaluation of EU politicians. When EU politicians are nominated they are mostly *genericised* and *collectivised*. This is apart from the *inclusion* of EU Commissioner, Laszlo Andor, and references made to Francois Hollande and Angela Merkel in relation to their comments and position on ‘benefit tourism’, which will be discussed further below. Focusing on EU politicians in general, a range of extremely negative referents are seen including ‘masters’, ‘traitors’, ‘blood sucking leaches’, ‘fat cats’, ‘Brussels bureaucrats’ and a significant number of references to ‘they’. Clearly, some of these signal further metaphorical references to ‘animals’ with both EU politicians and the EU as an organisation seen as inhuman. Moreover, referents such as ‘blood sucking leeches’ evidence how these social actors are perceived to be ‘parasitic’ (which is something that will be discussed further below but in more depth in section 7.2.4). The use of such negatively infused references also evidences how the UK public perceive and judge politicians of the EU. Nominations including ‘traitors’ and ‘blood sucking leaches’, link explicitly to judgements of social sanction, to their ‘veracity’ and ‘propriety’ and by extension evidence feelings of dissatisfaction, unhappiness and insecurity felt by the majority of the respondents.
Moving on to consider the representation and evaluation of EU member states, as discussed by the public, it would appear that there are some parallels to the article analysis. Thus, a ‘western’ and ‘eastern’ divide is apparent, and in some cases, it is also evident that EU dissatisfaction stems from eastern European expansion. This can be seen in examples 57.MPC and 58.MPC:

57.MPC: The EU was a good idea. **Until the countries of Eastern Europe joined** Comment 21, Article 4

58.MPC: Close the damned borders to those that don't have a job to go to. It's not rocket science. Let the EU make a legal challenge, it will take years and the people of France, Germany, Belgium, Austria etc. etc. want to do exactly the same, so we would have support for the move. It was a stupid Idea to begin with and **the only countries that want free movement and access to benefits for migrants are those parasitic countries that will benefit themselves through the economic boost created by the money sent home by their people and the load reduction on their own health services etc.** Comment 36, Article 6

Thus, both of these examples evidence a dichotomy between ‘western’ and ‘eastern’ EU member states. This is exemplified in more detail is example 58.MPC, where ‘the people’ of western EU members states, ‘France, Germany, Belgium, Austria…’ are positioned as having similar wants/needs to the British public via a *topos of comparison (similarity)*. The reason this is being discussed in relation to the representation and evaluation of EU member states, is because this construction is used to set up a comparison to other EU member states who are nominated here as ‘parasitic countries’. Although not explicitly discussed, it is clear that these ‘parasitic countries’ refer to new eastern European countries such as Romania and Bulgaria, and by extension the people who live there. Clearly, the predicate ‘parasitic’ is a metaphorical construction that is overtly racist, one that is employed in discourse to stigmatise and dehumanise entire populations and will be discussed further in section 7.2.4 (see also Musolff, 2016).

With reference to the *inclusion* of specific social actors, here I will discuss Angela Merkel and Francois Hollande before discussing Laszlo Andor. However, out of the 699 comments considered for analysis, only one comment makes reference to Angela Merkel and Francois Hollande. Thus, they are not evident in
the public comments as an authoritative voice endorsing the welfare restrictions (as was seen in Chapter 6, section 6.2.3). In this case, seen in example 59.MPC, criticism is directed via association with David Cameron and all three social actors are predicated negatively via judgements of their ‘capability’ and ‘propriety’, in that they do not listen to and actively ignore the people of their respective countries.

59.MPC: Cameron, Merkel and Hollande are running scared, I’m not falling for their backtracking, the whole lot need to be overthrown by their people and new governments put in place, ones that listen to the people as the people speak, not ones that ignore the people for decades and then try to do a u turn at the last hour! Comment 16, Article 4

Unlike Angela Merkel and Francois Hollande, Laszlo Andor is nominated several times, especially in the public comments corresponding to Articles 4, 5 and 6. Thus, as comparable with Chapter 6, section 6.2.3, he is nominated formally with the use of his name ‘Laszlo Andor’, titulated as ‘Mr Andor’, and categorised (functionalised) according to his occupation as ‘EU commissioner’, and he is also nominated negatively, through the adoption of referents infused with defamatory connotations such as ‘this fool’, ‘this clown’ and ‘Eurocrat’ (see Table 18). Once more, focus is placed on him being ‘Hungarian’, as is demonstrated in examples 60.MPC and 61.MPC:

60.MPC: Being Hungarian he would say that wouldn’t he. Can’t see that many would want to migrate to his country. Comment 56, Article 5

61.MPC: Why is a Hungarian commenting on British values? They are not even part of the EU are they? Comment 23, Article 5

In 60.MPC, the respondent is making an essentialist claim based on certain prejudices they holds in relation to what ‘Being Hungarian’ means. There is clearly a negative evaluation attached to this in the second sentence, where ‘his country’ (i.e. Hungary) is seen as an undesirable location, and by implication inferior to the UK. This also leads onto comment 61.MPC, where two interrogatives are posed questioning the authority of the commissioner, who is once more identified via his nationality. Although it could be interpreted that these questions are ironic or
sarcasm, I believe that they display an unawareness of what the EU as an institution is and, by extension the rights are freedoms the EU seek to implement (including the free movement of people). Thus, despite the UK being a member of the EU, a communitarian view is presented where the only people who should comment or make judgement on British politics or 'values' are the 'British' themselves.

Table 18: Laszlo Andor - Referential Strategies (Public Comments)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Political Social Actors</th>
<th>Referential Strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Laszlo Andor</td>
<td>Hungarian guy, Mr Andor, yourself, the EU commissioner Laszlo Andor, you, Commissioner Andor, this idiot, he, this fool, a/the Hungarian, the EU idiot, his, Laszlo, socialist, he, an alien, clown, EU embicile, Eurocrat, EU expert, Mr Laszlo Andor, a Commissioner, Hungarian Economist Laszio Andor (EU Employment Commissioner)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In keeping with the persistent anti-EU ideology, there are also comments that ironically endorse Laszlo Andor’s comments, as they believe that his criticism of the UK may indeed help or promote the UK’s exit from the EU. This is evident in example 62.MPC:

62.MPC: Mr. Andor is fully right. EU should warn UK and if necessary they should expel UK. Comment 100, Article 5

Finally, although there are not many comments that overtly challenge or resist the Mail Online’s Balkanism seen in their representation of both EU Political and EU Migrant social actors, there are a handful that do. One example of this is evident below (63.MPC), where the argument involving the topos of history, found in Article 6, is subverted by the respondent and used to challenge their position and their Balkanist representation about Laszlo Andor.

63.MPC: The Daily Mail hardly has a proud history of fighting for liberty and championing the oppressed. Nobody needs lectures on tolerance and decency from even the the Daily Mail. Comment 8, Article 7

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50 At this point in time (November – December 2013) prior to the EU referendum that was held in June 2016.
7.2.4 EU Migrants (Romanians and Bulgarians)

Turning to consider the representation and evaluation of EU migrants, and Bulgarians and Romanians specifically, it is clear that the discourse within the public comments intensifies and, in this section, explicit instances of a racist ideology is evident, depicted mostly in the form of a Balkanist representations. As was apparent in Chapter 6, section 6.2.4, referential strategies may again be subdivided focusing on a) Romanians and Bulgarians (specifically), b) EU migrants (generally), and c) Polish migrants, as evident in Table 19:

Table 19: EU Migrant Social Actors - Referential Strategies (Public Comments)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Migrant Social Actors</th>
<th>Referential Strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Romanian and Bulgarian Migrants</td>
<td>they, these immigrants, new immigrants, the numbers, them, the ones, these people, euro parasites, new migrants, those, Romas, criminal bosses, these people, Bulgarians, an invasion, their, a Roma beggar, this new lot, scroungers, eastern Europeans, Roma community, builders, beggars, it, Bulgarians, Romanians, Doctors, Dentists, the masses, thousands, 100,000, the true number, 3,000,000 Roma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish Migrants</td>
<td>the polish, Polish women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Migrants (genericised)</td>
<td>(EU) citizens, the Europeans, migrants, anyone, immigration, Eastern Europeans, they, an immigrant, unskilled people, the horse, outsiders, people, a migrant family, those, foreign people, these EU immigrants, anyone, no one, economic migrants, these people, benefit tourism, (EU) scroungers, the numbers, mass immigration, 500,000, Roma community, people, beggars, nurses, builders labour, the newly arrived, wasters of the world, freeloaders, 1m people, countrymen, soulless marauders, too many, riff raff, claimants, penniless dropout, the unemployed, 50,000 children, poor people, scientists, engineers, doctors, gypsies, the lot, castouts, castaways, benefit migrants, millions, their children, a serious problem, the ones, all newcomers, benefit immigrants, ethnic communities, migrant workers, pickpockets, the incomers, workers, 500 million people, the majority, tenants, this madness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Again, in a similar vein to Chapter 6, section 6.2.4, it is evident that all EU migrants (inclusive of Romanian, Bulgarian and Polish citizens) are only ever assimilated and once again there are examples of immigrants as collectivised social
actors or aggregated in terms of statistics. However, simply through an examination of the Table 19, there are clearly referents that are infused with explicit negative evaluation. There are also more specified groups of migrants with references to occupation or ethnicity (‘Roma’), and it will become clear why the ethnonym ‘Roma’ is included both in relation to Romanians and Bulgarians specifically, and EU Migrants more generally below.

For now, I will focus on a range of referential and predicational strategies which construct a Balkanist stereotype, not only helping to confirm and legitimise the notion of ‘benefit tourism’, but also evidencing that much of the discourse about EU Migrants is based on an essentialist and racist view of the ‘Other’. This can be seen in example 64.MPC, where EU Migrants are nominated as ‘parasites’ and it becomes clear in this example exactly how other metaphors are also utilised, evidencing an explicitly racist ideology:

64.MPC: If our only defense against this wave of benefit grabbing euro parasites is Coneron we may as well just leave piles of cash at every airport and port and hope they fill their pockets and turn right round. Comment 19, Article 1

As Musolff (2016: 73) explains, the metaphorical construction utilising the referent ‘parasite’ is a “derogatory categorization...which functions to dehumanize and stigmatize the target referent as part of a BODY-based ILLNESS/DEATH- scenario”. Although Musolff (2016) shows that parasites are either thought of as “bio-parasites” (and hence related to animals such as rats) or “socio-parasites” (people who live off others, such as ‘benefit tourists’), what is clear is that when the SOCIO-PARASITE is utilised for entire groups of people (such as immigrants) as the target group (see Lakoff and Johnson, 1980), it is nevertheless “based on a biological source concept” (Musolff, 2016: 75). I also believe that this has links to the conceptual metaphor “IMMIGRANTS ARE ANIMALS” (Santa-Ana, 1999). Being identified as ‘parasites’ also means that this group of people are judged as not only socially different (with reference to ‘normality’) but also deviant (with reference to ‘propriety’ and what is right and ethical within society). In this respect, they are representative of a group that is seen as both impoverished and uncivilized, and as such the metaphorical construction of EU migrants here as ‘parasites’ both attends to, but also derives from Balkanism. In
example 64.MPC, there are also other metaphors that are also apparent to further intensify the level of threat from EU migrants, namely a ‘war’ metaphor invoked by ‘defence’ and the ‘water’ metaphor seen through ‘wave’. However, I would suggest that the use of the determiner ‘this’, before ‘wave’ indicates that this comment is specifically about Bulgarian and Romanian migrants.

Although there is only one instance of ‘parasites’ being used to nominate migrants within the 699 comments analysed, there are also two other instances of it being used in relation to the EU and Eastern European member states (as demonstrated in section 7.2.4). Moreover, there are a series of other referents that infer ‘parasitic’ qualities in EU migrants (but specifically Romanians and Bulgarians) including ‘scroungers’, ‘freeloaders’ and ‘wasters’ evident in examples 65.MPC and 66.MPC, both of which reproduces the representation of EU Migrants and Romanians and Bulgarians specifically as ‘benefit tourists’, where the topos of abuse is invoked once more:

65.MPC: ... Does he not see the damage that will be done when these scroungers arrive. Comment 82, Article 2

66.MPC: ... And while we’re about it, let’s address the problem of all these freeloaders coming over here to use our health services at the expense of the taxpayer. We’ve been subsidising the rest of the world for too long! Comment 3, Article 5

Even when referents are not infused with a negative evaluation of EU migrants as ‘parasites’ or related terms such as ‘scroungers’, there are times where collectivised terms (such as ‘immigrants, ‘migrants’ or ‘they’) are activated in relation to behavioural and material processes that reproduce an existential belief in the notion of ‘benefit tourism’, as evident in examples 67.MPC and 68.MPC:

67.MPC: ... The whole situation Mr Carmichael is that the UK - due to it’s inert and spineless politicians - is being swamped with immigrants who have no intention of working and have every intention of bleeding the UK dry by any means... Comment 34, Article 2

68.MPC: All they will do is rent a postal address between them, pretend they have lived here for the required period of time and then proceed to claim their entitlements once the time limit is up ... Comment 49, Article 2
Once again, a ‘water’ metaphor is evident in example 67.MPC with the behavioural process ‘swamped’ chosen to evidence how the UK are passivated and further subjected to this ‘abuse’ of the welfare system. This is further intensified with the idiomatic phrase ‘bleeding the UK dry’. A more subtle point to note about this example is the choice of the prepositional phrase ‘with immigrants’ and not ‘by immigrants’. Thus, although ‘immigrants’ are still positioned as the ‘Other’ and an anti-immigrant sentiment is apparent, the responsibility for their actions seemingly lies with the politicians. In a way, this almost like a ‘double denigration’. Not only are migrants (in this specific example) represented and evaluated in a dehumanising and racist way, they also appear to lack agency. Example 68.MPC also evidences how social indexicals are drawn upon to reinforce qualities ‘they’ have. Here a Balkanist stereotype is drawn upon via the behavioural process ‘pretend’, which draws upon the idea that eastern Europeans are purposefully deceptive, reinforcing the idea that ‘they’ are intentional abusers coming to the UK as ‘benefit tourists’. Once more, such a discursive construction is part of an overarching argumentation strategy based on the topos of abuse. In one further example signifying such convictions, it is apparent how EU Migrants are dehumanised via the adoption of the ‘water’ metaphor ‘this drain’, as evident in example 69.MPC:

70.MPC: And the result will be, him rolling over and blaming the EU rules, and saying he tried on our behalf, if he’s honest about not wanting this drain on our benefits, why not make it a minimum wait of 5 years before even looking at benefit claims by outsiders...Comment 80, Article 1

Racism is also apparent through the way in which Roma people are represented and evaluated in the public comments. This is exemplified in example 70.MPC, where Roma people are predicated ‘crafty’ and through their activation in relation to crime, which is euphemistically presented as ‘know all the tricks of the trade’. It is also clear that this example invokes the topos of danger/threat especially when stating ‘RIP the UK’:
70.MPC: Im sure the Romas will still manage to claim benefits, they are nothing but crafty who know all the tricks of the trade, RIP the UK Comment 43, Article 1

There is also a level of confusion/conflation between Romanian and Bulgarian nationality and Roma ethnicity, and this is why it is necessary to include the *ethnonym* ‘Roma’ in within the referential strategies for Romanians and Bulgarians (*specifically*) and EU Migrants (*generally*) as evident in Table 5. In example 71.MPC, it is clear that all people from Romania and Bulgaria are viewed as having an ‘itinerant lifestyle’ as is traditionally associated with Romani people. Although this is not, and should not, be problematic in itself, what is problematic is the essentialism apparent and the *association* of this ‘lifestyle’ with ‘crime, begging and squalor…’. Thus all Romani people who may or may not be Romanian and Bulgarian, and all people who are Romanian and Bulgarian and may or may not be Romani are *activated* in relation to crime and anti-social behaviour. Such reductionism and essentialism is able to construct one homogenous view of eastern European people more generally, denying agency to all and reinforcing a persistent *Balkanist* representation, with an ideology of racism at its core.

71.MPC: …Immigrants from Romania and Bulgaria are not coming here for the benefits (although they will accept them if offered). They are coming because they want a better life. Many will continue their itinerant lifestyle when here causing severe problems with crime, begging and squalor wherever they go … Comment 56, Article 2

It is also clear that discourse on crime (as identified and discussed in Chapter 5, section 5.5.3), features within the public comments and is inextricably tied to discourse on welfare and the potential for welfare abuse. This is exemplified in example 72.MPC:

72.MPC: And it also means more beggars, pickpockets, campsites etc as they wait for the free handouts. Shameful. Comment 28, Article 8

The discourse on employment may also be discussed, especially in relation to two main points. Firstly, there is some discussion surrounding whether the motivation to migrate from Romania and Bulgaria is to claim benefits (‘benefit
tourism’) or indeed to work. This was evident in example 72.MPC above. Secondly, where the discourse on employment is adopted in relation to EU migrants (Romanians and Bulgarians) moving to the UK to work, there are opposing views as to whether this ‘type’ of immigration (or EU free movement) is or should be deemed ‘acceptable’. On the one hand, there are comments that express a pro-immigration view if certain conditions are fulfilled. This is evident in example 73.MPC where immigration from migrants who are predicated as ‘Hard-working, decent, self-supporting and contributing...’ is deemed acceptable.

73.MPC: ... you don't get it at all do you? **Hard working, decent, self-supporting, contributing migrants are not a problem. The majority of Bulgarian and Romanian immigrants won't have paid a penny into their own system and won't be paying a penny into ours...**Comment 37, Article 8

However, in this example, a dichotomy is constructed between the ‘desirable’ and ‘undesirable’ migrant. Clearly, ‘Bulgarian and Romanian immigrants’ fall into the ‘undesirable’ category as they are **activated** according to an avoidance of contributing to their own economy and/or welfare and the UK’s economy and/or welfare. This essentialist and **Balkanist** dichotomy resonates with comments made by Boris Johnson, as seen in Article 2, and discussed in Chapter 6, section 6.2.4. In his comments, Boris Johnson qualified immigrants from ‘western’ countries such as Australia and New Zealand as ‘hard-working’ in opposition to a ‘sizeable influx from within the EU, some of whom show no sign of wanting to work’ (example 70.MA). It would appear that this ideological division is also apparent in example 74.MPC, where those considered ‘hard-working’ are not Bulgarian and Romanian (or ‘eastern’ European).

On the other hand there is also a concern raised about whether people who migrate to the UK from EU countries are disadvantaging the British public's employment prospects, as evident in example 74.MPC (and as was discussed in section 7.2.3 - see example 51.MPC).

74.MPC: I mind **nurses and builders coming over** while we have mass unemployment. **We don’t need additional labour**; we need to employ those currently on the dole. Comment 75, Article 3
Much of the concern, which is expressed by the respondents, is in relation to the number of immigrants who have, or will, arrive. So far, one of the ways in which this has been exemplified is through the use of ‘water’ metaphors such as ‘wave’ and ‘swamped’. The sense of a large-scale immigration from Romania and Bulgaria is also seen in the repetition of collectivised referents such as ‘these immigrants’ throughout the discourse. Just like in Chapter 6, section 6.2.4, where it was shown that aggregated forms were not as prevalent as had originally been expected prior to analysis, they are not as prevalent here. However, there are a few instances where aggregated referents are included, mostly in relation to ‘mass’ or ‘massive’ immigration, as can be seen in example 75.MPC. Here, immigration is also identified metaphorically as an ‘invasion’, thus the utilisation of a ‘war’ metaphor once again intensifies the threat, invoking the topos of danger/threat.

75.MPC: ...Cameron has known for years, as has the rest of us, about the massive numbers of immigrants for Romania and Bulgaria heading for our shores in January. Why wait until now to try and head off such an invasion? Comment 81, Article 1

Other aggregated referents such as ‘50,000 children’ and ‘500 million people’ are also apparent but do not identify EU Migrants specifically. They are included to show the extent to which it is perceived that ‘British’ welfare will be widely available across the EU. However, as will be demonstrated further in section 7.3, this does not necessarily mean that the welfare restrictions are legitimised, but that the EU is delegitimised. This is exemplified in example 76.MPC:

76.MPC: yup thanks to the new communist bloc of the european union projekt the uk taxpayer now guarantees welfare to 500 million people...Comment 49, Article 8

Finally, this section will conclude by examining some specific instances where respondents have detected racism in the representation and evaluation of EU migrants (Romanians and Bulgarians) and have utilised this online platform to resist this. What has become clear is that resistance to racism is very rare in Mail Online public comments, although a handful of examples are evident. This was already seen in section 7.2.1, example 14.MPC in criticism directed towards David Cameron, and in section 7.2.3, example 64.MPC with criticism directed towards
the Daily Mail's position. Two further examples will also be discussed below, demonstrated in examples 77.MPC and 78.MPC:

77.MPC: here we go again more racist rhetoric. Immigration has massively improved this country in every way. I own a factory and only employ foreign staff they work harder and for less money than British staff so everyone is a winner, me my customers and my workers Comment 31, Article 3

78.MPC: so sad to see racism creeping across Europe. I can hear the echos of 1939 far to clearly. We need to let more people in so that we can see how other cultures are different from ours Comment 45, Article 4

Example 77.MPC discusses immigration in relation to the economic benefit it appears to bring the respondent in relation to his business. Intensification strategies related to quantification are adopted including the adverb 'massively'; however, the argument put forward and the way in which immigrants are represented, reinforces the dichotomy between immigrants and the British public as discussed above and, in addition to this, reproduces an exclusionary and exploitative tone. In example 78.MPC, immigrants are nominated as ‘people’ and the topos of history is invoked ‘I can hear the echos [sic] of 1939 far to [sic] clearly’ as a way to remind other respondents the horrors attached to racism, as related to World War 2 and the concentration camps of Nazi Germany. However, the example, which calls for pro-immigration stance simply because it would allow for an inter- or multi-cultural education, is based on a simplistic and essentialist view of culture.

7.3 Argumentation Strategies

I will now consider some of the main argumentation strategies that are found within Mail Online public comments in relation specifically to the welfare restrictions but also immigration control per se. As in Chapter 6, this section will be divided into arguments legitimising the new welfare restrictions (section 7.3.1) and then those delegitimising them (section 7.3.2). Analysing the public comments, it becomes clear that many of the argumentation strategies utilised in Mail Online articles are reproduced, but once again intensified. Moreover, it
becomes clear that there is an overarching sense of dissatisfaction with the welfare restrictions and a clear want for tighter immigration control per se.

### 7.3.1 Legitimising Welfare Restrictions

There is an overwhelming sense that the public delegitimises the welfare restrictions, and this is evidenced in section 7.3.2. In this section, I will outline the few instances where welfare restrictions are supported. Starting once more with the *topos of abuse*, examples 79.MPC and 80.MPC highlight the way in which this *topos* is utilised to argue for implementation of the welfare restrictions:

**79.MPC: Do it now, before the scroungers turn up here. If they know there's no goodies awaiting them, they'll stay put.**  
*Comment 60, Article 2*

**80.MPC: Discrimination has become a dirty word and is used to shut people up by shaming them whenever possible. Yet discrimination is a human requirement and we have to do it daily.** We discriminate on who we date, what car we buy, who we are friends with, what food we like, what programs we watch, we discriminate against tea when we order coffee. All of these things and countless more are discrimination. **Discrimination to stop people who have not paid into a system, arriving and taking money out of it, is not the dirty discrimination the liberal left claim it is. It is perfectly legitimate and reasonable.** People should stop being afraid of that word and allowing themselves to be battered into submission with it. *Comment 89, Article 1*

In example 79.MPC, the *topos of abuse* is evident through the referent ‘scroungers’, which is an example of the parasitic metaphor discussed in section 7.2.4 and the reference to benefits as ‘goodies’. However, example 79.MPC is not just an argument, it is a demand and starts with the imperative ‘Do it now’. These demands are extremely common within the public comments and there will be more examples evident in section 7.3.2. Example 80.MPC is unusual in the sense that it is an extended response with the formulation of a lengthy argument in order to legitimise the welfare restrictions. Here, the word ‘discrimination’ is repeated but also condoned. Discrimination is perceived to be a normal activity and part of everyday life, and because of this reasoning, discriminating against those who are considered to be taking advantage of the welfare system is perceived as ‘perfectly legitimate’. Whereas semantically ‘to discriminate’ also
means ‘to differentiate’, when this type of ‘discrimination’ is based on an unreasonable judgement, it is here that such an argumentation strategy becomes *unreasonable* and subsequently *fallacious*. The argument in example 80.MPC, which employs the *topos of reality* with the *topos of abuse*, is one of the examples that van Dijk (1993; 1997) might deem more sinister, because it subtly legitimises discrimination and, in my view seemingly condones a racist ideology. The argument my be reconstructed as follows:

### Argument
Discriminating against people who take advantage of the welfare system is legitimate and reasonable.

### Topos of Reality
Because discrimination is a human reality/normality, discrimination is subsequently legitimate and reasonable.

### Topos of Abuse
If the welfare system is being abused, measures should be taken to withdraw or restrict benefits.

### Conclusion
Welfare restrictions should be enforced.

Apart from examples 79.MPC and 80.MPC, most other comments seek to delegitimise the welfare restrictions, as they are perceived as not going ‘far enough’, as they do not prevent immigration from the EU. The final example I will present here is example 81.MPC, where welfare restrictions are simultaneously endorsed but also perceived as not going far enough:
While this is welcome, isn’t it closing the stable door after the horse has bolted and is feasting merrily on England's pleasant pastures? Comment 37, Article 4

Here, the idiomatic phrase ‘closing the stable door after the horse has bolted’, presented as a rhetorical question, suggests that there has already been damage caused by ‘benefit tourism’. The idiom is also extended by invoking the *locus amaenus* (literary *topos of idyllic place*). This further constructs a positive image of the UK the welfare system, which is subsequently seen as being taken advantage of.

7.3.2 Delegitimising Welfare Restrictions

As explained in section 7.3.1, there is a clear sense amongst *Mail Online* public comments that welfare restrictions are *delegitimised*. Moreover, it will become clear from the analysis below, that this delegitimisation is inextricably tied to EU dissatisfaction and arguments calling for tighter restriction or control of immigration *per se*. What will also become clear is that *Mail Online* readers are using public comment sections as a space to propose alternative solutions, which often come in the form of demands (through a series of imperatives) and are on many occasions explicitly discriminatory and/or racist.

Once more, this section will start by examining how the *topos of abuse* is employed; in this case, how it is used in the process of delegitimising welfare restrictions (which might at first appear counter intuitive). This is evident in example 82.MPC and 83.MPC:

82.MPC: It's not tough enough three months before they can claim benefits is a joke should be at least one year, they will still come here and just wait for the three months to go by then they will all sign on the great British gravy train! Comment 62, Article 6

83.MPC: No, kick them out. This is a massive con, most of these people have a perfectly good standard of living where they come from. They just don't want to have to work for their money. Comment 67, Article 8

In terms of APPRECIATION, the welfare restrictions are evaluated according to their ‘composition’, and in example 82.MPC, they are deemed as ‘not tough
enough’. They are also evaluated according to their ‘valuation’ as ‘a joke’ and thus not suitable. This evaluation is supported by the *topos of abuse* where EU Migrants are *activated* in relation to how they ‘sign on the...gravy train’, with this idiomatic phrase utilised to demonstrate abuse of the welfare system. In example 83.MPC, it is clear that once again ‘these people’ (EU Migrants) are predicated as not wanting to work, and by implication as wanting to migrate to receive social welfare assistance, invoking the *topos of abuse*. As with many of the arguments delegitimising the welfare restrictions, a proposal/solution is presented. In example 83.MPC, the only solution presented is not a restriction on welfare, but repatriation: ‘No, kick them out’. This is a discriminatory proposal, signalling an overtly anti-immigrant position. Thus when the *topos of abuse* is used to delegitimise restrictions, it is not that ‘benefit tourism’ or abuse of the welfare system is challenged; it is that abuse of the welfare system is perceived as rife, and subsequently further restriction and control is perceived as necessary.

A range of other *topoi* are employed to both delegitimise the welfare restrictions and to argue for further control on immigration. One of the most prominent argumentation strategies is to employ the *topos of burdening/weighing down*. Examples 84.MPC and 85.MPC represent some of the main concerns expressed, namely that immigration *per se* puts pressure on, not only the welfare system, but also other (social) services, employment opportunities and even British infrastructure.

84.MPC: **It does not go far enough, the UK is overflowing, pressure on schools, NHS, housing, transport and so on.** Besides you will do as your masters in Brussels tell you Cameron. *Comment 12, Article 1*

85.MPC: **Useless ! It's not that they take our benefits Mr Cameron - it's that they take our jobs, houses, school placers and medical services.** But like most politicians you are too out-of-touch to know the reality *Comment 28, Article 6*

Thus in example 84.MPC, the welfare restrictions are once again evaluated according to their 'composition', and for this respondent they are seen as not going 'far enough'. By implication this suggests that further restriction and control is necessary, and this is argued for through the employment of the *topos of burdening/weighing down*. This *topos* is further realised through the way in which
‘pressure’ metaphorically conceptualises the UK as a ‘container’ and, in this case, is perceived as ‘full’ through the employment of the water metaphor ‘overflowing’. Thus, the ‘water’ (and by extension ‘natural disaster’) metaphor and the ‘container’ metaphor are conceptually tied (as discussed by Charteris-Black, 2006). Although these metaphors are not employed in example 85.MPC, the same sentiment is evident through the way in which EU migrants are activated via the material process ‘take’ and the possessive determiner ‘our’ is used to signal exclusive (British) ownership of these services. The argument employing the *topos of burdening/weighing down* can be reconstructed as follows:

**Argument**
The implementation of welfare restrictions will not prevent (perceived high levels) of immigration from the EU.

**Conclusion**
Tighter immigration control should be implemented (including extending transitional restrictions for Romanians and Bulgarians).

**Topos of Burdening/Weighing Down**
Because immigration will result in the burdening and weighing down of other social services (including the NHS and education), the UK should act in order to diminish those burdens.

In example 86.MPC, the *topos of burdening/weighing down* is again utilised (‘we are full’), alongside a dialogically contractive ‘denial’, to assert that the discourse on immigration (as evident within these debates) ‘is not racist’ 51. Moreover, the respondent ‘proves’ that they cannot be racist as they are ‘married to an Indian’:

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51 Example 87.MPC is a response to Comment 45, Article 5: “So sad to see racism creeping across Europe. I can hear the echoes of 1939 far to clearly. We need to let more people in so that we can see how other cultures are different from ours”
Although this example does not delegitimise the welfare restrictions *per se* it does legitimise further control on immigration. Whereas a concern that immigration may burden or put pressure on social services may not be racist in itself, it is discriminatory especially in the wider context of the rights and freedoms all EU citizens have. Moreover, even *if* an anti-immigration perspective cannot be deemed as racist, there are clearly essentialist and racist beliefs that drive this perspective, as was evidenced in the representation and evaluation of EU Migrants (Romanians and Bulgarians) in section 7.2.4. Additionally, all of the examples that employ the *topos of burdening/weighing down* do so in isolation from any evidence, and these arguments do not appear to have justifiable grounding. At the end of this example, accusations of racism are further ‘countered’ by explaining the controlling immigration is ‘common sense’, a populist appeal but one that evidences that discriminating ideologies (including racism) are indeed naturalised and accepted.

It is also the case that the *topos of burdening/weighing down* is used alongside other *topoi* as is evident in example 87.MPC. Here, the *topos of danger/threat* is also invoked through the way in which ‘crime’ is added to the list of services in which immigrants *per se* (‘them’) are seen as responsible for burdening. Once more, this argumentation follows on from a negative evaluation of the ‘composition’ of the welfare restrictions, where idiomatic language is once again drawn upon with ‘papering the cracks’ implying the restrictions are potentially hiding bigger issues or problems:

*87.MPC*: Even *IF* the coalition agreed this restriction it represents little more than a papering over the cracks. **We need to STOP them coming here in the first place as they displace jobs and over stress housing, health, education and crime in THE most densely populated country in Europe!! THE MADNESS CONTINUES!!!** Comment 6, Article 2
Similarly, the *topos of burdening/weighing down* is also combined with the *topos of people*, as evident in example 88.MPC where the ‘majority of the UK electorate’ are positioned as favouring further restriction on immigration *per se* (and not just an implementation of welfare restrictions which is what David Cameron has proposed):

**88.MPC:** It’s about time Cameron took his head out of the sand and listened to the majority of the UK electorate, we have enough immigrants in our country legal or otherwise and to allow thousands more will cripple our infrastructure altogether...Comment 46, Article 2

The *topos of numbers* is also invoked to delegitimise welfare restrictions as is evident in example 89.MPC:

**89.MPC:** £1million a week being paid out in child benefit to 50,000 children in Eastern Europe who have never set foot in the UK. If you happy for that to continue, then carry on voting for the LabConLibdem consortium of liars, traitors, conspirators, and fr---sters. If you think that this is totally unacceptable, then do the right thing and VOTE UKIP Comment 90, Article 5

In the example above, the respondent draws on the figure of ‘£1million’ to show that welfare payments do not stay within the UK; rather, it is claimed they leave the country and are given to ‘50,000 children’. Thus, in this example figures are given, but these figures stand in isolation. Nevertheless, this practice of sending money to different countries is clearly perceived as undesirable, and further evidences a communitarian and not a cosmopolitan understanding of the UK’s relationship with the EU. Although the example does indirectly delegitimise the welfare restrictions, the main argument being put forward here is for the UK public to vote for UKIP (as discussed in section 7.2.1). This is further elaborated in the reconstruction below:
Welfare restrictions are also delegitimised through the utilisation of the topos of disadvantage. This was evident in section 7.2.2 where UK public social actors were portrayed as victims of immigration and is also evident in examples 90.MPC and 91.MPC:

**90.MPC:** The only sure way of limiting immigration is to shut the borders and now is the time, not 2017 after a referendum. **We have one million young people unemployed which will only continue** with more immigration. We need out of the EU and we need UKIP to do it. Cameron will bottle it like he always does. *Comment 72, Article 2*

**91.MPC:** Surely, not having enough money to provide cancer drugs to children is nasty, surely not having enough money to provide decent care to the sick or our old folk is nasty! That’s the balance, either we frit it away by giving it to a load of freeloaders or we keep OUR money for our own, that’s the choice. *Comment 30, Article 5*

In example 90.MPC, it is clear how the *topos of disadvantage* is utilised by drawing on the discourse on employment and displaying how immigration negatively affects job opportunities for British people (as discussed in section 7.2.2). It appears that this respondent does not believe the new welfare restrictions will be able to prevent immigration, and an alternative solution is proposed: The only
sure way of limiting immigration is to shut the borders...’. This is a dialogically contractive ‘pronouncement’, evidenced through the incorporation of the adverb ‘only’, thus seemingly constraining the immigration debate to only consider immigration restriction via an exiting of the EU.

Example 91.MPC, similarly evidences a dialogically contractive position where the adverb ‘surely’ is utilised and repeated to pronounce what is deemed to be a matter of fact: namely that vulnerable groups such as child cancer patients and the elderly will not be supported because welfare is being paid to the undeserved, to ‘a load of freeloaders’ (i.e. EU migrants) instead of to ‘OUR’ own. This comment is a direct response to Laszlo Andor’s criticism, discussed in Chapter 6, where he said that welfare restrictions would potentially make the UK appear to be a ‘nasty’. Thus, in this example, the adjective ‘nasty’ is recontextualized and repeated. In this case, I would suggest that the topos of disadvantage is employed in a fallacious manner as an unjustified appeal for compassion (argumentum ad misericordiam/ victim/victimiser reversal). To emphasise again, although it is not unreasonable to be concerned about where funding comes from and where it goes i.e. ensuring that the most vulnerable within society are supported, this comment presupposes that if welfare is given to immigrants, there will be no/or limited funds for other vulnerable groups. Thus, this example strategically positions EU Migrants as scapegoats, not only to emphasise an anti-immigrant stance, but also to delegitimise the EU.

Finally, while a range of topoi are employed to delegitimise welfare restrictions and legitimise further control on immigration, another prominent dimension involves the proposals and/or solutions put forward by the public (often as imperatives). Not only do these demands signal dissatisfaction with the welfare restrictions, primarily because they will not stop immigration, but they also show very high-levels of EU dissatisfaction. Whereas some of these call for immigration from the EU to be stopped or prevented, as evident in example 92.MPC, some seek to amend the welfare restrictions, where the period of time immigrants have to wait before they can claim any welfare payment is extended, as is evident in examples 93.MPC and 94.MPC.

92.MPC: Do not let them in in the first place, then benefits would not be a issue Comment 50, Article 1
93.MPC: Should be 5 years and paying taxes for that time. But I will still vote UKIP Comment 10, Article 1

94.MPC: Screw the EU....time to look after ourselves. Should be more like some other countries where you only get in if you HAVE a job to go to and you get NO benefits until you have paid in for 5 years........ Comment 5, Article 4

7.4 Public Comments: Chapter Summary

This chapter has evidenced that Mail Online public comments displayed high-levels of anti-immigrant and anti-EU sentiment, evidenced primarily through the dissatisfaction and delegitimisation of the new welfare restrictions implemented by David Cameron and the coalition government. The analysis has shown that a range of negative judgements were directed towards David Cameron, namely in relation to his trustworthiness and also his weakness vis-à-vis the EU. Moreover, this negative representation and evaluation was extended to all other UK political social actors (political parties), apart from Nigel Farage and UKIP. Here, the comments analysed displayed support and alignment with the party and their right-wing populist position, denigrating immigrants and delegitimising the EU. Thus it become clear that many respondents were utilising the online space to canvas for a UKIP vote.

Where the UK public were represented and evaluated, it was apparent that ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ (‘us’ and ‘them’) distinctions were reproduced but also reinforced and intensified, where the public positioned themselves as disadvantaged because of immigration particularly, but also because of the lack of ‘control’ the UK had being members of the EU. This was also evident through the sense of ‘Britishness’ that was constructed through references to the ‘indigenous’ or ‘native’ Brit, and also through interdiscursive connections to the discourse on employment.

A clear pattern of Euroscepticism meant that EU political social actors were also negatively represented and evaluated, and the centralisation of power within ‘Brussels’ and not the UK was again reproduced and reinforced to the detriment of the British public in particular. Moreover, on some occasions the EU was also described to be a ‘parasitic’ organisation that allowed for ‘parasitic’ practices, namely the migration of people deemed to be ‘benefit tourists’. Thus, this
displayed an explicit racist ideology (one that was evident, but implicit within *Mail Online* articles).

EU migrants and Romanians and Bulgarians specifically were only ever represented via a process of *assimilation* (as they were within the article analysis); however, within the public comments the discourse intensified and a racist ideology was explicit and rarely resisted. Many referential and predicational strategies were highlighted evidencing how a *Balknanist* representations were constructed and reinforced. This included a racist ideology apparent through the ‘parasitic’ metaphor and related concepts, which led to many respondents proposing discriminatory and exclusionary proposals and/or solutions to the perceived ‘problem’ of immigration, particularly immigration from Bulgaria and Romania (and ‘eastern’ EU countries).
Chapter 8 - Conclusion

8.1 Introduction

The aim of this thesis has been to study discourse about immigration within the UK in relation to the representation and evaluation of Bulgarians and Romanians prior to the uplifting of transitional restrictions on 1st January 2014. As the study progressed, there was one aspect that appeared to warrant more attention, namely the construction of a ‘benefit tourist’, which I argued was based on fallacious reasoning. The thesis also went onto examine the de/legitimisation of the implementation of welfare restrictions by the UK government. In proceeding to focus on this as a case study, a selection of Mail Online articles plus their corresponding public comments were analysed.

The main argument that has been presented concerns how Balkanist representations were constructed and reinforced in both Mail Online articles and their corresponding public comments, primarily through the construction of a ‘benefit tourist’ and via interdiscursive connections to discourses on welfare, employment and crime. Not only did this advance long-standing conceptual divisions between eastern and western Europe but, in arguing that a Balkanist representation is itself possessive of a racist ideology, the analysis therefore displayed the presence of racism in both covert and overt forms. Although new participatory structures online may allow for deliberative discussions which could encourage counter or resistant discourses, the openness, scalability and anonymity of the Internet might have also encouraged or appealed to overt forms of racism, which constructed EU migrants, in particular Romanians and Bulgarians, as the ‘Other’. Furthermore, the analysis also highlighted how Balkanist representations were inextricably tied to the delegitimisation of the EU and argumentation strategies for Brexit.

The purpose of this concluding chapter is to reconsider the main goals and research questions that were introduced in Chapter 1. In doing so, I will seek to provide answers that synthesise the main findings from both the article and public comment analyses in section 8.2. This chapter will also consider limitations to the study and outline further areas for research in section 8.3. Lastly, some final remarks will be made in section 8.4.
8.2 Goals and Research Questions

There were three main goals outlined in Chapter 1, which related to the originality of the research and helped to inform the construction of the research questions. Firstly, the thesis aimed to examine the representation and evaluation of EU migrants, in particular Romanians and Bulgarians. The focus on EU migrants was an important factor in the research, not only because of a personal motivation to examine whether racism was directed towards internal or European ‘Others’, but also because this appeared to be under researched in scholarly work analysing the representation of migrants in the UK and Europe. Thus, during this time, the ‘refugee crisis’\(^{52}\) necessarily dominated academic discussions on discourse about immigration. However, I saw that an examination of the discourse about EU migrants was also required, not only because of the intensity of discussions found in political and media discourse concerning the uplifting of transitional restrictions, but also because through critical examination it has been apparent that such discourse also evidenced racism.

Although there were a handful of studies that focused on the representation of Romanians and Bulgarians in the debate on EU expansion (Mawby and Gisby, 2009; Light and Young, 2009; Allen and Vicol, 2014; Balch and Balabanova, 2016), they did not utilise the methods of CDS, nor present a micro-linguistic analysis of how ‘benefit tourists’ were constructed and welfare restrictions de/legitimised, as has been the primary focus here. In relation to Research Question 1 (RQ1), I saw it necessary to examine the representation of EU migrants, in particular Romanians and Bulgarians, vis-à-vis other social actors to highlight, specifically, the ways in which social groups are discursively positioned and to show the way in which divisive ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ constructions may also be realised:

**RQ1:** How are EU migrants, in particular Bulgarians and Romanians, represented and evaluated vis-à-vis other social actors in discourse about immigration?

\(^{52}\) The ‘refugee crisis’ is presented in single quotation marks to acknowledge this label as being contested. Although refugee crises are not being disputed, the single quotation marks help to recognize that this is something ongoing even if it is not always highlighted in mainstream media.
Whereas *Mail Online* articles positioned the Conservative party, and particularly the prime minister, David Cameron in positive or more powerful positions, it was evident that the public did not reproduce these representations and evaluations, signalling their dissatisfaction with the government. Furthermore, I have argued that *Mail Online* articles positioned Conservative social actors, particularly anti-immigrant and Eurosceptic MP's, in this way to strategically present and endorse a anti-immigrant and anti-EU view and, at times, to construct Balkanist representations. Although this was not to the same intensity as the public comments, *Mail Online* articles strategically presented specific quotations from UK political social actors such as Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage in order to form Balkanist stereotypes about Romanians and Bulgarians. In the corresponding public comments, it became clear that opposing representations and evaluations of UK political social actors were evident, not because they did not share similar ideological positions, but because the respondents were calling for and demanding even tighter restriction or control on immigration *per se*. Thus, the comments focused on evaluating UK political social actors in relation to negative judgments of social esteem and social sanction, especially in relation to ‘capability’ and ‘veracity’. Where positive representations and evaluations were evident in public comments, this was mostly directed towards Nigel Farage and UKIP, despite their absence in *Mail Online* articles.

In *Mail Online* articles, UK public social actors adopted a mostly passive role, with their ‘fear’ of immigration being reinforced to construct the public as victims of immigration. However in the public comments, the respondents (who nevertheless cannot be considered representative as the UK public as a whole) were not simply passive, but very active and vocal about their anti-immigration stance. In this sense, emotions of anger and frustration were evidenced and many solutions were proposed or demanded in relation to what kind of restrictions ‘should’ be implemented, and what the respondents in this case believed was ‘right’. On many occasions, it was these demands that displayed examples of overt racism (to be discussed further below). Despite this, public comment respondents did also emphasise their passiveness in relation to the wider EU expansion and EU free movement debate, especially through the way in which they were portrayed as not being listened to by the government. Although essentialism surrounding a
‘fixed’ or ‘pure’ Britishness was evident in both the articles and the public comments, reproductions of this ideology was more intense in the public comments and related to arguments about ‘native’ or ‘indigenous’ eligibility to receive social welfare, thus displaying high levels of welfare chauvinism.

Examining the representation and evaluation of EU political social actors was also important across both the articles and corresponding public comments for two reasons. Firstly, the portrayal of EU political social actors evidenced a dichotomy between western and eastern EU member states, and in the article analysis, western member states such as France and Germany were represented as powerful and subsequently superior to ‘new’ eastern European member states including Romania and Bulgaria. This representation was reproduced within the public comments, although again more intense evaluations were apparent, including viewing eastern European countries as ‘parasitic’. In relation to the western and eastern dichotomy being perpetuated in both the articles and the public comments, it was also significant to explore the way a Balkanism was used to represent and evaluate EU Commissioner, Laszlo Andor and to delegitimise his counter-argument about “so-called ‘benefit tourism’”.

Secondly, considerations of the representation and evaluation of EU political social actors, inclusive of the EU as a collective social actor evidenced the Eurosceptic stance evident in both the articles and the public comments. The EU was portrayed in opposition to the UK, albeit in a more powerful but controlling position, which was inextricably tied to the rules for EU free movement (EU immigration). This was evidenced in both the articles and the public comments; however, the discourse was again more intense in the public comments.

In examining a range of social actors prior to and vis-à-vis the representation and evaluation of EU migrants (as discussed above), I believe the processes of ‘Othering’ became more explicit. Within Mail Online articles, EU migrants were represented via a process of assimilation and it was anticipated that immigration from Bulgaria and Romania would occur on a very large scale. Moreover, the articles presented this as something that should be feared across the UK. Metaphors that conceptualise immigration in relation to ‘water’, and by extension as a ‘natural disaster’ (despite being common in discourse about immigration), were seen to add to this sense of fear. The western/eastern divide
present in the representation and evaluation of EU political social actors was also evident, especially through the uncontested presentation of EU migrants, but in particular Romanians and Bulgarians, as being engaged in the practice of ‘benefit tourism’. Since this discourse continued to be reflective of Balkanism, I argue that this representation and evaluation of EU migrants reflects a covert form of racism (see below), one that on the surface does not necessarily appear to be racist and therefore seemingly conforming to the ethics of news reporting.

As already discussed, the Balkanism evident within the articles was reproduced to a greater intensity within the public comments. Racist representations and evaluations of EU migrants were therefore overt and explicit (see below) with very little mitigation evidenced. Similar to the Mail Online articles, EU migrants were discussed via a process of assimilation but infused negative evaluation was infused to a greater extent. The public comments also reproduced ‘water’ metaphors, not only in relation to the scale of immigration anticipated, but also with regards to the scale and intensity of ‘benefit tourism’. The adoption of other metaphors was also significant and contributed to a Balkanist representation, including that EU migrants, especially those from eastern countries such as Romania and Bulgaria, were seen as ‘parasites’.

By examining the portrayal of UK and EU political social actors, alongside EU migrants and the British public, I was able to evidence how certain ideological positions, which were anti-immigration and/or anti-EU, were also at times racist. This connects largely to the second goal of this study and Research Question 2 (RQ2), which was to investigate whether the discourse about immigration in question could be considered racist:

RQ2: Can discourse about immigration surrounding the representation and evaluation of Romanians and Bulgarians be considered racist, and to what extent is this apparent in the selected online newspaper articles and their corresponding public comments?

The way in which racism was conceptualised in this thesis was broader than some scholars might consider it to be (e.g. Miles and Brown, 2003). Thus, I adopted a view where racism was considered to be ‘syncretic’ in nature and inclusive of
‘racial’, ethnic, national, religious and cultural difference/s. Furthermore, I argued that a Balkanist representation was premised on the basis of a racist ideology. Therefore, where a Balkanist representations were apparent this subsequently also indicated the presence of a racist ideology.

Within Chapter 6, the article analysis demonstrated the strategic ways in which Mail Online articles were able to display covert forms of racism, or what might be best conceptualised as ‘new’ racism (Barker, 1981). This was apparent through the way in which Balkanist stereotypes were included by authoritative social actors and consequently endorsed. A series of argumentation strategies were also included to reinforce this, especially the topos of abuse, the topos of burdening/weighing down and the topos of danger/threat in relation to the overarching construction of the ‘benefit tourist’, which in itself was considered to be Balkanist.

Within the public comments, overt forms of racism were apparent but they were, nevertheless, based primarily on the same Balkanist stereotypes and western/eastern dichotomies evident within the articles. Thus, it is possible to say that respondents in the public comments reproduced the racist ideology seen within Mail Online articles, albeit in explicit and more intense ways. Furthermore, resistance to this prevailing ideology, which constructed Romanians and Bulgarians as the ‘Other’ via a Balkanist representations was rare, although there were a few instances where it seemed respondents attempted to challenge or resist what they had also acknowledged to be racism. However, even in these cases, resistance to racism was essentialist or considered the positives of immigration only from the perspective of an economic benefit.

Balkanist representations were also apparent in the ways the article and the public comments de/legitimised welfare restrictions, relating to Research Question 3 (RQ3), which was a later addition to the study:

**RQ3:** How are new welfare restrictions de/legitimised in Mail Online articles and their corresponding public comments, and to what extent might this contribute to the representation and evaluation of Romanians and Bulgarians as the ‘Other’?
In both the article and public comment analysis, it was clear that welfare restrictions were both legitimised and delegitimised. However, these seemingly contradictory positions were overwhelmingly based on the same ideological position which was anti-immigration, anti-EU and at times racist. Within the article analysis, the welfare restrictions were initially legitimised primarily through the adoption of the *topos of abuse* presented via recontextualized quotations from Conservative social actors. The *topos of abuse* which linked EU migrants, and Bulgarians and Romanians specifically, to the practice of ‘benefit tourism’, was argued to be based on fallacious reasoning in Chapter 5, but was nevertheless present in an uncontested way within the articles and therefore one of the ways in which the legitimisation of welfare restrictions constructed EU migrants as the ‘Other’. However, the article analysis also evidenced how the *topos of abuse* was used in relation to other *topoi* including the *topos of people*, the *topos of numbers* and the *topos of burdening/weighing down* that were chiefly related to the prevention of immigration *per se*. On the surface, it therefore appeared that restriction of welfare would correlate to greater control of immigration, or at least would be the case if ‘benefit tourism’ was an existential motivator for migration. However, not all articles adopted this position, and in articles 6 and 7 in particular, welfare restrictions were delegitimised. Delegitimisation occurred primarily from an acknowledgment that welfare restrictions would not prevent immigration from Romania and Bulgaria. Thus, although ‘benefit tourism’ was not contested, focus shifted onto the disadvantages that would be experienced by the UK public in relation specifically to employment and a range of other social services.

This type of delegitimisation was vehemently reproduced within the public comments and it was evident that there were few examples where welfare restrictions were legitimised. However, where they were, this once again based from the employment of the *topos of abuse* and ‘benefit tourism’ was largely accepted to be part of the ‘problem’. In the delegitimisation of welfare restrictions, it was clear that their ‘composition’ was negatively evaluated and they were deemed as not being ‘tough enough’. Although the *topos of abuse* was at times employed to delegitimise restrictions, where ‘benefit tourism’ appeared to be rife, there was a greater sense that a range of social services and employment prospects were vulnerable due to immigration, especially from Romania and
Bulgaria, evident through the employment of the *topos of disadvantage* and the *topos of burdening/weighing down*. Within the public comments, the delegitimisation of welfare restrictions was intensified through the incorporation of proposals or solutions that very often took the form of imperatives. In this sense, the respondents were seen to be demanding certain courses of action, which on several occasions evidenced racist discrimination and exclusion, including references to repatriation. Thus, the principle of EU free movement was seen as unfavourable, and there was no recognition of any benefit of free movement across the EU.

The final goal outlined within the introduction related to a small contribution the thesis has endeavoured to make in relation to the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA). Here, I have incorporated Martin and White's (2005) ‘Appraisal Theory’ in the analysis of evaluation alongside representation. I felt this was a particularly important part of the methodology, especially considering that the discourse about immigration analysed was populist and based on a series of emotions rather than sound judgements. The consideration of evaluation alongside representation is something that has been suggested by Hart (2014) and is an area that could be explored in further research.

**8.3 Limitations and Further Research**

This thesis has explored discourse about immigration in relation to the representation and evaluation of Romanians and Bulgarians in the UK. However, in narrowing the focus to explore the discourse topic of 'benefit tourists' and welfare restrictions, many other discourses and discourse topics could not be analysed in the same micro-linguistic detail presented in Chapters 6 and 7. Although discourses on crime and employment featured within the analysis where they were interdiscursively linked to the discourse on welfare, it was beyond the scope of this thesis to explore the complexities of these overarching discourses in a more exhaustive analytical way. Nevertheless, as the original corpus comprised over a thousand articles, there is potential for further research to be conducted. One area that I have already began to explore as a collaborative project is the way in which gender and ethnicity are represented in the *Mail Online*, specifically in relation to Roma women (Polyzou and Demetriou, 2018). In this project, we have evidenced a blend of both *Orientalist* and *Balkanist*
representations in the construction of Roma women as the ultimate ‘Other’, primarily through visual rather than linguistic means. In the analysis of selected articles where Roma women were hyper-visible via images, it was found that they were nevertheless invisible within the text, with the focus being primarily on the criminality and/or anti-social behaviour of male migrants from Romania and Bulgaria. This juxtaposition was something that emanated from the data collected for this thesis, and findings have evidenced discrimination at the intersections of sexism and racism in the *Mail Online*. Here, Roma women’s physicality became a symbol of ‘Otherness’ and they also stood metonymically for all Romanians and Bulgarians.

A further limitation to this study is that only up to 100 comments per article were considered. This methodological decision was made at a time when hundreds of articles were collected for the purposes of analysis and when it was therefore more difficult to capture, collect and store more examples. Despite this, it was never the intention of the thesis to generalise about the general public’s attitude towards immigration; rather, the purpose was to examine the discursive structures present in the representation and evaluation of EU migrants (Romanians and Bulgarians) vis-à-vis other social actors in relation to the uplifting of transitional controls and the implementation of welfare restrictions. Although the inclusion of more public comments may have added some additional nuances to the analysis, I do not think that this limitation has prevented the research questions from being fully answered.

It was also beyond the scope of this thesis to include a comparison with another newspaper. Although I had originally intended to compare *Mail Online* articles and corresponding public comments with equivalent articles and public comments from *The Guardian* (online) (as discussed in Chapter 5), I went onto only consider the *Mail Online*. As a ‘critical’ discourse analyst, the *Mail Online* has been of interest because of the way in which it reports in discriminatory ways. Although this is not to say that *The Guardian* does not also engage with or produce discourse on immigration that may also be perceived as discriminatory or at least as reinforcing/perpetuating negative conceptualisations (e.g. with the incorporation of ‘water’ metaphors), I chose to direct my analytical attention towards the *Mail Online* so that I could fully examine the micro-linguistic details
of both the articles and the corresponding public comments. I thought this was especially important considering the status of the Mail Online, as the most visited online newspaper in 2012, and type of influence the paper may have in the perpetuation and spread of discriminatory ideologies. I have also been able to answer all the research questions fully without the incorporation of a comparison. Nevertheless, a short comparison with The Guardian (Online) articles plus their corresponding public comments has been presented in Demetriou (2018). Here it was found that, although 'benefit tourism' was not mentioned and at times refuted within The Guardian (Online) articles, the public comments nevertheless continued to evidence instances of a Balkanist and therefore a racist ideology in relation to ‘benefit tourists’ and the legitimisation of welfare restrictions through the incorporation of referents such as ‘beggars’ and ‘losers’.

8.4 Final Considerations

This thesis has demonstrated that, despite the development of anti-racist policies within the UK, racism is still evident in political, media and public discourses about immigration whether in covert or overt forms. Immigration continues to be conceptualised in negative and also discriminatory ways, meaning that racist hate-crime also persists. Within the analysis, it was evident that covert forms of racism, evident via the presence of a Balkanist discourse were evident in both the articles and the corresponding public comments. However, I have also argued that the openness, scalability and anonymity of the Internet also seemingly contributed to the overt and explicit nature of racism that was also evident in the public comments.

At the end of Discourse and Discrimination, Reisigl and Wodak (2001) predicted that EU expansion would lead to an increased fear of immigration and a subsequent rise in racism. Moreover, they explain how fears could become “projected onto scapegoats – [with] these scapegoats [being] ‘the foreigners’ who ‘threaten the jobs’” (ibid: 267), emphasising that the expansion of a cosmopolitan EU would also be “accompanied by the rise of nationalism, ethnicism, as well as ‘xenophobia’ and racism” (ibid). I believe that this thesis has confirmed the existence of such fears and the continuation and perpetuation of racist ideology. Although social media has the potential to become a platform for the public to engage in deliberative democracy (Habermas, 1996), or for the realisation of
deliberative democracy, it is nevertheless also a place in which fallacious argumentation and manipulative discourse that is discriminatory, is disseminated.
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10 – Appendices

**Appendix 1: Macro Analysis**

*Appendix 1.1: Mail Online*

*Appendix 1.2: The Guardian*
Appendix 2: Mail Online Articles + Public Comments

Appendix 2.1: Article 1
Appendix 2.2: Article 2
Appendix 2.3: Article 3
Appendix 2.4: Article 4
Appendix 2.5: Article 5
Appendix 2.6: Article 6
Appendix 2.7: Article 7
Appendix 2.8: Article 8
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Headline</th>
<th>Standpoint</th>
<th>Discourses and Discourse Topics</th>
<th>Discourse on Welfare</th>
<th>Discourse on Employment</th>
<th>Discourse on Crime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>24 November 2013</td>
<td>Cameron prepares showdown with Europe over benefits for Romanian and Bulgarian migrants ~ Daily Mail Online</td>
<td>Prime Minister unveiling proposals to renegotiate relationship with Europe. New arrivals would have to wait a year, up from 3 months, to get benefits. EU rules ban discriminating between citizens and migrants’ hand-outs. PM considering move today, which would spark court battle with Brussels.</td>
<td>Discussing Immigration. Discussing on Power/Control. Discussing on Euros. Discussing on EU freedoms of movement.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>25 November 2013</td>
<td>Bulgarian ambassador: Britain has approved all our work permits since 2007 despite Home Office staff being told to refuse requests if UK workers can do the job ~ Daily Mail Online</td>
<td>Konstantin Dimitrov out at “anti-Bulgarian propaganda from UK politicians. Between 8,000 and 10,000 Bulgarians come to Britain each year in search of work.</td>
<td>Discussing on Immigration. Discussing on Power/Control. Discussing on EU freedoms of movement.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>25 November 2013</td>
<td>Coalition split over plan to curb benefits for new EU migrants ~ Lib Dem minister says he ‘needs to be persuaded’ while Boris backs restrictions ~ Daily Mail Online</td>
<td>The plan will create “social scoreboard” to rate countries on social matters — They include poverty, levels, health care, benefits and housing policy. German MPs say EU is aiming to be “Europe’s social conscience”. They claim EU wants to appropriate powers to supervise and intervene over moves member states deal with social problems.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>25 November 2013</td>
<td>European Parliament approves plan for ‘social policy’ that would lay foundations for the EU controlling benefit payments ~ Daily Mail Online</td>
<td>Half of Brits want to stop new migrants moving here ~ Daily Mail Online</td>
<td>47% say Romanians and Bulgarians should not have the right to come to the UK. Should not be allowed to work, live or claim benefits in Britain, poll says. Prime Minister unveiling proposals to renegotiate relationship with Europe. New arrivals would have to wait a year, up from 3 months, to get benefits. EU rules ban discriminating between citizens and migrants’ hand-outs. PM considering move, which would spark court battle with Brussels.</td>
<td>Discussing on Immigration. Discussing on EU freedoms of movement.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>25 November 2013</td>
<td>Desmond Tutu: Do NOT return to Powell rhetoric over Romania and Bulgaria immigration now ~ Daily Mail Online</td>
<td>Archbishop says Britain must recognise the ‘opportunity’ of immigration. Likes debate to 1968 Enoch Powell speech against immigration. 47% say Romanians and Bulgarians should not have right to come to the UK. Prime Minister unveiling proposals to renegotiate relationship with Europe. EU rules ban discriminating between citizens and migrants’ hand-outs.</td>
<td>Discussing on Immigration. Discussing on EU freedoms of movement.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>26 November 2013</td>
<td>Homeless Romanian is jailed after ‘real sex attack’ ~ Daily Mail Online</td>
<td>Marius Glad Trimbitas raped the woman, 24, in a stairwell in south London. The rapist who described himself as ‘evil’, was fought off by passers-by. He was deported from Britain in 2001 but returned in March this year. The victim was waiting for a bus home when she was attacked last month. Police said they ‘cannot rule out’ that Trimbitas may have carried out similar attacks.</td>
<td>Discussing on Immigration. Discussing on EU freedoms of movement.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>26 November 2013</td>
<td>Just 8,000 Bulgarians a year will move to UK, ambassador claims ~ Daily Mail Online</td>
<td>Konstantin Dimitrov’s forecast is in stark contrast to the 50,000 estimate by pressure group Migration Watch. It will be regarded as a warning underestimate by experts considering between 8,000 and 10,000 Bulgarians already come to the UK each year. Ministers refuse to give their own forecast after the previous government got its figures so wrong.</td>
<td>Discussing on Immigration. Discussing on EU freedoms of movement.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>26 November 2013</td>
<td>The Polish minister was incredulous as I told him Blair was opening our borders ~ Daily Mail Online</td>
<td>The look on the face of the Polish Interior Minister was one of incredulity.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>26 November 2013</td>
<td>Brussels Commissioner Lausis Anderson: ‘Cameron is making Britain the nasty country of Europe’ ~ Daily Mail Online</td>
<td>Lausis Anderson accuses David Cameron of an ‘unfortunate over-reaction’. Claims the British public are not given the ‘full truth’ about migration. PM unveils new restrictions on access to benefits for EU migrants. Cameron: EU principle of ‘free movement’ for workers has gone too far. But Commissioner insists inflow from Poland caused no damage to Britain.</td>
<td>Discussing on Immigration. Discussing on EU freedoms of movement.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>27 November 2013</td>
<td>Germany and France join PM on benefit tourism crackdown ~ Daily Mail Online</td>
<td>Tory MPs are calling for restrictions on Romanian and Bulgarian workers to stay in place after January 1, claiming Britain is ‘full-up’</td>
<td>Both Angela Merkel and Francois Hollande’s governments are looking at introducing similar restrictions. Brussels commissioner told to quit over his ‘nasty’ Britain remarks.</td>
<td>Discussing on Immigration. Discussing on EU freedoms of movement.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>27 November 2013</td>
<td>DO share your concerns on migration, declares Cameron days after Mail’s explosive poll? ~ Daily Mail Online</td>
<td>PM unveils new restrictions on access to benefits for EU migrants. ‘EU principle of “free movement” has gone too far’ he’ll say. Emergency package of measures comes days after a Daily Mail poll revealed four in five people don’t want unrestricted access to UK.</td>
<td>Discussing on Immigration. Discussing on EU freedoms of movement.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>27 November 2013</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>First paragraph: With our proud history of fighting for liberty and championing the oppressed, Britain needs no lectures on tolerance and decency from even the most vicious of nations.</td>
<td>Discussing on Immigration. Discussing on EU freedoms of movement.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>28 November 2013</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Discussion on Government. Discussion on EU freedoms of movement.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>Discourse</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| 28 November 2013 | Fury as Hungarian eurocrit calls UK 'naive': Sort out your own backyard first, MPs fume | Daily Mail Online                                                      | Lausko Anber said Cameron's benefit curbs for migrants 'fuelled system'. He added that they are in danger of suppressing the single market. Theresa May: "Comments show Brussels is 'on wrong side of argument'." Labour MP John Mann said he should look 'closer to home' before criticising. | Discourse on Immigration
Discourse on Welfare
Topics: new benefit restrictions, EU freedom of movement |
| 28 November 2013 | Now net migration is on the rise again! It's up to 182,000 after 2 years of falls as workers flee eurozone | Daily Mail Online                                                      | 182,000 more people came to UK in the year to June 2013 than left. Surprise increase fuelled by a drop in the number of people leaving. But there was a significant rise in people from the EU looking for work. Government has revealed new curbs on benefit migrants. European Commissioner Lausko Anber accused British of being 'naive'. Nick Clegg hit back saying freedom of movement is not freedom to claim. Cameron to challenge the other EU countries to follow UK's lead at summit. | Discourse on Immigration
Discourse on Employment
Discourse on Demographics
Topics: population increases, estimates/figures/statistics, workers from EU, British emigration, new benefit restrictions, EU freedom of movement |
| 28 November 2013 | Prime Minister’s plan vs reality: Will Cameron’s immigration crackdown work? | Daily Mail Online                                                      | David Cameron has hastily put together a package of measures to deter benefit tourists. Here, Home Affairs Editor James Slack assesses the plans - and the reality.                                                                                       | Discourse on Immigration
Discourse on Welfare
Topics: new benefit restrictions, benefit tourism |
| 29 November 2013 | Cameron tells EU chief to rein in ‘naive’ commissioner: PM admits Government can do little to reduce overwhelming incentives for people to migrate to Britain | Daily Mail Online                                                      | David Cameron clashed angrily with Brussels over migration policy. Prime Minister said Lausko Anber’s remarks were ‘inappropriate’. Commissioner accused PM of fuelling ‘hysteria’ and not telling truth. Cameron uses Lithuania summit to push reforms for freedom of movement. Theresa May admits EU wealth gap creates ‘incentive’ to move to Britain. | Discourse on Immigration
Discourse on Welfare
Discourse on Economy
Topics: migration policy, truth/lies about immigration, EU freedom of movement, EU wealth gap, new benefit restrictions (inferred) |
| 29 November 2013 | Lord Patten says political correctness stops politicians speaking the truth on immigration | Daily Mail Online                                                      | The former Tory minister blamed the dark side of globalisation for issues. He suggested politicians were increasingly reluctant to tell people the truth. He was speaking to international audience at the British Embassy in Paris. He said that Brussels' main problem on issues was lack of accountability. | Discourse on Immigration
Discourse on Globalisation
Topics: globalisation, truth/lies about immigration, EU problems (dissatisfaction) |
| 30 November 2013 | ‘We are not second-rate citizens’: Romanian Prime Minister tells Britain not to discriminate against ‘migrant wave’ | Daily Mail Online                                                      | Migrants from Romania and Bulgaria free to work in UK from January 1, but Victor Ponta says there is no evidence of ‘migrant wave’ to Britain. He says welfare restrictions should not be used to ‘justify discrimination’. | Discourse on Immigration
Discourse on Discrimination
Discourse on Welfare
Discourse on Employment
Topics: workers from EU, new benefit restrictions, estimates/figures/statistics, accusations of discrimination/racism |
| 30 November 2013 | Police hunt Romanian ATM thieves who are behind 90% of UK cashpoint fraud | Daily Mail Online                                                      | British and Romanian police are working to bring down cashpoint fraud. Around €40 million worth is thought to be committed per year in the UK. Around 90 per cent of it is organised by Romanian gangs according to police figures. | Discourse on Immigration
Discourse on Crime
Topics: police response, details of crime |
| 30 November 2013 | The EU simply won’t allow us to stem the tide of immigrants | Daily Mail Online                                                      | Conservative MP for North Essex speaks out over immigration. Bernard Jenkin says that the Prime Minister must do more on the issue. Compared David Cameron’s stance to 11th Century King Canute. | Discourse on Immigration
Discourse on Restriction |
| 30 November 2013 | Undocumented film exposes ‘Tajik school teaching Bulgarians to pick YOUR pocket’ | Daily Mail Online                                                      | Video shows ‘Golden Hands’, a renowned pickpocketing expert. He says 75-year-old has schooled hundreds of children in the art of theft. She says many of her pupils are on their way to Britain. | Discourse on Immigration
Discourse on Crime
Topics: details of crime |
| 30 November 2013 | Arrest foreign beggars, pleads council | Daily Mail Online                                                      | Five local government chief have written to the Home Office Minister. They have asked for tougher legislation to tackle aggressive begging. Move ahead of expected influx of Eastern European beggars from next year. | Discourse on Immigration
Discourse on Crime
[making anti-social/ undesirable behaviour criminal]
Topics: policies/legislation, details of crime (undesirable behaviour) |
| 30 December 2013 | Bulgarian burglar with string of offences in homeland is jailed for breaking into house just NINE days after arriving in the UK | Daily Mail Online                                                      | Emil Metodios, 32, was caught with items from burglary in Essex. Jailed to 16 months after pleading guilty at Basildon Crown Court. Claimed he just wanted to be by the seaside but had run out of money. Was caught after being chased by teenager in his underwear. | Discourse on Immigration
Discourse on Crime
Topics: details of crime |
| 30 December 2013 | PM David Cameron admits key migration target may not be met | Daily Mail Online                                                      | David Cameron said immigration target will be difficult to meet. Tory election pledge was to reduce immigration to ‘tens of thousands’. However net migration rose last year from 167,000 to 182,000. Rise was in part due to fewer Britons leaving the country to live elsewhere. | Discourse on Immigration
Discourse on Economy
Topics: migration target (estimates/figures/statistics), population increase, British emigration |
| 30 December 2013 | Welcome to Kazakhstan where gangmasters and slum landlords are the only winners, by RICHARD LITTLEJOHN | Daily Mail Online                                                      | N/A
First paragraph: The photograph was arresting. It certainly caused me to stumble over my scrambled eggs. I refer to that extraordinary picture of the kitchen with an en suite toilet, which appeared in yesterday's Mail. It was taken in an outhouse in Cambridge, home to two immigrants from Eastern Europe. | Discourse on Immigration
Discourse on Culture
Topics: housing/living conditions |
| 4 December 2013 | Romanians take the jobs Britons on welfare shun | Daily Mail Online                                                      | Mariana Campeanu said migrants ‘contribute greatly to GDP’. "They should be welcomed for filling jobs in agriculture and hospitality." She said they met shortfalls in key roles such as nursing and social care. | Discourse on Immigration
Discourse on Employment
Discourse on Economy
Discourse on Welfare
Topics: workers from EU (Romania), migrant contribution, labour shortages, British people on welfare |
28 04 December 2013
Homeless? What a joke! What a joke! Romanian Big Issue seller who stole from blind pensioner lives in £250,000 four-bedroomed house and has a conviction for theft ~ Daily Mail Online

Razvan Dumitru, 22, stole from 66 year old as she rummaged in her purse

Shocked shoppers alerted the blind victim and held Dumitru to the floor. He admitted theft and has been banned from selling the magazine again

The Big Issue seller lives in four-bedroom terraced house worth £250,000

Discuss on Immigration
Discuss on Crime
Topics: details of crime, details of victim

29 05 December 2013
EU referendum: Viviane Reding's 'shocking' reply to Theresa May's 'Migrant cap' proposal ~ Daily Mail Online

Viviane Reading attacked the welfare system for being 'too generous' EU Justice Commissioner vowed to block attempts to end 'benefit tourism'

Home Secretary suggested the idea of a 'cap' on the number of EU workers

Discuss on Immigration
Discuss on Welfare
Topics: restriction of immigration, cap on EU migrants, new benefit restrictions

30 05 December 2013
How UK visas for Lithuanian migrants are rubber-stamped in just ten minutes despite country being rated 'high risk' for fraudulent applications ~ Daily Mail Online

N/A

Discuss on Immigration
Discuss on Employment
Topics: workers from EU, workers from Britain

31 05 December 2013
Yes, too many young Britons are work-shy! Shame it takes a Romanian minister to say what our own politicians aren't ~ Daily Mail Online

First Paragraph: Almost a million 18 to 25-year-olds lack work. The compassion industry tells us this scourge should be our shame; that we are threatened with a 'lost generation', whom we have betrayed. Yet in any restaurant or pizza parlour, especially in southern England, one is likely to be served by a Pole, a Latvian or a Romanian.

Discuss on Immigration
Discuss on Employment
Topics: workers from EU, workers from Britain

32 07 December 2013
Send them all back home! In shocking video, UPF councillor and key Faragly ally launches astonishing racist rant... then sells DVD... "I stand by every word" ~ Daily Mail Online

James Morris is a key member of Ed Miliband’s strategy unit

Sent tweet saying he was ‘sad and ashamed’

Criticised by Tony MP who said Labour want to shut down debate

Discuss on Immigration
Discuss on Employment
Topics: anti-immigration, British voters

34 08 December 2013
Why was violent rubber with a 15-year criminal record allowed into Britain to bungle a family’s home? ~ Daily Mail Online

Emil Metadata, 32, took jewellery, cash and war medals from Essex home

Convicted last week as it emerged he has burglary and drug-dealing past

Police turned a blind eye by agreeing to recruit him as an informant

Discuss on Immigration
Discuss on Employment
Topics: migrant rights, labour shortages, EU freedoms, EU expansion, accusations of discrimination/racism

35 09 December 2013
Bosses of Domino’s and Ocado unite to back migrants’ right to work ~ Daily Mail Online

Dominio’s boss Lance Batchelor says firm struggles to recruit staff

Sir Stuart Rose said he believed in the free market, adding ‘Life is tough’

The comments come amid concern over relaxed immigration laws

Romanian Labour minister has already attacked ‘racism and xenophobia

Discuss on Immigration
Discuss on Employment
Topics: migrant rights, labour shortages, EU freedoms, EU expansion, accusations of discrimination/racism

36 09 December 2013
The bosses who would love to give jobs to Brits if they weren’t so lazy ~ Daily Mail Online

N/A

First paragraph: For years they’ve been accused of snatching jobs that might otherwise be filled by British workers

And with restrictions on Romanians and Bulgarians working in Britain due to be lifted on January 1, fears of a new influx of Eastern European migrant workers flooding into the UK are growing fast

Discuss on Immigration
Discuss on Employment
Topics: workers from Britain, workers from EU, immigration restrictions, concerns and fear

37 09 December 2013
‘UK is not the same place for EULIONS with buyers allowed to live and work ANYWHERE in the European Union’ ~ Daily Mail Online

N/A

Discuss on Immigration
Discuss on Employment
Topics: workers from Britain, immigrant workers, immigration policy/law

39 10 December 2013
UK population growth could hit 15m15m15m in a century ~ Daily Mail Online

Population could be double if migration, fertility and life expectancy are high

Number of over - 65s to exceed under - 16s by the end of 2020

Dramatic population change will heap pressure on public services

Two thirds of increase linked to immigrants and their children

Discuss on Immigration
Discuss on Demographics
Topics: population increases, life expectancy, fertility, public services

40 11 December 2013
Pay higher wages to attract UK workers, says Immigration Minister ~ Daily Mail Online

Mark Harper said firms unable to find workers are not paying enough

Hit back at claims by Domino’s boss Lance Batchelor that the chain could create 1,000 jobs - but too many British people do not want work

He said there is no question of government relaxing immigration rules to allow Domino’s to ‘keep wages low’

Comments come as Sir Stuart Rose criticised the work ethic of Britons

Discuss on Immigration
Discuss on Employment
Topics: workers from Britain, immigrant workers, immigration policy/law

41 11 December 2013
Roma gypsies return to Marble Arch where they are ‘aggressively begging’ ~ Daily Mail Online

Travellers reportedly targeting wealthy tourists and shoppers for money

They were evicted in July - with some even give free flight home

But now they’re back and council chiefs say there’s very little they can do

Discuss on Immigration
Discuss on Criminality/Undesirability
Topics: Roma community

42 11 December 2013
French minister, Manuel Valls, calls on Britain to change immigration policy ~ Daily Mail Online

N/A

Discuss on Immigration
Discuss on Employment
Topics: workers from Britain, immigrant workers, immigration policy/law

43 13 December 2013
Migrants from poorer countries could be banned from Britain to curb benefits tourism ~ Daily Mail Online

David Cameron proposed new rule to limit immigration for poor nations

Countries would have to improve economic wealth before curbs lifted

Prime Minister also warned prisoners ‘stamed well shouldn’t get the vote’

Iain Duncan Smith vows benefits tourism will not happen ‘on my watch’

Discuss on Immigration
Discuss on Economy
Discuss on Welfare
Discuss on Crime
Topics: restriction of immigration, benefit tourism, wealth of EU countries

44 13 December 2013
Romanians arrested at seven times rate of Britons in London ~ Daily Mail Online

Many arrests linked to cashpoint fraud costing £40million in six months

For every 1,000 Romanians in London 183 are arrested

Police told to investigate why figures are so disproportionate

Discuss on Immigration
Discuss on Crime
Topics: details of crime, police response, figures/statistics
51 14 December 2013

Immigrant influx 'tell put a strain on schools' Offord chief says
Government has 'big job' in ensuring there are enough quality teachers to cope Daily Mail Online

52 14 December 2013

Tony MPs call on David Cameron to show Parliament a veto on EU law so we control our borders Daily Mail Online

60 21 December 2013

Cut migration or 'risk block Serbia and Albania from joining EU', warns Cameron Daily Mail Online

61 21 December 2013

PM warned: 'We'll lose ethnic vote if you bang on about immigration' Daily Mail Online

62 21 December 2013

The towns braced for a 20 per cent rise in population in just 10 years Population boom looks certain to engulf South Daily Mail Online
63 22 December 2013 A third of Big issue vendors are now from eastern Europe, magazine founder reveals ~ Daily Mail Online
Big issue founder John Bird claims most are from Roma communities he says selling the Big issue is one of the few ways they can make money
Mr Bird criticised the former Labour government for opening up freedom of movement to the UK to residents of all EU countries His comments come after David Cameron vowed to veto plans to expand the EU’s borders unless reforms crack down on “benefit tourism”
But Nick Clegg has pledged to block curbs on immigration from the EU
Discuss on Immigration
Discuss on Employment
Discuss on Welfare
Topics: Homeless, Roma, Big issue, self-employed, EU freedom of movement, restriction of immigration, benefit tourism, cap on EU migrants

64 22 December 2013 One in three babies born in England and Wales has a foreign parent - and in some areas it’s more than 80% ~ Daily Mail Online
Nine in 10 babies have one non-British parent or part of the UK Seven in 10 babies in London have at least one foreign parent Number of foreign-born people in Britain quadrupled in 60 years UK government has proposed caps on migration for new year
Discuss on Immigration
Discuss on Demographics
Topics: statistics and figures, immigration increases, caps on EU migration

65 22 December 2013 Vince Cable compares David Cameron to Enrich Powell over Tory calls for tougher controls ~ Daily Mail Online
Business Secretary said Tories were spreading ‘pans’ about immigration Compared to notoriou ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech Accused of members of the public of being ‘schizophrenic’ in their concerns
His words threatened to reignite rows ahead of an expected migrant influx
Made the comments in an appearance on BBC’s Andrew Marr show
Discuss on Immigration
Discuss on Discrimination
Topics: restriction/control of immigration, political and public concern about immigration

66 23 December 2013 DAILY MAIL COMMENT! An insult too far from former Home Secretary Cable ~ Daily Mail Online
First paragraph: Yesterday, many Tory MPs were justifiably expressing their fury at the scurrilous attack by Vince Cable on the Prime Minister’s immigration strategy
Discuss on Immigration
Topics: government immigration strategy (restrictions)

67 23 December 2013 DAILY MAIL COMMENT! Contempt for voters’ views on immigration ~ Daily Mail Online
First paragraph: In a typically posturing intervention yesterday, Nick Clegg declared that the Liberal Democrats would not tolerate the Tories introducing any further curbs on EU immigration while he is in office.
Discuss on Immigration
Topics: political/public concern, cap on EU migration

68 23 December 2013 Surge of Romanians ‘could hit schools and hospitals’: Fears migrants coming to Britain will put huge pressure on public services ~ Daily Mail Online
Major report by the institute for Public Research gave a warning that London and the South East will be particularly at risk There could also be more aggressive begging, anti-social behaviour, rough sleeping and criminality from the new year, when restrictions are lifted
Discuss on Immigration
Discuss on Crime (anti-social behaviour)
Discuss on Education
Discuss on Health
Topics: pressure on public services, concern/fears, increase of anti-social behaviour, crime, ending of restrictions

69 23 December 2013 NIESR ‘UK growth would be slashed by 11% if Tory immigration target met’ ~ Daily Mail Online
NIESR says keeping immigration numbers below 100,000 would increase government spending as a share of GDP by 1.4 percentage points by 2060
That would cost almost £165 billion at today’s prices, or about £2800 for every person in the country Finances would be hit because immigrants tend to be younger than the national average
Discuss on Immigration
Discuss on Economy
Topics: benefits of immigration for economy, facts/figures/statistics

70 23 December 2013 Tory Grant Shapps suavages Cable in migrant row while others call on Cameron to sack him ~ Daily Mail Online
Grant Shapps said Business Secretary ‘ruins Christmas’ Cable accused David Cameron of spreading panic on immigration Other Conservatives have urged Prime Minister to sack him for remarks
Discuss on Immigration
Topics: political concern about immigration, references to claims about discrimination

71 24 December 2013 Mac on... Vince Cable’s stance on immigration (Satirical Cartoon) REMOVED

72 27 December 2013 Hungarian will be seen in London, Lapis and Istanbul among top plans to relocate ~ Daily Mail Online
1.677 people living rough on London’s streets from May to October 2013
On average, 13 from Bulgaria and 157 from Romania, charity figures suggest
Means 9.8 per cent are from the two eastern European countries Average of 780 of those sleeping rough from the UK - around 47%
Discuss on Immigration
Discuss on Poverty/Wealth
Topics: Romanian and Bulgarian as homeless, figures/statistics

73 28 December 2013 The new ethnic cleansing? ‘This disturbing dispatch from Eastern Europe reveals how racism exploited by politicians is driving thousands of people to flee to Britain’ ~ Daily Mail Online
Roma across eastern Europe have been fire-bombed, raped and murdered
One Hungarian columnist suggested running over Roma children in cars
In Slovakia some want to build high walls around gypsy settlements
Changing migration laws will allow exodus to Britain from January 1
Discuss on Immigration
Discuss on Discrimination
Discuss on Crime
Discuss on Economy
Topics: racism and discrimination in Eastern European countries against Roma, Roma exodus to Britain, EU freedom of movement, new rights for migrants/Roma, crimes against the Roma community

74 28 December 2013 The new ethnic cleansing? ‘This disturbing dispatch from Eastern Europe reveals how racism exploited by politicians is driving thousands of people to flee to Britain’ ~ Daily Mail Online
Bulgarians and Romanians will have the same rights as other EU citizens to live and work throughout Europe, but Britain is likely to be seen as more attractive than other countries struggling to make an economic comeback
The Home Office-funded ‘research - obtained by The Mail on Sunday - also suggests that the UK could lose out financially if low-paid Bulgarians and Romanians drive up Poles on higher wages, who pay more tax
Worryingly, the report also raises the prospect of tensions between Bulgarians and Romanians on one side and the first wave of Eastern European immigrants on the other Scroll down to read the full report
Discuss on Immigration
Discuss on Poverty/Wealth
Discuss on Economy
Discuss on Employment
Discuss on Culture
Topics: migrant rights, EU workers, wealth of EU countries, community tensions

75 28 December 2013 Third of people living in Britain will be first or second generation immigrants by 2050, EU predictions say ~ Daily Mail Online
One in three UK residents will have immigration background in 45 years
Britain’s net immigration is expected to rise to 12 million
England revealed as second most crowded country in Europe
Almost 500 people will be squeezed into every square kilometre by 2046
Discuss on Immigration
Discuss on Demographics
Topics: population increase, net immigration increase, figures/estimates/statistics

76 28 December 2013 What they DIDNT tell you about Bulgarian and Romanian migrants heading for Britain ~ Daily Mail Online
Tristram Hunt said that British youngsters must be trained for skilled job
Speaking days before Romanians and Bulgarians given right to work in UK
Discuss on Immigration
Discuss on Education
Discuss on Employment
Topics: student failure, British workers, Romanian and Bulgarian new rights (uplifting of transitional restrictions)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Body</th>
<th>Discourse on Immigration</th>
<th>Discourse on Culture</th>
<th>Discourse on Crime</th>
<th>Discourse on Economy</th>
<th>Topics:</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29 Dec 2013</td>
<td>First paragraph: The authorities know in detail that the lifting of immigration controls on Bulgarians and Romanians this week could lead to strain on public services, to housing problems and even to social cohesion issues among different migrant groups.</td>
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<tr>
<td>29 Dec 2013</td>
<td>&quot;UKIP: Anger of UKIP supporters after Nigel Farage says Britain SHOULD accept refugees from Syria&quot;</td>
<td>Daily Mail</td>
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<td>30 Dec 2013</td>
<td>Animal towns魔术师 revealed that refugees from Bulgaria are starting to live &quot;daily Mail&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 Dec 2013</td>
<td>Bobbi's saved! Disabled dog who was rescued from the gutters of Bulgaria</td>
<td>Daily Mail</td>
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<td>30 Dec 2013</td>
<td>Damian Draghici, Senior Roma says UK should worry about bankers not Romanian beggars &quot;Daily Mail Online&quot;</td>
<td>Damian Draghici says migrant beggars only ask for small sums of cash 'Yet some in the banks are stealing billions but nobody sees them,' he said. Senior Romanian official says migrant are put off by UK's poor weather. He believes that only 2,000 to 3,000 would make the trip this winter.</td>
<td>Discourse on Immigration</td>
<td>Discourse on Crime</td>
<td>Discourse on Economy</td>
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<td>30 Dec 2013</td>
<td>Don't lift the border controls, grassroots Tories beg Cameron&quot; Activists say the risk social unrest if the PM doesn't tear up plans &quot;Daily Mail Online&quot;</td>
<td>90 activists and consistency chairman demand that PM tear up plans Grassroots demand Cameron uses a little-known clause in EU law. Activists also call for an 'emergency' recall of Parliament.</td>
<td>Discourse on Immigration</td>
<td>Discourse on Crime</td>
<td>Discourse on Economy</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 Dec 2013</td>
<td>Sold Out! Flights and buses full as Romanians and Bulgarians head for the UK &quot;Daily Mail Online&quot;</td>
<td>Some-one-way tickets are selling for up to £3,000 each: Buses leaving Bulgarian capital of Sofia until January 9 are fully booked.</td>
<td>Discourse on Immigration</td>
<td>Discourse on Travel</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 Dec 2013</td>
<td>Germany's CSU calls for tighter restrictions on Romanians and Bulgarians migrants &quot;Daily Mail Online&quot;</td>
<td>The Christian Social Union fears that 'poverty migrants' will burden Germany's already struggling health and social services. Many German cities have pleaded with the government as Romanian and Bulgarian migrants 'ghettoize' communities. The CSU is demanding tougher restrictions on EU-member state migrants.</td>
<td>Discourse on Immigration</td>
<td>Discourse on Health</td>
<td>Discourse on Welfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 Dec 2013</td>
<td>Migrants will be charged by A&amp;E in clamping on health tourism &quot;Daily Mail Online&quot;</td>
<td>Migrants billed between £20 and £100 for a consultation at A&amp;E Patients may end up being presented with a chip and pin machine. Charges come in areas concerns NHS is not 'international' is it is claimed foreigner patients rack up costs of £26 billion a year. Many health tourists travel to UK specifically for free treatment. Ministers have ruled out making overseas patients pay to see a GP.</td>
<td>Discourse on Immigration</td>
<td>Discourse on Health</td>
<td>Discourse on Welfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>31 Dec 2013</td>
<td>Hundreds of thousands from outside EU could head for UK in passport loophole &quot;Daily Mail Online&quot;</td>
<td>Bulgaria and Romania offering passports to non-EU citizens. Romania has offered citizenship to four million Moldovans. Meanwhile Bulgaria has handed 90,000 Moldobrians passports. All will be able to come and work in UK under EU rules.</td>
<td>Discourse on Immigration</td>
<td>Discourse on EU</td>
<td>Discourse on Freedom</td>
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<td>31 Dec 2013</td>
<td>Tony Philippa Roe warns of burden Romanian and Bulgarian immigrants will place on public services &quot;Daily Mail Online&quot;</td>
<td>Philippa Roe of Westminster City Council says council taxpayers will face rising bills from Bulgarians and Romanian immigration. Claims that Roma immigrants have been bringing aggressive and behaving in an unsavoury way. Tens of thousands of Eastern Europeans expected in UK from tomorrow. Police boss says Romanians are already most likely to be criminals.</td>
<td>Discourse on Immigration</td>
<td>Discourse on Crime</td>
<td>Discourse on Welfare</td>
<td>Discourse on Economy</td>
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<tr>
<td>01 Jan 2014</td>
<td>Migrants: Give the people a say EU freedom says Keith Vaz &quot;Daily Mail Online&quot;</td>
<td>Labour MP even bought some a coffee to find out why they are here Romanian Victor Spinseau told him he would send his cash back home. &quot;I don't come to rob your country,&quot; he said. Mr Vaz says British officials should get referendum on number of EU migrants. Companies advertise 5,000 jobs to recruit Romanian workers Adverts promise cash daily and say command of English 'unnecessary'. Today 4,896 jobs advertised in England, but less than 150 in rest of Britain.</td>
<td>Discourse on Immigration</td>
<td>Discourse on Employment</td>
<td>Discourse on Welfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>01 Jan 2014</td>
<td>Romanian Big issue seller called the 'benefits teacher' is urging families to follow him Britain &quot;Daily Mail Online&quot;</td>
<td>Fizita Vasiu, 29, is claiming £28,000 in UK benefits She is now passing on her knowledge to friends and family. Best friend Nadia Ponesi, also 29, now hopes to move to Oldham. She came to UK last year in order to give birth to making claim easier.</td>
<td>Discourse on Immigration</td>
<td>Discourse on Welfare</td>
<td>Discourse on Health</td>
<td>Topisc: claiming benefits, using NHS</td>
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<tr>
<td>01 Jan 2014</td>
<td>Welcome to Britain! Labour MP Keith Vaz greets first arrivals from Romania &quot;Daily Mail Online&quot;</td>
<td>Labour MP even bought some a coffee to find out why they are here Romanian Victor Spinseau told him he would send his cash back home. I don't come to rob your country. 'I work and then go home,' he said. Mr Vaz says Britain should hold referendum on number of EU migrants. Companies advertise 5,000 jobs to recruit Romanian workers Adverts promise cash daily and say command of English 'unnecessary'. Today 4,896 jobs advertised in England, but less than 150 in rest of Britain. (SAME LEAD PARAGRAPH)</td>
<td>Discourse on Immigration</td>
<td>Discourse on Employment</td>
<td>Discourse on Welfare</td>
<td>Discourse on Welfare</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
92 02 January 2014  |  Beggars sleeping rough around Marble Arch are arrested by UK Border police  |  Daily Mail Online  |  Border officials round up a dozen Roma immigrants at London landmark One Romanian woman says she came to Britain for free NHS treatment Locals say that beggars have ruined the character of the area Arrests come a day after Romanians and Bulgarians earned the right to work in Britain without restrictions  |  Discourse on Immigration  Discusses on Crime  |  Topics: details of anti-social behaviour, details of arrest, immigration restrictions, migrant rights, EU worker rights, Roma community  |  19

93 02 January 2014  |  Bulgarians gather at Sofia station for three-day journey to London  |  Daily Mail Online  |  Bus left Sofia for journey through Western Europe towards London Dreams of Bulgarians passed up to begin their new life abroad Restrictions on Romanians and Bulgarians working in EU have been lifted  |  Discourse on Immigration  Discusses on Employment  |  Topics: Bulgarians travelling to Britain, restrictions on immigrants working lifted, Bulgarians starting new life  |  18

94 02 January 2014  |  DAILY MAIL COMMENT* Still, the voters are ignored on migrants  |  Daily Mail Online  |  N/A First Paragraph: Yesterday a publicity-conscious Keith Vaz visited Luton Airport to greet the first Romanian and Bulgarian workers to arrive in Britain following the lifting of transitional border controls.  |  Discourse on Immigration  Discusses on Employment  Discusses on Democracy  |  Topics: Politicians at Luton airport, workers from new EU countries, lifting of transitional restrictions  |  19

95 02 January 2014  |  Fatal flaws in report claiming migrants boost the economy, according to one of the country’s most senior statisticians  |  Daily Mail Online  |  Report by UCL researchers Christian Dustmann and Tommaso Frattini Given blanket coverage by the BBC when it was published last month hailed as proof that immigration has a positive economic impact on Britain But it is ‘totally flawed’ according to one of the country’s top statisticians  |  Discourse on Immigration  Discusses on Economy  |  Topics: economic benefit of immigration - report flawed  |  19

96 02 January 2014  |  Middle-class now just as worried about immigration as those on low incomes  |  Daily Mail Online  |  Study by base MORI found fears about high immigration Concerns about impact on hospitals, schools, transport and housing Middle-class complacency over issues being undermined  |  Discourse on Immigration  Discusses on Economy  |  Topics: immigration benefits - report flawed  |  19

97 02 January 2014  |  Skewed figures and a BBC agenda* JAMES SLACK reveals how the “benefits of immigration are endlessly overstated”  |  Daily Mail Online  |  Findings of a UCL study given huge coverage across BBC Yet, questions are now being asked about the accuracy of the report  |  Discourse on Immigration  Discusses on Economy  |  Topics: immigration benefits - report flawed  |  19

98 02 January 2014  |  UK firms place 8,000 job adverts in Romania for taxi drivers, hotel staff, nurses and even doctors  |  Daily Mail Online  |  Some of the adverts have attracted more than 500 applicants Many require only a ‘basic’ understanding of the English Language Others say that previous experience is not necessary Central London nightclub plans advert looking for naked dancers  |  Discourse on Immigration  Discusses on Economy  |  Topics: job adverts, English language skills, details of employment  |  20

99 03 January 2014  |  RICHARD LITTLEJOHN* Welcome to the UK, have a panini...  |  Daily Mail Online  |  First paragraph: The Right Honourable Nigel Keith Anthony Stanshaw Vaz has never been noted for his self-awareness. Without a doubt, he’s self-important, self-satisfied and self-promoting.  |  Discourse on Immigration  Discusses on Economy  |  Topics: Keith Vaz, new immigrants at Luton airport  |  19

100 04 January 2014  |  Britain has just 2.71 doctors per 1,000 people... which is fewer than Latvia, Lithuania and Lithuania  |  Daily Mail Online  |  N/A  |  REMOVED  |  19

101 04 January 2014  |  Britain’s new slaves* To millions of migrants, our streets seem paved with gold. But what awaits may a savage exploitation by gangmasters from their own lands  |  Daily Mail Online  |  First Paragraph: An owner often looks like his dog — and Edikas Markarevicius is no exception to that rule. Anyone who worked for him and did not meet with his approval would risk a home visit from the shaven-headed gangmaster and one of his rottweilers.  |  Discourse on Immigration  Discusses on Crime  Discusses on Employment  |  Topics: exploitation of workers,  |  20

102 04 January 2014  |  Exposed* Bulgarian fakers tell new arrivals to UK... We will fake documents so you can claim benefits  |  Daily Mail Online  |  M60 reporter posing as newly arrived Bulgarian offered illegal papers Follows relax of benefit restrictions on New Year’s Day for migrants  |  Discourse on Immigration  Discusses on Welfare  Discusses on Crime  |  Topics: Bulgarians travelling to Britain, illegal benefits, practices, new benefit restrictions  |  21

103 04 January 2014  |  Immigration* Britons to border guards on journey from hell... on board the first coaches from Romania to UK...  |  Daily Mail Online  |  Hungarian border guards threatened to delay them for 12 hours searching luggage and examining documents unless they paid £250 Travellers familiar with tortuous journey 1,200 miles via six nations had experienced it before  |  Discourse on Immigration  Discusses on Employment  |  Topics: Romanians travelling to Britain, experiences  |  21

104 04 January 2014  |  New voters turn against EU in record numbers as floods open for Romanian and Bulgarian migrants  |  Daily Mail Online  |  Survey reveals half population would cut ties with Brussels Record-low 33 per cent favour staying in sin regulations released Poll in June showed just 1% in favour of leaving the EU  |  Discourse on Immigration  Discusses on Employment  |  Topics: EU expansion, border control, Britain out of EU  |  21

105 04 January 2014  |  Slad Chrisites a ‘fine advert for Romanian immigrant labour’, according to Clive Tyldesley  |  Daily Mail Online  |  N/A  |  REMOVED  |  21

106 04 January 2014  |  Yes, I welcomed them in. But the more they come, the faster we will head for EU exit, writes Tony MP Mark Reckless  |  Daily Mail Online  |  First Paragraph: At dawn on New Year’s Day, when most of the country was still recovering from the previous night’s revelries, I was at Luton Airport to greet Victor Sprecu and Julian Barbel when their flight from Transylvania arrived in England.  |  Discourse on Immigration  Discusses on Employment  |  Topics: welcoming Romanians, leaving the EU,  |  22

107 05 January 2014  |  Basic principle of Encho’s Rivers of Blood speech was right, says Nigel Farage  |  Daily Mail Online  |  UKIP leader was asked if he agreed ‘Indigenous population’ were strangers in their own country before being told it was part of Powell’s speech Mr Farage said it was true ‘in a bit of England’ - before being told on Sky News that it was part of the 1968 warning of racial violence Mr Powell lost his job after the speech, which was denounced by Tory leader Edward Heath  |  Discourse on Immigration  Discusses on Employment  |  Topics: waiting at Luton airport, Britain exiting the EU,  |  22
| 108 | 05 January 2014 | British families will ‘lose out’ due to Romanian and Bulgarian cheap labour, Ed Miliband admits ~ Daily Mail Online | Labour leader insists it is not ‘prejudiced’ to fear impact on jobs. Warns of effect on people already in low paid, insecure jobs. Rules letting agencies pay foreign workers less should be changed. David Cameron again refuses to say how many migrants he expects to arrive. | Discourse on Immigration | Discourse on Employment | Topics: public and political fear/concern, workers from EU, workers from Britain, |
| 109 | 05 January 2014 | Bulgaria accused of ‘appalling hypocrisy’ as it BANS foreigners from buying land just days after its citizens get the right to work anywhere in Europe ~ Daily Mail Online | Non-Bulgarian nationals banned from buying agricultural land. Ban breaches agreement which allowed Bulgaria to join EU. Country accused of ‘hypocrisy’ in same week UK borders were opened. Bulgarian president says ban could cause ‘serious problem’ for country. Ed Miliband said public fears over immigration were ‘understandable’. | Discourse on Immigration | Discourse on Immigration | Topics: Bulgarian law, EU law, political and public fear concern about immigration, |
| 110 | 05 January 2014 | David Cameron vows to stop child benefit being exported to Poland and EU ~ Daily Mail Online | Prime Minister says it is wrong workers in the UK can send benefits home. Two thirds of all child benefit sent abroad goes to Poland. Deal would need to be struck with other EU countries or secure new treaty. | Discourse on Immigration | Discourse on Welfare | Topics: new benefit restrictions, benefit practices, EU policy and deal |
| 111 | 05 January 2014 | NICK ROBINSON: The public deserves the truth on immigration... from Britain’s politicians - and, yes, my own BBC ~ Daily Mail Online | First Paragraph; Predictions of an ‘invasion’ by Romanians and Bulgarians seemed to evaporate at Luton Airport when two MPs struggled to find a new immigrant to pose with for the cameras. | Discourse on Immigration | Discourse on Immigration | Topics: Luton airport, truth lies about immigration |

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<td>1</td>
<td>24 November 2015</td>
<td>Lib Dems resist Tony’s benefits plan for Romanian and Bulgarian migrants “Politics”</td>
<td>PM determined to further tighten restrictions on jobseeker’s allowance before transitional controls lifted in January</td>
<td>Discussing Immigration, Discussing Welfare. Topics: new benefit restrictions, lifting of transitional controls.</td>
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<td>24 November 2015</td>
<td>Michael Gove- defyng EU on new migrants is just practical politics “UK news”</td>
<td>Education secretary backs extending period Bulgarians and Romanians must reside in UK before claiming benefits</td>
<td>Discussing Immigration, Discussing Welfare. Topics: new benefit restrictions, transitional restrictions.</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>25 November 2013</td>
<td>Cameron must see past the hysteria and grasp the nettle on immigration “Sarah Wollaston”</td>
<td>The pressure on community relations can no longer be ignored. Doing nothing plays into the hands of xenophobes.</td>
<td>Discussing Immigration, Discussing Discrimination. Topics: community tensions, xenophobic ideas and beliefs, lacking certain beliefs about immigration.</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>25 November 2013</td>
<td>The rift over immigration to Britain continues to widen “Peter Fallier”</td>
<td>The public remains concerned about the number of immigrants arriving in the UK and the typical about political efforts to manage it.</td>
<td>Discussing Immigration. Topics: political response to immigration in Britain, public and political concern, numbers/figures.</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>26 November 2013</td>
<td>Europe needs a Roma working class “George Soros”</td>
<td>Roma represent more than 20% of new entrants into the labour force in the European Union’s newest member states but their living conditions have actually deteriorated since many of them became EU citizens.</td>
<td>Discussing Humanitarianism. Topics: Roma in Europe, EU citizens, EU freedom of movement.</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>27 November 2013</td>
<td>Benefit restrictions on EU migrants“ will they work” “UK news”</td>
<td>David Cameron has attempted to reassure the British public about new EU migrants by announcing a plan that will stop them claiming benefits. We set aside the rhetoric and look at the evidence on whether the proposal will work.</td>
<td>Discussing Immigration, Discussing Welfare. Topics: new benefit restrictions, immigration from Romania and Bulgaria.</td>
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<td>Cameron and Frake and reaction to curb on benefits for migrants “Politics live blog”</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Discussing Immigration, Discussing Welfare. Topics: new benefit restrictions, immigration from Romania and Bulgaria.</td>
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<td>27 November 2013</td>
<td>Cameron-purging over Romanian and Bulgarian workers, says Labour “UK news”</td>
<td>Voters will love Cameron’s plan to restrict migrants’ access to benefits, but he’s pandered to feelings rather than dealing with reality.</td>
<td>Discussing Immigration, Discussing Welfare. Topics: new benefit restrictions, public concerns, politics based on feelings (rather than facts), immigration debate.</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>27 November 2013</td>
<td>Cameron’s benefit tourism‘ crackdown is fast-free political rhetoric “Anne Perkins”</td>
<td>There will be no flood of Bulgarians and Romanians. But in any case, wasn’t it the Tories who championed a ‘weird’ Europe?</td>
<td>Discussing Immigration, Discussing Welfare. Topics: EU expansion, new benefit restrictions (inferred).</td>
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<td>27 November 2013</td>
<td>EU migrants: David Cameron sets out more benefit restrictions “Politics”</td>
<td>Plan is sensible and reasonable, say Lib Dems amid move to assert influx from Romania and Bulgaria</td>
<td>Discussing Immigration, Discussing Welfare. Topics: new benefit restrictions, immigration control/restriction, immigration from Bulgaria and Romania.</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>27 November 2013</td>
<td>European migration: wanted – an argument “Editorial”</td>
<td>Successive governments have manoeuvred themselves into a political dead end</td>
<td>Discussing Immigration, Discussing Welfare. Topics: calls for argument/debate about immigration, political responses.</td>
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<td>27 November 2013</td>
<td>Migration plan risks UK being seen as a realty country, says Commissionaire “UK news”</td>
<td>EU employment commissioner Laszlo Andor says Cameron’s efforts to outlaw so-called benefit tourism are product of hysteria.</td>
<td>Discussing Immigration, Discussing Welfare. Topics: new benefit restrictions, reactions, benefit tourism.</td>
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<td>27 November 2013</td>
<td>UK claims growing support over migration in clash with Brussels “World news”</td>
<td>Cameron unveils plan to curb EU migrants’ access to benefits but Brussells says freedom of £ – ‘we’re on the brink.</td>
<td>Discussing Immigration, Discussing Welfare. Topics: EU benefit restrictions, EU freedom of movement.</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>27 November 2013</td>
<td>UK claims growing support over migration in clash with Brussels “World news”</td>
<td>David Cameron plans to restrict migrant benefits, major warns the prime minister not to make ‘impossible demands of EU.</td>
<td>Discussing Immigration, Discussing Welfare. Topics: Britain in EU, EU freedoms, new benefit restrictions.</td>
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<td>28 November 2013</td>
<td>Net migration to UK jumps by 15,000 in a year to 182,000 “UK news”</td>
<td>Fall in immigration and rise in southern European arrivals risk government target of 100,000 by general election</td>
<td>Discussing Immigration. Topics: population increases, immigration increases, figures/statistics, demographics, migration targets, British immigration.</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>28 November 2013</td>
<td>Nick Clegg attacks EU commissioner over ‘nasty country’ comment “Politics”</td>
<td>Deputy prime minister says EU’s employment chief is wrong to suggest Britain’s stance on migrants’ benefits is unfair</td>
<td>Discussing Immigration, Discussing Welfare. Topics: reactions to new benefit restrictions.</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>28 November 2013</td>
<td>UK emigration at its lowest level since 2001 “UK news”</td>
<td>80,000 emigrants left Britain in the year ending June 2013, the lowest number in over a decade</td>
<td>Discussing Immigration. Topics: low British emigration.</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>28 November 2013</td>
<td>We need to talk about immigration, just not in this way “David Blunkett”</td>
<td>David Cameron is silent at windmills. Freedom of movement exists across Europe but a national debate about earned entitlement is needed</td>
<td>Discussing Immigration, Discussing Welfare. Topics: EU freedom of movement, rational debate about immigration, new benefit restrictions.</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>29 November 2013</td>
<td>Controversy over immigration policy “Politics”</td>
<td>Controversy over immigration policy “Politics”</td>
<td>Discussing Immigration, Discussing Welfare. Topics: reactions to new benefit restrictions.</td>
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<td>21 29 November 2013</td>
<td>End this gutter debate about Britain’s immigration policy “Ian Brell” “Comment is free” “The Guardian”</td>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>Immigration policy, public fears/concerns about immigration, addressing fears/concerns</td>
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<td>24 05 December 2013</td>
<td>Tony rebellion averted as immigration bill delayed “UK news” “The Guardian”</td>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>Discourse on Immigration, extending transitional restrictions, immigration policy debate postponed</td>
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<td>25 09 December 2013</td>
<td>Nigel Farage “establishment and media are out to get us” “Politics” “The Guardian”</td>
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<td>26 10 December 2013</td>
<td>Border forcing to protect UK, say MPs “UK news” “The Guardian”</td>
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<td>27 10 December 2013</td>
<td>Immigration minister “pay higher wages to recruit British and EU workers” “Money” “The Guardian”</td>
<td>Immigration</td>
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<td>28 12 December 2013</td>
<td>Bulgarian man who died saving British girl’s life is awarded bravery medal “UK news” “The Guardian”</td>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>Positive Representation of Bulgarian National</td>
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<td>29 12 December 2013</td>
<td>EU’s open borders hamper fate of UK “@gaurdianletters” “World news” “The Guardian”</td>
<td>Secure borders</td>
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<td>30 12 December 2013</td>
<td>Immigration is not the problem “Kenan Malik “Comment is free” “The Guardian” Opinion</td>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>Discourse on Immigration, National Identity, political responses towards immigration, anti-immigrant sentiment, national identity issues</td>
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<td>31 13 December 2013</td>
<td>British judge warns about tide of EU Immigrants “from the archives 13 December 1979 “From the Guardian “the guardian.com”</td>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>Discourse on Immigration, National Identity</td>
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<td>32 13 December 2013</td>
<td>EU migrants face 100 new questions to make it harder to obtain benefits “UK news” “The Guardian”</td>
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<td>33 13 December 2013</td>
<td>Facist past is commemorated widely not just in Hungary “@gaurdianletters” “World news” “The Guardian”</td>
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<td>34 15 December 2013</td>
<td>Archbishop of Westminster bringsucccess to bring immigration targets “UK news” “The Guardian”</td>
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<td>35 15 December 2013</td>
<td>Government considers EU immigration cap of 75,000 a year “UK news” “The Guardian”</td>
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<td>36 15 December 2013</td>
<td>UK immigration policy is punishing Britons with non-EU spouses “Vincent Nichols” “Comment is free” “The Guardian”</td>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>Discourse on Immigration, Employment, doesn’t relate to research questions</td>
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<td>37 16 December 2013</td>
<td>Nick Clegg attacks Theresa May’s ‘illegal’ plan for cap on EU immigrants “UK news” “The Guardian”</td>
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<td>Theresa May questioned by home affairs minister “Politics live blog” “Politics” “The Guardian” Blog</td>
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<td>39 16 December 2013</td>
<td>Theresa May says she wants to clamp down on EU citizens coming to UK “Politics” “The Guardian”</td>
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<td>40 17 December 2013</td>
<td>Theresa May distances herself from plan for cap on EU migration “UK news” “The Guardian”</td>
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Notes: N/A: Not applicable, DOES NOT RELATE TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS: Does not relate to research questions, REMOVED: Removed, Not included, NOT INCLUDING LETTERS: Not including letters, NOT INCLUDING BLOGS: Not including blogs.
41 17 December 2013 Where UK immigrants were born: 2011-2013 News ~ The Guardian

42 18 December 2013 Benefits delay is obstacle for jobless immigrants, says Ian Duncan Smith ~ UK news ~ The Guardian

43 18 December 2013 Britain's EU future will be decided by the sceptical centre, not the fanatics ~ Matthew Goodwin "Comment is free ~ The Guardian

44 18 December 2013 Immigration bill could lead to racism and homelessness, say MPs and peers ~ UK news ~ The Guardian

45 18 December 2013 Steve Bell on the Tory immigration policy ~ cartoon ~ Comment is free ~ The Guardian

46 18 December 2013 Tories rush through curbs on benefits access for Romanians and Bulgarians ~ UK news ~ The Guardian

47 19 December 2013 Martin Rowson on seasonal immigration ~ cartoon ~ Comment is free ~ The Guardian

48 20 December 2013 Bulgaria issues fierce rebuke to David Cameron over migrants ~ UK news ~ The Guardian

49 21 December 2013 Bulgaria’s president: "Don’t play on fear. Stop attacking us" ~ World news ~ The Guardian

50 21 December 2013 Should Britain fear a surge of east European migrants? ~ Alp Mehmet and Jonathan Portess ~ UK news ~ The Guardian

51 21 December 2013 How the Tory right turned against EU enlargement ~ World news ~ The Guardian

52 21 December 2013 EU migration "facts" instead of fears ~ Editorial ~ Comment is free ~ The Guardian

53 22 December 2013 Martin Rowson on seasonal immigration ~ cartoon ~ Comment is free ~ The Guardian

54 22 December 2013 Vince Cable attack on Tories over migrant ‘panic’ widens coalition rifts ~ UK news ~ The Guardian

55 22 December 2013 Vince Cable warns Tony leaders against stoking anti-immigration panic ~ UK news ~ The Guardian

56 22 December 2013 It's not racist to be averse over large-scale immigration ~ John Harris "Comment is free ~ The Guardian

57 22 December 2013 David Cameron acting short-sightedly over immigration, says Ian Mcmillan ~ Politics ~ The Guardian

58 22 December 2013 Discourse on Immigration

59 23 December 2013 Discourse on Immigration
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<td>What policy changes will most affect you in 2014?</td>
<td>UK news “The Guardian”</td>
<td>A number of policy changes will come into force in 2014. Tell us what changes will most affect your life by adding your comment to the thread</td>
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<td>Peterborough braces for new EU arrivals</td>
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<td>Many in the town, whose migrant population swelled by 10% in five years, are anxious about arrivals from Bulgaria and Romania</td>
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<td>On a visit to PadVaishem, the consequences of continuing to demonise the ancient scapegoats of Europe</td>
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<td>UK news “The Guardian”</td>
<td>Head of thinktank warns that prime minister is championing ‘negative, unscrupulous’ politics in response to immigration fears</td>
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<td>David Cameron ‘must stop pandering to UKIP’</td>
<td>UK news “The Guardian”</td>
<td>Ed Miliband must repair the leadership’s historic bargain to look after the economic interests of working-class members</td>
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<td>Discourse on Employment, Topic: Labour’s response to immigration (political response), economic interests of British workers</td>
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<td>Labour can end the hostility to immigration on the left</td>
<td>UK news “The Guardian”</td>
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<td>Net migration cap damages Britain</td>
<td>UK news “The Guardian”</td>
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<td>UN agency says bill will lead to ethnic profiling</td>
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<td>Britons ready to welcome migrants from Bulgaria and Romania, poll finds</td>
<td>UK news “The Guardian”</td>
<td>Ipsos MMR survey shows 72% of people aged 35-44 support rights of east European workers to live and work in UK</td>
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<td>Discuss on Employment, Topic: Britain welcoming migrants (for/against immigration), EU workers, EU immigrants from Bulgaria and Romania</td>
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<td>Beware this populism sweeping across Europe</td>
<td>EU news “The Guardian”</td>
<td>When will we hear the three main parties making the case for the positive benefits of immigration?</td>
<td>Discussion on Immigration</td>
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<td>Nigel Farage calls on government to let Syrian refugees into UK</td>
<td>UK news “The Guardian”</td>
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<td>74</td>
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<td>UKIP’s Nigel Farage chairs own party with call to let in Syrian refugees</td>
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<td>Ben Jennings on plans to charge tourists and migrants for NHS emergency services</td>
<td>UK news “The Guardian”</td>
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<td>76</td>
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<td>Chris Grayling accuses Lib Dems of blocking tougher immigration controls</td>
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<td>Justice secretary opens rift with coalition partners hours before Britain open its borders to Bulgarian and Romanian workers</td>
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<td>Migration: politics of fear</td>
<td>UK news “The Guardian”</td>
<td>The more politicians announce panic measures, the more likely they are to turn to hardline policies advocated by UKIP</td>
<td>Discussion on Immigration</td>
<td>Topics: political fear/concern about immigration, immigration policies</td>
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<td>Nigel Farage now talks on call to grant asylum to Syrian refugees</td>
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<td>79</td>
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<td>Thousands of Romanian children stay at home while parents work abroad</td>
<td>UK news “The Guardian”</td>
<td>Romanian government says 80,000 families have both parents working abroad, raising questions about the impact of EU migration</td>
<td>Discussion on Immigration</td>
<td>Discuss on Employment, Topics: EU freedom of movement for workers, parents working abroad</td>
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<td>Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 Dec 2013</td>
<td>Romanian and Bulgarians call to extend restrictions on migrants</td>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>Immigration: calls for extension of transitional restrictions</td>
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<td>30 Dec 2013</td>
<td>Tourists and migrants to be charged to use NHS emergency services</td>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>Immigration: health tourism costs restrictions on migrants</td>
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<td>31 Dec 2013</td>
<td>Romanian and Bulgarian migration sit up ancient dark parts of brain</td>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>Immigration: public opinion on immigration</td>
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<td>31 Dec 2013</td>
<td>Romanians moving to the UK for work</td>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>Immigration: public opinion on immigration</td>
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<td>01 Jan 2014</td>
<td>Romanian quizzed by MPs about wages</td>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>Immigration: UK employment equality on UK wages</td>
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<td>01 Jan 2014</td>
<td>British workers left unprotected</td>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>Immigration: workers unprotected from immigration</td>
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<td>01 Jan 2014</td>
<td>Employers could use immigration to cut UK wages</td>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>Immigration: immigrants to reduce UK wages</td>
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<td>01 Jan 2014</td>
<td>Immigration from Romania will lead to new pressures</td>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>Immigration: benefits, pressures of immigration, right-wing responses to immigration</td>
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<td>01 Jan 2014</td>
<td>Scapegoating migrants will cause damage</td>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>Immigration: political concerns, housing</td>
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<td>01 Jan 2014</td>
<td>Welcome to Luton: Romanian arrival greeted by two MPs and a media scrum</td>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>Immigration: new arrivals, NHS immigration</td>
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<td>01 Jan 2014</td>
<td>Will Romanian and Bulgarian migration feel welcome in Britain?</td>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>Immigration: immigration, community tensions, EU movement immigration debate</td>
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<tr>
<td>02 Jan 2014</td>
<td>If you want to curb immigration, pay a living wage</td>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>Immigration: workers home and away, exploitation of workers, ethical employment</td>
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<td>02 Jan 2014</td>
<td>Phil Doley on Nigel Farage and the Roma community</td>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>Immigration: public opinion on immigration</td>
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<td>02 Jan 2014</td>
<td>Romanian ambassador mocks MPs and media targeting immigrants</td>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>Immigration: responses to waiting for arrivals</td>
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<td>02 Jan 2014</td>
<td>The immigration invasion that never was</td>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>Immigration: no immigrant 'invasion', dispelling claims about immigration</td>
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<td>03 Jan 2014</td>
<td>Bulgarian and Romanian immigration hysterias</td>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>Immigration: right-wing populism, immigration, political fears and concerns</td>
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<td>03 Jan 2014</td>
<td>Martin Rowson on the UK storms</td>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>Immigration: not including satirical cartoons</td>
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<td>09 Jan 2014</td>
<td>Romanian and Bulgarians in the UK react to immigration freeze &quot;UK news &quot; - The Guardian</td>
<td>Guardian readers from Romania and Bulgaria with experience of working in the UK react to the media reports of the recent lifting of immigration restrictions. Share your own experiences in the thread below</td>
<td>Discourse on Immigration Discourse on Employment</td>
<td>Topics: immigration debate, EU workers, reaction to media, lifting of transitional restrictions</td>
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<td>04 Jan 2014</td>
<td>&quot;We must not pander to Ukip&quot; - moderate Tories challenge the party's drift to right &quot;Politics &quot; - The Guardian</td>
<td>Message on Europe and immigration disturbs MPs and thinktanks who fear its impact on business and centrist voters</td>
<td>Discourse on Immigration Discourse on Employment Discourse on Economy</td>
<td>Topics: right-wing politics, political fear about immigration debate, impact on business and voters</td>
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<td>05 Jan 2014</td>
<td>Cameron to push for cap on European migrants in UK negotiations with EU &quot; - UK news &quot; - The Guardian</td>
<td>PM sets out key areas for discussions with other EU members, saying UK needs changes to the way migrants can claim benefits</td>
<td>Discourse on Immigration Discourse on Employment</td>
<td>Topics: restrictions on immigration from EU, claiming benefits, negotiating with EU (Britain in EU)</td>
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<td>05 Jan 2014</td>
<td>Ed Miliband promises to close loophole allowing exploitation of foreign workers &quot; - UK news &quot; - The Guardian</td>
<td>Labour leader focuses on low pay, but says it is ‘not prejudiced’ to believe some Britons lose out economically to migrants</td>
<td>Discourse on Immigration Discourse on Employment Discourse on Discrimination</td>
<td>Topics: exploitation of workers, British workers and EU workers, who wins who loses, prejudice or not?</td>
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<td>05 Jan 2014</td>
<td>Nigel Farage backs &quot;basic principle&quot; of Enosh Powell's immigration warning &quot;Politics &quot; - The Guardian</td>
<td>Ukip leader says ‘tears of blood’ speech warned about the tension that can arise when there is large influx of people into an area</td>
<td>Discourse on Immigration Discourse on Employment Discourse on Discrimination Discourse on Economy</td>
<td>Topics: foreign labour, economic harm</td>
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<td>05 Jan 2014</td>
<td>UK must end dependency on low-wage foreign labour, says Ed Miliband &quot; - UK news &quot; - The Guardian</td>
<td>Labour wants to close loophole in agency workers directive, but CBI says such a move could harm economy</td>
<td>Discourse on Immigration Discourse on Employment Discourse on Economy</td>
<td>Topics: foreign labour, economic harm</td>
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<tr>
<td>05 Jan 2014</td>
<td>What to do if millions of Romanian vampires pitch camp at Marble Arch &quot; - Stewart Lee &quot; - Comment is free &quot; - The Guardian</td>
<td>I have to be cynical, but I think Boris Johnson is deliberately evoking deeply buried fears about blood-sucking Transylvanians</td>
<td>Discourse on Immigration Discourse on Employment Discourse on Discrimination Discourse on Finance</td>
<td>Topics: political and public fear and concern, stereotypes - Romanian vampires</td>
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Cameron prepares for showdown with Europe over benefits for Romanian and Bulgarian migrants

- Prime Minister unveiling proposals to renegotiate relationship with Europe
- New arrivals would have to wait a year, up from 3 months, to get benefits
- EU rules ban discriminating between citizens and migrants’ hand-outs
- PM considering move today, which would spark court battle with Brussels

David Cameron is set to defy European rules by announcing a tough new set of obstacles for immigrants as Britain's Romanian and Bulgarian communities rapidly grow.

People wishing to enter Britain will have to prove they have lived here for a year, up from three months, before they can receive benefits in one of the proposals expected to be unveiled.

It is one of many goals the prime minister will put to the EU in an attempt to negotiate a looser relationship with Brussels ahead of a 2017 referendum.

Another policy would remove child benefits from the dependent children of migrant workers, sources claim.

The move is a dramatic step that goes against EU laws preventing member states from having one rule for their citizens requesting state hand-outs and another for immigrants.

If he goes ahead with the proposals, there is little Europe could do to stop him for years.

The prime minister is today considering the move, which would spark yet another court battle with the European Commission over benefit restrictions and potentially tarnish the country's fragile relationship with the EU.

Currently, Britain is in court with Brussels defending its right to subject migrants to ‘additional tests’ in order to merit state hand-outs.

A poll for the Mail identified deep public anxiety about the ending of transitionary immigration restrictions on new EU members Romania and Bulgaria in January.

The move is a dramatic step that goes against EU laws preventing member states from having one rule for their citizens requesting state hand-outs and another for immigrants.

If he goes ahead with the proposals, there is little Europe could do to stop him for years.

The prime minister is today considering the move, which would spark yet another court battle with the European Commission over benefit restrictions and potentially tarnish the country's fragile relationship with the EU.

A poll found that 82 per cent did not want citizens of the two countries to gain free access to the UK, 85 per cent said they feared schools and hospitals could not cope and 76 per cent said young Britons could lose out on jobs.

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The poll also found more voters trust Labour on immigration (17 per cent) than the Tories (11 per cent). Some 44 per cent said they trusted no party.

Sources claim he is encouraged by powerful nations such as Germany, Denmark and Spain also announcing a tough new set of obstacles for immigrants as Britain's Romanian and Bulgarian communities rapidly grow.

The poll also found more voters trust Labour on immigration (17 per cent) than the Tories (11 per cent). Some 44 per cent said they trusted no party.

At home, pressure is mounting as at least 33 backbench Tory MPs have so far signed a petition to stop Bulgarian and Romanian immigration altogether by 2018.

A cabinet minister told The Sunday Times: “The writing is on the wall for the way the commission is behaving. Other countries have also had enough.”

A cabinet minister told The Sunday Times: “The writing is on the wall for the way the commission is behaving. Other countries have also had enough.”

By MIX DE GRAAF


© PA

Decision: David Cameron is deciding whether or not to defy Brussels to bring in harsher migrant rules
The comments below have been moderated in advance.
Comment 7
Not enough, wintry. Can we do more in more do we want to keep the ones you have let in? These people are not coming here to work they cannot speak English and half are illiterate. How will that help our country or our NHS service and schools? UKIP are only hope here if we come out of the EU the house of cards will collapse and eventually we will all go back to being our own country! Though poorer as a country but at least our MEP’s and MPs will be ok!

Comment 8
I though they could be deported if they’ve been here for three months and can’t prove they can support themselves so how can they be entitled to benefits? The amount of lies and misinformation in this subject is mind blowing!

Comment 9
Correct mate, No E303 = no benefits. Deportation after 3 Months if they can’t prove they can support themselves. That is EU Law. Time Job Centres and Councils started obeying it.

Comment 10
Should be 5 years and paying taxes for that time. But I will still vote UKIP

Comment 11
telling him since the beginning of the year. There is now less than 2 months to go before it kicks in. He’s left it too late. Everyone has been telling him since the beginning of the year.

Comment 12
It does not go far enough, the UK is overflowing, pressure on schools, NHS, housing, transport and so on. Besides you will do as your masters in Brussels tell you Cameron. It does not go far enough, the UK is overflowing, pressure on schools, NHS, housing, transport and so on. Besides you will do as your masters in Brussels tell you Cameron.

Comment 13
You just know this is not going to happen, just another load of hot air

Comment 14
To little to later

Comment 15
No benefits until they have lived...and worked...here for minimum 5 years!!

Comment 16
If there are more people milking the cow than feeding it. we are going to end up with one dead cow

Comment 17
Would be better to send some old wet rag than that flexie EU-lover, EU Dave.

Comment 18
Another court battle that we KNOW will end up in defeat. For God’s sake, just ignore the bloody EU and its courts. Sert governing the UK for the people of the UK, not the Brussels clowns.

Comment 19
If our only defense against this wave of benefits grabbing euro parasites is Cameron we may as well just leave pikes of cash at every airport and port and hope they fill their pockets and turn right round.

Comment 20
Make it 5 year qualifying residency before allowing access to benefits, including NHS and schools. Make it the same rules apply to those born here (qualifying time to include their qualifying time) as our job centres and local authorities will still get the services we pay for and those who haven’t contributed don’t get to steal our public services.

Comment 21
Opening the door to the next round of migrants is going to tip us back into financial problems, with drains on the benefits and social housing.

Comment 22
It’s also going to tip many parts of the country back to Medieval times.

Comment 23
There is now less than 2 months to go before it kicks in. He’s left it too late. Everyone has been telling him since the beginning of the year.

Comment 24
Just do Cameron. Stuff Brussels.
He waits until the 1st November!! There has been no let up in immigration to the UK since the Tories came to power putting a lie to the fact it’s all Labour’s fault, it’s the EU rules!!

Another cave in to EU coming.

Oh please, will the DM stop this Cameron propaganda! The EU "holds all the aces". Cameron is on record as saying that he will not allow Britain to leave the EU. There will be no negotiations, because the EU have no intention of allowing the return of any control to any member state. The only thing that we can do is ignore the EU and wait for the court case and the fine. But Cameron will not do this, because he is a lying traitor!!

A showdown and then he’ll give in. Watch this space.

Just more Tony electioneering for 2015.

It is NOT ENOUGH just make them live here for a year before receive benefit - They MUST CONTRIBUTE for a year before they can receive benefit - if they arent contributing then send them home. The sooner Britain leave EU - the better. Brussels are only interested on destroying Britain and bleed Britain dry

Why is it that Sweden is allowed to set boundaries for immigrants from within the EU but Britain can't? An EU citizen wanting to move to Sweden has to fulfil one of these criteria: have a job, have their own funding from example a pension, be married to or in a live-in relationship with a Swede or an EU resident who fulfils the criteria. If, within five years of moving here, the circumstances change and the person no longer fulfils the criteria, they lose their right to live here. Why can't Britain say the same??? Seems as though seemingly powerless country of Sweden has more courage than Britain!

Absolutely right...I lived in Sweden for a number of years and I soon discovered that they had common sense rules about immigration. I only lived there because I had a job to do and after that was done I had to leave. I could not claim benefits from their system. I hate what the UK has become, its full of self serving politicians who don't care about the British people or their concerns.

There is no 'showdown'. Simply tell the EU it is not going to happen - end of. I for one am tired of it.

A showdown? With Cameron? I've laughed so much at this, my ribs ache.

It was in the past, world trade, that's how we got so GREAT, we can and must start dealing with a whole world out there that we can do business with, like we used to. That is how we got rich, that is how we got strong. Now we have all done this before him, there is a whole world out there that we can do business with.

Sweden has more courage than Britain!

Another cave in to EU coming.

What would Mrs Robinson say? Fresh-faced Dustin Hoffman bemoans 'bad luck' in his career in rare footage shot just a year before Graduate

'Don't get me a girl': ViolA Davis says Winfrey came empty-handed to her special Valentine's Day renewal of vows ceremony Trouble at Kimmel

Kristin Cavallari reveals she called off her wedding to new husband Jay Cutler because she didn't want to be a stay-at-home wife and mom

Been Up All Night? A dressed down Louis Tomlinson takes a break from daddy duties as he chats and smokes with pals outside LA coffee shop

When one outfit isn't enough! Sarah Michelle Gellar shows some cleavage in a plumping LBD as she rocks FOUR different outfits in one day

Taking tips from PFW

Farmer tennis champ Boris Becker's stunning wife Lilly flaunts her shapely pins in a white skater skirt at photocall in Cologne

Lose, set, match

Pregnant Hilary Baldwin keeps her 'little princess' Carmen, 2, warm on walk with husband Alec... as 30 Rock star says third baby will be their last

Loved-up Jason Derulo can't keep his hands off girlfriend Daphne Joy as she flaunts her famous curves in figure-hugging number during romantic dinner date

Amy Willerton shows off her generous cleavage in plunging white dress as she works her red carpet magic at screening in Los Angeles

David Beckham shows off his flaky $300,000 watch as he suits up for charity exhibition of some of his most iconic items

Time costs money

CBB's Megan McKenna flaunts her waist in a figure-hugging gold gown as she files her final TOWIE scenes alongside love interest Pete Wicks

Angeline Jolie, Brad Pitt and family move into £14,000-a-month, eight-bedroom home in London

White Bird shoots sequel to World War Z

Sheer daring: Pixie Lott steals the show in a dramatic see-through black gown at Breakfast At Tiffany's opening night

Sheer brilliance

Please forgive me': Bryan Adams accuses Egyptian customs of screwing all over his prized vintage guitar in green pen

Includes 1957 guitar

Trump would be good for women's issues and Hillary is a "****ing liar" Carlson Jenner denounces down on her conservative views

A staunch Republican
must be self supporting & not be a burden on the host state - and have their own medical insurance. If this is not possible, please stop reporting these non stories. Cameron is either delusional or lying when he says that he is preparing for a showdown with the EU over benefits. Many politicians who live elsewhere in the EU must believe that they live in some sort of parallel universe. EU, because here you are not entitled to benefits, free healthcare, translations or any of the other things that the UK government DECIDED BY ITSELF to give to immigrants. In other countries you have to be self-supporting to even live there. DM - can you not campaign to pressure the UK government to merely do as other countries do?

Comment 42
No E303 = no benefits. Deportation after 3 Months if they can't prove they can support themselves. That is EU Law. Time Job Centres and Councils started obeying it.

Comment 43
I'm sure the Romans will still manage to claim benefits, they are nothing but crafty who know all the tricks of the trade, RIP the UK.

Comment 44
Could they not, also, get finance from criminal bosses who are living in luxury in Eastern Europe and organise them. I think this will be the plan for the future. Of course they will survive for a year and it will be widespread.

Comment 45
No debate needed other than tell the EU to go to hell and boil its head. Vote UKIP and re-gain our rights. If Cameron won't do it the PEOPLE will. G Bartholomew East Sussex

Comment 46
If Cameron thinks he can stop benefits for a year and remove child benefit from dependent children he must really be in dream land or does he not understand that like as he has become a puppet of the EU To Mr Cameron I would say if you really wish to solve this HE MUST LEAVE THE TWISTED EU and start thinking of his own country.

Comment 47
I would like to see that happen BUT I can't see it why because that too powerfull human rights.

Comment 48
Nothing will change.

Comment 49
Dave you obviously do not listen to the voters up and down the country. If you are going for 1 year before benefits can be applied for why not go for 5 years along with 5 years for Social Housing and access to the NHS. Don't doddle we ARE RIGHT

Comment 50
Do not let them in in the first place, then benefits would not be an issue.

Comment 51
I'll give it 10 minutes before Cameron pulls out the white flag. Vote UKIP

Comment 52
I would, except that the UKIP candidate for my area is an utter creep :{.

Comment 53
"New arrivals would have to wait a year, up from 3 months, to get benefits" - They should not have to wait a year, they should have to WORK for a minimum of a year!!!

Comment 54
No money no work NO ENTRY.

Comment 55
No E303 = no benefits. Deportation after 3 Months if they can't prove they can support themselves. That is EU Law. Time Job Centres and Councils started obeying it.

Comment 56
I think anyone coming to this country should have to get a job earning over a certain amount and pay continuously for 5 years before they can claim any sort of benefits and only be able to claim for a year

Comment 57
NO! they should be able to support themselves AND have to work and pay Tax for at LEAST 5 YEARS!!!!!! We need to control OUR borders like the AUS & NZ have. But are part of the EU we can't. Time to vote UKIP at every opportunity. Time to get OUR laws, borders and country BACK!!!!!!!!! And the ONLY party that gives a rats ass about the UK and its people is Nigel Farage and UKIP!!

Comment 58
I wonder what would happen if tens of thousands of Brits turned up in one of these countries asking for the nearest benefits office.........
Comment 59

How about 5 years Nil contributions in a real job.

Click to rate 299 1

Comment 60

Just no entry. We have > 20 million on job related benefits - we must get these people back into work before even thinking about expanding the available workforce.

Click to rate 269 2

Comment 61

Nothing wrong with that approach but is actually an immigration from within an EU a problem or from outside of it?

Click to rate 1146 22

Comment 62

Don't be dejected folks, our country is in the hands of the EU as not the PM as it should be. Both Blair and Cameron made this once green and pleasant land into the monstrosity it is today. I'm frightened to walk in the town centre in daylight, as these people hang about in menacing groups, splitting and shouting and showing you out the way instead of working round you or stepping aside. I'm a pensioner and my dad died in the war for his country and I never thought I would end my days like this. I believe UKIP is our only hope now.

Click to rate 42 4

Comment 63

Ha ha ha. Nice opportunity for UKIP endorsement. Our only hope? Ah you are amusing.

Click to rate 25 321

Comment 64

Lots of nationalities died for the british empire in WW2 but not Bulgarians and eastern Europeans.

Click to rate 51 3

Comment 65

I SECONEED THAT VOTE UKIP: THIS LOT ARE LILY LIVERED IDIOTS

Click to rate 350 14

Comment 66

East Anglia has been overrun with Eastern Europeans and I am very saddened to see thousands of unskilled people who barely speak English as they will definitely need to secure a well paid job it's absolutely fine. What's not OK is to bring here thousands of unskilled people who barely speak English as they will definitely need state support to get by.

Click to rate 396 5

Comment 67

Brussels claims migrant's show they are 'habitual residents', before they can claim child benefit, tax credit, jobseeker's allowance and state pension credit breaks the right to free movement. Not true; and Brussels knows this. The right to free movement is not impeded. What IS restricted is the assumption of entitlement to receive benefits merely set foot on our soil.

Click to rate 199 3

Comment 68

Exactly! If an immigrant wants to work in the UK and has the skills and experience needed to secure a well paid job it's absolutely fine. What's not OK is to bring here thousands of unskilled people who barely speak English as they will definitely need state support to get by.

Click to rate 14 0

Comment 69

I agree. You do not have to give benefits unless you have worked for a period of time. It varies in different countries. No free health care, unless 100% insured. The above article is correct in many of the comments.

Click to rate 12 0

Comment 70

It's not good enough

Click to rate 372 8

Comment 71

The Government of the immigrants country should be responsible for providing benefits for its citizens, not the host country. With such a scheme in place, the world would benefit from free movement of people.

Click to rate 27 0

Comment 72

That is the case Simon. The country they come from (in EU) pays all benefits back to the Country which pays them.

Click to rate 0 0

Comment 73

Well, if he doesn't put a stop to it, we all know a man who can. I'll be voting UKIP in order to reclaim my country from European interference.

Click to rate 69 3

Comment 74

Unfortunately, that is like shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted. Although I shall be voting UKIP together with most people I know.

Click to rate 13 0
Comment 78
3 years should be the minimum.

Click to rate

Comment 79
So they'll enter as self-employed, earning very little and then claim working family tax credits, tax credits, housing benefit, etc. They have to be prevented from setting up these small businesses too, like selling big brand-name clothing. There are millions of people already in the UK who can do these jobs. Of course, if they can offer skills we have a shortage of, and that shortage is real, then fine, move here. Free movement across Europe should not involve coming to a country for the purpose of claiming a free life there. It's a ridiculous EU rule.

Click to rate

Comment 80
And the result will be, him rolling over and blaming the EU rules, and saying he's lied to our behalf, if he's honest about not wanting this drain on our benefits, why not make it a minimum wait of 5 years before even looking at benefit claims by outsiders, and then only grant them if they have worked solidly here for that 5 years, cant see any of it happening can you ?, this country is being lead by a spineless bunch of shysters.

Click to rate

Comment 81
Nothing more than smoke and mirrors from Cameron. All pre election nonsense. Cameron has known for years, as has the rest of us, about the massive numbers of immigrants for Romania and Bulgaria heading for our shores in January. Why wait until now to try and head off such an invasion?

Click to rate

Comment 82
Regardless of what the EU think, do it. It's a start.

Click to rate

Comment 83
Show down, or lay down and get his tummy tickled!

Click to rate

Comment 84
Coming to a street near you in January. Scary imit?

Click to rate

Comment 85
Thatcher predicted all this.

Click to rate

Comment 86
I don't think Cameron has the guts to stand up to Europe. We will see.

Click to rate

Comment 87
It's not against EU Rules if he does it for everyone returning British included. If he does not he will collapse like a bucket of tripe after a court hearing. That Cameron's answer. There a better answer LEAVE. Vote UKIP

Click to rate

Comment 88
He still doesn't get it though. We have seen from earlier this year that they are fully prepared to live in parts and in fields. Not allowing them benefits does not include schools and hospitals. The point is there's no room and that this will save peoples appetite but it won't. If he is going to break one of their discrimination rules why not go the whole way and just stop them coming in full stop.

Click to rate

Comment 89
Discrimination has become a dirty word and is used to shut people up by shaming them wherever possible. Yet discrimination is a human requirement and we have to do it daily. We discriminate on who we date, what car we buy, who we are friends with, what food we like, what programs we watch, we discriminate against tea when we order coffee. All of these things and countless more are discrimination. Discrimination to stop people who have not paid into a system, arriving and taking money out of it, is not the dirty discrimination the Staal left claim it is. It is perfectly legitimate and reasonable. People should stop being afraid of that word and allowing themselves to be bullied into submission with it.

Click to rate

Comment 90
So.......a migrant family with four children and the wife pregnant, no skills or job prospects, nowhere to live in the UK......Now what is going to happen? The reality of this situation has not been thought through by Cameron and the big question is how are these people going to live without the immediate benefits system in this country? If Cameron really means business, it is not a case of trying to make things difficult once they are here, the only thing that is going to work is to prevent them from coming in the first place. Defy Brussels and close the borders NOW.

Click to rate

Comment 91
Too little and too late for the UK and the Tories. You had your chance. UKIP is the only answer.

Click to rate

Comment 76
I have a better suggestion Mr Cameron i.e. do not let them in at all! To hell with the EU and their threats! Stand up for the UK for once in your up to now spineless leadership.

Click to rate

Comment 77
God this is a mess. Poor countries should never have been allowed in the EU, what incentive was there to achieve higher economic status if we just give them everything? I worry that making them wait a year for benefits will just mean that we will have a huge homeless, begging community who rob and burglary to get through the first year. I say no benefits, why should there be? Britain can not afford it, very simply, there are already too many too many people on benefit!

Click to rate
Politicians do seem to make things hard for themselves. Why don’t they just make benefits dependent on contribution to national insurance for a period of 5 years. It will bring the indolent Brits who think that welfare is an alternative to work to their senses, turn off the magnet of free benefits to those from abroad who view us as a soft and also make the whole issue compliant with EU laws. Instead of which they come up with silly ideas that they know won’t comply with EU laws.

Comment 92

What could it possibly matter when all their documents are forged anyway? Do you understand what this really is? This allows illegal people with illegal documents to become legal and it legitimizes their forged paperwork. The person that thought this up should be hung for treason and crimes against the state.

Comment 93

In Spain you have to prove that you have worked for a year before you are entitled to claim any benefits and you must do so within 5 days of your employment ending or you get nothing. Why is this any different? The UK is the only country that actually abides by these stupid rules.

Comment 94

Too little. Too late. David Cameron is too weak to do what the people clearly want which is to stop the restrictions being lifted on January 1st.

Comment 95

It’s now not in 2018 that we need to stop Bulgarian and Romanians. Everybody is seeing a decline in this country apart from our silly politicians. They just don’t have a clue.

Comment 96

Yeah right. Cameron doesn’t care about Britain.

Comment 97

Cameron, not being a statesman, has done nothing in three and a half years, immigration, is the peoples no1 concern, being out of touch at ground level, has cost him the election to UKIP, he is a two nation pm.

Comment 98

Negotiate? It’s our country and we don’t want them here.

Comment 99

why not have a system where you cannot claim any benefits unless you have worked and payed tax for five years prior to making a claim? this would include everyone indigenous and foreign people.

Comment 100

We don’t want them here full stop!

Comment 101

Why not give them the same benefits as in their own countries? Why is selling the big issue Negotiate? It’s our country and we don’t want them here. Why is selling the big issue the point of this.
Coalition split over plan to curb benefits for new EU migrants: Lib Dem minister says he 'needs to be persuaded' while Boris backs restrictions

- Scottish Secretary Alistair Carmichael is unsure about David Cameron's proposals
- But Boris Johnson said 'it's time for the UK to take back more control

By DANIEL MARTIN FOR THE DAILY MAIL
PUBLISHED: 00:07, 25 November 2013 | UPDATED: 00:08, 25 November 2013

The Coalition was split yesterday on David Cameron's plans to limit access to benefits for EU migrants, with a Lib Dem minister saying it could 'put us on the wrong side' of Europe.

Alistair Carmichael, the Scottish Secretary, said he would 'need to be persuaded' on proposals to impose a minimum period before newly-arrived migrants could claim handouts.

However, London Mayor Boris Johnson backed the Prime Minister's calls for restrictions, saying: 'It is clearly time for the UK to take back more control of the terms under which EU migrants arrive on our streets.'

- ‘We need much more flexibility to set conditions for claiming benefits.

‘I am in favour of immigration by talented and hard-working people, but the present system is mad: cracking down on Australians, New Zealanders and high-spending Chinese students and tourists, but

‘I am in favour of transitionary limits on benefits for Romanians and Bulgarians moving to Britain after

restrictions.

The reluctance to impose restrictions by the Lib Dems comes despite even Labour accepting there

should be controls to ensure immigrants do not come here from Eastern Europe purely to live a life on

benefits.

The reluctance to impose restrictions by the Lib Dems comes despite even Labour accepting there

should be controls to ensure immigrants do not come here from Eastern Europe purely to live a life on

benefits.

Yvette Cooper, the Shadow Home Secretary, yesterday said her party had suggested nine months ago

it was in favour of transitional limits on benefits for Romanians and Bulgarians moving to Britain after

border controls are lifted on January 1.

The comments will, however, raise eyebrows, because Labour refused to impose similar controls in 2004 when the borders were flung open to migrants from Poland and elsewhere in the EU.

Number 10 has acted after two polls revealed deep public unease about immigration.

On Friday, a survey for the Mail showed more than four in five people did not want unrestricted access to the UK for Romanians and Bulgarians, and said they were concerned the NHS and schools would be put under too much pressure.

And a poll for The Times a day later showed that, by a huge margin, tightening border controls tops

the wishlist for renegotiation of Britain’s membership of the EU before a referendum in 2017.
The Mail revealed on Saturday that new limits on EU migrants who claim benefits in Britain are to be a key demand in the Government’s attempt to negotiate a looser relationship with Europe.

Cabinet sources say that gaining the right to ‘shut the door’ on benefits for newcomers and existing migrants who have not lived here for a minimum period of five years would be a key priority and could be one of the first issues to be discussed in Brussels.

Number 10’s tough stance on migrants comes days after two polls revealed just how worried Britons are about border controls.

Number 10’s tough stance on migrants comes days after two polls revealed just how worried Britons are about border controls.

As many as 12 countries, including Spain, Germany and Denmark, are understood to have concerns that large numbers of people are arriving only to claim generous benefits.

EURO SUPPORT GROWS

David Cameron is hopeful for support from a number of other EU countries for curbs on welfare tourism.

But Tory Education Secretary Michael Gove also backed Mr Cameron’s position yesterday.

The Prime Minister has previously threatened Britain over plans to limit benefits handouts, claiming that they ‘infringe the human rights’ of EU citizens.

One Cabinet minister said: ‘The writing is on the wall for the way the Commission is behaving. Other countries have also had enough.’

But when it comes to new migrants from accession countries in the EU, we need to look properly at the benefits system to make sure people are coming here to work and contribute, not to take advantage of what is rightly a generous welfare system.

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is a nonsense, with only 6 weeks to go. Anything that could have been done, should have been done a couple of years ago. Europe won't agree and the LD's are basically opposed to it.

Comment 3

Can someone in the Coalition please explain why these EU immigrants should receive any benefits, when they have contributed nothing that qualifies them to receive them? If they cannot come up with a plausible reason, then why are they discussing it?

Click to rate: 7 1

Comment 4

I will be bold enough to suggest that anything that "puts us on the wrong side of Europe" will result in some significant benefits for the UK.

Click to rate: 8 0

Comment 5

Benefits should be withheld for at least a year, living by begging and stealing for three months or even six months, especially during the warmer seasons, might be a viable proposition knowing that a relative fortune awaits them. The long suffering British public would then be in double jeopardy, with destitute gangs roaming the land and preying on them as well as living off them legally at the end of the qualifying period. On the other hand the prospect of living rough throughout a British winter might well deter them!

Click to rate: 5 0

Comment 6

Even IF the coalition agreed this restriction it represents little more than a pissing over the cracks. We need to STOP them coming here in the first place as they displace jobs and over stress housing, health education and crime in THE most densely populated country in Europe!!!

THE MADNESS CONTINUES!!

Click to rate: 16 0

Comment 7

It should be a minimum of five years paying tax into the system before they get a penny and as they told me not while you've got any savings also... that would shift the beggars out...

Click to rate: 4 0

Comment 8

no benefits AT ALL let them pay in for 5 years at least... if you don't put in you can't take out...

simples

Click to rate: 6 0

Comment 9

Yea Boris, you're right, it is mad but then so are the LibDems.

Click to rate: 6 0

Comment 10

Us native Brits can take some action – never vote for a " daft laddie " MP never give to a Roma beggar complain to the police about Roma beggars

Click to rate: 6 0

Comment 11

What can we say that already has not been said? The majority of Brits want severe immigration controls put into place now. We are a sinking island that fought 2 world wars to protect our borders, it is a disgrace to the memory of our fallen to allow this labour led betrayal to continue. Make a note of the MPs who cannot grasp this and vote them out at the next election.

Click to rate: 5 0

Comment 12

Dump Cleggers boys, and Cameron lets get shot of the coalition, Britain needs to regain control.

Click to rate: 6 0

Comment 13

Sorry no I'm not. Remove the one's that are already here, don't want them. How many more times, get out of Europe

Click to rate: 6 0

Comment 14

Not convinced? Send them up to Scotland and that will convince you of the error of your ways in a nanosecond!

Click to rate: 5 0

Comment 15

Why am I not surprised by the buffoon Cammichael utterances on this subject, politicians are not afraid of the voters they are afraid of the EU. We must remove clowns like Cammichael,Clegg & Cable immediately the country is ruined let's try and stave off this latest catastrophe.

Click to rate: 6 1

Comment 16

This political experiment called the EU has failed on so many fronts. Time to consign it to the historical dustbin. Vote UKIP...its our only hope!

Click to rate: 5 0

Comment 17

As we fund their benefits how come we haven't been asked. Why are we so easily dismissed as of no consequence. have they so much faith in their propaganda. Don't want to spoil their day.

Click to rate: 6 0

Comment 18

It's high time they broke the shackles from the Liberal party and went their own way be a marriage due for a divorce the Conservatives need to quell the emergence of UKIP and by Britain implementing its own rules on legislation regarding immigration, talking to other European countries who basically agree with Cameron to get some consensus back into blocking anyone who ever nationally from claiming any sort of benefit after a set time limit we have enough of our own who believe its a god given right to remain on benefits without any contribution for life,
Comment 19
What's the point we're finished.....

Comment 20
The Coalition was split yesterday on David Cameron's plans to limit access to benefits for EU migrants, with a Liberal Democrat minister saying it could "put us on the wrong side", of Europe. Alistair Carmichael, the Scottish Secretary, said he would "need to be persuaded" on proposals to impose a minimum period before newly-arrived migrants could claim handouts. "Well, how surprising - NOT!"

Comment 21
What planet does Alistair Carmichael think he is on? Who on earth is he meant to be representing?

Comment 22
Boris is not an mp.

Comment 23
Don't want them full stop. Nannind the benefits, shouldn't even come into it, they are blight, this new lot.

Comment 24
Get up, stand up, stand up for your rights.

Comment 25
The Limpwits will do nothing to upset their paymasters in Brussels, the whole lot of them are traitors to the people of this country.

Comment 26
Why does this Scottish nonentity look facially a little like Salmond? Something in the water. Not Boris is not an representing?

Comment 27
Paid into the pot with NO access to working tax credit or any other benefit until that time is up - and none for their family at all until ten years.

Comment 28
He needs to be "persuaded" folks. Be sure to persuade him at the next general Election won't you. I'm sure you will.

Comment 29
About time!

Comment 30
Good, but 6 months isn't long enough really. At least 1 year better.

Comment 31
Lib-Dems do not have the courage of their own convictions. They are just a bunch of losers. What's the piont we're finished.....

Comment 32
Too little too late. I despair for this country after January 1st

Comment 33
Is this Carmichael off his trolley or what? What does "prepared to look at the whole situation in the round" mean? The whole situation Mr Carmichael is that the UK - due to its inart and spineless politicians - is being swamped with immigrants who have no intention of working and have every intention of bleeding the UK dry by any means. The British people (not those who have been handed passports because they asked) are being pushed aside so that just about anybody from anywhere in the world can be paid benefits and be given housing of their choosing.

Comment 34
Just don't give them any benefits and they will not come or stay STUPID HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

Comment 35
I certainly don't need to be persuaded.
Comment 38

Lib-Dems are a complete waste of space and will be history in 2015. Labour are as bad whilst Tories are at least pretending to curb the immigrants. NOBODY will stand up for our country against the EU except NIGEL.

Comment 39

Everyone can see what will happen but the Lib_Dems will "fiddle while Rome burns"... Their lack of foresight is truly worrying.

Comment 40

No Benefits should be paid to migrants who have not paid one Penny in Tax or National Insurance. Also no one should be allowed in the country unless they can support themselves or have an important job to go too. I for one will vote UKIP to try to stop these waste of our Tax money, Darn the EU and what they think !

Comment 41

the LibDems need to wake up and listen to the voters

Comment 42

Horse and bolted comes to mine

Comment 43

Well if Alistair Carmichael isn't so sure and he presumably is Scottish, then they can have the migrants and pay for them in SCOTLAND

Comment 44

Sorry Carmichael, your job is to suppress Scotland in Westminster, it is not to have an opinion about anything else.

Comment 45

LibDems in particular and politicians in general really need to start listening to the views of the majority of the UK. It's about time Cameron took his head out of the sand and listened to the majority of the UK and even more so what is going to happen in a couple of months time. When the riots start it will tell Cloud Nine Clegg and his Euro Zealots to Naff Off.

Comment 46

It's about time Cameron took his head out of the sand and listened to the majority of the UK electorate, we have enough immigrants in our country legal or otherwise and to allow thousands more will cripple our infrastructure altogether. We already suffer from the austere cuts to the NHS, Police, Fire Services, Armed Forces, etc. and to let thousands more into our country is simply ludicrous. Romania and Bulgaria should be sent a message that there is no more money for benefits unless immigrants have worked and paid tax for at least five years, and while you at it tell Cloud Nine Clegg and his Euro Zealots to Naff Off.

Comment 47

What can we comment, the Government will do what it wants regardless of how the people of the UK feel

Comment 48

Simple. If Mr Carmichael is so in favour put them in his Scottish constituency then. No jobs there but they are only after the benefits anyway. Added bonus is that if the Scottish get independence they can pay for them too.

Comment 49

All they will do is rent a postal address between them, pretend they have lived here for the required period of time and then proceed to claim their entitlements once the time limit is up. You should only be able to take out if you have paid in it, the is the only fair way, too many economic migrants are now resident in this country:

Comment 50

Simple, go back to free scotland and give away scottish money England for the English, scotland for the jobs

Comment 51

State upfront, NO BENEFITS, NO HOUSING and NO FREE NHS TREATMENT. This will stop them in their Tracks!!!!!

Comment 52

You can reduce immigration to Britain at a stroke its easy really No benefits No housing No health treatment unless in an emergency if immigrants know they will not be entitled to benefits in this country there is no purpose in emigrating to Britain unless they can support themselves.

Comment 53

TREASON

Comment 54

If immigrants know they will not be entitled to benefits
That won't change while the UK remains subject to EU legislation as it is at present. With a lawful right of residence as they pay their own nationals. So an EU 'citizen' or a migrant or non-deserving benefits claimants to you. Too little, too late. The only way to stop benefit tourism is to rewrite the UK laws on benefits; the solution either stop paying it out or you will be cut up next in power.

It's time for these people to get real. Immigrants from Romania and Bulgaria are not coming here for the benefits (although they will accept them if offered). They are coming because they want a better life. Many will continue their indentured lifestyle when here causing severe problems with crime, begging and squatter wherever they go. Politicians inability or unwillingness to deal with this is shameful and we must hold them accountable.

Breaking Euro rules ?? Is Luxembourg don't pay benefits unless you have been in the country two years & then you can only claim them for two years. If they can do that why cant we ?? These liberal politicians say I mean you Cameron are a disgrace to the nation. They just don't want to listen so vote him & Clegg out & dont even consider Miliband as it will become worse.

It's time for these people to get real. Conditions on our welfare benefits can be accessed, by immigrants, appear to be perfectly within the EU rules, which are quite clear on the matter: "So, as long as you [the immigrant] have sufficient financial resources and health insurance so as not to be a burden on the social security system in the country in which you choose to live, you are entitled to live in the country of your choice." What the government do not have the ability to do, is to prevent any EU citizen choosing to take up residency in the UK.

That's bad enough that the Lib Dems oppose the move but this is the first time since coming to power in May 2010, that the Conservatives have even considered it. ‘It’s too little, too late and just another insulting pre-election ploy to gain votes.

Do A now, before the scroungers turn up here. If they know there’s no goodies awaiting them, they’ll stay put.

Tell that to our troops Mr Carmichael. And if Scotland gains independence, we’ll send all the non-deserving benefits claimants to you.

We should be curbing benefits for EVERYBODY. Too much is paid to too many far too easily. When this nation gives up its handout culture and re-discovers it’s work ethic we will be great again. Too many people are simply not contributing anything to the public purse but are putting their greedy hands in it all the time.

LibDems. Who needs them.

How many more eastern Europeans (even those who want to work) do they really expect us to suck up to their European masters and spending our hard earned income soon he will be just another insulting pre-election ploy to gain votes.

Cambridge a LibDEM who like all the others have no interest in the British people only in soaking up to their European masters and spending our hard earned income soon he will be proposing another tax to cover the costs of supporting these people

I just love it, the Scottish Secretary. When are we going to do something about these Scottish ministers dictating what is right for the rest of the UK, maybe independence for Scotland is not a bad thing after all, they will no long have a say in the running of the rest of the country. Come on Cameron, you are the majority leader, stop allowing the LibDems to dictate terms, otherwise you will end up leading a minority government. You will find a lot of people behind you whilst you get policy moved forward which the rest of the population is asking for.

Too little, too late. The only way to stop benefit tourism is to rewrite the UK laws on benefits; the UK and all member states are bound by EU law to provide exactly the same benefits to anyone with a lawful right of residence as they pay their own nationals. So an EU ‘citizen’ or a migrant or asylum seeker with a right to reside has the same legal entitlement to benefits as a UK national. That won’t change while the UK remains subject to EU legislation as it is at present.

This LibDem provacator needs to be ‘persuaded’. Where the hell does he think all the extra money is coming from? He wants to leave the decision making to Brussels, then he is superfluous to requirements and can resign. We pay a UK government to govern the UK and care for our welfare and interests….start governing.

It will not make any difference, common carnmon will be on his Christmas break in a couple of weeks, and he will take the flak in February, meanwhile the Westminster machine will party on over christmas whilst 200 pensioners will die every single day from cold related diseases.
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I DO share your concerns on migration, declares Cameron days after Mail's explosive poll: PM unveils sweeping new restrictions on access to benefits

- PM unveils new restrictions on access to benefits for EU migrants
- 'EU principle of “free movement” for workers has gone too far' he'll say
- Emergency package of measures comes days after a Daily Mail poll
- Revealed four in five people don't want unrestricted access to UK

By JAMES CHAPMAN FOR THE DAILY MAIL

PUBLISHED: 00:08, 27 November 2013 | UPDATED: 10:07, 27 November 2013

David Cameron will today unveil sweeping new restrictions on access to benefits for EU migrants.

The Prime Minister will insist that he shares the public's 'concerns' about a renewed wave of migration from Europe.

Ahead of the lifting of controls on newcomers from Romania and Bulgaria on January 1, he will declare that the founding EU principle of 'free movement' for workers has gone too far.

Mr Cameron will say Labour's record of failure meant many people are 'deeply concerned' about what will happen when the transitional restrictions come to an end, adding: 'I share those concerns.'

He has responded with an emergency package of measures within days of a Daily Mail poll, published last Friday, which revealed more than four in five people do not want unrestricted access to the UK for Romanians and Bulgarians.

This was the trigger for other polls that signalled similar levels of public concern.

"We need to face the fact that free movement has become a trigger for vast population movements caused by huge disparities in income," the Prime Minister will say, proposing a bar on arrivals from EU countries which do not meet a fixed level of average earnings.

By January 1, Mr Cameron will announce EU jobseekers will no longer be paid housing benefit to subsidise accommodation costs.

There will be time limits before out-of-work benefits can be claimed.

Migrants who currently get jobseekers' allowance after less than a month will have to wait three months before claiming.

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Benefits will no longer be paid indefinitely, with payments stopped after six months unless people have a genuine prospect of employment.

Beggars and vagrants from EU countries will be removed and barred from re-entering Britain for 12 months.

Most controversially, the Government is planning a new 'minimum earnings threshold' – below which benefits top up earnings, such as income support, will be cut altogether.

Government sources said the threshold had yet to be set, but would aim to prevent EU workers topping up low incomes with benefits.
"We are changing the rules so that no one can come to this country and expect to get out-of-work benefits immediately; we will not pay them for the first three months. If after three months an EU national needs benefits – we will no longer pay these indefinitely.

He will say: 'They will only be able to claim for a maximum of six months unless they can prove they have a genuine prospect of employment. We are also toughening up the test which migrants who want to claim benefits must undergo.

"This will include a new minimum earnings threshold. If they don’t pass the test, we’ll cut off access to benefits such as income support.

‘Newly arrived EU jobseekers will not be able to claim housing benefit. If people are not here to work – if they are begging or sleeping rough – they will be removed. They will then be barred from re-entry for 12 months, unless they can prove they have a proper reason to be here."

Mr Cameron will say free movement is key to his attempts to carve out a looser relationship with Brussels ahead of an in/out referendum on EU membership by 2017.

‘Britain, as part of our plan to reform the EU, will now work with others to return the concept of free movement to a more sensible basis.

‘And we need to do the same with welfare.

For example, free movement shouldn’t be about exporting child benefit – I want to work with our European partners to address this.

‘And we need to do the same with welfare."

Mr Cameron will accuse Labour of a ‘monumental mistake’ in failing to control immigration from Eastern Europe.

He will say its refusal to impose controls on new EU members in 2004 led to a surge in immigration.

One million people from central and Eastern Europe now live in the UK.

‘In 2004, the Labour Government made the decision that the UK should opt out completely of transitional controls on the new EU member states.

They had the right to impose a seven-year ban before new citizens could come and work here, but – almost alone in Europe – Labour refused it. That was a monumental mistake,’ Mr Cameron writes in an article for the Financial Times today.

He will say: ‘That was the moment to address difficult questions about when to allow new entrants full access to each others’ labour markets – but the Labour Government ducked these questions.

The Immigration Bill, he will add, will add, already seeks to reduce ‘pull factors’ to Britain. He will also unveil four new measures.

"One would be to require a new country to reach a certain share of average EU GDP per head before full free movement was allowed.

Individual member states could be freed to impose a cap if their inflow from the EU reached a certain number in a single year.

The PM will say he wants to look at various options to stop surges of immigration.

‘And we need to do the same with welfare."

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One million people from central and Eastern Europe now live in the UK.
Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg said: 'These are sensible and reasonable reforms to ensure that...
(yet) but we can move you at the next election....I shall smile as you leave No10!!

Comment 28

4 out of 5. But a pole of Daily Mail readers isn't exactly a neutral survey.

Comment 27

A "pole" of Daily Mail readers??? Sheesh!

Comment 26

Not as on-trend as usual

Comment 25

His political suicide, like watching a car crash in slow motion with no one doing anything meaningful to stop it. Tinkering with benefits does not address the issue on every voter's mind.

Comment 24

Finally a step in the right direction.

Comment 23

Well, I don't move in right wing circles yet I have yet to speak to any one who supports immigration had been a disaster.

Comment 22

You must have poles on the brain - can't say I blame you, you are surrounded by them, after all. It is 'POLI' BTWF!

Comment 21

Do you mean 'poll' or are you making a pun?

Comment 20

Like a poll for the Guardian IS?

Comment 19

A 'poll' of Daily Mail readers?? Sheesh!

Comment 18

Poll ! Obviously not a Mail reader

Comment 17

'pol'?

Comment 16

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Comment 15

"4 out of 5. But a pole of Daily Mail readers isn't exactly a neutral survey.

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His political suicide, like watching a car crash in slow motion with no one doing anything meaningful to stop it. Tinkering with benefits does not address the issue on every voter's mind and he and his party will pay dearly for it come the next election.

Comment 13

Let's see if this gets implemented!

Comment 12

random' is the word. But the Mail may just be representative at this time. And it's 'poll'.

Comment 11

until in EU he can't and will not do a thing, mark my words

Comment 10

and he and his party will pay dearly for it come the next election.

Comment 9

means to stop it. Tinkering with benefits does not address the issue on every voter's mind

Comment 8

His political suicide, like watching a car crash in slow motion with no one doing anything meaningful to stop it. Tinkering with benefits does not address the issue on every voter's mind and he and his party will pay dearly for it come the next election.

Comment 7

"4 out of 5. But a pole of Daily Mail readers isn't exactly a neutral survey.

Comment 6

His political suicide, like watching a car crash in slow motion with no one doing anything meaningful to stop it. Tinkering with benefits does not address the issue on every voter's mind and he and his party will pay dearly for it come the next election.

Comment 5

Well, I don't move in right wing circles yet I have yet to speak to any one who supports immigration had been a disaster.

Comment 4

You must have poles on the brain - can't say I blame you, you are surrounded by them, after all. It is 'POLI' BTWF!

Comment 3

On the BBC sunday morning live show their pole last Sunday showed 89% thought

Comment 2

meaningful to stop it. Tinkering with benefits does not address the issue on every voter's mind

Comment 1

"4 out of 5. But a pole of Daily Mail readers isn't exactly a neutral survey.

Comment 0

His political suicide, like watching a car crash in slow motion with no one doing anything meaningful to stop it. Tinkering with benefits does not address the issue on every voter's mind and he and his party will pay dearly for it come the next election.
I own a factory and only employ foreign staff. They work harder and for less money than British staff. So everyone is a winner, me, my customers and my workers.

No, not “everyone” is a winner. The British taxpayer isn’t a winner, because your workers are paying less tax on their lower wages. The British worker you’d have had to employ instead at a living wage isn’t a winner, either. The overstretched National Health and education systems aren’t winners, either.

You like exploiting immigrants so you can have a better life. Employers like you are exactly what this country doesn’t need. It’s because of people like you that this country has so many problems with EU migrants. It’s because of people like you that this country doesn’t have a world-class education system. It’s because of people like you that this country doesn’t have a world-class health system.

Comment 30

Comment 31

Comment 32

Comment 33

Comment 34

Comment 35

Comment 36

Comment 37

Comment 38

Comment 39

Comment 40

Comment 41

Comment 42

Comment 43

Comment 44

Comment 45

Comment 46

Comment 47

Comment 48
Cameron simply take us out of the EU, the immigration and many other negative issues will immediately be solvable.

Or just stand up to the EU just like many other EU states do.

Since this will obviously never happen, I will take this legislation, if indeed it is passed. If you cut off the prospect of benefits and stop the Roma community from begging in the street, you will see a drastic fall in number of EU migrants. People do not come here for our gold weather, they come for money, cut the source of income and they will leave. The only ones remaining will be those in employment.

Blast blah blah. He'll say anything but will do absolutely NOTHING. Well, apart from sell us all immediately be solvable.

Thank you 'soapbox lik'' for raising a valid point. Genuine people who are going to democracy not a charity" well said.

He's meant to be in charge of this country......not the bloody EU....he should grow some balls...tell them to go to hell....WE DONT WANT THEM.

They want to know why they find a disabled child funny," Katie Price is determined to meet online trolls who have posted vile abuse about her son Harvey, 13

Love and basketball! Pregnant Chrissy Teigen shares a smooth with husband John Legend as they sit courtedate at game Counting courtedate

Eva Longoria is a wonder in white as she shows off her slender figure in sleeveless top...and exposes latest results of laser surgery to remove tattoos

She's got some from! Holly Willoughby shows off her ample assets in a plunging red bodycon after shocking fans with fuller pout (he's looking at her lips)

All are happy and healthy! Monera Baccarin and Ben McKenzie have welcomed a baby girl named Frances Lula Setta Schenkkan

Alexandra Ambrosio displays her perfect pins in a chic leather fringed mini as she steps out in style in Paris

What a stunner

In that really you Kylie? Jenner is almost unrecognisable as she posts flashback picture from just four years ago Famously overhauled her image - and post

Khloe Kardashian shows off cleavage as she heads to lunch in LA wearing a low-cut top and white fedora Had her assets proudly on show

Can't outrun the SLIME! Mo Farah is covered with green goo as he's crowned Kids' Choice Awards Inspirational Athlete Showed his fun side

They come when they come! Alec Baldwin admits third child with wife Hilaria was a "happy": Said they didn't plan their last tid

Britain's Next Top Model finalist Jessica Wilkinson reveals she's no longer happy with her body after the pressure drove her to stress-eat Now content

Real housewives! Kate Upton flashes eye popping cleavage as she shows her very domestic side for V Magazine Not ready for chores

It was my proudest moment? Beyonce reveals giving birth to daughter Blue Ivy was her biggest accomplishment

Relatable motherhood

Dimwit troll alert! Don't let him wind you up, he has to do something after he has finished his homework.
Comment 67
Lil, agree with everything you have said, except the democracy bit. We are ruled by Brussels, not WasiImamister.

Comment 68
If there builders are as good as the polish then we are doomed we don't need any of them.

Comment 69
UK is more like a benign dictatorship than a democracy.

Comment 70
According to Google we have an Insetocracy! A system of government where the least capable to lead are elected by the least capable of producing, and where the members of society least likely to sustain themselves or succeed, are rewarded with goods and services paid for by the confraticied wealth of a diminishing number of producers.

Comment 71
Well said! Soapbox Lil. I second that!

Comment 72
Nobody canes what you mind

Comment 73
You're the nobody "citizen". You have no understanding of identity.

Comment 74
Local beggars allowed here, no foreign beggars please.

Comment 75
I mind nurses and builders coming over while we have mass unemployment. We don't need additional labour, we need to employ those currently on the dole.

Comment 76
Can't agree more! The agricultural jobs are all there for taking, as the old people's home. The problem is, the vast number of British people would rather stay unemployed and complain about people who are not afraid to get their hands dirty.

Comment 77
Great, but I'm still voting UKP.

Comment 78
And me.

Comment 79
and me.

Comment 80
UKIP won't get any MPs at the next general election. Mark my words.

Comment 81
A vote for UKIP is a vote for Labour. Total waste of time. Sadly, this fact only brings about red arrows on this website. So on.

Comment 82
PJA as I said to my mother the other day, "You have voted Conservative all your life and what have they done to your country?" I will vote with my heart for UKIP and we all do we can get shot of the LIBLABCON!

Comment 83
Then I hope you won't be surprised to wake up to a Labour government on 8th May 2015.... How could you possibly risk allowing Ed Balls to be chancellor of exchequor.

Comment 84
At last - some posts rightly pointing out the fact a UKIP vote is in reality a Labour gift. What a refreshing change to see some people have finally caught on to what Farage himself has signalled often enough, and Bloom is now prepared to admit. UKIP will not gain any serious ground in a UK general election, merely greatly weaken the Conservative position and open the door for Labour. That will mean there will be no EU
strategy?

Comment 85
Vote UKIP and you might well UKIP.

Comment 86
Backbone of an amoeba more like, an election is coming up so lets do a con job on the voters.

Comment 87
is it even remotely plausible that UKIP will actually do anything other than sap Tory votes? either way if you only vote for the tories you are voting for a government that is clearly unfit for power.

Comment 88
@jenks... and your solution is? Tory? LibDumb? which do you prefer, frying pan or fire? Get off the LibLabCON merry-go-round!

Comment 89
Dippydave and timebobsquarepants - what your saying is ridiculously short sighted because if you don't vote for UKIP then you are 100% guaranteed to let Labour in at some point anyway and nothing will change. Tactical voting for the Tories is AT BEST about us and THEIR ONLY GOAL IS TO CLING ON TO POWER. SO IF YOU WHY WOULD ANYONE VOTE FOR THE OTHER PARTIES? THEY DON'T CARE but how much they will get when they arent in power. UKip all the way and if it splits the

Comment 90
Congratulations, but you'll be the first to complain when Miliband becomes PM because invertebrates if you wish but don't then complain when we become nothing more than a small European state.

Comment 91
be a permanent cast member/

Comment 92
WEG NOT IF EVERYONE VOTE FOR UKIP THEY WILL BE VOTED UNANIUMOUSLY. WHY WOULD ANYONE VOTE FOR THE OTHER PARTIES? THEY DON'T CARE ABOUT US AND THEIR ONLY GOAL IS TO CLING ON TO POWER. SO IF YOU VOTE UKIP THEY WILL BE ELECTED WITH A MAJORITY.

Comment 93
Voting UKIP is too late!

Comment 94
wagfest the only people to blame are the tory's themselves, you broke your promises where was our referendum

Comment 95
Great. You and three percent of the electorate. If the last general election is anything to go by. The rest of us are, quite literally, shaking in our boots at the mighty power your party wields.

Comment 96
All these Tory henchmen here stating dont vote for UKip you will end up with Labour. Well I'll tell you what I WANT to vote UKip so they have a large say in our government and NOT as it is now where we have to sit and listen to complete idiots with no interest in our future. UKIP all the way and if it splits the Tory vote, great I dont want to see the Tories in power EVER AGAIN

Comment 97
The only plus about Ed Balls becoming chancellor is that in no time at all everything would fall to pieces and the IMF would take over and force real change-bring it on!

Comment 98
Do something about it then Cameron !! your seat is slipping from beneath you -- you WILL loose to UKIP if you do not ACT --

Comment 99
It's "lose"... Sorry, just a bugbear of mine.

Comment 100
He will lose to Labour... Wake up to reality!

Comment 101"lose" not "face"
The immigration backlash: Germany and France join PM in call for crackdown on benefit tourism as Hungarian eurocrat brands UK the 'nasty country of Europe'

- Tory MPs are calling for restrictions on Romanian and Bulgarian workers to stay in place after January 1, claiming Britain is 'full up'
- David Cameron has proposed changes to foreign workers' benefits
- Both Angela Merkel and Francois Hollande's governments are looking at introducing similar restrictions
- Brussels commissioner told to quit over his 'nasty' Britain remarks

By JAMES CHAPMAN FOR THE DAILY MAIL
PUBLISHED: 23:15, 27 November 2013 | UPDATED: 09:34, 28 November 2013

Brussels was facing open revolt over its no-borders immigration policy last night.

Hours after David Cameron outlined a crackdown on benefit tourism, France and Germany sensationally followed suit with similar plans.

The triple assault pushed Brussels onto the back foot and one of its commissioners was told to quit for claiming Britain risked becoming the 'nasty country of Europe'.

In Westminster, 46 Tory MPs kept up the pressure by signing a Commons motion calling for restrictions on Romanian and Bulgarian workers to stay in place after January 1 because Britain was 'full up'.

An agreement signed by Angela Merkel's new coalition government in Berlin said 'poverty migration' from new EU countries was causing considerable social problems.

It declared: 'We will therefore tackle unjustified benefit claims by EU citizens.

Francois Hollande's socialist government said the 'social dumping' of people from poor Eastern European states amounted to a threat to the economic and social fabric of France'.

His ministers outlined plans to limit the rights of temporary workers from other countries.

Mr Cameron insisted he was sending a clear message that Britain was no soft touch but he was criticised for again refusing to predict how many Romanians and Bulgarians will come to Britain when temporary controls are lifted on January 1.

There was also anger that some of the Prime Minister's changes to benefit rights will not be in place in time.
A bar on migrants claiming out-of-work benefits for the first three months;
- Welfare payments being stopped after six months unless the claimant has a genuine chance of a job;
- Migrant jobseekers not being able to claim housing benefit to subsidise accommodation costs;
- A 12-month bar on the return to the UK of any EU migrant found begging or sleeping rough;
- New £20,000 fines for employers who undercut British workers by paying migrants less than the minimum wage;
- A new salary threshold below which income support and other benefits which top up earnings will not be paid.

But some of the MPs who called for an extension of controls on Romanian and Bulgarian migrants urged Mr Cameron to do more – and risk EU fines.

Former minister Sir Gerald Howarth said the proposals were ‘incredibly robust’ but said even at this late stage ministers should ‘contemplate extending the transitional arrangements so that we have another two or three years to prepare’.

An angry exchange in the Commons, Tory MP Charles Walker urged the Home Secretary to ‘find her inner lion or tiger and extend transitional controls until 2019’, adding: ‘She should take the hit and not pay the EU fine.’

Philip Hollobone, another Conservative, said: ‘My constituents take the view that this country is full, and that we should not open our borders to Romanians and Bulgarians.’

Jacob Rees-Mogg, MP for North East Somerset, said: ‘The free movement of people is no longer working in the interests of this nation, so why do Her Majesty’s Government lack the political will to change the law?’

European Commission president José Manuel Barroso said Mr Cameron had called him earlier this week ‘informing me about the intentions he has on these issues of freedom of movement’.

‘I had the occasion to underlie to Prime Minister Cameron that free movement is a fundamental treaty principle that must be upheld,’ he added.

‘At the same time I look good note that the UK wants to ensure that the measures it plans to take respect EU law. The Commission can only comment in detail when we receive legislative proposals brought forward by the UK.’

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Mr Cameron suggested a future Tory government, as part of its pledge to renegotiate EU membership, would propose changes to allow member states to halt arrivals if numbers exceeded a fixed level.

He also suggested freedom of movement should only be fully allowed if the average income of a country’s people was not too far below the EU average.

The Liberal Democrats have supported the clampdown on migrants’ benefit rights, but say they would not back the longer-term reform of freedom of movement rules.

London Mayor Boris Johnson suggested fundamental reform was needed.

‘At the moment we are claiming to have capped immigration by having a 60 per cent reduction in New Zealanders, when we can do nothing to stop the entire population of Transylvania – charming though most of them may be – from trying to pitch camp at Marble Arch,’ he said.

‘David Cameron is right about giving countries more flexibility over the time-lag before other nationals may claim benefits, and I can’t believe he is alone among EU leaders.’
because they are wondering which currency will fail first. Snakes and ladders anyone?

that still goes on in the post soviet EU. The nasty member still paying its way in the world...

come to and get guilt free abortions without persecution and a religious drumming down, yes

So awful are we that half the world want to live here. The nasty country where Polish women can

Thanks for the compliment. This awful country - one so awful during WW2, we freed the world.

listen to the people as the people speak, not ones that ignore the people for decades and then

Hey Brussels, guess what? Everyone is just about sick of listening to your rubbish, I think the

Which idiot couldn't have predicted that if you gave everyone in Europe free movement,

You only get in if you HAVE a job to go to and you get NO benefits until you have paid in for 5

Screw the EU.....time to look after ourselves. Should be more like some other countries where

One more bad word on Brussels and you’re out of EU, you nasty Briton!

What could possibly go wrong?

Haha, what hilariously open racism, "Toilet bowls..." - nice. Welcome to the civilised UK.

Speedy, we have stopped being "civilised, we are now officially "nasty" and we love it, the jig is up for your lot, go and bolt your head.

Cameron, Merkel and Hollande are running scared, I'm not falling for their backtracking, the whole lot need to be overwritten by their people and new governments put in place, ones that listen to the people as the people speak, not ones that ignore the people for decades and then try to do a u turn at the last hour!

Comment 1
I would also say the "social dumping" of poor people from the third world threatens the "social fabric of the UK". For goodness sake, how difficult is it for us to introduce a points system for immigration like they have in sensible countries such as Canada and Australia.

Comment 2
Very, very, very, where the EU is concerned. Impossible.

Comment 3
I don't care if they think we're nasty please stay away

Comment 4
Paying catch-up or is that just common sense or a change? Glad to hear the 'nasty' comment chap has got the boot.

Comment 5
Screw the EU....time to look after ourselves. Should be more like some other countries where you only get in if you HAVE a job to go to and you get NO benefits until you have paid in for 5 years......

Comment 6
So, some overpaid Eurocrat thinks we're "nasty", does he? Great! Who cares? It's better to have

Comment 7
Hey Brussels, guess what? Everyone is just about sick of listening to your rubbish, I think the

Comment 8
One more bad word on Brussels and you're out of EU, you nasty Briton!

Comment 9
Politicians better start getting this right because europe is heading for another war the way things are going. It will probably start as a low level civil wars until it explodes in to nation against nation.

Comment 10
This is what they want and the war machine will just make the rich even richer and wipe out a few million plats whilst they're all it.

Comment 11
That is exactly how it will happen. Europe can never duck nature and any idea it can stop wars is a fools paradise. Nature will just mutate conflict to within borders as is clearly already beginning here.

Comment 12
Which idiot couldn't have predicted that if you gave everyone in Europe free movement, everyone in the crappy, non performing, no benefits, low wage countries would move to the countries with higher wages and benefits. Now all countries in the EU will become toilet bowls rather than just a few, so congrats to the EU project for finally achieving complete uniformity through...

Comment 13
What could possibly go wrong?

Comment 14
Haha, what hilariously open racism, "Toilet bowls..." - nice. Welcome to the civilised UK.

Comment 15
Speedy, we have stopped being "civilised, we are now officially "nasty" and we love it, the jig is up for your lot, go and bolt your head.

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Comment 17
Thanks for the compliment. This awful country - one so awful during WW2, we freed the world. So awful are we that half the world want to live here. The nasty country where Polish women can come to and get guilt free abortions without persecution and a religious drumming down, yes that still goes on in the post soviet EU. The nasty member still paying its way in the world whereas Germany (exports thrives under Euro) don't want a nasty retrait to the deutschmark because they are wondering which currency will fail first. Snakes and ladders anyone?
I can only say; Oh Lord! It is coming....

Comment 36

I can only say; Oh Lord! It is coming....

Comment 35

Why does it apply only to the people from the EU?

Click to rate

50 4

Comment 34

You hope in vain mate if you think liblabcon will ever keep a promise or do anything valuable past the next election.

Click to rate

24 0

Comment 33

AT LAST - Maybe I hope?

Click to rate

75 8

Comment 32

Too little, and way too late!

Click to rate

91 2

Comment 31

Hungary doesn't have much space either. It's a small country. Little known fact for you: The UK helped relieve Hungary of 2/3 of its territory (including its historic capital Pressburg) and 1/3 of its ethnic Hungarian population only 90 odd years ago at the Paris peace conference. Imagine the outrage if that had ever happened to us.

Click to rate

103 0

Comment 30

Good! We just don't have the room as an island. Send them all to Hungary then, idiot.

Click to rate

28 0

Comment 29

Good man. Even if you don't vote UKIP all you have to do is spoil your ballot paper; NONE OF THE ABOVE. If no one votes for liblabcon or very few they are all finished. The masses hold the power and they don't even know it.

Click to rate

116 8

Comment 28

Please everybody vote ukip. Cameron is powerless to the EU, even those who say UKIP are a pintetl vote or voting for ukip will get labour in. I really don't care anyone. I'd rather do what's right and vote UKIP even if it means labour get in as a result, just for the principal and so I can tell my kids at least I stood up and did what was right.

Click to rate

80 1

Comment 27

About time

Click to rate

93 3

Comment 26

Waiting to see the same scene after 1st January in UK

Click to rate

92 0

Comment 25

I'd rather we were 'nasty' than the mugs we have been for so long

Click to rate

52 0

Comment 24

Even the French socialist government back tighter controls. ... What will our lefty Guardian readers think about that....can't get all up on their high and mighty "right wing racism" card even if you don't vote UKIP all you have to do is spoil your ballot paper; NONE OF THE ABOVE. If no one votes for liblabcon or very few they are all finished. The masses hold the power and they don't even know it.

Click to rate

118 0

Comment 23

Is that a stable door banging and the sound of distant hooves - I can hear ?

Click to rate

13 0

Comment 22

If you love giving billions to unelected corrupt faceless dictatorships then by all means read about it in the Guardian. If you love giving billions to unelected corrupt faceless dictatorships then by all means read about it in the Guardian.

Click to rate

106 22

Comment 21

The EU was a good idea. Until the countires of Eastern Europe joined

Click to rate

106 22

Comment 20

Excellent news? Seriously? How many times do you have to be fooled until you wake up. Watch their actions, go on and I dare you to vote either liblabcon again and see what happens.

Click to rate

87 3

Comment 19

Although this is excellent news, I still feel that the government must do more to stop benefit tourism, pass emergency legislation and get a tighter grip of our borders. It's simple mathematics.

Click to rate

14 1

Comment 18

Rubbish, sorry.

Click to rate

10 75
While this is welcome, isn’t it closing the stable door after the horse has bolted and is feasting
merely on England’s pleasant pastures?

It’s so nice to switch the lights out and lock the door before leaving

lol let them all in and when there nobody in the country im heading straight there to start my own
webhead country whos in , ill be leader so your be ok as i want them back lol

Too right... We are full to brimming as it is..... Time to sour the benefits milk me thinks......

I will happily live with being called Nasty, rather than gullible!

Why only now? It’s too late to put anything in place. Or maybe Cameron is just pretending to do
something about this problem so if nothing is resolved then he can say he did all he could but
talked. And to Brussels, call the UK or any name you want , slap a fine but it won’t change the fact
that the UK is full and don’t have money . Why don’t you set an example and let all these
Eastern Europeans come to Brussels first, keep them for a year and tell us how you get on.

I will happily live with being called Nasty, rather than gullible!

so sad to see racism creeping across Europe. I can hear the echos of 1939 far to clearly. We
failed. And to Brussels, call the UK any name you want , slap a fine but it won’t change the fact
that the UK is full and don’t have money . Why don’t you set an example and let all these
Eastern Europeans come to Brussels first, keep them for a year and tell us how you get on.

Who does the hungarian think he is, They should let the bulgarians and romainians settle in
there country, there certainly not wanted or needed here. Are borders should be closed totaly,
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While this is welcome, isn’t it closing the stable door after the horse has bolted and is feasting
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And what has this EU expert from Hungary to say now? This is the first crack in the EU

Comment 57

Please everybody vote ukip. Cameron is powerless to the EU, even those who say UKIP are a protest vote or voting for ukip will get labour in. I really don’t care anyone’s’ id rather do what’s right and vote UKIP even if it means labour get in as a result, just for the principal and so I can tell my kids at least I stood up and did what was right.

Comment 58

I see France and Germany have finally woken up, it’s taken them long enough.

Comment 59

Ban all migration whether from the EU or the rest of the World. If the EU decide to fine us, don’t pay the fine and stop paying into the EU. Reality is the EU needs the UK’s money more than the UK needs the EU.

Comment 60

Oh dear, they are on the move!! God help us, we need you more than ever.

Comment 61

If our money is our system decide. Fine or sanction the UK, who cares. We want out anyway.

Comment 62

We will see if anything actually happens. We can hardly look after the population now, there will come a point where the camel’s back will break. Are you listening Mr Blair? Don’t you ever pull the plug on Britain.

Comment 63

If people are free to move within the EU (and claim benefits) why on earth don’t the various “European” govs make benefits (and the terms under which people can claim them) universal. That way, there would be no discrepancy between countries, and no incentive to migrate.

Comment 64

About time everyone grew a set. It is unfortunate for people who are borne into poverty, but that does not give Brussels the right to ensure that every country is dragged down to the same level (eventually). Common sense HAS to prevail and having an open borders policy is insane!

Comment 65

rather the nasty country than the nation of fools.

Comment 66

Finally the Germans and the French see the light.

Comment 67

We should be only allowing immigration for those who have a guaranteed job here that cannot be filled by a UK national. Why are we taking more people in while there is unemployment? There should be a soft touch shouldn’t be accommodated.

Comment 68

Because the employers want hours and minimum wage for everyone Tony boys just get richer and richer

Comment 69

And what has this EU expert from Hungary to say now? This is the first crack in the EU
enough? and it looks like you were the one, now other leaders are following your lead and not before time. Well done David Cameron for starting the ball rolling, it needed someone to speak out about this.

Comment 72

Well put. I can see this is going to spark a lot of reactions.

Comment 73

It just takes one person with guts to speak out about something as important as this and nine times out of ten others WILL follow suite. If I'm honest many countries are now fed up with being told what they can and can't do, especially when it comes to immigration and benefits.

Comment 74

Just say no to the EU. If the UK gets fined is it cheaper than paying out for the many thousands of immigrants who can't wait to come here and get everything for free.

Comment 75

I was on business in Paris just over a week ago and sitting around the dinner table in the restaurant of an evening were Brits, Germans, French & Swiss. The number one topic of conversation throughout which the other nationalities themselves prompted - immigration and this anticipated influx of unskilled and illiterate immigrants, especially amongst the Roma, placing a massive drain on already limited resources along with the associated rises in crime. People are growing heavily sick of politicians paying this topic lip service and pandering to less than 1% of do-gooders amongst the populous who find the whole topic (problem) "vibrant" and "enriching" contrary to the wishes of the other 99% of us.

Comment 76

Close the borders and tell the EU to stick their finger where the sun doesn't shine!

Comment 77

There is nothing you Brits can do about it. That other Scottish traitor Gordon Brown signed all your rights away under the Lisbon Treaty with the full permission of your Queen.

Comment 78

What will happen to the economy of Bulgaria and Romania when it happens all these people leave. My guess is that the least educated will leave first, Doctors, Dentists etc. Then again I ask what happens to those left behind? Both this is the problem that the EU needs to address, rather than bashing the British people. If some sort of orderly transition is not imposed, utter chaos will reign.

Comment 79

I don’t care who comes here providing I don’t have to pay for them.

Comment 80

ighttownfo - you a tax payer?... if so well I am sorry!

Comment 81

Laszlo Andor should now be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law for inciting and attempting to export racial hatred to Britain. This tyrannical attempt at trying to offload his country's problems onto Britain is typical of this treacherous cabal in and from Brussels.

Comment 82

A country needs to import people that will help improve it such as scientists, engineers, doctors etc. Not people that are going to come and claim benefits, its absurd. When will enough be enough?

Comment 83

There's no housing for us Brits, let alone opening up the borders on the 1st......places of beauty in the UK will be spoilt by these people, its bad enough with the gypsies.

Comment 84

Cameron - too little too late. Everyone I know is voting Ukip.

Comment 85

These people are being used by their own governments who do not want or need them, by trying to offload them they are making them someone else's problem, it cannot possibly be fair, it’s like having a problem child and throwing them out of the house instead of helping and nourishing them.

Comment 86

Well done David Cameron for starting the ball rolling. It needed someone to speak out about this and it looks like you were the one, now other leaders are following your lead and not before time so who cares what the others say I know I don’t that’s for sure.

Comment 87

Ok now we know we are not alone, stop this madness now Cameron.
STEP 1 ... GET US OUT OF THE EU FOR GOODNESS SAKE!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

what the Queen thinks of all this. Especially since it's these sort of people that start barbecuing family, and we have a government. They should keep their bloody noses out. I actually wonder

Yeah good. These people DO NOT own our country. They DON'T live here. We have a royal election's, by a party that truly cares for Britain. Don't hold your breath. This is a knee jerk reaction to being wiped out in next years EU doing? Thought not!

Britain is not only NOT nasty - hello, which is the only EU country to stand against the Nazis and liberated Western Europe - Britain is the most open country in the EU with London alone having

The Government has just answered its own problem and has finally acknowledged it.

"David Cameron has proposed... "Mr Cameron questioned"... He also suggested"... - So nothing of any real value. If migrants are being paid less than British workers"... So there you have it ladies and gentlemen, the UK is for the immigrants because they are a cheaper workforce, I'm not talking about aid under the minimum wage but just in general they are a cheaper work force for companies and corporations

Good to see U.K. And Germany coming together on this issue ...... ironic really, as it was Germany's romantic notion of The Wall coming down that kicked off the problem in the first place.

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'Cameron is making Britain the nasty country of Europe': Eurocrat accuses PM of not telling 'the truth' on migrants

- Laszlo Andor accuses David Cameron of an 'unfortunate over-reaction'
- Claims the British public are not given the 'full truth' about migration
- PM unveils new restrictions on access to benefits for EU migrants
- Cameron: 'EU principle of "free movement" for workers has gone too far'
- But Commissioner insists influx from Poland caused no damage to Britain

By MATT CHORLEY, MAILONLINE POLITICAL EDITOR
PUBLISHED: 09:02, 27 November 2013 | UPDATED: 14:01, 27 November 2013

A European Commissioner today launched a devastating attack on David Cameron’s plans to curb benefits for migrants, accusing the Prime Minister of not telling the truth and fuelling ‘hysteria’.

Hungarian Laszlo Andor claimed action to deter foreign benefits claimants risked presenting the UK as a ‘nasty country’ and could be the start of the ‘slippery slope’ towards the collapse of the single market.

The European Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion boasted that massive immigration from Poland had ‘did not cause damage’ to Britain but actually helped the economy to grow.

But Commissioner insists influx from Poland caused no damage to Britain

Cameron: ‘EU principle of “free movement” for workers has gone too far’

Claims the British public are not given the ‘full truth’ about migration

Laszlo Andor accuses David Cameron of an ‘unfortunate over-reaction’

The extraordinary remarks by a senior Brussels official directly attacking the British Prime Minister is likely to fuel growing public anger at the rules imposed by the EU on border controls.

So we would need a more accurate presentation of the reality not under pressure, not under such hysteria which sometimes happens in this case.

Mr Cameron today insisted he understood the public’s concerns, and unveiled a package of measures to restrict access to benefits for EU migrants.

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SOCIALIST ECONOMIST DUBBED THE MOST LEFT-WING MAN IN BRUSSELS

Ahead of the lifting of controls on newcomers from Romania and Bulgaria on January 1, he will declare that the founding EU principle of ‘freedom of movement’ for workers has gone too far.

EU jobseekers will no longer be paid housing benefit to subsidise accommodation costs, there will be time limits before out-of-work benefits can be claimed and migrants who currently get jobseekers’ allowance after less than a month will have to wait three months before claiming.

Benefits will be stopped after six months, beggars and vagrants from EU countries will be removed and banned from re-entering Britain for 12 months and a new ‘minimum earnings threshold’ will be set below which benefits that top up earnings, such as income support, will be cut altogether.

But Mr Andor tore into Mr Cameron’s plans, accusing the Prime Minister of not giving the British public the truth about immigration.

“*This is an unfortunate over-reaction. We have been in dialogue with the British authorities, government offices, in recent years.*

‘Ditch green policies and you will split the Tory party’...
The point is that the British has not been given all the truth and the full truth about this subject. And then we end up on the slippery slope. And that everyone of course others may invent other idea. He went on: ‘If we start to dismantle some of the rules of the single market which should apply to the single market which the UK appreciates so much in the European Union.’

In a thinly-veiled swipe at Mr Cameron’s pledge all EU member states, including the UK. He said the current rules had been drawn up by the current movements of workers and the proportionally and not in such a way.

Mr Andor insisted the issue was not ‘immigration’ but the free movement of workers which applies to every EU member state.

He added that there are existing EU rules and safeguards against ‘so-called benefit tourism’.

Mr Andor said: ‘It is true that migration from countries like Poland in the last decade was higher. Then, officials predicted just 13,000 migrants a year would come but more than a million have arrived. There are fears of a repeat of 2004 when Labour opened up the borders to eight Eastern European countries – including Poland.

He complained that an article by Mr Cameron today drew a link between EU enlargement and the number of migrants.

‘Well we know that about two thirds of the migrants who go to the United Kingdom from non-European countries. And also if you look at the current movement, much more people moving from for example Italy and Spain than from Romania and Bulgaria.’ He added that there are existing EU rules and safeguards against ‘so-called benefit tourism.

For example jobseekers allowance: if someone newly arrives to the UK or another country it is the home country which in the first place needs to cover if necessary jobseekers and not the receiving country.

But Downing Street rejected the accusations from the £212,000-a-year Eurocrat. Mr Cameron’s official spokesman said: ‘As the Prime Minister was saying in his article, we are not the only country to see free movement as a qualified right. I think it is very important to be clear about the measures that the Government is taking.’ The spokesman told a daily Westminster media briefing that the PM was ‘of course’ confident of the legal basis for his proposals. Pressed over whether he would go ahead with their implementation regardless of the response from Brussels, the spokesman said: ‘This is what we are going to do.’

There has been growing anxiety about the impact of restrictions on Romanians and Bulgarians being lifted in January.

The UK government is under pressure to curb entry to the UK when EU restrictions on Romanians and Bulgarians coming here to work are lifted in January.

There are fears of a repeat of 2004 when Labour opened up the borders to eight Eastern European countries – including Poland.

Then, officials predicted just 13,000 migrants a year would come but more than a million have arrived.

Mr Andor said: ‘It is true that migration from countries like Poland in the last decade was massively higher’, Mr Andor

When Laszlo Andor was handed the plum job as European Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion in 2009, even parties in his native Hungary said he was ill-suited to the role.

The economist himself admitted: ‘Everyone says I’m an unusual choice.’ Fluent in English and Russian, he studied at the Karl Marx University of Economic Sciences and was an active member of the economic section of the Hungarian Socialist party from 1998 to 2005. In 2000 he was forced to deny being a member of the Communist Party.

In 2009 he was forced to deny being a member of the Communist Party. In 2005. He earns £212,000-a-year, and has been described as ‘probably the most left-wing of the EU’s 28 commissioners’. In an attempt to play down tensions with the UK, Mr Andor added: ‘It is part of the reality not under pressure, not under such

Mr Andor said: ‘It is true that migration from countries like Poland in the last decade was higher.

Mr Andor said: ‘It is true that migration from countries like Poland in the last decade was higher. But the point is that the British has not been given all the truth and the full truth about this subject.

He went on: ‘Unilateral action... is not really helpful because it risks presenting as a kind of panic which sometimes happens in this case.’

Mr Andor insisted the issue was not ‘immigration’ but the free movement of workers which applies to every EU member state.

He added that there are existing EU rules and safeguards against ‘so-called benefit tourism’.

Mr Andor said: ‘It is true that migration from countries like Poland in the last decade was higher. Then, officials predicted just 13,000 migrants a year would come but more than a million have arrived. There are fears of a repeat of 2004 when Labour opened up the borders to eight Eastern European countries – including Poland.

He added that there are existing EU rules and safeguards against ‘so-called benefit tourism’.

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There are fears of a repeat of 2004 when Labour opened up the borders to eight Eastern European countries – including Poland.
He said the last government's refusal to impose immigration from Eastern Europe. However, Mr Cameron accuses Labour of a "monumental mistake" in failing to control immigration from Eastern Europe.

"They had the right to impose a seven-year ban before new citizens could come and work here, but—almost alone in Europe—Labour refused it. That was a monumental mistake," Mr Cameron writes in an article for the Financial Times today.

He said that was the moment to address difficult questions about when to allow new entrants full access to each other's labour markets—but the Labour Government ducked those questions.

But Labour's shadow home secretary Yvette Cooper accused Mr Cameron of "playing catch-up".

She added: "It was massively higher but it did not cause damage. It actually contributed to the growth of the British economy."

"I think if there are real problems we have to look at those, analyse those together, and if there is any kind of problem we have to reflect together."

"These measures fall way short of what the British public want though. Our borders will remain open."

"After Labour proposed this change in March, the Government said it was all fine and nothing needed to change. Yet now, rather than following a coherent plan, they are flailing around. No wonder public confidence in the Government's handling of this issue has collapsed.

"This change was only one of Labour's proposals. The Government should also be beefing up staff on visa and immigration matters."

"UKIP leader Nigel Farage said: 'UKIP has driven the agenda in terms of warning of the dangers of migration from Eastern Europe."

"I think if there are real problems we have to look together."

"It is true that migration from Eastern Europe is in the public interest... but we have to take the decision that is right for this country and not be driven by politicians who are trying to win votes," he added.

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Comments (1171)
would allow like for like, then how can they say YOU must feed and house their countrymen.

mention I do not want people singing, well caterwauling on our streets. Until their countries

Comment 23

We don't want Britain to be the nasty country of Europe we want it to be OUT.

Comment 22

Does this idiot live here does he walk our streets see what we see. We know what impact its had as we see it every day not this fool thats paid by the mad institutions.

Comment 21

Hooray!

Click to rate  

10  3

Comment 20

We don't want Britain to be the nasty country of Europe we want it to be OUT.

Click to rate  

29  4

Comment 19

And still the Nero's fiddle while Rome burns

Click to rate  

29  3

Comment 18

I doubt whether Commissioner Andor knows what he is talking about.

Click to rate  

29  3

Comment 17

We are British first, Europeans second

Click to rate  

45  7

Comment 16

Mr Andor if you are so concerned with migration perhaps you would have them where you live because we the UK cannot support anymore, we are stretched to limit.

Click to rate  

100  6

Comment 15

About time too!

Click to rate  

41  3

Comment 14

Claims the British public are not given the 'full truth' about migration———We already know more than enough about the truth of migration courtesy of the Labour government.

Click to rate  

36  4

Comment 13

Well hopefully, if we are declared a 'tasty' country, then nobody will want to come here. Also, if it does cause the collapse of the single market, the EU, I for one, will not be complaining.

Click to rate  

58  3

Comment 12

If they are such a magnificent contribution to growth why is Hungary not encouraging them to

from Europe. If he thinks we're nasty and history tell us we're not, so be it

never given any mandate to his parasitic organisation to flood Britain with soulless marauders

Same old rhetoric from the EU commissioner Laszlo Andor. The people of this country have

Comment 11

I doubt whether Commissioner Andor knows what he is talking about.

Click to rate  

29  3

Comment 10

Stick to your guns Mr Cameron let the world know, WE DO HAVE A BACKBONE.

Click to rate  

105  6

Comment 9

Laszlo Andor calls Hungary a nasty country too! Nominated by the former Commies in Hungary... say no more

Click to rate  

90  6

Comment 8

This country simply does not have the work or money, medical, schools to deal with it all. Not to mention I do not want people singing, well caterwauling on our streets. Until their countries

would allow like for like... then how can they say YOU must feed and house their countrymen. Stop it now, Cameron is asking to much of us. Then having the audacity to cut benefits in one way or another that is what he has done.

Click to rate  

165  6

Comment 7

We are full! Please enact border controls now!

Click to rate  

65  24

Comment 6

So Cameron is telling 1m people they are a monumental mistake - I hope they will reply at the ballot box.

Click to rate  

158  10

Comment 5

Nothing to debate. Just vote UKIP and get rid of these mendacious politicians once and for all.

Click to rate  

330  15

Comment 4

Keep talking Mr Andor people like yourself do a great job in building support for Britain's withdrawal from the EU. Two countries are net contributors and Germany without UK taxpayers the whole corrupt bureaucracy would collapse
So?!!!!!!

We risk becoming a “nasty country” because we think it unfair that anyone from an EU nation can dip into our Social Welfare funds, and access our NHS services when they have made precisely zero contribution, and in the case of far too many have no intention of ever contributing. You can call that “nasty”, I prefer sensible. I can see this man’s words coming back to haunt the pro-EU lobby during the upcoming European Elections, he’s just gifted UKIP several tens of thousands of additional votes - Bravo.

PLANET.FOOL FOOL FOOL

WHAT PLANET DOES THIS EMBICILE LAZLO ANDOR LIVE ON OH YES THE EU

The EU idiot is so out of touch with reality it is unbelievable. The EU IS GOING TO COLLAPSE.

Memorial for Cameron... Cameron is trying to end (which will fail spectacularly), the idea that people can come here and feel themselves of everything a long standing, tax paying resident can. This we is not YET a country of States like the USA, no matter what your language and terminology you use in Brussels. To that end, stick your union where the sun don’t shine, because failing a complete end to democracy in the UK, we will be out by 2020.

So?!!!!!!
So flooding the country with claimants from Italy and Spain is OK then? The current rules, he says, were agreed by the UK. Let's get that right: it was agreed by a few civil servants and politicians, any implied approval by voters has the EU policy wrapped up in a big bundle of other policies called a manifesto. When we get specifically asked, in a referendum, will the EU agree to sticking to facts not half-truths and lies when they campaign for the continuation of an organisation that handles billions but has no effective accounting system.

Comment 56
Being Hungarian he would say that wouldn't he. Can't see that many would want to migrate to his country.

Comment 57
He would say it because he thinks that the UK is still wealthy. I have very bad news for him - the UK is broke!

Comment 58
Most young people are leaving Hungary in droves because they can't get a job and
Comment 73

ANOTHER EU EMBLICHE THAT REPEATS PARROTER FASHION THE EU DREAM

Comment 74

Whilst I do agree with your sentiment, I do find it ironic that your aggressive post misses the word 'imbicile'.

Comment 75

He has 212,000 reasons to do so! not to mention the very comfortable retirement.

Benjamin and the Coalition only quote "NET" immigration numbers. We can see the facts with our own eyes on our streets all the unemployed who only come here to get benefits. We can see the facts with our own eyes on our streets all the unemployed who only come here to get benefits.

Comment 71

The FACTS are the lie about immigration have ALL lied or kept silent since 1973 when they started to sign OUR lives and country away... The ONLY one I now trust is NIGEL FARAGE He is the ONLY one who fights for The British people and OUR country and tells us the TRUTH! The lobbies are all selling EU loving TRAITORS!!!!

Comment 70

Regarding not being given all the facts, Cameron and the Coalition only quote "NET" immigration numbers. We can see the facts with our own eyes on our streets all the unemployed who only come here to get benefits. We can see the facts with our own eyes on our streets all the unemployed who only come here to get benefits.

Comment 69

There is some good news here: At least now when we do talk about this we don't get called all the nasty names. Times are changing.

Comment 68

He's right. We haven't been given all the facts. If we had, we would have kicked off the revolution sooner.

Comment 67

Agree, about time we started getting nasty, we're known as a soft touch, the rest of the world is laughing at us. If I want to go and live in Spain, I have to prove I have sufficient funds and healthcare in place, here any penniless dropout is welcomed.

Comment 66

If we are generous all the time and say 'no' once, we are the worst people in the world. But if we had been nasty all the time, and were generous once, we would be the best people in the world.

Comment 65

If the likes of Laszlo Andor consider themselves 'nice', I'm more certain than ever that I'd prefer to be 'nasty'.

Comment 64

Luis, I WOULD GO FURTHER. WHY ARE YOU STAYING IN THE UK? IS IT A CASE OF YOU ENJOYING UNLIMITED BENEFITS?

Comment 63

luis, Bedford, yet they still come, I wonder why that is?

Comment 62

luis so why are you here?

Comment 61

There is some good news here: At least now when we do talk about this we don't get called all the nasty names. Do not be misled. Vote UKIP.

Comment 60

you already have this reputation

Comment 59

Suits me. If we get the reputation of being "nasty", then fewer people will want to come here!

Comment 58

he has 212k reasons to do so! not to mention the very comfortable retirement.
I've paid tax and worked hard all my life. These EU scroungers are currently packing for the UK and that makes me a 'nasty person' then fine by me. I've paid tax and worked hard all my life. These EU scroungers are currently packing for the UK.
**Comment 94**  
I am an English person living in the Netherlands. I have to pay for my medical care and my partner must say he will be accountable for my costs, if any. I employ 4 staff and expect to be treated in this way. I pay my taxes and live to the rules of this country: that's the way it should be in England.

**Comment 95**  
What a bloody cheek! We stand up for ourselves, and we get called all sorts. Our Country, Our Rules.

**Comment 96**  
Let's be even more nasty.

**Comment 97**  
What gives him the right to get involved with our country's politics... Oh, right: he's from the EU. It's his job to stick his nose where it doesn't belong...

**Comment 98**  
It's his job to stick his nose where it doesn't belong... What gives him the right to get involved with our country's politics... Oh, right; he's from the EU, since a Prime Minister told us the truth about the EU!

**Comment 99**  
"...accusing the Prime Minister of not telling the truth" - He's right, it's been many many years since a Prime Minister told us the truth about the EU!

**Comment 100**  
Mr. Andor is fully right. EU should warn UK and if necessary they should expel UK.

**Comment 101**  
Oh yes please!!

**Comment 102**  
Yes, do us a favour and expel us please Mr. Commissioner. We have been very naughty and nasty. You don't want the risk of us in your lovely EU. Please check us out at the first available opportunity. Pretty please?

**Comment 103**  
Just expel the UK, we don't need any warnings.

**Comment 104**  
Hooray!! I want to live in a very nasty country. I'm fed up of living in a stupid country, the nastier the better as far as I'm concerned.

**Comment 105**  
Oh well, look where living in a nice country got us, up poop street with only one paddle that's why we are always going in circles voting LibLab!

**Comment 106**  
It should not only be EU members but also the rest of the world. Why should they get ANY benefits out of this country regardless of time here... Also why should ANY person other than an English person be able to vote in any elections, I would not expect to be able to vote if I were to move to another country.

**Comment 107**  
No damage to Britain then? How about my wages kept lower than what they should be because of all the Eastern Europe workers coming in? We want out thanks.

**Comment 108**  
or me and millions (yes, millions) of people out of work because there are more people here than there are jobs. And the real irony, the jobs are in India and China where there are labour shortages.

**Comment 109**  
Cameron is pretending to act tough to fool the public but most people know full well that making them wait 3 months boltons they are given Job Seekers Allowance will not stop them coming. Many will probably beg and steal during those 12 weeks. And many will sleep rough all over the place. Vote UKIP.

**Comment 110**  
Why don’t you get educated and / or open your own business and take advantage of this so called cheap labour - your going to be in a win - win situation.
PM's plan vs reality: Will Cameron's crackdown stop anyone coming here?

By JAMES SLACK FOR THE DAILY MAIL

Published: 0219, 28 November 2013 | Updated: 1259, 28 November 2013

David Cameron has hastily put together a package of measures to deter benefit tourists. Here, Home Affairs Editor James Slack assesses the plans – and the reality.

**PLAN:** Migrants who currently get jobseeker’s allowance after less than a month will have to wait three months before claiming.

**REALITY:** Mr Cameron claims emergency legislation is needed but, under the habitual resident test, newcomers can already be forced to wait up to three months. Cases are decided by officials at job centres. The EU objects to the rules and is already mounting a legal challenge.

**PLAN:** Benefits will be stopped after six months unless people have a genuine prospect of employment.

**REALITY:** Already the case. Existing DWP guidelines state migrants must be ‘genuinely seeking work, and have a reasonable chance of being engaged if they wish to continue receiving handouts. Officials will have to prove the migrant is not about to find work, which can be very difficult.

**PLAN:** Beggars and vagrants from EU countries will be removed and barred from re-entering Britain for 12 months.

**REALITY:** Migrants who make no attempt to find work are considered not to be exercising their EU Treaty rights and can be kicked out. However, this depends on already-stretched immigration officials finding out who they are – and having the resources to boot them out. There are doubts over the ability of border guards, who have allowed terrorist to slip into the country, to stop anyone who has been removed simply getting on the next coach or plane back to Britain.

**PLAN:** A ‘minimum earnings threshold’ will be introduced to access benefits that top up earnings.

**REALITY:** Sounds tough but councils will still be obliged to help any EU migrants – including Romanians and Bulgarians – who present themselves as homeless, especially if they have children. New arrivals with low-paid jobs will continue to be entitled to HB. Even for a one-bedroom flat, it can be worth £250 a week. The maximum is £400 a week. Policy will not be in place by January 1.

**PLAN:** New arrivals with low-paid jobs will continue to be entitled to HB. Even for a one-bedroom flat, it can be worth £250 a week. The maximum is £400 a week. Policy will not be in place by January 1.

**REALITY:** End the payment of child benefit to migrants whose children live abroad.

**PLAN:** Migrants who make no attempt to find work will be removed and barred from re-entering Britain for 12 months.

**REALITY:** Migrants who make no attempt to find work will be removed and barred from re-entering Britain for 12 months.

**PLAN:** EU jobseekers will no longer get housing benefit to help with accommodation costs.

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**PLAN:** A ‘minimum earnings threshold’ will be introduced to access benefits that top up earnings.

**REALITY:** Migrants who make no attempt to find work will be removed and barred from re-entering Britain for 12 months.

**PLAN:** Benefit tourists will now have to wait three months before claiming.

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There is nothing in the package to address the real issue, writes Home Affairs Editor James Slack

AND WHAT IS MISSING ...

There is nothing in the package to address the real issue: the lifting of restrictions on Romanians and Bulgarians coming to the UK to work from January 1.

With an estimated 50,000 people moving to the UK each year, further pressure will be placed on schools, hospitals and roads.

British youngsters – there are one million out of work – will face even greater competition to find jobs.
Comment 1
Full of hot air
Click to rate... 56  0

Comment 2
The words Cameron and crackdown don't go together in the same sentence. It's all soft, futile and too late. Bye bye UK
Click to rate... 52  0

Comment 3
Cameron is useless. Farage knows what needs to be done.
Click to rate... 60  0

Comment 4
He is creating a smoke screen, why wait till now Cameron? UKIP
Click to rate... 58  2

Comment 5
We have a yellow bellied rat in charge of this nation, he's a euro fanatic, bought and paid for, of course he's just all or nothing to com us to vote for his traitorous party in 2019, I mean just look what he did with Spain recently, trying to the EU please help us over Gibraltar and see what their response was, THEY LAUGHED IN HIS FACE, he couldn't pull the skin off a raw pudding never mind saving our nations welfare and security, it really hurts my sides laughing at this man a comedic politician, the world is also laughing
Click to rate... 66  2

Comment 6
Has any OM reporter been to these countries? If I have spent 3 months every year for 6 years walking in these countries, estimates are out. You can't stop them, thousands have already paid for transport, the masses will arrive in spring when it warms up
Click to rate... 55  1

Comment 7
All us stupid people (talking to you Boris from the middle of a box of cornflakes but you can't hear me at the top though I already know this and we also know the only solution is to close the borders. Just say No to the EU and pay a fine if need be it would be a lot cheaper than paying for transport, the masses will arrive in spring when it warms up
Click to rate... 47  0

Comment 8
That's all well and good, however if they come over and find work it's less jobs for all us British citizens! We loose either way.
Click to rate... 46  2

Comment 9
In a word NO it won't stop one migrant from coming here. We do not need those that are already here. Problem is we cannot get rid of those that have already come and entrenched themselves. I despair, I really do.
Click to rate... 38  1

Comment 10
Just an attempt to appease voters to vote Tory in 18 months time. Tories, Labour or Libdems will
Click to rate... 38  1

Comment 11
Our school leavers don't stand a chance do they? The only option we have is to leave the EU. Cameron when he is voted out, and he knows this.
Click to rate... 56  0

Comment 12
The issues here are bigger than the illegal Iraq war this is about our identity as a country and the economics of over a million young people out of work plus housing schools NHS the whole system cannot take this amount of people coming into our country. If nothing is done to close the doors then I really do wish that come the next election UKip take 200+ seats away from the conservatives and the liberals that will be the message from the British public to these head in the sand politicians and The Prime Minister.
Click to rate... 47  0

Comment 13
Simple answer NO they have all signed up for this madness the Tories, Libour and the Lib Dems there is no hope while we vote for any of this lot.
Click to rate... 38  0

Comment 14
Charlotte Crosby's hopes of a US TV career are in tatters after she admitted a second drink-drive offence Banned for three years
Click to rate... 55  1

Comment 15
He's too cowardly. Call an election NOW!
Click to rate... 58  42
He will do nothing...

Comment 23
thank you for this important information.

Comment 24
We can hope You need to be tougher Cameron! We can't afford to keep anyone else's castaouls or casetawlays.

Comment 25
He KNOWS his talk is all empty and meaningess. he doesn't care, he's happy to follow the Euro way, this is all just his pathic way of trying to fool us he's listening and acting.

Comment 26
NO

Comment 27
Emm no! That's why I'm voting UKIP!

Comment 28
Useless! It's not that they take our benefits Mr Cameron - it's that they take our jobs, houses, school places and medical services. But like most politicians you are too out-of-touch to know the reality.

Comment 29
No because his EU masters won't let him change anything

Comment 30
NO !!! I suspect that Crosby has done some real number crunching and has found out how many Tories are defecting to UKIP - Cameron would not have done anything off his own back...

Comment 31
Wow!! They might have to wait a whole three months !! That will stop them..lol

Comment 32
Our politicians follow Blair and rule by subterfuge! They seem to be oblivious to the damaged they create. Is it because they are here today gone tomorrow with their-roots-fulfill!!! Shameless bunch.

Comment 33
Cameron has a cunning plan to deter benefit migrants! I Now we know for sure that we're going to be swamped and bankrupted...:-)

Comment 34
So even now there there taking the public for a bunch of gullible fools, once the immigrants are in the country with children with little or no money nowhere to stay, of course they will be given benefits of some sort, it's the law as it stands, the only way to make a real impact is to stop them arriving, Please look for control people as necessary at it, it will be cheaper in the long run, but of course the reality is it's all far to late, and they know it!!!

Comment 35
To retain the 'right' people in the U.K. for his 2017 vote on IN/OUT of the E.U. !!!!!!!! The only ray of hope is a total non-retum of this P.M. and his 'dearleader' E.U. believers !!!!!!!! Ex Con, member (One of many)

Comment 36
Close the damned borders to those that don't have a job to go to. It's not rocket science. Let the EU make a_leame_sense, it will take years and the people of France, Germany, Belgium, Austria etc, etc, want to do exactly the same, so we would have support for the move. It was a stupid idea to begin with and the only countries that want free movement and access to benefits for migrants are those parasitic countries that will benefit themselves through the economic boost created by the money sent home by their people and the load reduction on their own health services etc...

Comment 37
CUMORON IS DOING NOTHING TO ADDRESS THE GENUINE CONCERNS OF HARD-WORKING UK TAXPAYERS IN RELATION TO THE MILLIONS OF MIGRANTS SWAMPING THE ALREADY GROSSLY OVERTWRADED UK. THE MEASURES ANNOUNCED BY CUMORON THIS WEEK ARE HOHASH - THE USUAL SPIN AND WaFLIE BY A TOFFEE-NOSED TORY WHO IS WHOLLY OUT-OF-TOUCH WITH REALITY. VOTE UKIP TO END THIS NONSENSE.

Comment 38
The only change will come when The Conservatives AND Labour politicians are out of a job, then they try JSA and foreigners in "theirs" jobs. It is the ONLY way to motivate them...

Comment 39
It will not work as they will easly wait 3 month they should get nothing UKP need to get in now dont wait for an election vote of no confidence now.
This is just an attempt to quieten the general public on immigration, nothing will change this country is too deep in the clothes of Brussels who will continue bleed this country dry and even moreso further their plans to rule us.

Who should run Britain? - that is the only issue and it cannot be avoided any longer. Stay trapped in the EU or become independent? Whether it is immigration, trade, environ, energy or any other governance matter, the EU tells us what to do and we have to do it.

UKIP. Cameron has had nearly 4 years to sort this out and has done NOTHING, I will be voting for UKIP.

The simple answer is no, and he knows it Vote UKIP

Musical chairs on the Titanic with Captain Camoron!!

It's simple con trick use by the last government, shout abt make em think you doing an

No, now he try's! Too little too late and he knows now that the British public aren't going to vote for him or his lies but their all liars and greedy pigs that are only in government to get money money it isn't about making the country better or protecting the public it's about selling out for him or his lies but their all liars and greedy pigs that are only in government to get money it isn't about making the country better or protecting the public it's about selling out for him or his lies but their all liars and greedy pigs that are only in government to get money it isn't about making the country better or protecting the public it's about selling out for him or his lies but their all liars and greedy pigs that are only in government to get money it isn't about making the country better or protecting the public it's about selling out for him or his lies but their all liars and greedy pigs that are only in government to get money it isn't about making the country better or protecting the public it's 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This plan, like everything he's done in "power", will be a failure.

Comment 58

Qualification for migrant benefits should be years not months. Implement this and they won't come.

Comment 59

Stop benefits full stop to outsiders, not paid in no benefits. But but LibLabCon wont do it only one party left to help Ukip.

Comment 60

It's not tough enough three months before they can claim benefits is a joke should be at least one year, they will still come here and just wait for the three months to go by then they will all sign on the great British gravy train!

Comment 62

My bet is there will be 100,000 come in the first year and the strain on services will produce anxiety and riots within 2 years before the general election. Ukip will not stand a chance as EU marshall law will be introduced and then there will be civil war. The plan has already been agreed between LibLabCon and the EU Commission.

Comment 63

It’s insane the taxpayer has to pay for an interpreter for those who don’t speak English, how much is that alone costing us, I expect the state will rob the sick, the elderly and the vulnerable to pay for it all, enough is enough, the curse of being part of the EU.

Comment 64

I'm not holding by breath! Although it will be necessary to hold on to your belongings after the influx or romanians! Mr cameron is not fooling anyone!

Comment 65

I saw a news clip this morning about 'Nigel' immigrants living under a bridge somewhere in central London. There were about twenty of them and the report said they have been there for months. This is in effect a squatter camp, under a bridge in London. Is this the sort of thing the English want to see in their country? Come to SA and see what it looks like. This is third world poverty being exported to the UK. So the question is, why has this been allowed and why has something not been done about it? If this is just the problem on a small scale what is it going to be like in 10 years time?

Comment 66

No, it's too latelife's country has been run into the ground by greedy self serving MPs of ALL parties who feather their own nests while destroying everything that was once great about this country. Good people if YOUT MP is one of them, boot them out at the next election.

Comment 67

So much hot air from Dave, as usual. He’s playing to the gallery. What he really thinks is that these immigrants help guzzle the coffers and will work for a pittance. He won’t be satisfied until wages are rock bottom and he & his friends run off with maximum profit. I can see the day coming - if nothing is done - where the rich all live in gated cities, with the poor outside the gates. A Robin Hood scenario.

Comment 68

Close the borders until a referendum is held. This should be held within three months. Then act according to the results of this referendum. This so called crackdown will achieve nothing once the borders are opened.

Comment 69

Of course Cameron's 'plan' won't deter those seeking a better life. My objection is based on what he will do to remove migrants who have not come here legally. How will he know how many he has removed? The answer is he won’t know. He will do this in order to appease public opinion. He will do this as it is to his advantage to do so. This is the sort of thing that Cameron does. It is the only way he knows how to do things. His public profile is his first priority. The rest are just a distraction.

Comment 70

Why do I get the idea this is just a cynical election ploy? If none come, he will say he did it, if it does come, he will say EU did it. Why did he not do this on day 1 of his employment. WHY is he picking predominantly on a country with a smaller population than Scotland. WHY is this ONLY EU countries, the number of some nationalities immigrants here is greater than the TOTAL population of Bulgaria. HOW WILL IT EFFECT THE SCOTS if they vote for independence?

Comment 71

Don't ever trust a single word that Cameron says. He is a very smart Tony Eaton educated bloke, and so knows that this is just a smoke screen. The funny thing is he thinks the rest of us are too thick to see through it.

Comment 72

"Comming to this country to work? What work? We have high unemployment, no housing, no school places no hospital beds, yet we are expected to take in more! We are full, there is no room at the inn!

Comment 73
The only way people will stop coming to the UK is that Cameron puts in place the legislation to stop them. The real question is does he have the guts to do so? So far it looks like the answer is NO and the British indigenous people don't like that answer.

No one has explained to me how this is supposed to deal with the 2/3 of immigrants who come from outside the EU.

Stop it all, take a break for 6 months let no one in, not too difficult, sort it out and the allow only controlled immigration like America, Australia and N Z. If I was young enough I would leave this country I am beginning to feel a stranger here after paying taxes once I was 15 to feed and clothe people from abroad. That us not fascist just economics we cannot feed Europe.

To little to late and of course our border agency is in a position to implement the procedures for deportation etc ?

As usual the Tories and Labour will vote in opposite ways on anything put before them but what I thought was out of order last night was the Tory voting against the Cost of Living Debate in particular all those that have claimed heating expenses including the laughing Tory MP Pincher who himself claimed £360 if there is no cost of living problem will not be taking the 17 per cent rise and be no longer claiming energy expenses in the future? Lets wait and see. It is sad that the Tory side of the debate was mainly men who probably never ever do any household shopping whilst the Labour side was mainly women who would no what is happening in the real pleb land!

Too little too late. UKIP

I think the plan is that let enough 'poverty migrants' in so UKIP will never get in power.

No more mugging us Cameron with a small c, as you do not deserve the British people, s respect anymore. Off with his head.

This is such a serious problem and Dave just wants to talk talk talk and not do do do. We all

The ones that come we must make them feel so unwelcome they would rather go home

What about NHS SCHOOLS, HOUSING, JOBS. THESE WILL STILL BE AVAILABLE TO ALL NEWCOMERS. Tell all would be immigrants, and those already here, that if they work, they will be taxed at a higher rate to help offset the cost of schooling, health etc. Plus no social housing or tax credits AND no social security payments.

Too little Too late..............

Watch everyone vote ukip once its on everyone's door steps. See you Cameron / clegg. See you

It's all lies and spin because Cameron is scared letters of UKIP's rise.

Think about this - Romanians Bulgarians and just about anyone else from Eastern Europe, push their supermarket trolleys across Italy and France to get to the UK because British legislation allows them to claim benefits here that they cannot claim in those countries. Why do you blame the EU? In this case, its Britain who is giving your taxes away not the EU?

We are run by a Government of advisers, with the man at the top who knows nothing except how to talk. It is obvious that the Advisers are in the same position as the man at the top. They have no experience either. Why does the man at the top need hundreds of advisers, all on high salaries. This is where our money goes. Quangos, probably cost us Billions , advisers hundreds of thousands, probably into millions. Projects like the great train robbery, billions. Is it any wonder that there is no money left for US

One corrupt government telling another corrupt government what to do. So this is the EU at its best.?? Cameron could of acted long before all this, but, no he chose to hang about in the
This page contains a mix of news articles and comments from MailOnline. The main topics include political discussions, health issues, and celebrity updates. There are also comments from users expressing their opinions on various subjects.
DAILY MAIL COMMENT: How can it be nasty to stand up for Britain?

**By DAILY MAIL COMMENT**

**PUBLISHED:** 00:02, 28 November 2013 | **UPDATED:** 00:02, 28 November 2013

With our proud history of fighting for liberty and championing the oppressed, Britain needs no lectures on tolerance and decency from even the most virtuous of nations. But when the accuser who brands us a ‘nasty country’ comes from Hungary, notoriously Europe’s most bigoted nation, the hypocrisy gauge shoots off the scale.

Is EU employment commissioner Laszlo Andor so little ashamed of his country’s past and present that he feels entitled to insult Britain over David Cameron’s all-too-modest attempts to control our borders?

With a record of vilifying anti-Semitism that endures to this day (Hungary’s neo-Nazi Jobbik party won 17 per cent of the vote in 2010), it was from the Socialist commissioner’s homeland that Hitler drew some of his most brutal henchmen.

Meanwhile, nowhere in the world are Roma more viciously persecuted than in modern Hungary, where Jobbik’s uniformed supporters regularly invade gypsy villages to intimidate and attack the inhabitants.

This is the true meaning of ‘hastiness’. And it has nothing to do with the motives behind Mr Cameron’s almost laughably restrained efforts to restrict mass immigration from Bulgaria and Romania after January 1.

No, this is all about the sheer weight of numbers from abroad, which has already imposed appalling strains on our schools, hospitals, housing and other services since Labour embarked on the most dramatic demographic upheaval in our history.

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‘Cameron is making Britain the nastiest country of Europe’: Eurocrat accuses PM of not telling ‘the truth’

I DO share your concerns on immigration, declares Cameron days after Mail’s explosive poll: PM

Indeed, what is so frustrating about the Prime Minister’s 11th-hour measures – many of which change nothing, as James Slack exposes on Page 8 – is that they are unlikely to keep any would-be migrants away.

Mr Cameron’s first duty is surely to us – and the 970,000 young Britons out of work.

His proposed curbs are still likely to be challenged in the European Court, tame and ineffective though they promise to be. So if we’re to be sued anyway, why not listen to the public – backed by 46 Tory backbenchers, and counting – who demand all restrictions should be retained after January 1?

The Prime Minister might even make himself popular for a change. Or does he believe, like so many on the liberal Left, that it’s nasty to stand up for one’s country?

The poison of secrecy

As this paper has long and passionately argued, Britain’s time-honoured system of open inquests is a cornerstone of liberty – the citizen’s ultimate guarantee of justice.

For it has meant that if anyone dies in suspicious circumstances, whether at the hands of a criminal or an agent of the State, grieving families and the public have an absolute right to know the facts.

That right was denied to the loved ones of Iraq weapons expert David Kelly. Yesterday, it was also denied to the widow of poisoned ex-KGB spy Alexander Litvinenko, when the Government won a court order blocking the release of information about his death.
True Christmas spirit

This paper warmly applauds the NHS drive to recruit 100,000 ‘Good Samaritans’, pledged to look in regularly on an elderly friend or neighbour as winter bites.

In a country where the vulnerable are so often abandoned to loneliness, this humane campaign is in the true spirit of Christmas. We urge all our readers who can to take part.

Forgotten at last?

After decades of playing down Britain’s decisive role in the Normandy landings, and celebrating de Gaulle leading the Allies into Paris, France wants the Queen at the centre of next year’s 70th anniversary celebrations.

Is it possible that our curmudgeonly Gallic neighbours (who, as we all know, really won the war!) have at last swallowed their pride – and forgiven us for liberating them?

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Comments (19)

The comments below have been moderated in advance.

Comment 1

Cameron is the leader and figurehead of the liberal left. The type of liberals who’s policies from immigration to education always seem to benefit them and theirs, while the vast majority pay the bill. From China to the EU, the rich and powerful find hiding greedy and corruption behind a socialist/left mask a very productive scam.

Click to rate

71

5

Comment 2

Yes Prime Minister we are with you all the way! These people can support themselves! No problem I am all for giving people a chance, but not at the cost of our workers that goes for the brits to.

Click to rate

58

5

Comment 3

Really good article - thank you

Click to rate

44

8

Comment 4

Cameron is a pro-EU Quokka. Expecting him to stand up for the interests of the British people is a pipe dream. If the Daily Mail want a Prime Minister who does that, they’ll better start supporting Farage.

Click to rate

8

4

Comment 5

I’m fifty six, unemployed for eighteen months but looking bad. I’m also having to wait six weeks for an appointment to have a lump in my thyroid examined. I’m happy for us to be branded nasty if it will keep out any more scroungers taking our limited resources.

Click to rate

14

3

Comment 6

The last person to truly stand up and speak out for this country was none other than Margaret Thatcher, there is no one willing to do what she did for us even if she did become unpopular with many, what she did for us even if she did become unpopular with many.
The Daily Mail's hard-hitting campaign against EU immigration negates this completely. The bottom line is that the Daily Mail is returning to its 1930 position supporting extreme right wing authoritarian positions. The problem is the genie is now out of the bottle we have no大纲 and anyone who thinks we live in a fair society needs to examine their own conscience.

Comment 12
I could not believe the first sentence of this leader. Many like to think that the UK is a fair place and fights for the oppressed in the world. The Daily Mail’s campaign against EU immigration negates this completely. The bottom line is that the Daily Mail is returning to its 1930 position supporting extreme right wing authoritarian positions. The problem is the genie is now out of the bottle we have no大纲 and anyone who thinks we live in a fair society needs to examine their own conscience.

Comment 13
Nonsense! The borders are on the coast and in the airports, not the JobCentre. Meaningless waffle from Cameron.

Comment 14
Keep our borders closed on the grounds of national security. There will be riots if another few million benefit immigrants are shoe-horned into already outhaving ethnic communities. We are best able to decide what is right for our country not the bloated and corrupt EU and it’s backbone.

Comment 15
Cameron is keeping his options open for a lucrative sinecure in Brussels, like the rest of the Europhiles...

Comment 16
If countries such as Hungary were not members of the E.U. the voices of small people like this so called commissioner would not be heard outside their own villages, never mind on the world stage. The message to such as him must be ‘Put your own house in order before poking your nose into the affairs of others’.

Comment 17
Whenever we stand up against this madness we are accused of racism. I am so sick of this card being constantly played.

Comment 18
‘The real problem is Cameron is not standing up for our country. In fact he speaks for the Commission not for his home Member State. Not that you would expect the average DM reader to know that.

The views expressed in the contents above are those of our users and do not necessarily reflect the views of MailOnline.
Benefit controls rushed through: EU migrants will now have to wait three months before they can claim out-of-work handouts

- In the past EU migrants could claim benefits as soon as they arrived in UK
- Now they will have to wait before they can draw on the welfare system
- Other measures include cutting off benefits for migrants after six months

EU migrants will have to wait at least three months before they can claim any out-of-work benefits under emergency regulations to take effect from January 1, David Cameron will announce today.

The Prime Minister will say he understands the concerns of voters worried that incomers should not be allowed to take advantage of Britain’s benefits system and public services.

The Government has rushed to assemble a package of measures because Britain is required to lift temporary restrictions on the free movement of people from Romania and Bulgaria at the start of next year.

The new time limit on benefit claims had not been expected to be in place in time for January 1.

But Mr Cameron will today confirm that regulations are being laid before Parliament to bring them in by that date.

Previously, EU migrants have been able to start claiming jobseeker’s allowance for at least three months under emergency regulations if they are in proper employment.

The work and pensions secretary, Iain Duncan Smith, said: “A number of EU migrants arriving here are not in work and are using the jobseeker’s allowance to support their travel costs.

But when they have arrived here, they then go on to claim benefit handouts within weeks of arriving – prompting concern that some people are arriving, signing on and only then looking for work.

The hard-working British public are rightly concerned that migrants do not come here to exploit our public services and our benefits system,” Mr Cameron said.

“As part of our long-term plan for the economy, we are taking direct action to fix the welfare and immigration systems so we end the ‘something for nothing culture’ and deliver for people who pay the bills.

‘Accelerating the start of these new restrictions will make the UK a less attractive place for EU migrants who want to come here and try to live off the state. I want to send the clear message that while Britain is very much open for business, we will not welcome people who don’t want to contribute.’

Other measures already announced include cutting off benefits after six months for EU jobseekers with no employment prospect and stopping them from making housing benefit claims.

The Government is also toughening the so-called ‘habitual residence test’ to include a minimum earnings threshold, to check whether migrants are in proper employment.

There will also be a 12-month re-entry ban for people who have been removed for not working or being self-sufficient, and £20,000 fines for businesses found to be undercutting British workers by paying migrants less than the national minimum wage.
Migrants are to be tested on their language skills to determine whether they are likely to prove a barrier to them finding employment. The Government leaving everything until the last minute.'

Yvette Cooper, Labour's shadow home secretary, said: 'Labour called for these benefit restrictions nine months ago. Yet David Cameron has left it until the very last minute to squeeze this change in. Why is expected to demonstrate a 'reasonable standard of English' or be barred from claiming benefits.

Share or comment on this article

Long-term plan: Prime Minister David Cameron, left, said the emergency laws were an effort to end the 'something for nothing' culture. Work and Pensions Secretary Iain Duncan Smith, right, has said that migrants will be blocked from claiming benefits if they are unable to demonstrate a 'reasonable standard of English' or are claiming it breaks the right to free movement across the EU and has started legal action.

Who says it's lonely at the top? Gigi Hadid and Kendall Jenner pace for V magazine as BFF's share the spotlight

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Stephanie Davis confirms split from Jeremy McConnell after he admitted to cheating

Who needs trousers? Rihanna debuts new shoe collaboration with Manolo Blahnik - including a pair of waist-high denim boots that come with a BELT

EXCLUSIVE: Bobbi Kristina's boyfriend Nick Gordon grins and laughs as her autopsy reveals drink, drugs and drowning killed her. His response? 'I'm glad that a*** is all over.'

Be afraid... Preacher/serial killer Lucas Johnson is in cathoeds with Jordan as he targets Denise - again. It was just like old times in EastEnders, by Jan Shelby

EXCLUSIVE: Bette Davis confirms romance rumours as she is spotted sharing a sweet moment with her co-star turned beau Thomas Sabuksi for the first time

Shirtless TOWIE hunks James Lock and Pete Wicks display their sculpted physiques as they squeeze into denim hotpants for charity car wash

Every day's a catwalk: Alessandra Ambrosio shows off her endless legs in thigh-high boots and jewelled dress as she struts her stuff on the streets of Paris

EXCLUSIVE: "She will sell her side of the story in due course" Stephanie Davis confirms split from Jeremy McConnell after he admitted to cheating

BEYONCÉ posts sweet behind-the-scenes snaps of daughter Blue Ivy 'helping' her and Chris Martin get ready for the Super Bowl... Learning the Formation?

"I saw the effect on my family": Jahnere Douglas admits he might have killed himself over father's domestic abuse if his brother hadn't taken his own life first!

"EXCLUSIVE: "She will sell her side of the story in due course" Stephanie Davis confirms split from Jeremy McConnell after he admitted to cheating"

"You mean whether the bosses want them? Of course they do - they're desperate for a job, as they will receive no income at all otherwise. Personally, I would rather steal than work if I was unemployed. It's bizarre that British people posting here are in favour of legislation which they squeeze into denim hotpants for charity car wash

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Looks lovely

Proud mama Kris Jenner is the picture of glamour in shades and a luxurious fur-trim coat

Moments police approach rowdy participants of Barking brawl

"I have you no soul?"

Disgruntled dog-walker Muddy disaster!

"Something for nothing' culture. Work and Pensions Secretary Iain Duncan Smith, right, has said that migrants will be blocked from claiming benefits if they are unable to demonstrate a 'reasonable standard of English' or are claiming it breaks the right to free movement across the EU and has started legal action.

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If this is true, the questions needs to be asked why we have had so many wars where people could just turn up and sign straight away? I always thought there was a delay - this needed to be done urgently before Poland, Lithuanian etc joined - it is almost an afterthought now.

Comment 20
wait 3 months hey? that should deter them, flannel for the British people.

Comment 7
The reason, our country is deliberately being destroyed. Fact.

Comment 8
Its TRUE Nigel Farage has been telling all those who will listen for YEAR!!!!!! Go to UKIPs website go to youtube the TRUTH is there to see, he has been speaking the TRUTH and predicted what will and is happening for YEAR!!!!!! Nigel Farage is the ONLY one who stands up for the UK and its people! The Brits/haven have ALL led us to this since 1973 when they started signing OUR country away BEHIND OUR BACKS!!!!!!! They are ALL self serving lying EU loving TRAITORS!!!

Comment 9
Well, you must remember, there is an election in 15 months, and Camaprat thinks we will be fooled into voting for him. It must be UKP all the way.

Comment 10
Tragically there is little we can do at this stage, but next year we all have a vote to elect our county MEP representative, I would urge you all with every fibre of my body to vote for your UKIP MEP candidate, this means that if successful UKIP may have a Majority in the EU Parliament and thereby having the power to veto decisions. Voting for any other party is will be seen as diarrasal.

Comment 11
I was once out of work and with a new baby, I was unable to get any sort of support. Perhaps I should have changed my name to something ending in k or similar.

Comment 12
I can’t believe it. Do you mean that Cameron actually pulled one of his fingers out of his backside?

Comment 13
They can claim ‘subsistence allowance’ for three months, and then full benefits, at the moment.

Comment 14
Marvelous - that’s a really good start! Now close the remaining loopholes Migrants supposedly follow work, so they can either work or fly off.

Comment 15
That is of course, if Clegg doesn’t clog it all up! why on earth has Cameron left it so late, this is what other countries do and it works very well unfortunately although I am a British Citizen the various Governments pay lip service to the request of the voting public and the ignore the views of the public at large.
It's just a pity it's always left to the Tories to do the 'hard work' then get called the nasty party, and more than likely kicked out next election for doing what should have been done years ago. Did the Labour party do all this, of course not. They want to be seen as the party giving out all the free goodies.

@ exapt, the tories have been in long enough to do something they know was coming and they did nothing, all they have to do is shut the gates and say no more people are coming into our country.

How can Cameron shut the gates. The last time I heard you are in the E.U so he can't. At least he's doing something which is far far more than Labour ever did, at least the Tories were not going abroad looking for immigrants.

What's to say they don't start the application before they arrive here with all the 'help' they seem to be getting? They should get zero benefits for the duration of their stay. Are they here to work or spend my taxes?

Comment 23

Comment 24

3 MONTHS ...... So they can get the same as we who has paid ridiculous amounts of tax and National Insurance into the system for 40 YEARS !!!

Comment 25

Double check that with Berlin first, as it won't come into force before

Comment 26

good news but why 3 months and not 6? And someone ought to tell the EU we aren't stopping immigrants.

Comment 27

It should be 6 months as it is here in France. As retirees who paid tax and National Insurance in the UK during our working lives, if we returned to the UK we would not be entitled to any benefits at all for 6 months!

Comment 28

And it also means more beggars, pickpockets, campides etc as they wait for the free handouts. Shameful.

Comment 29

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Comment 30

Don't like #? Then why did you vote CONLIBLAB? What are you going to do now?

Comment 31

Foz forty years of paying in means nothing, you'll be regarded a layabout if you have to claim any benefit.

Comment 32

@Foz - It does not matter how long you have paid tax and National Insurance. Romanians and Bulgarians have paid tax in their own countries as well. The same goes with the jobs, Romanians and Bulgarians can work here as there are over 6000 British companies in Romania and thousands of Brits working in Romania and Bulgaria as well. What comes around...

Comment 33

DO NOT LIKE ... So we pay into something our whole lives and the incomers come here and within three months they have full benefits ... health care, education and housing too little too late!

Comment 34

Nope I had two years off after having my son four years ago, went back to work earning over £10k, then in Oct had to have an op and left work and couldn't claim sickness benefit because. I had not paid enough NI, it is a joke

Comment 35

It's all me me me - you want to be much more worried about the vast scale corporate tax avoidance and turn your gaze onto the eye watering sums we are owed. Some estimates are now at £12 BILLION!

Comment 36

No, "Foz", the won't get the SAME as you, they will get far MORE than you. I wouldimgage you have probably own your house, have some savings and don't have ten kids, in which case you will get nothing, whereas they will get everything paid for!

Comment 37

@hatelypoopies... you don't get it at all do you? Hard working, decent, self-supporting, contributing migrants are not a problem. The majority of Bulgarian and Romanian immigrants won't have paid a penny into their own system and won't be paying a penny into ours. If I gave you a choice of being in the Bulgarian benefits system or managing...
So now we're going to be subjected to three months of crime sprees to fund their way of life till they claim handouts paid for by us taxpayers?

That would happen even if they were receiving benefits.

And the majority will no doubt continue to supplement their benefits with crime after becoming eligible to claim.
clean criminal and medical record should also be a requirement.

Three months wow!! How about, if you haven't a job and somewhere to stay you can't come in. A languishing for three months in the UK, yep that should stop them.

Too little...Too late..I will still be voting for Nigel..we need an in/out Referendum now..Not 2017.

Far too little and far too late. The uk is gone!

Wait three months for a lifetime on benefits.....umm........why does that not impress me?

Three months...I don't see the point here.

Three months? I don't get it...Why not one month?...just fire them from the system, it seems like a waste of money.

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Three months? I don't get it...Why not one month?...just fire them from the system, it seems like a waste of money.
Comment 72
Forget benefits... we don't want them here. If you can't do anything about it why do we even vote?

Comment 73
they can always beg on the streets for 3 months £700 a week tax free not bad money at all

Comment 74
What I want to know is where they will all live...? The government and councils do not have the houses for people who are already here. So it will be up to the private landlord to house them. The problem being they will probably have money for the first months rent and a deposit, but then what?... I can see many landlords going bankrupt because rents will not be paid and the law will not allow landlords to simply throw them out. Banks and building society's will reposess the properties, and the tenants who begged their way in will in no doubt get a council house or hotel paid for by the tax payer and the poor old landlord has to carry the can...

Comment 75
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Comment 76
No benefits for any of them, Cameron needs to find a backbone and some guts and shut ‘the gates today’. We who pay Camerons Wages and Benefits are telling him no more to come in to our country and he does not listen

Comment 77
They should have a job before they come here. If not, don’t let them in, they are not wanted. It could not be much simpler!!

Comment 78
If the government can get this sort of thing done in such a short space of time, why can’t they do doing other jobs/directorships or appearing on TV shows?

Comment 79
Brilliant government Reactive rather than proactive.

Comment 80
It’s better than nothing, I’m still voting for UKIP.

Comment 81
Delaying tactic!

Comment 82
It should be 3 years not months or better still no benefits at all

Comment 83
too little too late

Comment 84
3 months? Pathetic Cameron vote UKIP to stop our country from being given away by LibLabCon!!

Comment 85
No benefits for them until they’ve paid a substantial amount into the pot.

Comment 86
It’s a nice idea, but a year would be better. Better still would be a blanket ban on claiming any benefits beyond strictly very short term / emergency for anyone who had not paid in... and you can only claim for the length of time you have in fact paid in. Thus old people who have worked hard all their lives would be entitled to a good set of benefits! Children would obviously be an entirely different category, but if the parents were unable to care for them, they would be removed and then prevented from having any more until they could support the ones they already had. Ah... one can dream...

Comment 87
I’ve worked since leaving school in 87, only had six days off six in all those years, and I still have 12 years left on my mortgage. YET, after the last 3 months, these people get the same as me, a free house and benefits. David Cameron/Tony Blair/Gordon Brown, hold your heads down in shame. It’s no wonder people are voting UKIP due to your constant failings of looking after the rest of Europe and not YOUR own people

Comment 88
Hi there Class 40 fan, but you are overlooking the fact that Cameron, Clegg, Brown,
That INCLUDES healthcare!!

It's a sop for the angry. NO benefits until they have contributed to the economy for two years. That INCLUDES healthcare!!