Police legitimacy and the policing of protest: Identifying contextual influences associated with the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to compliance and cooperation beyond the limits of procedural justice and elaborated social identity approaches.

by

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2018
Abstract

Police legitimacy is fundamental to the relationship between the state, citizens and their police, and this is nowhere more challenging than in public order policing contexts. Procedural Justice (PJ) and the Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM) have gained dominance in UK policing as the means of establishing greater perceptions of police legitimacy and public compliance and cooperation with the police and the law. Much of the theorising and empirical research in this field has been conducted with regard to police reform, complaint handling, crime reduction and sporting event policing. However, there are limitations to both PJ and the ESIM approaches within public order contexts. PJ and the ESIM assume that violence and disorder stem from a failure of policing to create perceptions of police legitimacy. However, this is problematic for the policing of protest and public order for three interrelated reasons. Firstly, there are occasions when violence occurs despite the police use of PJ and ESIM approaches. Secondly, ignoring or underplaying this detail serves to demoralise the police and undermines their trust in using PJ and the ESIM. Thirdly, an insistence on police use of PJ and ESIM as the exclusively legitimate means of dealing with violence and disorder, ignores different approaches to police legitimacy that are not found within the PJ or ESIM literature. The findings presented in the thesis suggest that PJ and the ESIM do not necessarily work in protest contexts, because protesters’ self-policing, a key claim of the ESIM, does not necessarily equate to compliance with the law and authority. Personal values and moral legitimacy are important aspects of protest contexts that feature less prominently than required within the PJ and ESIM research. The thesis argues that police legitimacy, defined empirically, needs to be understood with regard to the policing context. It is in this respect that the thesis claims an original contribution by identifying and explaining contextually based influences associated with the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and their attitudes to compliance and cooperation. The thesis uses a mixed method approach to examine the claim of PJ and the ESIM that fair and respectful treatment garners increased perceptions of police legitimacy and creates compliance and cooperation with the law and the police. The empirical research comprises an exploratory quantitative survey (n=40), qualitative interviews (n=79) and non-participant observations at thirteen protest events in London between 2010 and 2015. The findings establish that while the general claims of PJ hold and that social identity forms part of perceived police legitimacy, protesters’ perceptions need to be understood contextually. A contextually driven model of police legitimacy (CDM) developed from empirical data is presented, it suggests that additional influences other than fair and respectful policing play a determining role in constructing and shaping protester perceptions of police legitimacy and their attitudes to compliance and cooperation. The theoretical implications are considered and professional practice recommendations for the policing of protest are presented.

Key words: police legitimacy, procedural justice, protest, ESIM, compliance and cooperation.
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## Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACPO</td>
<td>The Association of Chief Police Officers was a not-for-profit private limited company that led the development of policing practices in the UK. It was established in 1948 as a forum for chief officers to share ideas and coordinate their strategic operational responses. It was replaced in 2015 by the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antifa</td>
<td>A term originally used to describe the Anti-Faschistische Aktion group (a German anti-fascist organisation), often used as an umbrella term to denote a protest network opposed to fascism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BF</td>
<td>Britain First are a far-right British political organisation formed in 2011 by former members of the British National Party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bitcoin</td>
<td>A cryptocurrency and worldwide payment system. It is the first decentralized digital currency without a central bank or single administrator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Bloc</td>
<td>A Black Bloc is the name given to a protest tactic usually carried out by protesters who wear black clothing. It involves direct action and sometimes the use of violence at protests. The term refers to the activity and is not an identifiable movement or protest group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>The British National Party is a far-right political party formed in 1982 by former members of the National Front in the United Kingdom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>The community impact assessment is used by the police to identify issues that may affect a community’s confidence in the ability of the police to respond effectively to their needs, thereby enhancing the police response.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate Camp</td>
<td>A protest camp organised by the Campaign against Climate Change. They bring people together to push for action to prevent the destabilisation of global climate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Containment</td>
<td>A police tactic for controlling crowds. It involves the formation of cordons (lines) of police officers who then move to contain a crowd within a limited area. It is sometimes referred to as “kettling” outside of the police service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoP</td>
<td>The College of Policing is a professional body for the police in England and Wales. It was established in 2012 to take over a number of training and development roles that were previously the responsibility of the National Policing Improvement Agency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDL</td>
<td>English Defence League is a far-right movement which focuses on opposition to immigration, Islamism and Sharia in the United Kingdom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EG</td>
<td>Evidence Gatherer – a uniformed police officer with the remit to record audio-visual evidence during the policing of protest and disorder. Usually deployed in pairs as an EG team.</td>
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</table>
ESIM
The Elaborated Social Identity model proposes that conflict in crowds emerges directly from social identity processes and inter-group dynamics, usually between the police and crowd members.

FIT
Forward Intelligence Team consisting of two or more uniformed police officers who are deployed to gather intelligence during protests.

G20
The Group of Twenty is an international forum founded in 1999 for the governments and central bank governors of selected countries. It discusses policy relating to international financial matters.

HMIC
Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary was the body responsible for assessing and reporting on the performance and effectiveness of the police service in England and Wales until 2017.

HMICFRS
Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Service. In 2017 HMIC also took over the inspections of England’s fire & rescue services, assessing and reporting on their efficiency, effectiveness and leadership. The name changed from HMIC to Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Service (HMICFRS).

IPP
Imprisonment for Public Protection were sentences created by the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and used from April 2005, they were designed to protect the public from serious offenders whose crimes did not merit a life sentence. They were abolished for new sentences from 2012.

Kettling
See Containment.

NCTT
The National Community Tension Team is a strategic body under the National Police Chiefs’ Council responsible for community intelligence doctrine and briefing to UK police forces.

NPCC
The National Police Chiefs’ Council coordinates the operational response across the service to terrorism, organised crime and national emergencies. The NPCC brings together and is funded by police forces in England, Wales and Northern Ireland as well as the armed services and some overseas UK territories.

NPIA
The National Policing Improvement Agency was a non-departmental public body in the UK that was established to support the police by providing training, guidance and expertise. It closed in 2012 with many functions passing to the College of Policing (CoP).

Occupy
Occupy is an international socio-political movement that protests against social and economic inequality.

PACE
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 is an Act of Parliament which instituted a legislative framework for the powers of police officers in England and Wales and provided codes of practice for the exercise of those powers.
| **PEEL** | An acronym for the Police Effectiveness, Efficiency and Legitimacy inspection process carried out by HMIC/HMICFRS. |
| **PERF** | The Police Executive Research Forum is a national organisation of police executives in the United States. Its aim is to improve policing and advance professionalism through research and public policy debate. |
| **PJ** | Procedural Justice is a psychologically-based compliance theory with Durkheimian and Weberian foundations. It emphasises the primary role of fair processes and respectful treatment at the hands of authority in establishing public perceptions of legitimacy with compliance and cooperation as its corollary. |
| **PLO/PLT** | Protest Liaison Officer/Protest Liaison Team - specially trained police officers (or teams of such) who are deployed to work with protest organisers and protesters before, during and after an event. The purpose being to facilitate lawful, peaceful protest by dialogue between the two. |
| **PSU** | A Police Support Unit is a body of police officers trained in specialist public order policing tactics. Sometimes deployed with helmets, overalls and shields it consists of 1 inspector, 3 sergeants and 18 constables. |
| **SAC** | Students against Cuts also known as the National Campaign Against Fees and Cuts is an organisation of activist students and education workers who campaign against tuition fees, education cuts and privatisation in the UK. |
| **Searchlight** | A British magazine founded in 1975 which publishes exposés about racism, antisemitism and fascism. |
| **Snatch squad** | A team of police officers deployed into a crowd to arrest and remove an identified person suspected of an offence. Also known as an arrest team. |
| **SPR** | The Strategic Policing Requirement sets out the threats, police response and resources required for defined crime types and policing situations in the UK. |
| **Threat assessment** | A threat assessment is based on facts, information and intelligence and forms the basis for the police response to a situation. |
| **TPA** | The Peoples’ Assembly is a UK political protest and pressure group that was launched in 2013 to oppose austerity and cuts to public services. |
| **TUC** | The Trades’ Union Congress is a national federation of trade unions in England and Wales, representing the majority of trade unions. |
| **UAF** | Unite against Fascism is an anti-fascist pressure group in the UK formed around 2003. |
| **UKIP** | The UK Independence Party is a Eurosceptic and right-wing political party in the United Kingdom. It emerged from the Anti-Federalist League and was renamed in 1993. |
Acknowledgements and permissions

Thank you to my supervisors Dr. Dominic Wood and Prof. Robin Bryant (2nd supervisor).

I would like to thank Prof. Tom Tyler for his permission to use specific questions from his “Chicago” study questionnaire (1990).

Dr. Jonathan Jackson for permission to use the “Trust in Justice” questions and scale items from the European Social Survey questionnaire (2011).

Thank you to the many protesters who assisted in the research by exercising the right to protest.

Thank you to my family and loved ones for their unwavering support and encouragement over the years while I completed the thesis.

For my father and grandfather before him.
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Introduction

“You have to challenge authority to change things, this is the way to a better system, we the few, doing it for the many. I am not here to do what the police want, they're part of the problem. Resist. Rebel. Revolt.” (Interviewee TPA3, The Peoples’ Assembly)

Police legitimacy lies at the heart of the relationship between the state, citizens and their police. The primary focus of this thesis is on the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and their attitudes to cooperation and compliance. It is both theoretically and empirically-based. The empirical research uses an approach that Jefferson (1990, p. 16) has called “bottom up - the vantage point of the policed”, one that privileges the protester’s point of view. Additionally, it draws upon theoretical perspectives of police legitimacy and uses non-participant observation informed by many years of professional expertise and competence. It seeks to make sense of protester perceptions of police legitimacy, provide contextual analysis and a more nuanced understanding of their sources. The thesis argues that police legitimacy, defined empirically, needs to be understood with regard to the policing context.

The policing of protest is an activity that places police legitimacy under intense pressure and scrutiny. It has received much public, academic and professional attention in recent years, specifically within the Procedural Justice (PJ) (Jackson et al, 2011, Tyler, 1990) and the Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM) (Stott, 1998, 2009) literature. PJ has gained status as orthodoxy in UK policing as the means to establish greater police legitimacy and foster compliance and cooperation with the police and the law. The ESIM is instated as the dominant model for understanding crowd dynamics (Stott, 2009) and it informs policing strategy and tactics in the UK aimed at enhancing police legitimacy and reducing conflict (HMIC, 2009a, 2009b). A positive contribution of both approaches has been to significantly raise the level of interest and debate about police legitimacy. However, neither PJ or the ESIM address the presence and influence of antecedents and contingencies on the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy. These antecedents and contingencies appear to derive from three main sources:

- The asymmetry of policing (Skogan, 2004, 2006, 2012);
- Social distancing and motivational posturing (Braithwaite, 2009, 2010, 2011);
- The dialogic nature of police legitimacy (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; Tankebe, 2013).

These sources are expanded upon in chapter one. Ultimately, they demonstrate complexities that are currently missing from our understanding of the nuances of police legitimacy in the policing of protest.

Protest is an area of policing in which it can be difficult to be reflective, yet arguably where it is most important to do so. The thesis investigates theoretically and empirically, the influences associated with the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police
legitimacy and their attitudes to cooperation and compliance with the police and the law. Through the empirical data it presents a contextually driven model\(^1\) of police legitimacy (CDM) consisting of four factors. The four factors underpinning the model are: 1) *protester constructions of policing* which concern views about the perceived role and function of the police and the narratives that are created and communicated by protesters; 2) *power and identity relationships* between protesters, and protesters and the police; 3) *levels of protester engagement and distancing* concerning their positions on cooperation or defiance with the law and the police; and 4), *pre-existing protester ideology* concerning their political or dogmatic positions that may serve to frame the context of protest and its policing. A full account of the CDM, together with a narrative detailing its development from the empirical data is provided in chapter six. However, a preliminary outline is shown here in order to set the scene for the reader (figure 0.1).

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\(^1\) The term “model” is used to denote an explanatory framework that is constructed from the empirical data and informed by related theories. The research process, coding and analysis of the data was informed by grounded theory method, but the thesis does not claim a grounded theory.
The introductory chapter will outline how the concept of legitimacy can be interpreted and understood in different ways, it introduces the tenets of PJ and the ESIM highlighting their contributions to policing and articulates the link between them. It orientates the thesis theoretically and sets out the research questions. Through a mixed method study, the empirical research investigates the claim of PJ and the ESIM that fair and respectful treatment by the police increases perceptions of police legitimacy and engenders compliance and cooperation. It also identifies additional influences that are associated with the construction and shaping of protestor perceptions of police legitimacy.

The empirical research was conducted across 13 protest events in London over a five-year period between 2010 and 2015. It comprises an exploratory, quantitative survey (n=40) and qualitative interviews (n=79) with protesters, and non-participant observations by the researcher. The thesis engages with the burgeoning body of theorising and empirical research literature within the fields of PJ and the ESIM as they relate to police legitimacy, both generally but more specifically to protest. It critically examines the influence that they weigh in policing practice, policy and training and makes recommendations for future research and professional practice. PJ and the ESIM are examined in more detail as the thesis unfolds, but a very short explanation of each is provided here to assist the reader in understanding the terms being applied.

What is PJ?

PJ is a psychologically-based compliance theory with Durkheimian and Weberian foundations (Hough et al, 2010; Tyler, 1990). It emphasises the primary role of fair processes and respectful treatment at the hands of authority (such as the police) in establishing public perceptions of legitimacy, with compliance and cooperation as its corollary (Tyler, 1990, 2006). PJ focuses on the way that police and other legal authorities interact with the public, and how the characteristics of those interactions shape views of the police and public willingness to obey the law.

PJ is based on four main principles, 1) treating people with dignity and respect, 2) giving people a 'voice' during encounters with authority, 3) neutrality in decision making, and 4) conveying trustworthiness (Tyler, 2006). PJ approaches in the criminal justice system are process-based rather than outcome focused, that is to say that they emphasise quality of contact and fairness over results and effectiveness. The corresponding effect of perceptions of legitimacy are held to occur because the experience of fairness and respectful treatment fosters feelings of trust and shared identity between people and authority.
What is the ESIM?

The ESIM is derived from social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) and it proposes that conflict in crowds emerges directly from social identity processes and inter-group dynamics, usually between the police and the crowd (Reicher, 1996a; Stott, 2009). The ESIM posits that individual identity in a crowd context transforms from a personal to a predominantly social (group) identity. This transformation provides people with a frame of reference for judging whether they are able to act in particular ways, such as opposition to the police or another group who are present. The ESIM argues that the quality of contact with the police informs these identities and behaviours, such that a negatively perceived police action is likely to evoke hostile group reactions directed at the police (Stott, 1998, 2009). In contrast, positive, facilitative measures carried out by the police encourage cooperation and “self-policing” within groups (Reicher, 1996a; Stott, 2009, 2011).

The theoretical framework of the thesis is drawn from these two approaches. From PJ with regard to the concept of empirical legitimacy and its corollary of compliance and cooperation (Tyler, 1990, 2006). From the ESIM (Stott, 1998, 2009) as it relates to a reliance on emerging perceptions of police illegitimacy in understanding protester behaviour and cooperation with the police and the law. The constituents of PJ have been cultivated through an expanding body of work across Europe, Australia and the US (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003a; Tyler, 1990, 2006; Jackson et al, 2011). In the UK the ESIM is currently pre-eminent in the policing of sporting events and protest crowds (Stott, 2009, 2011). Together, these two perspectives inform the theoretical setting for my investigation into the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and their attitudes to compliance and cooperation with the law and police at protest events.

The concept of legitimacy

Legitimacy is a core concept in PJ and ESIM. Before discussing the version of legitimacy upon which they rely, I will outline some broader observations related to the notion of legitimacy. While the thesis specifically engages with the version of legitimacy that PJ and the ESIM assume, we should acknowledge other theoretical considerations regarding the concept of legitimacy and how it can be interpreted.

In most areas of policing, the existence and authority of the police is assumed, meaning that legitimacy becomes questions about fairness, respect and police conduct, rather than the existence of the police per se. However, in conflictual situations such as protest and disorder, such order cannot be so readily assumed. Protest contexts are fluid and dynamic, in such a way that the very authority of the police is at times drawn into question. Arguably, protest is aimed at challenging such order and authority.
The simplicity offered by PJ makes it an attractive proposition as a means to generate greater police legitimacy and cooperation and compliance. However, such simplicity complicates its application to explaining police legitimacy in complex policing contexts such as protest since PJ relies upon a particular version of legitimacy that is Rawlsian in nature which assumes established order in society as a given (Rawls, 1971). The work of Hobbes, Locke and Kant focused on the need to justify the existence of authority and that order could not just be assumed. Hobbes, in part saw crime and disorder as a norm, rather than pathological, in the sense that authorities needed to bring about order. However, later interpretations of legitimacy have assumed the existence of order and the discussion becomes one about how police authority should be exercised. PJ relies on an assumption of established order. However, whilst relying on the concept of empirical legitimacy it perhaps fails to grapple some fundamental challenges associated with it, for instance, what if people eschew the established order or fail to recognise the authority of the police or the law?

The legitimacy of the state (and by association its agents) is often framed in Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian terms (Simmons, 2001). However, with their social scientific focus PJ and the ESIM appear less concerned with the moral and political philosophical dimensions of legitimacy. Moral and political philosophy have wrestled with the notions of the legitimacy of the state and citizens’ obligations and rights for centuries before the inception of the social sciences. The Lockean tradition identifies the need to account for the nature and justification of political obligation and state legitimacy, seeing the two as distinct (Simmons, 2001). PJ and the ESIM do not rely upon a distinction. Why should this matter we may ask? It matters, since in philosophical terms their interpretation of legitimacy outcomes, such as compliance and cooperation arising from a person’s felt obligation, ignores the idea that compliance with the state and its agents can be an obligation quite independent from how they “feel” about it. Reliance on the notion that there is no overriding need for obligation to the state, risks plunging us into the realms of philosophical anarchism that ranges from a repudiation of the existence of the state or its functionaries with a call to replace it with a more subjectively acceptable version based on a “balance of reasons” (Simmons, 2001, p.108). That is to say, by applying degrees of weight to the obligations being placed upon us. Our decision making in this way becomes highly contextualised. Simmons explains in the following terms:

The finality or imperatives of rights or obligations is, on the balance of reasons, very much a function of the context within which they are exercised. (Simmons, 2001, p.108)

The notion of legitimacy applied in PJ is one more reliant on a Weberian tradition, which sees legitimacy as gifted to the state by its subjects through levels of acceptance or denial of its authority (Beetham, 1991, 2013). However, a reliance on beliefs, personal
attitudes and public perceptions as defining legitimacy is not without significant argument. Simmons (2001) draws a distinction between their presence and that of what constitutes legitimacy as follows:

The attitudes of a state’s subjects can at best be part of what argues for its legitimacy, not that in which its legitimacy consists (emphasis added). (Simmons, 2001, p.133)

This differs from an analysis basing legitimacy solely on empirical perceptions and subjectivity alone. The latter ultimately reduces legitimacy to nothing more than the ability of the state (or its agents) to produce feelings of acceptance and allegiance. Defining legitimacy in these terms is merely the capacity of the authority to engender certain beliefs in its subjects. Simmons (2001) elaborates on this further by noting that no state can theoretically claim a right to impose and enforce a binding duty on its subjects purely on feelings of loyalty or some innate or contrived ability to create them. In reality, it can be argued that there are simply situations where much to their chagrin people will not like what is done to or required of them or others as members of society. In philosophical terms, we may contend that we cannot solely rely upon legitimacy based on attitudinal aspects, instead accepting the idea “that a state is legitimate and will, typically we hope (emphasis added) result in feelings, beliefs or attitudes but this is not necessarily the case” (Simmons, 2001, p.134).

In policing, a further problem with basing legitimacy on public consensus alone is that there are limits as to how far the police can respond to popular views. This is highlighted in an example provided by Wood (2017):

...the police will not always be able to gain consensual support for protecting a known paedophile or allowing a racist organization to march through the town centre. (Wood, 2017, p.42)

The point here is that the police do do such things, because whilst they might not be supported by the majority, it remains the “right” thing to do. This is the nature of moral rather than consensual legitimacy arising from public opinion (Wood, 2017). The concept of legitimacy then can be interpreted differently to that based on consensual perceptions.

In the Lockean sense legitimacy is the state’s right to impose on us through legally binding directives. This differs from a Kantian view in which, although born with an innate right to freedom, people obligate themselves to civil society for rights to be realised and protected. The notion that the state somehow deserves our obligation features in Rawls’ account of legitimacy, but in such a way that justifying the state is unimportant (Rawls, 1971, 1995; Simmons, 2001). Rawls (1971) appears to rely on an acceptance of the state in some form and of its use of coercion. In Simmons’ analysis of Rawls’ work, it appears the question
becomes one of “what sort of state” (2001, p.143) not whether there should be one. We might conclude that in a Rawlsian sense we need only demonstrate that a state is legitimate because “reasonable members of a society can accept it as the best conception of the good” (Rawls, 1995, p.144). Moreover, that it can be assessed by external, validating criteria. How then might we understand legitimacy in these objective terms?

**Objective legitimacy**

Objective legitimacy is defined by morally justifiable objective criteria (Beetham, 2013). Thus, authority can be viewed as legitimate not simply because of a subjective assessment by those subject to it, but because it meets external universal requirements, those of “rationally, defensible, normative principles” (Beetham, 2013, p. 5). Therefore, any normative conception of legitimacy has to describe why meeting these criteria confers authority on norms, institutions or persons. It can be argued for on a rational basis, such as why the criteria generate morally binding rules. Whereas empirical legitimacy means stating that people believe an arrangement to be right and just, normative legitimacy means substantive recognition that the truth (or validity) of these arrangements is right and just. For evidence of objective criteria, we might look to the example of universal human rights² such as those of the right to life, freedom from slavery and freedom from torture (Simmons, 2001) or the protection of the rights of others (Wood, 2017). These can be argued for on a rational basis, independent of public consensus.

According to Beetham (2013, p.6) the definition of legitimacy commonly applied in the social sciences is distinguishable from that in political philosophy on the basis that it is “concerned with legitimacy in particular historical societies rather than universally; with legitimacy in given social contexts (emphasis added) rather that independent of any particular context: with social relations rather than ideal ones”. With PJ and the ESIM focusing on perceptions of legitimacy and attitudes about cooperation and compliance in a given context, how might we better understand the term empirical legitimacy and the subjective basis behind it?

**Empirical legitimacy**

Empirical legitimacy as commonly applied in the social sciences is Weberian in nature (Hinsch, 2008). Specifically, this interpretation of legitimacy is concerned with public recognition or approval of authority, values or norms. Where this notion is applied to the law, it is deemed

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² Irrespective of whether we believe human rights can be established objectively, it is beyond question that their efficacy and meaning can only be established if they are accepted and assumed to be objective moral criteria. In this respect, human rights are distinct from, and more than legal rights.
legitimate when people perceive it as a norm that should be complied with (Jackson and Bradford, 2010a). Hinsch (2008, p.40) explains that “the empirical understanding of legitimacy naturally occupies a central place in explanatory theories of social order”. This is interpreted by Jackson and Bradford (2010a) in the following way:

An observer sitting outside the system might find a particular arrangement unjust and unacceptable, but they must nevertheless conclude that it is legitimate when those governed believe (emphasis added) it to be so. To say something is legitimate is to make a claim about the subjective (emphasis added) state of mind of particular individuals. (Jackson and Bradford, 2010a, p.2)

Consequently, according to the notion of empirical legitimacy we could say that the police are legitimate when citizens feel obligated and inclined towards them. However, as one of the most renowned authorities on legitimacy in the social sciences, Beetham (1991, 2013) notes that this is only part of empirical legitimacy and he presents us with something of a hybrid model. Beetham (1991) draws on both objective and empirical notions of legitimacy, in which he attends to how power is legitimised by authority. There are three dimensions to this, 1) conformation to established rules, 2) justification of the rules and 3) evidence of consent by subordinates to authority. Beetham (2013, p.16) explains that “the first is that of rules, the second is that of belief, and the third is that of actions (emphasis added)”.

There are five important observations arising from Beetham’s multi-dimensional account of legitimacy which differs from a purely normative or empirical stance. Firstly, that power can be legitimate when the rules relating to its acquisition and maintenance are formal (such as the law) or informal (such as custom and convention). Secondly, that the power creating such rules has a justifiably valid source of authority. Thirdly, that rules alone are insufficient to secure legitimacy unless they have justification derived from beliefs shared by both the authority and its subordinates. Fourthly, what suffices as justification may go beyond what is legally defined yet must still be based on logic and rational justification. Fifthly, expressed consent, seen through the actions of subordinates, introduces a moral and normative commitment on their part: its public expression gives rise to the legitimation of power (Beetham, 1991, 2013). Thus, according to Beetham any consideration of legitimacy must involve both normative and empirically-based elements.

The discussion above demonstrates a distinction between different interpretations of legitimacy, how then is police legitimacy to be understood in PJ? The framework applied in PJ is an empirical one focused on public mandate and opinion (Jackson et al, 2011). PJ theorists tend to apply three criteria to assessing whether police authority is appropriate, proper and just, that is to say, the criteria which underpin the public mandate of police legitimacy. First, a criterion termed the obligation to “obey” (or what Beetham (1991) calls expressed consent).
Here, the perceived legitimacy of the police is concerned with whether people would obey the instructions of the police, even if they disagreed with the reasons. Secondly, a criterion termed moral alignment, where the legitimacy of the police is concerned with whether their decisions reflect the personal values of people and their social group(s). Thirdly, a criterion based on perceptions of legality, wherein legitimate authority is believed to be following its own rules and regulations. This is an empirical framework, wherein no single criterion is prioritised, but all must co-exist in the relationship between the police and policed for the police to be deemed legitimate (Jackson et al, 2011). Thus, police legitimacy is actualised or instantiated by specific acts of deference, compliance or cooperation by the public. It is consensual. Arguably, legitimacy seen in this way is highly context specific since according to Mawby (2002) “[the] legitimacy of the public police [is] potentially held up for scrutiny when any policing activity is engaged in” (2002, p.53).

Tyler’s (1990, 2006) original PJ model identifies trust and confidence as a mediating link between peoples’ experiences of policing and their perceptions of police legitimacy. In other words, perceived legitimacy may be damaged by low public confidence in police effectiveness, fairness and engagement with communities. Tyler (2006) defines legitimacy as being the psychological property of an authority, institution, or social arrangement that leads those connected to it to believe that it is appropriate, proper, and just. According to Bradford and Jackson (2011) the premise is one in which procedurally just and fair treatment at the hands of the police is linked not only to public satisfaction, but also with an inclination to offer support and assistance in the future and personal compliance with the law (Tyler and Huo, 2002). The work of Tyler and other PJ theorists suggests that the conduct of police officers, especially during moments of contact with the public is pivotal in constructing and shaping perceptions of police legitimacy and compliance and cooperation. However, this seems a rather clinical and unilateral approach devoid of any recognition of the various contextual complexities of policing and public attitudes, especially those of protest and public order situations.

In general terms, PJ theorists see the police as representatives of society and the legitimacy of the police as an institution as bound up with the dominant social order (Jackson and Bradford, 2009). They see challenges to these assumptions by society as rare, citing that the police in England and Wales retain a relatively high level of support among the public which speaks to “a continued recognition and justification for the police” (Jackson and Bradford, 2009, p.3). However, they recognise that on the other hand, legitimacy is more contested at the level of personal interaction between the police and the public. Individuals appear readier to challenge police authority at this level (Jackson and Bradford, 2009; Loader and Mulcahy, 2003; Reiner, 2010). We might consider that given their dynamic and
contentious nature protest situations provide ideal circumstances for police legitimacy to be challenged, rendering it ‘tentative and brittle…to be renegotiated case-by-case’ (Reiner, 2010, p.162). This demonstrates that the underlying assumptions of PJ about the presence of order and authority are not ubiquitous in every policing situation, they are context relevant.

**Legitimacy, procedural justice and policing**

Policing represents a wide variety of circumstances that have the potential for contention between the police and citizens, challenging the nature of the relationship between citizens, the police and the state. The police find themselves thrust to the forefront of maintaining social order and come to represent the very public and at times coercive face of state authority, as such, these occasions always bring the issue of police legitimacy sharply into focus (Reiner, 2010; Wright, 2002). Waddington (2003) highlights the problematic nature of policing contention in the following terms:

> The legitimacy of law enforcement may at any time become problematic but is not intrinsically so. Criminals are ipso facto beyond the moral community and police can readily don the mantle of moral superiority. This is quite different when those whom the police seek to restrain or suppress are motivated by ideals. In these circumstances any police action (even mere presence) may be interpreted as illegitimate. In other words, policing contention is unavoidably ‘political’. (Waddington, 2003, p.395)

In a liberal democracy, the police find themselves between a proverbial rock and a hard place in balancing expectations that they will facilitate the right to free speech, assembly and association with concerns about public safety and the maintenance of law and order.

> Contextually, in protest situations the police tread a fine path between perceived legitimacy and illegitimacy, with the prospect of what pleases one being met with displeasure from others, in building trust and cooperation with some while eroding it in others. However, there are clearly occasions where the police must act to prevent injury, damage to property and by objective criteria behave with decorum to no avail. In this sense police legitimacy understood empirically (as PJ does) is always conditional, never absolute and highly context specific (Waddington, 1994a, 1999). What is clear from my empirical data (see chapter six) is that protesters’ perceptions of police legitimacy have deep and far reaching antecedents and contingencies, with outcomes for both the police and protesters. I argue and demonstrate through the data that the contextual aspects of protest exercise significant influence on the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and their attitudes to cooperation and compliance with the police and the law.

> The behaviour and activities of police officers during encounters with the public can be essential to the way in which perceptions of the police are formed. It has been suggested that
direct and specific contact with the police often results in lower levels of overall confidence, however this is not conclusively the case (Myhill and Quinton, 2011). In the UK, public confidence in the police together with perceptions of police fairness have remained largely stable. It may be the case that on occasions some improvement can be gained by positive encounters, which is what PJ and the ESIM approaches to policing propose, but it appears that the best case may be to hope for a maintenance of existing trust and confidence levels (Myhill and Beak, 2008; Myhill and Quinton, 2011). Since protest situations often involve police-initiated contact with the public, police responses are likely to cause neutral or lowered satisfaction levels if this general observation holds true in those contexts (Myhill and Beak, 2008). Indeed, my empirical data suggest that protesters see protest policing as being distinctly different from day-to-day general police duties and public interaction. Improved service, measured in confidence terms may not always follow with greater gain for police legitimacy in the eyes of the public. The relationship between treatment and confidence in the police according to Skogan (2006, p.100) may be “asymmetrical rather than balanced. Good days may not balance out bad days. At its worst the police may get essentially no credit for doing a good job while a bad experience deeply influences peoples view of performance and legitimacy”. Therefore, the asymmetrical nature of policing arises as a potential contingent to PJ and the ESIM accounts of police legitimacy.

However diverse the definitions of legitimacy are, a common feature of that relied upon in PJ research is that it confers both the right to command and promotes the (felt) duty to comply and cooperate (Tyler, 1990; Weber, 1978). This duty may be one imposed through an external driver, such as that derived from fear of sanction or punishment or from an internalised one which sees the obligation felt as a personal and moral one, because it is the ‘right thing to do’. The former condition may be termed instrumental compliance and the latter as normative (Bradford and Jackson, 2010, Tyler, 1990). In normative compliance citizens defer and comply with legitimate authorities because they have a belief that it is right to do so (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003a, 2003b). In simple terms, the conception sees the law as legitimate because citizens view the system and its agents as providing a suitable standard that can be followed, the implication here is that people are influenced not by sheer power alone but because they feel and believe the rules and decisions to be fair, proper and worthy of ‘obedience’. The description highlights again the deeply affective and contextual features of empirical legitimacy.

The law is one means by which the state creates or maintains social control. PJ views compliance with it, forced by the exercise of instrumental means alone as costly, largely ineffective and ultimately inefficient, it being more short-term because it is not internalised by the public. Indeed, in PJ’s analysis of policing and crime control, the threat of sanction or punishment is never enough to secure widespread compliance and cooperation in society
(Tyler, 1990, 2006). Fundamentally, due to the nature of protest, it is a context where empirical legitimacy is more fluid, dynamic and precarious; being defined or redefined accordingly as a result of contact with the police (Jackson and Bradford, 2010a, 2010b; Stott, 2009). This observation, I suggest, is problematic for wholesale reliance on PJ and empirical legitimacy as a general and ubiquitous approach to policing. Moreover, a note of caution should be applied since such a notion infers that experience of police contact is the sole means by which legitimacy is made or broken. I will demonstrate through the empirical data that protester evaluations of contact with the police are not the only means by which they construct and shape their perceptions of police legitimacy. Nor does positive contact with the police necessarily result in protesters expressing views of compliance and cooperation with the law or the police. Arguably, such inferences by PJ and the ESIM are too simplistic as far as understanding the complexity of police legitimacy in the context of protest. I contend that there are additional factors at work that impact upon the routes to perceived police legitimacy and public cooperation and compliance.

In the study of police legitimacy and compliance and cooperation with the law, PJ (Tyler, 1990, 2004) has undoubtedly emerged as one of the most influential theoretical perspectives in recent times. A plethora of commentaries, analyses and research studies have emerged demonstrating its application across the world (Bradford et al, 2009; Jackson et al, 2011; Mazerolle et al, 2013; Myhill and Quinton, 2011; Sunshine and Tyler, 2003a, 2003b). In a sense, PJ is presented as a panacea for the problem of crime and disorder and improving police-public relations. How then might we understand its contribution to policing?

The contribution of procedural justice to policing

The general contribution of PJ to policing can be summarised from Jackson and Bradford’s work (2010a, 2010b) in that how the police treat people matters not just on legal or ethical grounds, but in terms of influencing generally how society interacts with the police. Specifically, whether the public will cooperate in all aspects of crime control and crime prevention, by engaging in formal and informal crime prevention, such as making reports of crime and incidents to the police and generally supporting the public police in its activities (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003a; Murphy et al, 2009; Tyler, 2004). Jackson and Bradford (2010a) explain the PJ contribution to policing in the following terms:

Fair and decent treatment fosters satisfaction with the authority involved, enhances legitimacy and increases cooperation. If that authority is the police this enhanced legitimacy is further held to boost compliance with the law and encourage self-regulation. In contrast, if the police are perceived to be illegitimate not only will cooperation decline but people will be less likely to obey the law, encouraging or forcing authorities to take a more punitive and/or aggressive stance. (2010a: p.6)
Thus, the widespread contribution to policing claimed by PJ is that improving or increasing public perceptions of police legitimacy will universally augment compliance with the law without the need for police intervention or coercion, fostering generalised cooperation and compliance as a felt, public duty to do so. However, most commonly PJ is applied and researched in certain policing contexts such as beat duties (such as traffic stops), community-based engagement initiatives, stop and search operations and complaint handling (Mazerolle et al., 2013). We may question then whether its general claim carries to each and every quarter of policing practice and more pertinently that of protest and public order. In short, whether it really is a case of what worked, specifically, not what works universally.

The contribution of the elaborated social identity model to policing

Whilst PJ has established broad appeal and application in policing and crime control, the ESIM is aimed more specifically at crowd management and protest policing. Significantly, ESIM-based policing and best practice currently provide the driving force from both police and academic directions in these areas (Stott, 2009). The revised manual of guidance for public order policing Keeping the Peace (ACPO, 2010) and recommendations contained in a variety of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) reports, rely heavily upon the work and influence of the main protagonists in this field of study (HMIC, 2009a; 2009b; Stott, 2009). These recommendations are endorsed as being able to “shape the future of national public order policing and drive changes in [police] preparation for protest and our relationships with those involved” (HMIC, 2009b, p.2). The discipline of social psychology offers a significant amount of empirical research that accounts for the dynamics at work in crowds and the reasons for the development of collective disorder. The ESIM is most relevant to the policing of protest given its emphasis on the interactional level and its dominance and primacy appear as yet unchallenged. Accordingly, in a submission to HMIC, Stott (2009) declared the ESIM as:

The leading scientific theory of crowd psychology. It provides a theoretical basis for accurately explaining and predicting the nature of crowd behaviour, particularly as this relates to the emergence of collective disorder. (Stott, 2009, p.2)

On this basis, the ESIM has gained considerable momentum within the policing of sporting events and protest crowds.

The ESIM is based on the social identity theory developed by Tajfel and Turner (1979) which was originally formulated to explain intergroup prejudice and discrimination. It posits that a person has not one, but several identities that correspond to different group memberships or affiliations into which a person enters through a process of self-categorization (Reicher, 2003; Stott and Reicher, 1998a). An individual is deemed to have multiple social
identities derived from perceived membership of various social groups. In general terms, those who perceive that they share the same social identity behave in ways that act against outsiders, but for their confederates. Thus, creating a “them” and “us” situation, this is typically referred to as an in-group and out-group dynamic (Stott, 2009). The ESIM explains how crowd disorder develops due to changes in crowd member’s social identities, as a direct result of their perceptions of police legitimacy (Stott, 1998; Stott and Pearson, 2007). Stott et al (2001) explain the basis for this change in the following way:

Social identity processes involve the dynamics of intergroup relationships. Therefore, rather than context being seen as something external to identity, the context in which one group acts is formed by the actions of the other. (Stott et al, 2001, p.363)

The immediate context then appears significant in the ESIM, but it gives little significance to antecedents and factors outside of it. Stott (2009, 2011) proposes that emergent perceptions of police illegitimacy are the central drivers of conflict, quite beyond prior intentions. Therefore, the ESIM relies on the idea of emerging notions of legitimacy and takes little or no account of any antecedents or contingencies to police legitimacy. Ostensibly, it relies upon an acceptance that these notions emerge during the protest event itself based predominantly on contact with the police. The ESIM, which focuses on explaining the development of crowd conflict appears to provide a feasible, but perhaps limited explanation for the emergence of violence and disorder during dynamic encounters with the police. Furthermore, it does not account for the range of sources from which perceptions of police legitimacy are constructed and shaped.

What the ESIM does provide is a framework for protest policing based on four elements. Firstly, an understanding of the role of social identities in the crowd, gleaned from operational knowledge about the psychological groups that are present. Reicher (2011) summarises the importance of understanding the group culture for the following reason:

...if public order policing put as much emphasis on cultural intelligence as on criminal intelligence it would be in a better position to pre-empt conflict. (Reicher, 2011, p.18)

Secondly, a differentiation between psychological groups, through an awareness of the different values and norms that may be present. Essentially, this is in order that group members are not treated homogenously and subjected to “catch all” police tactics. Thirdly, recognition of the role of facilitating the legitimate goals of the crowd, which is viewed as the buttress to the ESIM framework (Reicher, 2011). Fourthly, establishment of a clear communication strategy concerning police actions which starts before the event or protest and continues throughout. The use of policing approaches based on the ESIM, aimed at garnering perceptions of legitimacy, encouraging benevolent social identities and reducing collective
conflict are currently forefront in the theoretical orientation and best practice for dealing with protest in the U.K. (HMIC, 2009a, 2009b, ACPO, 2010, Stott, 2011, Reicher, 2011). If PJ and the ESIM both lay claim to providing the means for establishing greater police legitimacy and compliance and cooperation, how might they be linked and related to the context of protest policing?

**Articulating the links between procedural justice and the elaborated social identity model**

Having outlined the contributions of PJ and the ESIM to policing, we can now identify how the two have become increasingly theoretically linked. The proponents of PJ articulate a clear linkage between it and the ESIM (Bradford, 2010, 2012). Notably, that the principles of ESIM-based policing correspond with those advocated in PJ, specifically, in that fair and respectful treatment by the police influences group values and identity that increases perceptions of police legitimacy with cooperation as a corollary (Bradford, 2010, 2012). With the ESIM's reliance on social identity as its theoretical basis there is every reason for it to be incorporated within the relationship between the two. According to PJ, individual perceptions of the police are implicated with the formation of collective identity in groups. It suggests that judgements about the fairness of the police will be the most important factor in such formative processes (Tyler and Blader, 2000). Thus, it is proposed that fair treatment promotes a sense of inclusion and value within the group. Consequently, positive social identities are therefore formed in relation to the police, with them being seen as relevant to and representative of the group, thus promoting compliance and cooperation with the police (Bradford, 2012; Stott, 2009).

The link between perceptions of police legitimacy and collective conflict is well documented within the ESIM approach to policing (Reicher, 1996a, 1996b; Stott, 1998) and that of perceptions of legitimacy in increasing compliance and cooperation with authority and the law in PJ (ESS, 2011; Jackson et al, 2011; Tyler, 1990, 2006). PJ appropriates the ESIM conceptually as the means of establishing a causal relationship between fair treatment by the police and compliance and cooperation as its corollary. The PJ claim is that procedurally just policing influences peoples' behaviour and their social identity, correspondingly social identity influences changes in behaviour, notwithstanding the circular nature of this assertion, it is one that resonates absolutely with the ESIM interpretation of the dynamics of crowds and their policing (Bradford, 2012; Hough et al, 2010; Reicher, 1996a, 1996b; Stott, 2009; Stott et al; 2001; Stott and Reicher, 1998a).

Hough et al (2010, p.1) note that the police are “the most visible and accessible face not only of the criminal justice system but also, arguably, of the state itself”. The joint claim of PJ and the ESIM is that procedurally fair policing, characterised by neutrality, transparency and equitable, respectful treatment creates alignment between people and the police as state
representatives. A claim offered by PJ is that this perception of shared group membership has greater trust, legitimacy and cooperation as its corollaries. Central to these claims is that the level of people’s identification is shaped, in no small part and in certain contexts by the quality of their interactions with police officers which again is consistent with the ESIM (Hough et al, 2010). Yet, we might note that these interactions do not occur in a vacuum devoid of any history, ideology, attitudes and beliefs. The ESIM is expressed as the means of explaining the mechanism for shifts in identity arising from emerging notions of police illegitimacy (Stott, 2009). In practical terms, the ESIM provides guidelines for the policing of crowds and protest based on the police educating themselves about crowd identities, facilitating legitimate group aims, communicating police intentions and avoiding the indiscriminate use of force. We can see that PJ and the ESIM are theoretically and practically conflated as complementary approaches to enhance perceptions of police legitimacy and secure cooperation and compliance.

However, PJ and the ESIM appear to assume that violence and disorder at protests flow from a failure of policing to create perceptions of police legitimacy. This is problematic for the policing of protest for three reasons. Firstly, violence and disorder may not be solely due to a failure of policing because there are occasions when violence occurs despite the police use of PJ and ESIM approaches. Secondly, this assumption serves to demoralise the police and undermines their trust in using PJ and the ESIM when they do not work. Thirdly, an insistence on using them denies the legitimacy of other ways of dealing with violence and disorder. Moreover, PJ and the ESIM appear to underplay the significance of pre-existing perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to compliance and cooperation, that are rooted in a number of antecedents and contingents.

In summary, PJ and the ESIM approaches rely upon the concept of empirical legitimacy, both theoretically and for the purposes of empirical research. The key measures that relate to researching empirical legitimacy are identified as trust and confidence, moral alignment with the public, perceived legality of police actions and the corresponding willingness to comply and cooperate as a “felt” public duty (Hough and Sato, 2011; Jackson et al, 2011; Jackson and Bradford, 2010a, 2010b). These measures are applied in my exploratory survey of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and their attitudes to compliance and cooperation with the police and are then further investigated by the qualitative interviews and non-participant observation phase of the empirical research. In order to engage on a similar footing with PJ and the ESIM, the thesis employs their version of legitimacy yet acknowledges its limitations and the criticisms that can be levelled at it. This is not to make a judgement that any particular concept of legitimacy is preferable to another, it is more about highlighting the limitations and nuances that arise from a reliance on empirical legitimacy.

Orientation of the thesis sits within the police legitimacy debate by engaging aspects of PJ
and the ESIM with regard to how protesters’ perceptions of legitimacy are formed and acted upon. To this end the thesis examines two key questions in the context of protest:

- To what extent do the broad claims of PJ and the correlates of police legitimacy and compliance and cooperation hold?

- What additional influences can be associated with the construction and shaping of perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to compliance and cooperation?

The scope of the second question goes beyond that addressed by PJ and ESIM research. Specific to the context of protest and public order policing it acts as the stimulus to add to our understanding of the contextually-based influences that are associated with perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to compliance and cooperation with the law and police.

**The structure of the thesis**

The thesis is organised into seven chapters. Chapter one traces the origin of PJ from Tyler’s original work (Tyler, 1990) and charts its rapid development as orthodoxy in UK policing. It examines the contribution of PJ to policing, specifically its spread into protest and public order policing and how it has informed assessments of police performance. The chapter concludes by identifying important antecedents and contingencies to perceptions of police legitimacy and its corollary of cooperation and cooperation with the law and the police.

Chapter two details the changing political and social aspects of protest and public order policing and reactions to it throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It also examines how crowds have been understood from classical psychological reductionism, that is the idea of the “mob”, to modern day social psychological models of crowd dynamics. The trends in the way that protest has been managed are examined and the chapter deals with the debate about the paramilitarisation of the policing of protest.

Chapter three covers four main topics. First, it draws together ideas about what constitutes protest and the role of social movements in how peoples’ intentions and actions are framed, organised, communicated and acted upon. In a review of academic literature, the discussion seeks defining criteria for protest that informs the contextual framework for the empirical research. Secondly, the chapter examines the role of social media in the framing of protest events, the establishment of communication networks and as a means of mobilising resources. Thirdly, it critiques explanatory theories and models of public disorder, specifically those referred to as “tinder and spark” explanations of riot and disorder (Waddington, 2007). The origin and development of the ESIM is examined, together with a critical look at the role of *emerging* perceptions of police illegitimacy in the escalation of collective violence (Reicher,
The chapter concludes by identifying links between protestor attitudes and behaviour, highlighting the importance of context and the conditions under which protestor attitudes influence their behaviour.

Chapter four analyses more recent attempts to legitimize the policing of protest and public order in the UK since London G20, 2009. It draws on academic and “grey” literature sources in a critique of the recommendations and changes to police training and policy, intelligence gathering, tactical flexibility and the police use of force.

Chapter five describes and evaluates the research strategy, methodology and processes employed for the two stages of empirical research. It also provides a commentary about the researcher’s reflections on the research process and ethical considerations.

Chapter six provides the analysis, results and discussion of both phases of the study, highlighting the key themes that were taken from the phase 1 survey for development in phase 2. It provides a narrative about the construction of the CDM of police legitimacy from the empirical data.

Chapter seven provides the conclusion and recommendations. It sets out the theoretical, policy and professional practice recommendations that arise from the literature reviews and empirical research. The limitations of the research are discussed and opportunities for further research identified. It concludes by proposing that perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to compliance and cooperation need to be understood in light of the policing context, there being a number of additional influences acting on their construction and shaping beyond PJ and the ESIM explanations.

**About the researcher**

During the five-year period of the empirical research and writing of the thesis I was a serving police officer, having served for 29 years in a number of roles in different police services and geographical settings. I left the police service in 2016. While serving I was fortunate to have been involved in the planning and policing of large-scale public events, sporting crowds, protest and public order operations at a number of strategic and tactical levels in the UK and Germany. Professionally, the most notable of these was as a police support unit (abbreviated as PSU) commander at the London G20, 2009, involvement in its aftermath following the death of Ian Tomlinson and the subsequent HMIC reviews of public order policing (HMIC, 2009a, 2009b).

I had always been somewhat uncomfortable with the rather predictable and formulaic approach to the policing of crowds and the lack of innovation in the way that the police are
expected to, and often do, respond to protest. I became intrigued with the reasons as to why crowds behave in certain ways, particularly when in most scenarios by sheer numbers alone they overwhelm the police presence and yet most often do not take advantage of a potential vulnerability. In contrast, I was interested in why protesters did not always respond to well-intentioned or facilitative styles of policing that were being lauded as best practice. Why in the presence of identical policing practices should one police cordon face violent opposition and another stoic or good-natured cooperation? I found the political and social psychological processes highly interesting and the way in which they influenced peoples’ compliance and cooperation (or not) with the police in a diverse range of protest contexts. Latterly, I began to feel uncomfortable with a growing emphasis on police tactics as wholly and unilaterally responsible for the initiation of collective violence and conflict. I felt that, whilst no defence of oppressive policing should be made (and certainly the police can be inappropriately heavy-handed at times), this emphasis could not be generally applied or a universal interpretation. I had been in numerous protest situations where the police behaved impeccably to no avail, where their very presence or existence as a state agent acquired opprobrium from the protesters. Similarly, I had been in other protest situations where one might have expected collective conflict, yet it did not occur. The construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy appeared to be an unpredictable, multifarious affair. One in which the singular premise of PJ and the ESIM that unilateral, fair and respectful treatment by the police fosters cooperation and compliance and self-regulation did not seem to be borne out by the experience of professional practice. As a result, I suspected that there may be other contextually based influences at work that impacted upon the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and their attitudes to compliance and cooperation with the law and the police. The experience led me to begin and sustain an intense interest and research focus.

As a serving police officer at the time and a researcher, significant challenges were faced in carrying out empirical research in the context of protest and my reflection on the experience is discussed in detail later. For the avoidance of doubt, the thesis is not a defence of repressive, inappropriate policing of protest and public order. However, it does note that perceptions of police behaviour and the use of force are only one element in an arrangement of contextual influences represented by the CDM. After all is said and done, in the history of protest and public order policing there are examples of police repression wherein conflagrations of violence and disorder have not occurred, some where heavy-handed policing was utterly responsible, yet others where seemingly fair and proportionate policing garnered no greater legitimacy or cooperation from the public (HMIC, 2009a, 2009b, 2011b; Scarman, 1974, 1981; Waddington, 2007; Waddington, 1991, 1993).
In conclusion, this introductory chapter has introduced the reader to PJ and the ESIM approaches to policing. It has discussed the concept of legitimacy and highlighted that upon which PJ and the ESIM rely, namely empirical legitimacy. The limitations of this were highlighted by examples where the police are morally or duty bound to act against the wishes of the majority. The analysis identified that legitimacy can be established objectively through moral argument. Human rights, and the obligation of the state to protect peoples’ rights highlighting this point. However, we saw that legitimacy can be based on empirical and objective criteria such as in Beetham’s (1991, 2013) multi-dimensional model of legitimacy.

The chapter also outlined the contributions of PJ and the ESIM to policing and demonstrated the theoretical link between them, one based on a shared assumption of fair and respectful treatment and processes as the means to enhance police legitimacy and compliance and cooperation. Taking this link into account PJ and the ESIM appear to infer that violence and disorder stem from a failure of policing to create perceptions of police legitimacy. This inference is challenged by the antecedents and contingencies to police legitimacy that are discussed in the next chapter as it charts the rise and establishment of PJ as orthodoxy in UK policing.
Chapter 1

The establishment of procedural justice as orthodoxy in UK policing

“The police support the system and I want to change it, they did a good job today, but it’s not for me to agree with them”. (Interviewee 1, Occupy London Stock Exchange protest)

“It’s not my duty to support the police at a protest”. (Interviewee 36, TUC March)

This chapter traces the origin of PJ from Tyler’s original work and “Chicago” study (Tyler, 1990) and charts its rapid rise as orthodoxy in UK policing. It examines the contribution of PJ to policing practice, how it has informed management practices and internal assessments of police performance. The chapter concludes by identifying important antecedents and contingencies to perceptions of police legitimacy and its corollary of cooperation and cooperation with the law and the police.

PJ has come to exert significant influence in policing and criminal justice. It was not that long ago that one of the major reviews of policing in England and Wales (Flanagan, 2008) made no direct reference to PJ as the means to develop policing for the 21st century. However, in recent times it has become common parlance. Whilst a very positive move in terms of attempting to enhance police legitimacy, the danger is that we stop thinking about the subtleties and nuances of different policing contexts. It is apparent that within a relatively short timeframe PJ has gained a position as orthodoxy in UK policing and it is now recommended as a generic approach to crime control and in managing police-community relations (Tyler, 1990, 2006, 2011a; Quinton et al, 2015). Furthermore, it has been used to underpin the so-called revised Peelian principles and the social justice model of policing contained in the Independent Police Commission review of policing (2013).

The emergence and rise of procedural justice

It is in the US that we see the emergence of PJ in policing and police management, first and foremost. Tyler (2006) describes the professionalisation of policing in the US from the early 1990s onwards, a situation that has been mirrored to some extent here in the UK. Such professionalism it is claimed can be demonstrated by the growing academic interest and research in policing policy and practices, the development of professional qualifications at most levels of policing and greater emphasis on police leadership development. Indeed, there is now a requirement for all UK police officers to have academic qualifications as a prerequisite to joining or in gaining in-service ones through police and HEI partnerships (COP, 2016). The speed with which PJ has taken hold is worth consideration since it has significantly influenced developments in policing on several levels here in the UK.
Tyler’s (1990) original work based on his Chicago study was published in 1990. But it was not until 2006 and thereafter that PJ is consistently referred to as a substantial canon of work to be applied in criminal justice (Myhill and Beak, 2008; Myhill and Quinton, 2011; Quinton et al, 2015). Since then the mantra of it being “a growing body of research” appears ubiquitously in the relevant literature (Mazerolle et al, 2013). However, Sir Ronnie Flanagan (2008) in one of the most significant examinations of modern day policing in the UK makes no reference to PJ and appears to avoid its vocabulary, therefore we might consider it a newcomer to our policing world. Flanagan’s (2008) Review of Policing avoided reference to developments in PJ or seemed unaware of them yet noted that British policing was at a crossroads arising from the challenges that it faced in the wake of austerity in the late 2000s. He spelt out the position in the following terms:

Serious decisions must be taken, not simply by the police service itself but by everyone involved in policing, about how we can best succeed over the next decade and beyond. One option would be to match the growing complexity of modern policing by seeking to specify every outcome and control and bureaucratisation every aspect and process, from the centre to the force and within the force from the chief constable to the constable, in an attempt to cover every risk and meet every demand. To me, however, such a response would fail to acknowledge that a fundamentally different, more dynamic model is essential…an alternative vision of what successful 21st century policing should look like. (Flanagan, 2008, p.6)

The success of which Flanagan spoke was identified as being based upon a risk-based approach, in part on policing ethics and problem solving, development of frontline skills, principled approaches to risk management and streamlining doctrine and policy. A veiled reference to PJ might loosely be found in Flanagan’s (2008) report that the police should:

Develop clear lines of accountability for bringing clarity to who is responsible for what and hold them to account. Adopt a problem-solving approach, looking at the whole system, measure and value what matters, not what is easy to count, understand what works by identifying successful outcomes and sharing good practice. Clearly define policing purpose to better reflect ‘real local demand’; do what is right for the victim, right for the community, is in the public interest and fair. (Flanagan, 2008, p.8)

These measures were intended as the means by which successful policing would be delivered, with success being measured by the protection and gaining of trust and confidence of the public. In tandem with developments in the US, Flanagan (2008) recognised the significance of public perceptions of police accountability, practically this appeared to be assessed by perceptions of how the streets were being policed and how the local police treated the community. While Flanagan’s review may have had reducing bureaucracy as its key theme, due more perhaps to its terms of reference from the Home Secretary than much else, police accountability and the means by which it was experienced by the public appeared
central to its aim. Local accountability as experienced by the public was key, less important it seemed were the formal and structured mechanisms for public engagement and police accountability.

What Flanagan highlighted was that since the late 1980s to the early 1990s in the UK, public sector reform aimed to meet public expectations of community safety and public protection. In Flanagan’s terms (2008, p.12) the police became sole guardians of protection from all manner of risk and harms in a society where authority figures were in decline and the police came to fill the “authority vacuum”. At the time much of the public felt little ability to influence the police or their decisions. However, we should note that community justice and law enforcement have arguably been diverted away from the public police to local authorities and private policing over a number of years (McLaughlin, 2007; Reiner, 2010; Shearing and Stenning, 1983). The public experience of fair decision making and personal treatment, so necessary for assessments of legitimacy *ala* the PJ thesis may not always be at the hands of the public police, but rather other less equable mechanisms of law enforcement and social control. What we can derive from Flanagan’s analysis is that structural accountability of the police appeared as less important to the public than it did to government, inspection bodies such as HMIC and the police themselves. What mattered was that people were most interested in “issues at the very local (their own street) level and in how they are treated” (Flanagan, 2008, p.14).

In addition, Flanagan observed that police cultural change was most likely to make the biggest difference to public confidence and satisfaction, not PJ *per se* but echoing similar sentiments that can be found in the Tyler’s work (1990, 2006). Thus, the cultural change referred to focused on what Flanagan (2008, pp.39-41) called the “treatment of individuals during the processes that exist”, one that would “wage influence on public confidence and by association improve perceptions of trust and credibility of the police”. Trust and confidence in the police according to Flanagan (2008) is driven by contact, another similarity with PJ. A note of caution is advised here in light of the contingencies to various aspects of police legitimacy that are shown to undermine perceptions of trust and confidence in the police and the law itself (Braithwaite, 2009; Murphy and Cherney; 2011; Skogan, 2006, 2012). Flanagan (2008) appears to unwittingly drift into the trap of asymmetry in police-public relations, with an over reliance on the simplicity of unilateral cultural change in the police engendering widespread confidence and satisfaction. However, what he established was a seed bed for the emergence of PJ in UK policing, one that would extend and be nurtured in a subsequent green paper on policing in 2009. Police legitimacy and PJ as they are currently promulgated do not appear in any explicit sense in Flanagan’s 2008 review or indeed the government response to it. Instead the focus is on building trust and confidence in the context of controlling crime through local
cooperation and partnership and on reducing bureaucracy within the police service. We cannot look to this review of policing for any significant recognition of PJ in UK policing. However, the Independent Police Commission review of Policing under Lord Stevens (2013) largely relies on the tenets of procedural justice to the extent that it underpins its recommendations for revised Peelian principles and a new social justice model of policing.

Behind the political machinations in UK policing, academic interest in PJ abounded from the mid to late 2000s with a significant amount of empirical research published and a major Europe wide survey of Trust in Justice being carried out within the European Social Survey (ESS, 2011; Mazerolle et al, 2013). The National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) and London School of Economics (LSE) produced a widely read summary of PJ theory and research concerning what works in crime reduction as police forces sought to meet the challenge of doing more for less, discharging what the government saw as their main function to “prevent crime and disorder” in times of austerity (Home Office, 2010, p.5). In assisting this venture Myhill and Quinton (2011) produced a detailed summary of academic research and the links between police legitimacy, public cooperation and crime reduction in order to demonstrate how this could be done. In a single, police-focused document we see stated for the first time the idea of a causal relationship between PJ, police legitimacy and crime control: an indication of the trajectory to come. Myhill and Quinton (2011) cited the US development of PJ and a further analysis by Mazerolle et al (2013) provided evidence that community-based policing and specific initiatives, such as scripted road traffic stops encourages legitimacy and compliance with the law. We might consider whether such interventions are desirable or indeed possible in many other dynamic policing situations (such as protest and public order).

Nonetheless, Myhill and Quinton (2011) did single out protest and public order policing by linking PJ to the social identity theories of crowd control such as the ESIM, one of the first times that such a link can be found in the literature. They summarise this as follows:

There are implications for the policing of protest and public disorder (emphasis added). Overall, fair and respectful treatment by the police in a general sense, might enhance social bonds that make disorder less likely. Furthermore, it is possible that the legitimacy of the specific tactics used by the police to deal with a public disorder incident – in the eyes of particular elements of the crowd – could make the situation better or worse. Social psychologists have for example argued for a graded tactical response in these situations… if the police are seen to act fairly and treat people with respect, it can encourage crowd members who have law abiding intentions to align with the police and to self-police other crowd members. (Myhill and Quinton, 2011, p.10)

PJ is placed firmly front and centre through this analysis as the new way to control crime, enhance perceptions of police legitimacy and public cooperation. Significantly, it proposes that PJ can be used as the basis for protest and public order policing. However, it failed to occur to the proponents that no published empirical research applying PJ specifically to protest was
available to support the assertion. As an initial foray into the application of PJ in policing it suffices, however, it fundamentally misses the internal aspects of cultural change and the behavioural standards identified earlier by Flanagan (2008). However, the PJ drive continued through a supplemental paper (Quinton et al, 2015) provided in the wake of the police Code of Ethics (CoP, 2014). Prior to its publication ethical standards in policing were subject of review by the College of Policing through the Integrity programme which was precursory to the introduction of the police Code of Ethics in 2014 (CoP, 2014). Superficially, the Code of Ethics appears entirely unrelated to the development of PJ in UK policing. However, when PJ is seen in its original US context with emphasis on officer behaviour and quality of contact between police and the public, the significance of PJ in the Code of Ethics becomes apparent. Indeed, developments in PJ research now claim that there is a direct, causal relationship between police organisational behaviour and the treatment of its’ staff with how they relate to the public (CoP, 2014; Quinton et al, 2015). This is usually referred to as organisational justice (Quinton et al, 2015).

The Integrity programme (ACPO, 2012) proposed that police integrity was necessary to maintain public trust and confidence in the police. Further, that the quality of daily interaction with the police was central to it and seeing police actions as legitimate encouraged public compliance. Thus, the Integrity programme shared much in common with the PJ agenda. The introduction of the Code of Ethics drove the principles of PJ further into the fabric of UK policing and the psyche of senior police leadership. The College of Policing commissioned research related to the Integrity programme in an effort to further demonstrate the link between organisational justice, PJ and police legitimacy (Quinton et al, 2015). In studies limited to Durham Constabulary, evidence is adduced to indicate that officers who perceive being poorly treated are more likely to disengage, see less value in providing high quality service to the public and are less committed to ethical policing (Bradford and Jackson, 2011; Quinton et al, 2015). It concludes with a recommendation for effective leadership in driving the Code of Ethics by “being firm in setting and enforcing standards” (CoP, 2014, p.3). While the authors make no claims for wider generalisation and the response rates for the two surveys might be considered methodologically poor (at a third in each case), the findings significantly influenced the substance and pace of the Integrity programme in the UK, further raising the profile of PJ.

Quinton et al (2015) contributed a further commentary aimed at examining and setting out the evidence about fairness in policing. Its aim, to establish the ways in which police officers should act; fairly, ethically and with respect (again linking these in a causal manner to public perceptions of police legitimacy and crime control). Furthermore, it included an examination of how organisational behaviour might be used to shape officers' personal values and cooperation with force practices. The key argument established is that organisational justice has a positive impact on officer behaviour towards the public (Colquitt et al, 2001;
Colquitt, 2008; Greenberg, 2007; Tyler, 2011a). The inference is that this would engender wider public cooperation with the police and reduce crime (Quinton et al, 2015). How then might PJ be integrated into police culture and management to achieve this?

PJ can be seen in the police Code of Ethics (CoP, 2014) under the rubric of fairness and respect, partly on the basis that it is linked to fair treatment of the public. The value placed on PJ in police organisational structures and its intended impact on the public is summarised by Quinton et al (2015) in the following terms:

Bringing together internal justice models and external PJ it is possible to see how fairness and respect within a Force could open up important feedback loops in policing at relatively low cost. The evidence suggests that when officers feel they have been treated fairly and with respect they are more likely to say that they value the public and support ethical policing, assuming that these translate into action and the public are treated with greater fairness and respect police legitimacy is likely to be enhanced and people more likely to offer voluntary support. This public support could help to close the loop in as far as the research suggests that perceived public support and cooperation are important factors. (Quinton et al, 2015, p.12)

On the basis of the strategic significance given to the relationship between internal and external PJ outcomes the course seems set for its rise in police administration and leadership for many years to come. How then are procedural and organisational justice linked with police performance and assessments of police effectiveness? Previously, HM Government sought to reduce central targets, pushing accountability to a more local level and reduce bureaucracy. However, it should be noted that the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 strengthened the mandate of HMIC (now the HMICFRS) to centrally drive compliance with national initiatives. It is to this body that we turn our attention to see how the PJ agenda is driven, monitored and reported through the Police Effectiveness, Efficiency and Legitimacy (abbreviated as PEEL) assessment process.

The procedural justice drive through assessments of policing by HMIC

The PEEL assessment process is the annual programme of inspection for police forces in England and Wales and replaced the thematic type of inspection used until 2013 (HMIC, 2014a). The evidence gained is used to assess the effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy of the police with the intention that the public will be able to judge the performance of their local force and policing as a whole through the published findings (HMIC, 2014a). The effectiveness of a police force is assessed according to how well it carries out its responsibilities including preventing crime, protecting those considered vulnerable, tackling anti-social behaviour and dealing with emergencies and calls for service. Its efficiency is assessed in relation to how it provides value for money. A police force’s legitimacy is assessed according to whether it operates fairly, ethically and within the law (HMIC, 2014a).
How legitimacy is defined within PEEL provides us with a clue about its reliance on the components of PJ, as both an assessment tool and the mechanism by which policing is expected to be delivered. The PEEL legitimacy criterion relies upon a rather narrow interpretation that a police force is considered legitimate where it has the consent of the public and that the force consistently behaves in a way that is fair, reasonable, effective and lawful (HMIC, 2014a). Conceptual and methodological challenges arise from the manner in which PEEL operationalizes the notion of legitimacy and gathers its evidence. Fundamentally, it is clear from the headline and core assessment questions used by HMIC that it synonymises police legitimacy with operational effectiveness (HMIC, 2014a, 2016). No direct reference is made to the theoretical concept or constituents of police legitimacy that are applied in PJ research, however, a critical look at the definition reveals its basis as that of empirical legitimacy. Thus, we have evidence of a somewhat restrictive and subjectively-based notion, borrowed partially from PJ of what it means for the police to be legitimate.

Three sources of information about police performance appear to be used for the PEEL assessment, arguably each with its own methodological challenges namely, 1) the Crime Survey of England and Wales, 2) victim satisfaction surveys and 3) police self-reported datasets (HMIC, 2014a). Notably, questions are asked relating to organisational justice and force compliance with the Code of Ethics and it is clear that HMIC view PEEL assessments as hand in glove with the Integrity and Leadership programmes inspired by PJ (HMIC, 2016). HMIC (2014a) make clear they will use PEEL assessments in line with the College of Policing activity:

HMIC will give fuller and more specific consideration to leadership in future PEEL assessments. This will allow us to take account of the College of Policing review of leadership. (HMIC, 2014a, p.3)

We can only surmise that this entails inspection based on the ten recommendations contained in the Leadership Review (HMIC, 2016), although we should acknowledge that the PEEL inspection criteria are currently under review (HMICFRS, 2017).

The theme of organisational culture reflected in the review of policing by Flanagan (2008) is revisited in PEEL assessments with an emphasis on leadership delivering and maintaining an ethical culture. Critically, a reliance is made apparent on the certainty of a direct, causal relationship between organisational justice, PJ and police legitimacy with public compliance. Arguably, the PEEL programme has less to do with PJ and police legitimacy as we might know them in their academic guise and it appears a highly confused inspection regime that reflects neither academic precision or thorough examinations of police efficiency and effectiveness. This assertion is made on the basis that methodologically PEEL shares little in common with the research methods available and commonly applied in the field of PJ and it is limited as an effective measurement of a police forces operational performance.
Cynically, there appear to be elements of PEEL assessment aimed at nationally driving compliance with organisational justice and the Code of Ethics agenda, with HMIC providing central governance. Whether the general public share the same desire and translate this into greater perceptions of police legitimacy remains to be seen and tested.

In summary, from its US origins PJ has rapidly been woven into the fabric of UK policing and is being pursued as the means to deliver cost effective, normatively-based crime control and social order. Whilst not appearing overtly in previous reports on police reform, PJ fell rather gracefully into a role as the means to drive cultural and practice changes in the police service. In so doing it has been merged with organisational justice and police integrity under the Code of Ethics and Leadership programmes. At a strategic level, progress of the PJ agenda continues to be driven through the PEEL inspection programme and College of Policing oversight.

Principally, this type of policing rests on the assertion that fair processes and respectful treatment at the hands of the police engender perceptions of legitimacy, and compliance and cooperation. The assumption is made by PJ that this mechanism operates against a background of social order and stability. However, not all policing contexts might reflect this assumption. PJ, in tandem with the ESIM is recommended as best practice for the policing of protest and public order with little specific empirical evidence to support it. However, there are a number of antecedents and contingencies to PJ theory, perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to compliance and cooperation that can be identified.

The antecedents and contingencies of procedural justice and the elaborated social identity model

Thus far, I have demonstrated the dominant positions that PJ and the ESIM have attained in policing. However, there are antecedents and contingencies to the claims made by PJ and the ESIM about police legitimacy and compliance in specific policing contexts such as protest. Can it be a simple case that fair processes and respectful treatment engender perceptions of police legitimacy and compliance and cooperation? Might there be additional factors to take into account that potentially undermine this assumption? Factors that serve to moderate the impact of PJ and ESIM-based approaches? Have these received limited attention in this area of research thus far? The discussion below provides clarity about the sources of antecedents and contingencies and their influence on perceptions of legitimacy. There are at least three main sources of antecedents and contingencies that can be summarised as: the asymmetrical nature of the relationship between the police and public (Skogan, 2006, 2012); the dialogic nature of police legitimacy that is not reflected in PJ (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; Cherney and Murphy, 2011; Tankebe, 2013); and the phenomena of motivational posturing and social
distancing (Braithwaite, 2009). These all resonate with my own finding of additional factors involved in the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and their attitudes to compliance and cooperation (see chapter six).

The asymmetry of policing

The notion of an asymmetric relationship between police and public engages the present debate since it relates to the claims of PJ and the ESIM that quality of contact with the police creates trust and confidence and perceptions of police legitimacy. Social identity-based approaches to policing crowds such as the ESIM rely upon the idea of emerging notions of police illegitimacy in crowd contexts, without addressing the existence and impact of the asymmetry issue. Skogan (1989, 1994, 2004, 2006, 2012) has identified that the relationship between how people perceive their treatment at the hands of the police and their levels of trust and confidence in the police may be asymmetric in nature. The impact of negative experiences of police contact is many-fold more than that of positive ones. There are factors that can influence these public perceptions such as, personal background, previous experience and neighbourhood conditions. Personal background often relates to characteristics such as colour, ethnicity, age and socio-economic status and there are longstanding examples of contention between the police and citizens based on race and perceived social inequality. Citizens who perceive themselves as being greater stakeholders in society often have a greater inclination to support the police (Correia, 2000; Skogan, 2006). The experience of police contact can be subject to what Skogan (2006, p.104) refers to as a “bedside manner” relating to the empathy, helpfulness and fairness of the police. However, positive assessments of police conduct are mitigated in those people who have had previous contact that was perceived as punitive (such as prior arrests, stop search and contentious situations). The context of protest and public order policing can bring this asymmetry sharply into focus, magnifying its effect.

The idea that the effects of negatively and positively rated contact with the police are asymmetrical is a longstanding one (Jacob, 1971; Nicholas and Walker, 2004; Skogan, 2006). The explanation advanced for this is that people may simply view good experiences of the police as atypical or that they anticipate good experience and only take notice when they do not receive it (Weitzer and Tuch, 2004). Skogan (2006, 2012) elaborates on this explanation by proposing that positive attitudes do not carry the same psychological power as negative ones, perceived negative experiences shaping attitudes and behaviour more than positive ones. In his own research of public encounters with the police, Skogan (2006) identifies a very strong asymmetry in the impact of perceived positive and negative contact. He explains that human beings are more risk adverse than logically rational and that they pay excessive
attention to bad news. While acknowledging this as less the case in a UK context he
demonstrates it to be present nonetheless. Skogan (2006) summarises the implications of
asymmetry for policing in the following terms:

By inference the large asymmetry we observe in many places could be
interpreted as implying that the *quality of service rendered does not matter very
much* (emphasis added)... the answer seems quite clear: democracies are
committed to both equality of treatment and an objectively fair level of treatment
through every aspect of law and constitutions, yet the *one-sided interpretation*
(emphasis added) of those efforts remains a huge stumbling block...The
empirical message is “You can’t win, you can just cut your losses”. No matter
what you do, it only counts when it goes against you. (Skogan, 2006, p.119)

Normatively, the police in a liberal democracy *should* strive to gain consensus, yet the enigma
comes in deconstructing and navigating the size, composition and manifestations of the
stumbling block.

PJ may lay claim to providing the means of closing the gap on the positions elaborated
in the asymmetry debate, indeed much empirical work has been undertaken in demonstrating
the efficacy of respectful treatment and procedural fairness in securing legitimacy and
compliance (Jackson et al, 2011; Mazerolle et al, 2013). Yet there are at least three reasons
to cast doubt on this assertion. First, there is evidence that the influence of PJ varies across
groups and more significantly across *contexts* (Cherney and Murphy, 2011; Tankebe, 2009a).
Second, research in this area relies on common measures and commonalities in the PJ
concepts applied to police legitimacy, however, authors have identified deficiencies in the
variables being applied (Jackson et al, 2011; Reisig et al, 2007; Tankebe, 2009a). Moreover,
Cherney and Murphy (2011) draw upon Tankebe’s (2009a) work on the instrumental
dimensions of PJ to demonstrate that research attention should be directed at the variance in
PJ outcomes across different *policing contexts*. Specifically, variance occurs according to
peoples’ personal and vicarious experience of encounters with authority, cultural differences
and where the legitimacy of the law itself is questioned (Braithwaite, 2009; Cherney and
Murphy, 2011; Weitzer and Brunson, 2009). Thirdly, and highly pertinent to my thesis is the
observation that PJ research in the *specific* context of protest policing is lacking (Mazerolle et
al, 2013). In short, these reasons raise the question of whether PJ “works all the time,
depending on the context and groups being engaged” (Cherney and Murphy, 2011, p. 229).
My contention is that it does not. The policing of protest and public order, for the police and
protesters is highly context specific, rather than generalised and routine. There is every reason
to consider that other influences are at work in the construction and shaping of protester
perceptions of police legitimacy and their attitudes to compliance and cooperation.
The dialogic nature of police legitimacy

According to Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) legitimacy consists of a dialogue between power-holders and their audiences, wherein power-holders such as the police make a claim to legitimacy and the audience responds (positively or negatively) to that claim. The police in turn observe the audience’s response to their claim to legitimacy and may or may not alter it as a result. However, PJ deals only with audience legitimacy, not power-holder claims in the route to perceptions of police legitimacy and compliance and cooperation. Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) make the observation that with the rapid increase of empirical research in PJ, it has over-extended its early theoretical basis. In an effort to advance the conceptual understanding of legitimacy, Tankebe (2009a, 2013) argues that power-holder legitimacy is of equal importance and needs to be accounted for. Tankebe’s argument engages certain aspects of Tyler’s original work, and that which follows it. Tyler (1990, 2006) began his original work by contrasting instrumental and normative modes of compliance and cooperation, he divided the normative mode into “personal morality” (that is, general beliefs as to how people should act) and “legitimacy” (that is, perceptions as to whether the police rightly have authority over them). Surveys were conducted, asking questions about peoples contact with the police, their reaction to such contacts, and their corresponding behaviour. Tyler (1990) concluded that people comply with the law not so much because they fear punishment, but because they feel that legal authorities are legitimate and that their actions are generally fair. Therefore, with an emphasis on legitimacy, he placed normative compliance above instrumental compliance. A further dimension of Tyler’s work (1990, 2006) was the perceived procedural fairness of the police as being particularly important in shaping perceptions of legitimacy and compliance as its corollary. Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) note that the concept of a felt obligation to obey the law cannot be so straightforwardly equated to legitimacy, because there may be several reasons why people feel obliged to obey the law or cooperate. These include apathy, pragmatic acquiescence (what they call a dull compulsion) and calculations about risks and benefits. We cannot understand what creates, sustains or undermines legitimacy, if we only focus on audience legitimacy based on peoples’ perceptions (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; Tankebe, 2013).

Two additional aspects to audience legitimacy are perceptions of legality and shared values (what Jackson et al (2011) call moral alignment with the police). Despite an obvious link between police illegality and a lack of legitimacy, it is paradoxically the case that the proper enforcement of the law can sometimes fail to enhance legitimacy (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012), for example in cases where the police exercise the letter of the law without fear or favour, much to the chagrin of those subjected to it.
The PJ concept of shared values (or moral alignment) between the public and police becomes problematic, Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) explain:

Suppose that a given society has a set of strongly and consensually held values, but that because of political disturbances or economic crises in nearby countries, it experiences a relatively sudden influx of several separate sets of migrants, each with core values different from one another and from the host country. What is now a “shared value” within that society? Issues of this kind can present real dilemmas for law enforcement agencies. (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012, p. 25)

The notion of shared values between the police and the policed tends to assume that laws arise from the shared norms of society, yet this does not universally follow. The relationship between laws and values is by no means always so straightforward (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012, p. 25). Therefore, to understand the nuances of police legitimacy properly, these points must be accounted for. However, most PJ studies do not pay sufficient attention to them relying upon narrow, constrained variables that are only measured quantitatively.

In summary, the police must seek to understand the construction and shaping of police legitimacy in the eyes of the public through a “legitimacy dialogue”, that is, one based on listening, observing and reflecting in action. I suggest that this “legitimacy dialogue” can be informed by the police attending to protester constructions of policing, pre-existing ideology, levels of protestor engagement and distancing and power and identity relationships that are contained in the CDM (see chapter six).

**Motivational postures and social distancing**

Braithwaite (2003, 2009, 2010) has written on the positions that people take in relation to the law, state authorities and the manner in which they are manifested. The positions can be seen as motivational postures taken in order to engage with or disengage from authority or the law. Motivational postures are described as sets of beliefs and attitudes that encapsulate peoples’ orientation to another social entity (Braithwaite, 2010). Social distancing is the position that people adopt in relation to state authority, systems and laws. It is posited that there are degrees in the positions that people adopt to authority and/or the laws they represent, both within and outwith formal structures. Essentially, where legitimacy is contested, be it of the law or authority itself, a position of defiance may be adopted (Braithwaite, 2010). Defiance can be seen as dismissive or resistant with neither cast as definitive stances being subject to personal and group revision throughout contact with agents of authority. The characteristics of dismissive and resistant defiance are described below.

Dismissive defiance is characterised by people asserting what they deem to be their absolute right of freedom to the authority, this is less about taking a position against it but is more concerned with making statements about their position in relation to the authority, an
individual statement of their personal liberty (Braithwaite, 2010). Of course, if we follow the logic of the ESIM pathway, from the individual to the group identity, then this potentially becomes a statement of the group based on a shared social identity of opposition. Dismissive defiance in this respect potentially brings people into direct conflict with the state and its instruments of governance, in either a passive or active manner. Passively, it is manifested by ignoring the agents’ efforts to take control of a situation. Actively, by open and direct challenge to authority and seeking to grapple that control and place it into their own hands. In short, a political struggle for power and control (Braithwaite, 2010). In a policing context, both are potentially problematic, making it difficult for the police to engage with those who ignore or won’t recognise their authority and likely to result in the use of coercion in the latter case.

Elsewhere, defiance has been characterised as the idea that the authority has no right to control or interfere with personal freedoms (Brehm and Brehm, 1981). In essence the aim is not merely to alter or ameliorate the situation, but to offer a direct challenge to those in authority who have created it, Braithwaite (2010, p.1) summarises it as meaning that “you have no right to expect subservience of me”.

Resistant defiance has as its focus, not the authority itself, but the rules and mechanisms that they administer. The objective in these circumstances is aimed at influencing and changing the practices or inclination of the authority in order to steer a different course of action. Resistant people are assumed capable of remaining engaged and moved to a position of greater cooperation with the law or authority. In short, dismissive defiance signals rebellion and freedom, and a desire to reject constraints such as laws and rules, whilst resistant defiance signals a desire to change the rules or the manner in which the authority applies them. Dismissive defiance gives rise to greater conflict and confrontation between citizens and state authority, it representing an existential threat to the authority itself. By contrast, resistant defiance is open to dialogue and discussion through the existing political and social structures (Braithwaite, 2010). It is further proposed that there are those who will be committed to deference and compliance with the law and authority by virtue of their own personal values and less likely to place social distance between them (Braithwaite, 2003). All of these positions are reflected in my empirical data and the factors of the CDM (see chapter 6).

However, these positions should not be seen as definitive stances, they are capable of change and can be escalated or de-escalated one from another. The origins of these positions can be based on a multitude of personal, social, environmental, ideological and political influences (Braithwaite, 2009, 2010). Yet, it is noticeable that the development of defiance relies upon the construction of narratives, that become pivotal in creating and maintaining these positions. Braithwaite (2009) observes that people create narratives about themselves or their group, or of the state and its agents in order that they are not seen as the
“villains”. She elaborates that these narratives have institutional, environmental and personal facets that are designed to justify levels of disengagement and distancing. In this construction, moral agency is utilised to establish standards of behaviour and ways of thinking that are acceptable to the individual and group identity (Bandura, 1989; Braithwaite, 2011). There are parallels with the ESIM here, it reflects this agency insofar as, in group-based defiance people draw on shared norms and values which may be explicitly stated or assumed. In so doing, the narratives that are created are made understandable and acceptable to the group (Zerlditch Jr., 2001). This occurs in any protest campaign or activity, where the acceptability and rightness of the cause is important for fostering public acceptance and to create social identities. The ways in which people make sense of rules, the laws and state authority are contained in these narratives. Commonly, the theme of injustice as a rubric is invoked by those wishing to justify levels of defiance and to secure their credibility (Braithwaite, 2010). The empirical research and conclusions from the present study support the notion that, in the context of protest, personal values and beliefs about the law, the creation and communication of narratives about the police, power and identity relationships and pre-existing ideology are significant influences in the construction and shaping of perceptions of police legitimacy, attitudes to cooperation and compliance, and in justifying protesters’ positions to authority.

The presence of defiance as a position can become problematic for the state and its agents, once socially widespread or highly visible it can precipitate social disorder. Under a state of resistant defiance people may still submit to the authority of the law and its agents, even if begrudgingly through deference or fear. However, under conditions of dismissive defiance, where authority itself is seen as irrelevant or oppositional, people may disengage and withdraw from the state and its agents, rendering them obsolete in their own minds and signalling the end of any hope of cooperation or compliance (Braithwaite, 2010). Braithwaite (2003) describes the idea of complete withdrawal as disengagement, which is a position extending beyond mere resistance and involves people operating outside of the system and its agents and receding from any interaction at all. Disengagement is described by Murphy and Cherney (2010) in the following terms:

Disengaged people are unlikely to want to challenge an authority and are unlikely to interact at all with authority or its system of rules...are particularly difficult to win over even when PJ is deployed in an attempt to engage such groups. One reason being that PJ is seen as an insincere attempt to win cooperation. (Murphy and Cherney, 2010, p. 6)

The idea of insincerity and even suspicion is one highlighted in my own empirical research when protesters identified doubt about the motives of the police and their actions, whether factually based or not (see chapter six). Understandably, the state and its agents may utilise PJ approaches to foster engagement, but not without creating potential for it to be seen merely
as a “ploy”. The impression that PJ can be nothing more than an insincere attempt to gain cooperation and engagement is repeated elsewhere (Braithwaite, 2003, 2010; Tankebe, 2009b).

Much PJ theorising and research deals with peoples’ perceptions of the authority itself, in the context of the present work, the police. However, it can be argued that this is a flaw in PJ by failing to take account of how the legitimacy of the law itself is perceived (Murphy et al, 2009). Murphy and Cherney (2010, p.6) refer to this as “authority legitimacy versus law legitimacy”, whereby those who question the legitimacy of the law itself may be less inclined to engage with authority and adopt positions of disengagement. Attention to the antecedent nature of the relationship between legal legitimacy and perceptions of police legitimacy is scarce in the literature, generally and specific to protest policing (Mazerolle et al, 2013). Significant gaps appear in the research on the role of perceptions about the legitimacy of the law and the legal system. However, it is apparent that not only are the police required to be perceived as fair and just, but the rules and laws enforced by them need to be seen as such (Mazerolle et al, 2013; Murphy and Cherney, 2012). Therefore, perception of legal legitimacy is a vital antecedent to attitudes of compliance and cooperation with the police. Whilst the police as an entity may be viewed as a legitimate authority, the laws, policies and regulations that they enforce can be perceived as illegitimate. Conversely, others propose that the manner in which the police conduct themselves and discharge their duties influences peoples’ perceptions of the law (Tyler and Huo, 2002). These observations point to a less than linear relationship between a complex array of factors, it being a more comminuted route to perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to compliance and cooperation. Thus, it appears that not everyone pays heed to PJ-based approaches in every policing context.

Evidence indicates that groups with shared identities who feel distinctly different from the police are less likely to respond to PJ approaches because officers’ presence, as far as what they represent, are not “identity relevant” to them (Bradford, 2012, p. 23). PJ has greater efficacy in establishing a link between police legitimacy and compliance when people perceive authority, such as the police as an in-group (Bradford, 2012; Smith, 1983, 2007). This has contextual relevance to it, since police activities based on procedural fairness that are perceived as irrelevant to a group’s prevailing identity may achieve very little. Procedural fairness is a constituent of PJ and yet has nuances within it, there is a wide spectrum of what is perceived as procedurally fair ranging from that occurring at the individual level of interaction to societal inclusion in policy and decision-making (Murphy and Cherney, 2010). The latter has no direct individual input from the point of view of the public apart from engagement in the political processes (such a voting and lobbying), whilst the former engages people at the
personal level. Policing relies heavily on the interactional level and assessments of what is fair can be highly subjective.

The dynamic between authority and social groups depends on the inter-group status and relevancy. PJ outcomes will vary according to the group context and the salience of social identities, where multiple and conflicting identities occur in social settings such as protest the relevance of the police and what they represent may be questioned and fragmented. Bradford (2012) identifies that:

The weight of current evidence serves to complicate the potential link between police fairness and social identity. (Bradford, 2012, p. 24)

According to PJ and the ESIM, perceived representativeness of the police to the social group and the setting is an agent in establishing perceptions of legitimacy and compliance. Perceptions of the police as representative in this way can be influenced by tradition and symbolism relating to the police role in social order. Mazerolle et al (2013) explain this aspect in the following terms:

Tradition carries with it historical elements and cultural beliefs and practices. Traditional responses and held beliefs relating to police legitimacy may characterise community held beliefs in the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a police service over many years or generations. These beliefs are not necessarily based in fact but are handed down from one generation to the next as a set of expectations and responses. Moreover, people are part of communities and are influenced by the attitudes of those with whom they interact. (Mazerolle et al, 2013, p.1)

PJ approaches can be problematic for the contexts of protest policing given the focus on delivering procedural fairness without taking into account the full range of antecedents and contingencies in the complicated connections between police activity, social identity, perceptions of legitimacy and attitudes to compliance. The CDM of police legitimacy proposes that these can be more fully accounted for by the four factors of, 1) protester constructions of policing, 2) power and identity relationships, 3) levels of protester engagement and distancing and 4) pre-existing ideology. These occur across three dimensions at the personal, social and protest cause levels.

If we accept for the moment the proposition that PJ might not work all of the time in every context, the argument can be taken further to ponder if PJ approaches can, in certain contexts be counter-productive? There is variance in peoples’ attitudes toward the very laws that the police are expected to enforce and this is not specifically addressed in PJ research as a contingent (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; Braithwaite, 2009; Cherney and Murphy, 2011). Furthermore, people may perceive the police as being a legitimate authority (or not) and
question the justification and legitimacy of the law itself both generally and specifically. Thus, it is clear from the contingency debate that police approaches aimed at demonstrating procedural fairness may be impeded or induce a counter effect. It is quite possible that oppositional views to state authority, the police and/or the law itself can co-exist simultaneously. People may adopt positions that are opposed to the law and the police, support the law in principle but not the police, support the police but not the law itself (Murphy and Cherney, 2011). Empirical research has identified that perceptions of legal legitimacy do influence levels of compliance with authority, a notable aspect to this research is that PJ approaches may be counter-productive relating to compliance with authority where the legitimacy of the law itself is questioned or challenged (Murphy and Cherney, 2011). Indeed, I will demonstrate through my empirical research that personal values related to the law are influential in the way that people construct perceptions of police legitimacy and come to view compliance and cooperation with the police and the law, regardless of benign or positive evaluations of protest event policing.

In summary, this chapter has charted the development and explosive rise of PJ from its original US origins into British policing. In particular, identifying how it has informed the police Code of Ethics, PEEL inspection regime and police reform. In so doing, it has highlighted the establishment of PJ as orthodoxy in UK policing. Evidence has been presented for the existence of a number of antecedents and contingencies to both PJ and the ESIM approaches to the policing. The weight of influence of positive contact with the police is not entirely equivalent to that given to negative encounters, providing the basis for an asymmetric dimension to protesters’ perceptions of police legitimacy. Impressions or experiences of negative contact may be viewed as the norm, with positive encounters balanced against the proviso that they are the exception to the rule, indicating a filtering process through which evaluations of policing can be made.

However, the influence of PJ in attempting to secure perceptions of police legitimacy and compliance can be confounded by the context, circumstances and social processes within and outwith the protest event itself. The dialogic nature of police legitimacy demonstrates that the PJ empirical research has over-stretched its theoretical basis, causing us to question the variables that are applied and how we understand the complexities of police legitimacy and pathways to compliance. The phenomena of social distancing and motivational postures based on protester beliefs and attitudes can and does influence people’s degrees of engagement with authority, the police and the law and informs their social identity. The net effect of these antecedents and contingencies can cause what might be described as a contextual “gap”, one in which police claims to legitimacy lie on one side and protester perceptions at the other. It appears that we have reason to believe that these antecedents and
contingencies serve to influence the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and their attitudes to compliance and cooperation beyond PJ and the ESIM explanations. Due to its meteoric rise, few would doubt that PJ has become common parlance in policing and criminal justice in the UK. However, it raises the question of what did we do before? Are we to consider that issues of trust and confidence, police legality, alignment of values between the police and public, police and legal legitimacy were not priorities on the professional practice and academic agendas? Clearly not. The danger is that with the new nomenclature that comes with PJ we begin to rely on simplicity without reflective practice and critical thinking. Without reflection, we cannot develop learning and come to rely on generalisations that overlook the nuances of different policing contexts. PJ is a positive contribution to policing, but it has its limitations.

The chapter that follows examines the foundations of the policing of protest and disorder. The historical background to policing in England and Wales under the old watch arrangements to the birth of the new police in 1829 is discussed. It documents some pivotal moments in the policing of protest and public order that led to reform, with a move away from the use of the military to the civil police. It also details how crowds have been construed from classical psychological reductionism, that is the idea of the “mob”, to modern day social psychological models of crowd dynamics. Trends in the way that protest has been managed are also identified and examined.
Chapter 2

Foundations and trends in the policing of protest and public order

“The police incite violence, arrest people at random and use disproportionate violence against protesters”. (Interviewee 22, TUC March)

“On protest days like this they get the Met TSG out. Thugs, psycho-goons”. (Interviewee 5, Justice for Ian Tomlinson protest)

The policing of protest and public order is at times a fraught venture, arguably one of the most challenging policing situations for the public and the police, with a long political and social history in the UK. In order to contextualize it, the following chapter begins by setting the historical background to policing since the thirteenth century under the old watch arrangements, to the birth of the new police in 1829 and beyond. It documents some pivotal moments in the policing of protest and public order that led to reform, with a move away from the use of the military to the civil police. The chapter details the changing political and social landscape, how it relates to protest and public order policing, and reactions to it throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It also details how crowds have been construed, from classical psychological reductionism, that is the idea of the “mob”, to modern day social psychological models of crowd dynamics. Trends in the way that protest has been managed are critically examined and the chapter concludes with a detailed discussion about the paramilitarisation of the policing of protest.

Policing before the new police

The maintenance of order, as far back in English history as Saxon times was based on collective responsibility under the watch of appointed people. According to Emsley (1996, pg. 9) the medieval constable was “a man appointed from within his community and charged with carrying out the duties of the office [and] increasingly became the executive agent of the manor or parish for which he was appointed and it was his task to make reports about felons, miscreants and nuisances”. The longstanding tradition survived into Norman times where the constable gained royal authority under the remit of maintaining the King’s peace and policing arrangements became governed by statute. In order to maintain law and order, towns were required by the Statute of Winchester in 1285 (13 Edw. I, St. 2) to establish a watch and householders were obliged to perform this duty to assist the locally appointed constables charged with being the spokesperson for the community and responsible for community oversight (Cowley, 2011). The watchman guarded the entrances to the town at night, patrolled the streets and maintained order by arresting drunks and prostitutes (Bunyan, 1976, p. 59). A second legislative change contained in the Justice of the Peace Act 1361 (34 Edw. 3, c.1), established aristocrats chosen by the Crown, as Justices of the Peace (JPs) and the role of
constable became subordinate to crown authority vested in them. The constable was accountable to the JPs, who passed down orders and instructions via the constables to the community (Cowley, 2011). These arrangements survived for many centuries until the social landscape and expanding economy of the eighteenth century changed the nature and expectations of the watch. The expectation became one of protecting those whose legitimate business or pleasure took them onto the streets at night (Beattie, 2001, p.169). However, there is some evidence that watch duty was unpopular among the citizens required to perform it (Rosenheim, 1991). Yet, relatively few refusals were officially recorded, although it is difficult to know whether this was because people grudgingly undertook the duty, hired a substitute or because enforcement action was only taken at times of crisis. A pivotal moment for the watch arrangements came when certain London parishes obtained legislation in 1735, under which citizens exchanged their duty to serve by paying a watch rate (Rawlings, 2002). Other parishes followed suit.

Eventually, by the late eighteenth century few people in London were choosing to serve, leading to the appointment of paid deputies. Many parishes had established or improved watch schemes. Reform did not necessarily stop once a new watch scheme was in place. Many parish watch committees continued to seek further improvements so that by the nineteenth century some had regulations about the qualifications, pay, working methods and discipline of the watchmen, and had even extended their cover by the appointment of patrol officers with greater discretion to operate (Harris, 2004). Across the country, with growing urbanisation, the local ruling elite often wanted their towns to acquire the trappings of civic status. This included a professional watch system. Reform of the watch in one town, led neighbouring communities to introduce changes, due in part because of the fear that potential criminals would simply migrate from better, to less well policed areas (Emsley, 2009).

Reform proposals were not without difficulties, citizens who were unwilling to serve or critical of the professional watch were also unenthusiastic about contributing to its cost. The complex structure of the government in many boroughs could also obstruct reform, and there were power struggles between local political and interest groups over control of the watch forces (Rawlings, 2002). The question remains as to whether these reforms made any real difference. The records of trials at the Old Bailey indicate that after the mid-eighteenth century, victims, who had previously called for assistance from their neighbours, were more likely to call for the watch (Shoemaker, 2004; Williams, 2011). This suggests that they had some confidence in the new professional forces, although it might merely indicate that, having paid for this service, they no longer expected neighbours to respond or there was a belief that calling for the watch would in some sense reinforce their testimony against an offender (Williams, 2011). Certainly, criticism of the watchmen arose and persisted throughout the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, although it is not easy to judge whether this was because they were inept and/or corrupt (as is often reported) or because public expectations of them had increased (Emsley, 2009; Hurl-Eamon, 2005; Rawlings, 2002).

Specifically, the ability and efficiency of the watch arrangements to cope with public disorder and disturbances was considered questionable before the new police were formed, a situation epitomised by the Gordon Riots in 1780. Lasting for five days, no magistrate could be found who would face the ‘mob’ to read the Riot Act 1714 (1 Geo.1 St.2 c.5), causing the royal prerogative to be exercised in deploying the army onto the streets (Emsley, 2009; Rawlings, 2002). Deploying military might against the civilian population raised a number of problems. Mistrust of the government meant that there was widespread opposition to the existence of a standing army for use against civilians. Moreover, magistrates who had the power to request assistance from the army, had a number of concerns about doing so: the nearest barracks might be some distance away which meant the soldiers might arrive too late to deal with outbreaks of disorder; there was uncertainty about the authority to use force and what level of force might be exerted; there were fears that the presence of soldiers might further inflame public resentment that otherwise would have dissipated (Rawlings, 2002; Williams, 2011). This created a dilemma, since the authorities had been criticised for failing to request the army early enough to quell the Gordon Riots. However, there were also concerns that parts of the military had been sympathetic to the rioters (in that case, if not others). It appears that fears concerning the use of force were not altogether unfounded. In 1761, an imported militia from North Yorkshire gained notoriety after hacking at least forty people to death at a protest in Hexham, Northumberland (Emsley, 1996, 2009). Could the authorities run the risk of similar events becoming more common place? Efforts were made to reduce the dependence on soldiers by establishing paramilitary forces composed of part-time volunteers. Yet, these also proved difficult to control, when in 1819 a charge by one such force turned a peaceful meeting in Manchester into the Peterloo massacre. Perhaps in consequence, the government and civil authorities continued to rely on the army to some extent in dealing with protest and disorder. Indeed, to improve the availability of troops, a large number of barracks were built around the country (Rawlings, 2002). The use of troops in support of the new police continued sporadically beyond 1829, yet with a growing acceptance and desire that the civilian population should be policed by a civil force without resort to military power (Emsley, 2009).
Policing and the new police

It is inconclusive whether there had been an actual rise in public disorder during the early nineteenth century or a growing intolerance of public gatherings (Harris, 2003). The situation did not escape the attention of Sir Robert Peel, adding momentum to his argument for reform. Even if he did consider a civil force that might take on the mantle of riot control, the issue remained politically sensitive and did not appear to be writ large in his pronouncements for policing in London in 1829. However, historic events and reactions to them provided the background to the development of the new police, Rawlings (2002) explains that “from the outset it was intended that by creating a single force the new police would be able to deal with public disorder” (2002, p.118). Sir Robert Peel himself declared that:

The whole of the police force will be gradually placed under such a degree of discipline as may enable it to act with effect, should any occasion arise for its services, as an (sic) united corps – for instance, the late riots in Spitalfields, and tumultuous mobs of any kind”. (The Times, 11th August, 1829)

Thus, it appears that the policing of protest and disorder was always considered to be part of the remit.

A significant difference between the new police and the previous watch system was the “severing of the connection with the community police, the parish authority and ratepayers” (Rawlings, 2002, p. 118). The public were to be policed and expected to co-operate with it. Notwithstanding the introduction of the Metropolitan Police in London, most counties however, retained the office of parish constable. The borough councils (in 1835) were permitted to organise a police force, yet few of them seemed eager to implement this (Williams, 2011). Accordingly, by 1837, just over half of the boroughs had an established police force. Legal arrangements in 1839 allowed any of the English counties to raise and equip a salaried police force, JPs were permitted to appoint Chief Constables, for the direction of the police in their areas and allowed one officer per 1,000 population (Emsley, 2009). Whilst discretionary, the arrangements saw the development of the first police constabularies. In the 1840s, there was still a great disparity between different parts of the country with no single style of policing having been adopted (Emsley, 2009). With concerns about rising political unrest associated with the Chartist movement, attempts were made to establish greater standardisation and control of policing to meet the challenge (Rawlings, 2002; Redekop and Pare, 2011).

The system of policing that developed throughout the nineteenth century appears to have changed little into the early part of the twentieth century, it was a format based on foot patrol, delivered by a disciplined (often along military-type lines) and bureaucratically-controlled force (Williams, 2011). Against this background, protest and disorder appeared to occupy two types. The first relates to community disorder and unrest, often between different sections of the community, into which the police became drawn (Waddington, 1992). The
second, from the 1970s onwards, occurred directly between the police and ethnic minorities, and the police and protesters at industrial disputes. Anti-globalisation and political protest being a much more recent addition to the protest landscape (della Porta et al, 2006a). Dunning et al (1987) mapped British community disorders occurring from 1900 to 1970, and found that apart from in 1910, that saw a very sharp rise, there was a significant decline in large-scale disorder until the 1960s.

The 1950s occupy a special place in the nostalgic tradition of the British police, epitomised by the fictional character of Dixon of Dock Green (McLaughlin, 2007). In this, a consensual police officer upheld the law and was an integral part of the community which they served. The constable knew the people and they him. Petty criminals deferred and assisted in investigating serious crime (Emsley, 2009; McLaughlin, 2007). Policing as a symbol of the consensual society is important because it feeds into a broader, imagined social history of Britain (Loader and Mulcahy, 2003; Williams, 2011). However, whilst conceptually the 1950s are understood to have been a period with an absence of conflict and disorder, policing was not perhaps the halcyon days that they are portrayed to be. The so-called ‘golden age’ of policing still suffered riots and witnessed a spiralling crime problem (Reiner, 2010; Waddington, 1991). Reported crime rose, there were fears for the erosion of respect in society and a young generation out of control. Some of this was the perennial fear of crime and disorder, but some of it was new with a youthful population who had little direct experience of the World War years, more opportunity and income (Reiner, 2010; Brogden, 1991).

In 1962, a Royal Commission on the Police was formed, to look at the relationship between the police, the public and means of ensuring proper accountability. This was a chance to confront the dilemma facing a police service working on the basis of ‘the law on the streets’, and a public which increasingly was demanding that they stick consistently to the methods of ‘the law in books’ (Williams, 2011, p. 58). What stands out from a study of its history, though, is the way that this opportunity was missed. The members of the Royal Commission, and the crucial posts of chair and deputy, were vetted to make sure they were “reliable” (Rawlings, 2002). The outcome of the Commission was a report about administration and structures of accountability and the 1964 Police Act (1964, c.48) was drawn up. Significantly, it removed elected watch committees, consolidated a national institution of ‘senior’ police officers, increased the power of the Home Secretary and reduced the Police Authorities to the role of “quartermaster” (Williams, 2011). It allowed the Home Office to amalgamate boroughs and counties, a process that eventually produced 43 police forces. Greater centralization accompanied close attention to central control of police training and accreditation. Consequently, the system of British police organization moved further from institutional accountability to the public, towards a more centralized, performance and target focused system with the aim of greater “professionalization” (Williams, 2011). Arguably, this created
opportunity for greater command and control and mutual support between police forces to deal with disorder.

However, the Royal Commission could not transform relations between the police and the public, they continued to be problematic with claims of police repression and racism against sections of communities. According to Williams (2011) the immediate catalyst for most controversy in the 1970s and 1980s was the role of racism in both policing and wider society. When substantial numbers of West Indian immigrants arrived in the U.K. after the Second World War, they congregated in certain areas, which made them susceptible to discrimination and harassment. They felt that the police were of little help to them. Relations deteriorated, until by the 1970s a young generation, which had seen their parents discriminated against came of age in an era of high employment and a policing style which was perceived as harassment (Whitfield, 2004; Williams, 2011). Consequently, a number of disorders occurred between predominantly black youths and the police. Confrontations were often sparked by police raids and heavy-handedness at events such as the Notting Hill carnival (where disorder had occurred in 1976 and 1977) (Waddington, 1992). However, such disorders were not limited to London, with riots breaking out in many inner cities across the country during the 1980s (Bristol, Liverpool, Manchester, Birmingham to name just four). Indeed, it appears that many community disorders of the time went under-reported (Benyon and Solomos, 1987). With rising crime rates, the minority who turned to crime drew police responses aimed at the whole community, which further soured relationships. Lea and Young (1984) described the situation in some areas as ‘military policing’ characterized by:

…policing without the consent of, and with the hostility, active or otherwise, of the community. The community do not support the police because they see them as a socially or politically oppressive force in no way fulfilling any protective functions… the police force under such circumstances will not be in a position to receive the type of information from the community which would enable its activities to be characterised by the principle ‘certainty of detection’. The crucial consequence of this situation is that an important part of police activity will come to constitute the random harassment of the community at large irrespective of involvement in crime. (Lea and Young, 1984, pp.172-173)

It was against this stark backdrop that police operations such as ‘Swamp ’81’ in Brixton 1981 occurred. A police operation aimed at street crime, using stop and search and widespread arrests of suspected persons, it triggered three days of anti-police rioting in the area. Many were shocked at the breakdown in police-community relations. Lord Scarman’s (1981) Inquiry concluded that although the riots could not be condoned, the police needed to make significant changes to the way that they went about their duties (Williams, 2011). However, whilst some improvements were initiated, the breakdown in consensual policing, rising unemployment, deprivation and social unrest unleashed a political imperative from the 1980s onwards to re-create and maintain order and control. In part this could be manifestly
seen in the policing of community disorders and industrial disputes of the 1980s, particularly the miners’ strikes. Reiner (2010) observes that since that time police responses to public disorder developed a tougher edge, taking on a more professionalised, paramilitary face characterised by weapons, technology and specialist equipment. He summarises the situation as one in which “Darth Vader displaced Dixon in riot control tactics” (Reiner, 2010, p. 87). Arguably, most public order policing tactics, training and equipment in the UK have gone largely unchanged since.

**Historical perspectives on crowds and protest**

In examining the foundations and trends in protest and public order policing, it is useful to survey some of the historical and social origins of crowds, how they have been understood and policed over time. One of the first wholesale analyses of crowds in the UK occurred as a study of the food and labour riots of the eighteenth century. Thompson (1970) describes how reactions of the masses to soaring food prices and unemployment up and down England in the eighteenth century led to an interest in group behaviour by historians and politicians of the time. While Thompson recognised the social and political context of disturbances, Beloff (1938, p.75) earlier proposed that these activities were seen as nothing more than “degenerations into mere excuses for crime”. Although historical evidence is scant to support such accusations the idea appeared widespread across western Europe and to some extent still endure today. Stott (2009) provides a detailed and thorough examination of the classical approaches to crowd psychology which have influenced the policing of crowds and public order.

In producing a detailed social history of France, Taine (1876) was among the first to conceive crowds as being irrational and mob-like. Significantly, he proposed that crowds consisted of those of lower intellect who lacked any rationality. At the time he provided a framework for the understanding of crowds that rapidly spread and the idea was given significant momentum through the work of Gustave Le Bon (1895), who proposed a tripartite arrangement to the pathology of crowd psychology. The three themes identified are those of submergence, contagion and suggestibility. Submergence proposes a loss of personal identity in crowd members when they are immersed in a group. Le Bon (1895) asserted that this occurs principally because of the anonymity given to an individual within the context of a large crowd. For Le Bon, this signaled a shift from mere personal psychology to a crowd one, which was homogenous, shared and which lacked individuality. The contagion aspect refers to the unfettered spread of ideas or emotional states within the crowd, similar to how we might understand that an organic disease does, inferring that disorder could somehow be infectious and transmitted. Suggestibility refers to a trance-like state induced by anonymity, which is the
conduit for the contagion to occur. Le Bon suggested that through the dynamic of these three components, homogeneity enables the crowd to act and be influenced as one, particularly by leaders. The inference is that by merely being part of a crowd, individuals lose all sense of self and any personal responsibility. This view of crowds of course includes a de-civilisation concept that see's individuals in a crowd context as somehow degenerative and innately barbaric (Reicher et al, 2004). Le Bon (1895, p.32) pointed to this when he observed “they possess the spontaneity, the violence, the ferocity of primitive beings”. Ideas of social degeneration were certainly fashionable during this period, which may account for its appeal.

Le Bon’s work has since been shown to be decontextualized (particularly by proponents of social identity-based approaches to crowds) in terms of it being isolated from the social and cultural conflicts occurring at the time. Myopically, he failed to detail the real grievances of the people and the potential effect of state authority or police upon the crowd. Reicher et al (2004) state that such a shallow analysis of the contextual elements of group behaviour ultimately leads to an unnecessary pathologisation of crowds. In essence, this means that classical reductionist psychology is unsighted and nonchalant to the prevailing social, ideological and interactional contexts of crowd behaviour. Reicher (2004) considers that policing strategies today still miss opportunities to fully engage and understand the complexity of social identities in crowds, although arguably developments are being made in dialogue-based approaches to the policing of crowds and protest (HMIC, 2009a, HMIC, 2009b, Stott, 2009). These developments are important, and Reicher (2003) explains that failing to engage with social, ideological and interactional levels of crowds excuses the need for police to communicate with the crowd in anything other than unilaterally, if at all. Less communicative policing styles may be differentiated from broadly European ones today that tend to rely on police negotiation and communication with individuals and the crowd (HMIC, 2009a, 2009b, 2011b). Waddington (2007, p.59) asserts that “pacificatory gestures” by the police can promote positive police-public relations, however this is not perhaps without contingencies. An over-reliance on widespread coercive activity can lead the police to deny any responsibility for crowd behaviour, since they come to believe that violence is in the very nature of the group itself. Denial of this nature only serves to validate police repression and the use of escalated force in order to control crowds. In the modern context of protest policing, this adds justification for the use of coercive tactics which in turn can result in creating or heightening perceptions of illegitimacy toward the police (Stott, 2009).

Festinger et al (1952) attempted to establish support for classical psychological reductionism through the theory of deindividuation. It proposes that the level of anonymity given to a person in a crowd works to reduce their self-awareness and decreases their threshold for displaying anti-social behaviour. It follows that this influences their ability to use
or engage in violence. Deindividuation is however derived from a study of adolescent male youths in which anonymity, given in the guise of group membership, increased expressions of anti-social and anti-normative behaviour (Festinger, 1957; Festinger et al, 1952). Originally, it was argued that deindividuation takes place when individuals within a crowd are not scrutinized, thus feeling unaccountable for their actions. The psychological consequence being to lessen internal restraint and increase behaviours that would normally be inhibited. The concept was developed further to include a sense of anonymity induced by heightened arousal, sensory overload, drugs and alcohol use (Zimbardo 1969, Diener et al, 1976). However, analysis of the outcomes of several deindividuation studies indicates that it is erroneous and lacks broad empirical support (Diener, 1980; Postmes and Spears, 1998). The notion that people lose self-awareness cannot be relied upon theoretically or pragmatically in formulating policing approaches to crowds or in understanding protest events. On the contrary, it seems to be the case that individuals retain personal awareness and individual responsibility for their actions (Mcphear, 1991; Madensen and Knutson, 2011).

Classical reductionist views undermine the significance of the situational and interactional levels of crowd behaviour by failing to take account of the influence of the police, other protesters or antecedent attitudes within crowd members. What we see is an inference that crowd members are always potentially violent and dangerous, whether they are cognisant of it or not. Moreover, this putation has influenced the policing of crowds for a long time. The view is, that to some extent it endures in the UK today, despite a desire within the police service to facilitate peaceful protest and adopt less coercive tactics (HMIC, 2009a, 2009b; Stott, 2009). There are signs of change with efforts to increase engagement, facilitate peaceful protest and mitigate the consequences of the use of perceived repressive interventions such as containment (or “kettling”). By no means can sea change be anticipated in the near future, with this would come an entirely different way of configuring crowds and the ways of policing them (Reicher, 2011; Stott, 2011; Stott et al, 2010). The enduring influence of history may be harder to eliminate than by simply discarding old textbooks or vade-mecum. The situation is compounded when the police are faced with contradictory assessments of their ability and performance, such as the perceived failures of the police to deal with the UK student riots 2010 and the August 2011 disorders that led to a dampening effect on earlier G20, 2009 recommendations. Arguably, this has created something of an identity crisis for protest and public order policing in the UK.

**Trends in the management of protest**

Thus far the chapter has discussed some of historical context of the policing of protest and disorder and how crowds have been understood. I will examine in more detail later the
contribution of alternative theoretical approaches to understanding crowds and disorder, but before doing so I will examine observable trends in the management and policing of protest and public order. A close examination of protest and public order policing in the UK since the 1960s reveals certain patterns in policing styles that have emerged. These are in part reflected in global trends and developments that began to gain more detailed academic attention during the 1980s (della porta et al, 2006). Observations of a number of protests in many countries reveal an initial position of repressive policing with a more generalised move toward the concept and practice of negotiated management, that is to say, one based on dialogue with protesters and facilitation of their aims. Latterly, this was to become displaced with a regression to more repressive styles of policing (della Porta and Fillieure, 2004; della Porta and Reiter, 2006b; HMIC, 2009a, 2009b).

The negotiated management policing style saw the police implement regimes based on dialogue with protesters before and during events, which indicated a departure from a reliance of the use of force and coercion, even where acts of civil disobedience might be present. In latter day parlance, this might be described as peaceful, but not necessarily lawful protest activity, the type often seen on the streets and public places of the UK (HMIC, 2009a, 2009b, HMIC, 2011b). It is claimed that negotiated management marked a shift in the dominance of western policing styles that were present during the late 1960s and 1980s which tended to be generally less tolerant and altogether more repressive (della Porta et al, 2006; della Porta, and Reiter, 2006; Waddington, 2007). In a British context, the negotiated management style has been identified in many studies of urban community disorders where a measured policing approach aimed at restoring confidence in the police and re-establishing legitimacy has been commended as the way forward for the policing of protest and disorder (Field, 1982; Hoggett and Stott, 2008: HMIC, 2009a, 2009b; Waddington, 2007). Negotiated management as a policing style can be said to be characterised by respect for the right to protest, a more liberal attitude towards short-term community disruption, reduced tendency to make mass arrests and reluctance by the police to resort to high levels of force to control situations (della Porta et al, 2006; Mcphail et al, 1998). Such descriptors have similarity with previous recommendations and police directives going back to the 1980s and in this sense are nothing new (Waddington, 1994a). Whether negotiated management of protest truly occurs in the literal sense of an equable relationship between police and protesters is debatable, since as Waddington (1994b, p.79) points out “negotiation is not a neutral process” with protest often being managed to a large degree on police terms.

Some commentators note that there has been a consistent move in the past decade or so for police in the West to return to approaches in line with a more punitive and actuarial penology, perhaps reflective of wider practices in the criminal justice sphere of the time.
(Hough, 2007; Noakes et al, 2005; Noakes and Gillham, 2006). The policing intervention of containment (“kettling”) and associated tactics such as cordons (static or moving lines of police officers) have been interpreted as sharing more in common with the escalated force and coercive strategies of previous decades. The evidence for this observation is cited from studies of a series of protests in which political and anti-globalization demonstrations have attracted greater repressive policing (Noakes et al, 2005; Noakes and Gillham, 2006). Further evidence can be found in the policing of G20, 2009 in London and the London Student protests 2010, where a heavy reliance on these tactics appeared to prevail (HMIC, 2011a). In the UK, the development and use of perceived coercive tactics such as containment coincides with this chronology, although the use of containment as a formalised police tactic in the UK is a relative newcomer in the history of public order tactics (ACPO, 2010).

While much of the research cited was conducted in a US context, similar conclusions in support of it can be found in studies of European protests (della Porta and Reiter, 2006b; Waddington and King, 2005). Repressive policing styles are often linked with strategies aimed at nullifying protesters’ objectives and the activities of a minority within protest crowds. However, in consequence they can indiscriminately be directed at larger, homogenous groups who become affected by their mere physical presence alone. Policing interventions forming part of such strategies are characterised by: disruption of the right of assembly; use of intelligence gathering and surveillance methods; removal or arrest of suspected ringleaders; establishment of no protest zones; and the mass detention or containment of protesters without criminal charge (della Porta and Reiter, 2006b; Noakes et al 2005). Policing based on escalated force is commonly underpinned by the notion that large crowds are in some way inherently irrational, dangerous and in need of control (Le Bon, 1895; Reicher, 2003; Schweingruber, 2000; Stott, 2009). This is evident since it gives little, if any priority to the right to peaceful protest, communication between police and protesters is poor and there is frequent illegitimate use of coercive force against what is perceived to be an homogenous horde of protesters (della Porta and Fillieule, 2004; HMIC,2009b; Mcphaul et al, 1998; Stott et al, 2010). Repressive policing manifests in three main types of police strategies: coercive using force to control, contain or disperse protest; persuasive using contacts and communication with protest groups or activists to influence or control; and information strategies using criminal intelligence and information gathering as a preventive measure to identify offenders (della Porta and Reiter, 1998, 2006b).

Coercive and preventive strategies predictably involve large numbers of highly visible, paramilitarised and riot-equipped officers. In a domestic context, this has been evident in disorders of the late 1990s, May Day 2001 demonstrations in London, G8 2005, G20 2009 and Student protests 2010 (HMIC, 2009b; Stott et al, 2010; Waddington, 2007). Notably, in
tactical terms Police Support Units (PSU) in the U.K are highly structured, heavily equipped and controlled by a rigid command structure (ACPO, 2010). A militarily-organised police force can be considered to be more prone to brutality since it implies a hierarchical organisation with ‘blind’ obedience to orders (della Porta and Reiter, 2006a, 2006b). However, perhaps more importantly is the way in which they can be perceived by protesters as heavy-handed and antagonistic serving to shape attitudes of police legitimacy. The significance of the presence and appearance of this type of police resource cannot be underestimated in terms of public perceptions and the presence of feelings of mistrust, fear and trepidation amongst protesters. The danger in light of more recent reviews of disorders in the UK is that it becomes more commonplace (HMIC, 2011a, 2011b). Yet, according to my own empirical research we might recognise that protesters are capable of drawing a distinction between the types of police and tactics used in protest and general police duties and that even benign police tactics such as traffic safety measures aimed at facilitating protest can be misinterpreted.

The wider political setting of protest can exert significant influence over the policing style adopted, this is characterised in the way that power is held by the state and the political imperatives or agenda placed on the police in particular protest scenarios (della Porta and Reiter, 1998; Reiner, 2012; Waddington, 1994b; Waddington, 2007). Latterly, there has been much more emphasis placed on the role of the police as protectors and facilitators of citizens’ rights. Certainly, the zeal with which human rights legislation is driven would indicate so and the way in which it permeates every quarter of policing, not just the public order sphere (Flanagan, 2008). In a liberal democracy we may expect this to be the case and aspire to it normatively, yet the spectre that comes in the shape of the police as the coercive arm of the state is perhaps less openly acknowledged at times (Waddington, 1991, 1994b). In consideration of the political nature of the policing of protest the strategies employed can of course be influenced by the views of government and parliamentary committees, protest groups, news and social media and the prevailing social sensitivities: making the policing of protest “unavoidably political” (Waddington; 2007, p.395) and at times highly contentious. Policing, and in particular the policing of protest and public order is a political activity, Brewer et al (1988, p. 4) emphasise that “nowhere are the police political innocents: to claim otherwise is disingenuous. By focusing on public order, policing is clearly revealed as a political activity”.

All of the above factors may conspire together to influence the policing strategy and protester perceptions of police legitimacy. However, policing practice based solely on persuasive strategies can perhaps be the author of their own demise. Consider, what happens when dialogue and communication between police and protesters cannot or does not occur despite the best efforts of those involved, particularly in cases of those who are disengaged
from the state or its agents? Orde (2011) highlights this type of dilemma in general terms following the 2010 Student Protests in London when he stated:

There are lots of people to talk to, but they need to stand up and lead their people too. If they don’t we must be clear that the people who wish to demonstrate won’t engage, communicate or share what they intend to do with us and so our policing tactics will have to be different….more extreme. (Orde, 2011, p. 30)

The problem here are the assumptions that people want to engage and that without communication the police are somehow obliged to police events to the ‘worst case’ scenario, which by a process of reciprocity can actually serve to heighten tension and the potential for disorder. This can lead to perceptions of police illegitimacy and the withdrawal of cooperation and compliance. However, as I have previously highlighted there are antecedents and contingencies which underpin the construction and shaping of perceptions of police legitimacy. Indeed, it could be argued that those who do choose to engage with the police are a self-selecting group, who in PJ parlance already possess a degree of moral alignment with the police. In the management of protest, they are less problematic for the police since they are likely to hold greater perceptions of legitimacy and be inclined to cooperate.

della Porta and Reiter (1998, p. 20) have previously argued that the very restriction and prohibition of protest is often a factor in “encouraging violent dynamics”. We know that feelings of anger and frustration can be provoked within groups when individuals feel threatened or have their aims blocked by others (Myers et al, 2010; Reicher, 2003). Thus, where the policing strategy involves an over reliance on coercive tactics, with large numbers of police officers present, and is seen as preventing what protesters perceive as their legitimate activity, conflict is viewed as more acceptable and lamentably, all the more likely (della Porta and Reiter,1998; Reicher, 2003; Stott, 2009).

The type of changes seen in police or crowd behaviour during policing interventions have been described as “reciprocal adaptations” that can be caused by memories of ‘atrocities’ committed in the past on both sides (della Porta, 1995, p.40). This demonstrates the distal and proximal nature of the influences that are at work in shaping perceptions of police legitimacy. A combination of these can form a body of protester and police knowledge that directly influences the style of policing and the way that protesters perceive it. Protester perceptions of policing style may inform the framing of protest that can represent existential challenges to the police, acceptance of their tactics and contributes to a reciprocal dynamic between the police and protesters. This body of knowledge exists on three levels, 1) in the immediate context of events where protesters respond to the prevailing policing style at the time, 2) in the preconceived notions brought by both parties, that impact on views about each
other, and 3) in perceptions of police legitimacy that are likely to influence future events and views of policing more broadly. These notions of police legitimacy can endure long after protest events themselves and affect future encounters. A striking example of this was provided by Climate Camp organisers soon after the London, G20 2009 (at which a man died) in an open letter published to the Metropolitan Police:

> On August 17th, you wrote to the Camp for Climate Action requesting further information on the location of our next camp...you say that this is to help with “community liaison” and for you to put a “preplanned and proportionate” policing operation in place. The location is a secret... there’s a simple reason for this: I’m afraid we just don’t trust the Police. Why? Because it seems as though every time we have a protest the police turn up and start hitting people. Look at what happened at G20 that’s not a good way to win people over. (Climate Camp, 20/08/09)

In summary, a view emerges from the literature that the policing of protest across the western world has undergone something of an annular evolution. Whilst certainly not a unanimous one, there is a reliance on the idea that heavy-handed and disproportionate policing contributes to crowd violence and disorder (Waddington and King, 2005; Stott, 2011). In general terms, the 1960s to 1980s were dominated by forms of policing that were considered to be more repressive and based on escalated force. In contrast, it is claimed that from the late 1980s into 1990s there was a desire (with limited success) to move towards the negotiated management of protest, with the period post-1999 being characterised by a return to escalated force and repression, particularly related to political protests. There is a significant body of evidence to commend the above analysis as a broad picture of recent history in the style of protest and public order policing in the UK. A style that can and does influence the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to cooperation and compliance with the police. Understanding how these are constructed and shaped is key to how the police make policy, are trained, plan for and operate in protest and public order situations.

**The paramilitarisation of policing**

A significant debate related to the trends in protest and public order policing is one of paramilitarisation (Jefferson, 1987; Waddington, 1987, 1991; Waddington, 2007). Whilst I do not intend to replay the twists and turns of the arguments in detail here, it is useful to recognise and precis the main points about the paramilitarisation of policing. We should perhaps start with how paramilitary policing might be defined, Jefferson (1990) describes it in the following terms:
...the application of (quasi-) military training, equipment, philosophy and organization to questions of policing (whether under centralised control or not) and a concretely grounded sense of the history and sociology of paramilitarism. (1990, p. 16)

This is differentiated from a more traditional form of policing that is described as:

...lines of bobbies, with arms linked, pushing and shoving against lines of demonstrators...this dominant image neatly captures the essence of the traditional approach to public order policing, namely the bringing together of a number of conventionally uniformed officers to form a relatively static and defensive human shield. (Jefferson, 1990, p. 1)

Whilst some might see this as a quaint and romantic image of the policing of 1960s demonstrations, it serves in highlighting the distinctions between the types of policing in question. Waddington (1987, 1991, 1994) places emphasis on paramilitary policing as having utility in protest and public order situations, in tandem with greater command and control, it being less prone to officers acting as “loose cannons” outside of strategic objectives. He explains that “…it is essential that officers engaged in public order situations are carefully supervised and controlled, for internal controls on behaviour are unlikely to prove reliable” (Waddington, 1991, p. 137). For Waddington (1991), more traditional and less paramilitary policing (without the conditions contained in the definition above) allows individual police officers too much discretion and the ability to run amok in already highly charged situations. Significantly, this might involve indiscriminate use of force and coercion against innocent and guilty alike (Waddington, 2007, p. 28), provoking crowd reactions and diminishing police legitimacy. On this basis, Waddington makes the case for specially trained, equipped, and closely supervised units of officers, operating to strategic aims. The type of tactics particularly related to achieving these aims involve co-ordinated arrest teams (or “snatch squads”), evidence gatherers (EGs) and intelligence operatives (Jefferson, 1990, Waddington, 2007).

However, the paramilitarisation of policing is not without controversy. Jefferson (1990) sets out the case against it, noting that whilst it might appear to professionalise policing, it has an “inherent capacity to make matters worse” by amplifying the prospect of disorder (1990, p.16). Jefferson (1990) notes that there are typically four distinct phases that occur where paramilitary policing is applied; preparation, controlling space, controlling the crowd and clearance.

In the preparation phase (sometimes referred to as standby or waiting time) specialist officers trained and equipped, sit, waiting for action, often “cooped up in vans or police canteens” (Jefferson, 1990, p.84). This standby time serves to be stressful and frustrating while boosting officers’ morale and readiness for action. From the protester point of view such preparation can be interpreted as provocative.
The next phase is concerned with controlling space, dominating areas that the protesters may or may not use, sometimes involving moving people from one area to another. This activity understandably causes resentment, which if misinterpreted by the police only confirms the trouble they were expecting (Waddington, 2007). Having demarcated the use and availability of space, the police become involved in controlling the crowd. If, and often it does, this involves containment (sometimes with the use of force), crowd anger and resentment is said to grow. Jefferson describes this as:

In this situation, with tempers becoming frayed and frustrations mounting, the paramilitary nature of the response – horses, dogs, riot shields and so on – only serves to make matters worse, by seeming to invite the stone-thrower. (Jefferson, 1990, p. 85)

Consequently, a spiral of reciprocal violence is triggered, creating action and reaction in a self-fulfilling prophecy, often aimed at restoring order, relying on highly repressive policing. Following the conflagration of violence and the restoration of some order comes the clearance phase. Most protesters may comply and move on, some feeling resentment and indolence, yet eventually the police will clear an area, only for both to return more determined and better prepared, on subsequent occasions (Jefferson, 1990). The extent to which paramilitary policing contributes to these effects may have dependency on a number of antecedents and contingencies described elsewhere.

Apart from the type of tactics, training, use of equipment and the stages applied in paramilitary policing Jefferson takes issue with the idea of impartial law enforcement, and police discretion. He asserts that the police appeal to the idea that they uphold the law without fear or favour as servants only of the law itself (Jefferson, 1990), whilst a laudable idea this is seen as unrealistic in the following way:

Either way, impartial law enforcement constitutes an impossible mandate...for constables under his [the chief constable’s] command because the necessary prerequisite for impartial law enforcement - clear law activated by a particular complaint – is often simply not applicable to the area of law being enforced. (Jefferson, 1990, p. 47)

Nowhere perhaps is this seen more readily than in the context of a tumultuous crowd in a protest situation, some of whom may be committing a variety of offences among a majority who are not. In the absence of complaint, a lack of evidence or proper identification of suspects the police tendency is to arbitrarily apply their discretion.

One reason why the paramilitarisation of policing is so appealing relates to police concerns about safety and Jefferson (1990) highlights an amusing anecdote about the actual risks of policing as follows "...a police researcher inquiring about police sick days in the Met.
discovered that more working days were lost from falling down ladders while decorating than that it has negative undertones about policing whilst ignoring the key point that it provides for from injuries in the line of duty” (Jefferson, 1990, p. 144).

However, Waddington (1987, 1993) takes issue with a number of the observations and conclusions that Jefferson (1987, 1990) makes about the paramilitarisation of policing. Fundamentally, he disagrees with the terms of the definition applied to paramilitarism, noting “co-ordination through superior command and control. Instead of leaving individual officers to take uncoordinated action…” (Waddington, 1987, p. 38). This approach allows for a more disciplined response to disorderly and violent situations than is possible by traditional policing methods. Further, Jefferson (1987) synonymises paramilitarisation with public order policing per se, when in fact most officers engaged in public order policing tend to be general beat officers with additional training, not members of full-time specialist units. It could be argued that most provincial police forces in the current climate can least afford the luxury of specialist squads, which is one reason that the national Strategic Policing Requirement (SPR) requires minimum numbers of regular, trained officers in each force area and recommends mutual support across areas (HMIC, 2011b, 2014b). Waddington (1987, 1993) notes that by necessity, with such training comes particular equipment, whilst unwelcome it is “…merely defensive [because] police officers are also employees, and it is no more acceptable to expose them to a hazardous working environment without adequate protection” (Waddington, 1993, p. 354).

Whilst acknowledging that there are valid criticisms to be made of specialist squads, Waddington (1993) argues that specialisation, even in the use of force is not necessarily militaristic or a feature of modern day policing. He questions whether it be preferable to have officers deployed in protest and public order situations without the specialist training that might be required (whether it is used or not)? To do so might attract claims of less professionalism. Waddington (1993) concludes that just because officers are trained in the use of force, it does not follow that they will use it.

As to Jefferson’s account of the inevitability and amplification of violence deriving from his four-phased approach. Waddington (1993) draws on his own extensive empirical data to demonstrate that the conditions for amplification, as described by Jefferson (1987, 1990) are normally present in protest situations. However, confrontation, disorder, and violence are quite the exception in reality. Whilst it may be true that the police seek to control space, with planning and preparation it is often achieved by using barriers and “cordoning” off. Waddington (1987) notes that even when space and the crowd are controlled more overtly by a police presence, disorder does not habitually follow. Thus, to claim that “crowd anger will almost certainly
(emphasis added) follow such containment” (Jefferson, 1990, p. 87) is erroneous and misleading. In clearing the street, officers often do so with little or no violence by “simply ushering people along” and even when officers are dressed in overalls, helmets and carrying shields, violence is not a necessary corollary (Waddington, 1993, p. 356). Waddington challenges the assertion that there is a strong correlation (as claimed by Jefferson) between so-called paramilitary police and violent disorder, noting that to claim so requires not only that violence should occur when paramilitary deployments are present, but that it should be avoided when such deployments are absent.

The use of the view from below (that is from the perspective of protesters) in Jefferson’s (1990) examination of protests can be interpreted methodologically as a very selective perspective (Waddington, 1987, 1993). This may be a valid point, I certainly acknowledge the limitations in my own research, yet contend that when dealing with protesters’ perceptions of police legitimacy and their attitudes to compliance and cooperation, it is a necessary and useful heuristic. One that can be supplemented by informed non-participant observation.

The paramilitary debate is one that more broadly continues and while not settled, it none the less offers a useful description of the contribution of policing styles and use of police power in the development of violence during protest. Furthermore, of the influence of judgements about protest policing on perceptions of police legitimacy. Perhaps it is a case of the lesser of two evils since as Waddington (1993, 1995) notes, militarism has always existed, given the ability of state authority to call upon the military for support to its civil powers (Waddington, 1991, p. 155). If we wish to avoid calling upon military support in the policing of disorder and civil disturbance, the police must be adequately trained, equipped and able to deploy at least with a degree of “paramilitarism”.

In summary, this chapter has discussed some of the historical context of policing, examining the policing of protest and order under the watch arrangements and the reforms that came with the new police in 1829. It has highlighted the political and social aspects leading to a move from the use of the military to the civil police in the policing of protest and disorder. The theoretical approaches to crowds and their psychology have been highlighted, together with the tracing of trends and developments in policing styles that have occurred across Europe. A trend that has seen a return, according to some commentators, to repressive paramilitarised policing. The paramilitarisation of policing has been examined in detail and the key points for and against it presented. The following chapter will provide a discussion of the characteristics of protest, how we can understand it contextually and how it is organised. It sets out an operational definition, in order to frame the empirical research and concludes with a critique of specific theories and models that deal with violence and disorder.
Chapter 3

Understanding protest and public disorder

“What is a rebel? A man who says no: but whose refusal does not imply a renunciation...Rebellion cannot exist without the feeling that somewhere, in some way, you are justified”. (Camus, 1953, p.19)

“Protest and resistance give you a feeling that you’re not on your own...like you are part of something”. (Interviewee 4, Students Against Cuts protest)

At the heart of protest lies the belief that something, somewhere is fundamentally wrong, that someone should do something. The protester, whether they view themselves as a “rebel” or not protests not simply to be contrary, that is, just for the sake of saying “no” but has reasons and motivations as diverse as protest events themselves. Seeking to understand how the act of protest is conceived, its manifestations, levels of organisation and coordination is an important, yet often neglected aspect of the theory and practice of protest and public order policing. However, typologising and categorising protesters and protest carries with it limitations. The purpose of this chapter is to establish recognition for a more nuanced understanding of the influences associated with the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and compliance and cooperation, by demonstrating the complexities of protest and its policing

The chapter covers four main topics. First, it draws together ideas about what constitutes protest and social movements, how peoples’ intentions and actions are framed, organised, communicated and acted upon. The discussion explores several types of protest activity and how levels of organisation and coordination can be interpreted. From an array of academic literature, the discussion seeks some defining criteria for protest, that informs the contextual framework for the later empirical research. Secondly, the chapter examines the role of social media in framing protest events, establishing communication networks, and as a means of sharing and mobilising resources. Thirdly, it summarises and critiques explanatory theories and models of public disorder, specifically those broadly called “tinder and spark” explanations of riot and disorder (Waddington, 2007). The origin and development of the ESIM is examined, together with a critical look at its claim about the influence of emerging perceptions of police illegitimacy in the escalation of collective violence (Reicher, 2011; Stott, 2009, Stott, 2011). The chapter concludes by demonstrating the theoretical link between protester attitudes and behaviour, highlighting the importance of context and the conditions under which attitudes can influence behaviour.
Protest and social movements

Protest can be defined as a form of expression of an extraordinary nature, which is intended to accrue some benefit from a political or economic system, such activity is said to occur within the existing political structures (Lipsky, 1968). Opposition is expressly directed at policies or social conditions. However, three observations can be made about Lipsky’s (1968) conception. First, it implies that the political structure facilitates or at least tolerates protest, not so perhaps in oppressive regimes across the world. Secondly, it implies that protest is somehow not a part of everyday activity or the social context, and thirdly that protesters recognise and validate the existing political system. The extraordinary nature to which Lipsky (1968) refers implies that the social and political setting is stable, well-established and features a certain status quo. This echoes the assumption in PJ of the acceptance of authority and a backdrop of social order.

Alternatively, we may view protest nowadays as an ordinary feature of late modern society. That is to say, protest has become part and parcel of contentious politics and a much more common form of citizens expressing support or dissent for the issues that matter to them (Johnston, 2011; Goldstone, 2003). In this sense, protest has perhaps become much more normalised as a social and political activity and not extraordinary at all. Johnston (2011) interprets Lipsky’s (1968) view as being:

…a time when researchers saw protest as extraordinary phenomena. Only occasionally usually under conditions of dissatisfaction, destabilising social change and social psychological influences…would people come together to voice grievances. Unhappy, isolated citizens would gather around a shared grievance or demand and if conditions were right, a social movement would form which could variously be aimed at reform, revolution or personal transformation. (Johnston, 2011, p. 65)

This is typically identified as a collective behaviour approach to protest, which sees the means by which protest is made as something out of the ordinary. In many instances, given the frequency with which protest occurs across such a diverse range of issues today, we might consider it as merely the routine exercise of politics by another means. This is particularly the case in democratic states where the public can seek to influence the policies and direction of international, national and local government mid-term, beyond the rigid timetable of the ballot box (Johnson, 2011).

However, protest can be viewed as a special form of policing context and protesters as “extraordinary” citizens. Any engagement in protest is made on a self-selecting basis, in that protesters choose to participate in it. This is in contrast to many other policing contexts where people do not exercise such choice, such as road traffic stops, stop and search, as a
victim or witness of crime. Protesters thus choose to place themselves in (potential) contact with the police at protest events in ways that are extraordinary to everyday public life. Undoubtedly, there may be a minority of people who are dedicated and frequent activists in protest causes and in one sense we might consider these to be “extraordinary” people, on the basis that they are different from the majority of citizens who do not engage in protests with such frequency (if at all).

Protesters can view the policing of protest as somehow distinct from general day-to-day-policing too, in the way that they perceive police officers and police tactics at protest events. In understanding the nuances associated with the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy, the context and type of policing situation is highly pertinent. Protest engages people (protesters and police alike) doing extraordinary things and ignoring this subtlety leads to generalisation and complacency in our understanding of it. It is a policing context in which the general claims of PJ (Tyler, 1990, 2006) about the route to perceived police legitimacy and compliance and cooperation may carry less efficacy. One where the impact of antecedents and contingencies such as asymmetry (Skogan, 2006, 2012), social distancing and motivational posturing (Braithwaite, 2009, 2010, 2011) and the dialogic nature of police legitimacy (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; Tankebe, 2013) can be magnified. In short, the conditions for perceptions of police legitimacy are not equal in every policing context.

Increasingly, the term social movement society has been applied to the political scene in liberal democracies, in which participation by the masses in protests and demonstrations has become more common place (Johnston, 2011; Meyer and Tarrow, 1998; Opp, 2009). In contrast to societies where protest was the recourse of underprivileged and excluded groups, the argument is that it is now the means to promote various political agendas. Moreover, that because of the diffusion and acceptance of protest as a legitimate activity, many organisations and pressure groups readily resort to using it (Johnston, 2011, p. 66). Indeed, social movements are formed for all sorts of issues, not necessarily political ones. A situation described by Melucci (1989) as the “movementisation” of society. Evidence in support of this in the U.K. is drawn from the considerable increase in the number of protests over recent years, the way in which they have become institutionalised and the increasingly moderate response from state authorities to protest activity (HMIC, 2010a, 2010b, 2012; Johnston, 2011). However, the latter point may be debatable given examples of punitive policing and what some commentators report as a return to more repressive policing styles across democratic countries in western Europe (della Porta et al, 2006; Redekop and Pare, 2011).
The institutionalisation of protest can be viewed as a means by the state to manage political contention, particularly where it originates from groups who are apt to engage in unconventional types of direct action and lack well defined organisation (Peterson, 2006). Institutionalisation in this form is described by Meyer and Tarrow (1998) as:

The routinisation of collective action, such that the challengers and authorities can adhere to a common ‘script’, recognising familiar patterns as well as potentially dangerous deviations; inclusion and marginalisation, whereby challengers willing to adhere to established routines will be granted access to political exchanges in mainstream institutions, while those who refuse can be shut out of conversations through repression or neglect; co-optation, which means that challengers alter their claims and tactics to ones that can be pursued without disrupting the normal practice of politics. (Meyer and Tarrow, 1998, p.21)

This relationship permits protesters to present and pursue their agendas, simultaneously giving the police the opportunity to manage them without direct challenge or confrontation. Examples of this include police negotiation on times, locations, limits on physical numbers, zones for protest, police protection in the face of counter-protest and a certain degree of tolerance to civil disobedience (such as blockades, sit-ins, traffic disruption and occupations) (Meyer and Tarrow, 1998). However, concessions such as these indicate a “scripted” type of encounter between police and protesters, but do little to describe the dynamic, spontaneous situations which often become highly contentious, with a potential for violence and disorder because they depart from the routinisation script.

Protest constitutes certain acts or conditions consisting of: the expression of grievance(s); an inability to ameliorate the situation personally and directly; an objective to highlight said grievance(s); and to bring about some change (Opp, 2009; Turner, 1969). Implicit in this description is the existence of some form of a collective, which is perhaps why many commentaries on protest synonymise it with social movements (abbreviated as SMs) (Opp, 2009). Since this is the case I will summarise below some of the main points concerning SMs and how they are often conceived.

A social movement in broad terms can be described as a collectivity of individuals, however, this would clearly include any social collection of individuals. There appears to be specific criteria that define SMs in terms of their level of organisation, intention and group size (Opp, 2009). Certain authors focus on the organisational aspect of SMs, in terms of the pursuit of common goals or objectives as a defining characteristic of the collective (Opp, 2009; McCarthy and Zald, 1973, 1977), others have appeared to downplay the significance of this aspect and highlight physical numbers of participants as the key feature (Olson, 1965). However, Olson (1965) proposed that the larger a group becomes, the less common good is
achieved, suggesting that there is an optimal, critical mass. It can occur that in very large groups competing agendas arise, with some sub-groups becoming antagonistic to each other. We may argue that the numbers of persons involved is arbitrary, since what difference might five, ten, fifteen or twenty etc. make to a movement as a whole and emphasis on sheer physical numbers does not appear to be widespread in the literature on this topic. Although, interestingly, the British police have used physical numbers to define a protest by referring to the presence of two or more persons (ACPO, 2010). Moreover, British public order legislation applies numerics to certain group activities such as riot, violent disorder and affray (under the Public Order Act 1986).

What appears to unite many explanations of protest is the existence of specific goals and objectives as a defining characteristic of the group(s), whether pre-existing or emergent through a shared social identity, in order to mobilise support or to highlight a particular issue. In commenting on the social psychological features of SM's, Snow and Oliver (1995) extract the following as their defining characteristics:

Change-oriented goals; some degree of organisation; some degree of temporal continuity; and some extra-institutional and institutional activity. (Snow and Oliver, 1995, p.571)

Street demonstrations have been explicitly identified as an example of extra-institutional activity (Opp, 2009; Snow and Oliver, 1995). Arguably, individuals are usually unable to influence the target of their protest alone, hence they form or join a SM, utilising it as a vehicle to do so. The reason for this is that most definitions of SMs in the literature imply joint action as a key ingredient, whether or not individual membership has any longevity beyond the parameters of the protest event itself. There is tacit acceptance and the implication that joint action occurs through the physical presence of individuals rather than more abstract forms of activity (Opp, 2009). However, virtual and e-protest using the internet and social media are complex nascent phenomena, for this reason their use is discussed in more detail below. Whether all SMs use protest is outside the scope of the present study, but certainly, individual protesters use SMs as a means to an end, inasmuch as their activity can be coordinated and collective towards pursuing common goals. The collective nature of such activity is common in much of the literature (Jenkins and Form, 2005; McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Toch, 1965; Zald and Ash, 1966). However, collective action may not be and frequently is not as well organised and coordinated as this implies.

Types of protest

What then specifically qualifies collective behaviour as “protest”? Returning to the earlier criteria set out by Lipsky (1968) and Turner (1969) we can discern four key points, that protest
is 1) an action or behaviour, 2) intended to support or demonstrate dissent for a target or cause, 3) intended to bring about change or exert influence, and 4) that protesters cannot or will not achieve it individually. Protest activity can be said to be regular where it appears to have rules and conventionality, in that it is formalised and often repeated, examples include party political activities, meetings and lobbying (Lipsky, 1968; Turner, 1969). In contrast, marches, picketing, blockades, sit-ins and alike may depict more irregular activity (Opp, 2009). However, this appears to be too simplistic, because some of these activities are de facto, highly organised and often sponsored by political parties and trades union groups, in this sense they already exist within a regulated framework defined by those organisations and thus by definition are ‘regular’.

Unofficial and disorganised protest can occur spontaneously, yet still be aimed at a target, intended to shame, influence or support a wider political agenda. Protest then can be viewed as “more or less organised, legal or illegal, more or less legitimate, violent and non-violent and so on” (Opp, 2009, p. 38). This description provides a broad dichotomy, but in many instances, protesters do not categorise themselves in a well-defined and polarised fashion. The reality may be much more diffuse and consist of many sub-groups within the wider collective. An awareness of this is critical to understanding the nuances of protests and their policing, based on the motives, intent, attitudes and beliefs of the crowd (Reicher et al, 2004, 2007). This is why it is important to account for the range of factors upon which perceptions of police legitimacy are constructed and shaped.

A coalition approach to protest provides for coordinated activity, by a network arrangement that mobilises protesters and takes in a wide range of interest groups who would not normally organise together (Peterson, 2006). A particular feature of the coalition approach is its temporary nature, protesters often only coming together for a defined event or objective and dissolving just as quickly (Peterson, 2006). This resonates with Snow and Oliver’s (1995) observations of the temporal nature of social movements. The lack of formal organisation is explained further by Peterson (2006) as being one in which:

…rainbow coalitions join together, a temporary and loosely knit array of organisations and action groups within particular countries, as well as like-minded groups and organisations across borders in a communication network coordinated through internet channels...what distinguishes this [coalition] is the lack of controlling elements. (Peterson, 2006, p.46)

However, let us not confuse less organisation with a lack of coordination. While the coalition approach might not have defined overall leadership and a distinct, single leader is rarely identified, it brings together a number of key players through coordinated communication. Indeed, my own empirical data suggest the coordination of protest activities
or assumptions of support between what might appear *prima facie* to be disparate groups. Such communication often occurs in dynamic protest situations through the use of social media. For more recent examples of how protest events can be coordinated we may look to the use of social media before, during and after the UK August riots 2011 (House of Commons, 2011; Roberts et al, 2011). However, to conclude that social media is in some way to “blame” for causing public disorder is not borne out by the evidence (RCVP, 2012).

The fluid nature of this type of coordination can be problematic for the police who often only differentiate two groups, nonviolent or violent, preferring defined leadership and organised groups with whom they can readily engage, who play to the script of institutionalised protest. The ESIM approach to crowds posits that perceived group membership and perceptions of the police are highly significant factors in this circumstance that will influence how protest events unfold (Stott, 2009). According to this analysis the extent to which individuals relate to groups or sub-groups can be dictated by the course of events and the manner in which protesters and the police categorise themselves and each other. This emphasises the ESIM’s reliance on the proximal aspects of police/protester contact, rather than on the existence of pre-existing notions of police legitimacy.

**Organised and disorganised protest**

A simple dichotomy has been suggested elsewhere which provides for two types of protest, organised and disorganised (Hylander and Granström, 2011). These terms are not synonymous with regular and irregular, the organised type appears to capture elements of the coalition approach set out above. The disorganised type is not always construed as protest at all, but rather more criminal, opportunistic behaviour and is discussed below. Four types of organised protest have been identified from observation and analysis of several nationalist demonstrations: leader-governed, rule-governed, goal-governed, and idea-governed (Hylander and Granström, 2011).

Leader-governed protest is typically characterised by the presence of a defined leader, often identified prior to the event(s), their leadership may be self-declared or group assigned. Commonly, the leader will deal with any legal and procedural aspects of the protest such as negotiating and gaining authorisation from the police or state authority. This does not necessarily imply or guarantee any control over the participants and their behaviour, but the police might anticipate being able to exercise a degree of vicarious control over the event and participants via the leader. However, it is worth noting that this may have more to do with how the protesters perceive the legitimacy of their own leadership rather than perceptions of the
authority of the police. Notwithstanding, less conflict appears to occur where there is both leader-focus and participant assent for it (Hylander and Granström, 2011).

Rule-governed protest denotes an organised event insofar as it has structure and systems in place, such as defined protester roles and responsibilities for the event or its issues. It has leadership (singular or shared) and boundaries created by the participants or the leadership on their behalf. Hylander and Granström (2011) note that often those involved in this type of protest have previous protest experience, and tacit or explicit frameworks define what is deemed as acceptable or unacceptable behaviour. The presence of stewards, and shared, expected group norms that may be published or communicated are also features of this type of protest.

Goal-governed protest is generally less well defined by organisation and coherent groups, instead tending to consist of small sub-groups formed for a particular purpose or objective and it typically lacks prior notification to the authorities. Examples of goal-governed protest groups are described as:

…project organisations, the group exists for as long as the project…typically it has a clear goal, for example to perform a sit-in, demonstration or trainstopping. (Hylander and Granström, 2011, p.78)

The detail and means of the action may not be widely communicated to the participants, even before the event. Notably, the protest may rely on a degree of civil disobedience, but not overt or unilateral violence. This is in contrast to the coalition approach described above, that relies on widespread communication for disparate leaders and participants to be coordinated for the protest to achieve its goals (Peterson, 2006). Significantly, the conduct and outcome of goal-governed protest can be influenced by how the police react to it or are perceived as doing so by protesters, whether they can or do facilitate the goals of the protesters, police categorisation of protesters and their intentions and vice versa. This can be described as follows:

The police can overlook offences like an unannounced sit in but not the destruction of tools or buildings. The protesters expect the police to do their job and move the protesters or block them from entering and they expect to take their punishment. The police may trust the protesters to be non-violent. (Hylander and Granström, 2011, p.79)

Such a reciprocal relationship echoes the more scripted approach to routinised protest that we have discussed above. However, where each party goes beyond the tacit script, goal-governed protest is likely to develop into conflict and disorder.

Idea-governed protest refers to sub-groups with no defined structure or leadership. A key feature of this type is self-determination in terms of its activities, goals and meaning. The
act of protest is usually spontaneous and dynamic with an anarchic undercurrent or one explicitly stated as such. Individual freedom of expression and rejection of any structure, leadership and authority is actively promoted that can be described as:

Participants have a more or less anarchist ideology. They agree on a common set of principles but each and every individual speaks for themselves and not on behalf of any group. Even if most would wish to demonstrate peacefully they do not take responsibility for what other protesters do. [The] attitudes toward violence are leaving it to each individual to decide what violence is necessary. (Hylander and Granström, 2011, p.79)

The type of ideology espoused here means that there is a variety of individual attitudes ranging from those who would never resort to the use of violence, those who would do so to protect themselves, to those who believe that either the protest cause itself justifies violent struggle or in order to subvert the existence of the state and its authority. These authors highlight that idea-governed protest is often accompanied by music, use of vehicles, dancing, drama, community food provisions and street “partying” in the face of authorities (Hylander and Granström, 2011). This spontaneous and potentially chaotic scene is difficult for the police in terms of how they categorise and manage the group(s), is it a bona fide gathering or a serious public disturbance? Furthermore, how the police and protesters ‘read’ the script of protest, categorise and react to each other influences the outcome. However, problems arise with the term “anarchist” where it is used to categorise types of protest or protester because there are many forms of anarchism and anarchist protesters, making the terminology and what it tries to portray misleading (Dupuis-Der, 2014).

It is arguable whether goal-oriented and idea-governed protest can be classified as typically organised. The key features are identified as a lack of coordination, less communication with authorities, and the encouragement of autonomous sometimes anarchic behaviour that implies de facto, less formal organisation. The coalition approach to protest iterates the coordination associated with different interest groups, who come together for a common purpose. This demonstrates that a lack of organisation does not always equate to less coordination in protest.

Disorganised protest has been described by Hylander and Granström (2011, pp.80-81) as consisting of “provocateurs and thrill seekers” who represent a small group of relatively hardcore individuals, bystanders and opportunists who do not share the objectives of the wider group or protest movement. Police and protesters often agree that this group does exist and yet they may not define themselves as such. The presence of this group is stereotypically credited with the emergence of violence and criminal activity. Certainly, the police and protesters appear to anticipate their presence and where violence erupts usually assign
responsibility to them. Conversely, where events pass peacefully and without incident the police may conclude that this group were either not present or "policed" out (Granström et al, 2005). However, violence and conflict may occur as a direct result of police actions and categorisation of protesters in those terms (Granström, 2008; Hylander and Granström, 2011). Nonetheless, there is evidence that some protesters do see the presence of provocateurs as disruptive and shifting attention away from the objectives of protest itself. Meyer and Tarrow (1998) explain:

Putting half a million people on the streets for an orderly demonstration may push policies in activists' directions more than the dramatic and disruptive efforts of a few militants who firebomb or turn over cars. (Meyer and Tarrow, 1998, p.24)

In policing terms this seems encouraging, since it implies that the police can act specifically against a small element and accrue legitimacy in the eyes of the wider group who distance themselves from them. However, others might propose that the activities of provocateurs are not protest at all, inasmuch as they are merely opportunities or excuses for criminal behaviour unrelated to the true purpose of the protest. Evidence in support of this can be drawn from the multitude of offences and actions displayed in the UK August riots and looting, 2011 (RCVP, 2012). While many were viewed and expressed as legitimate, objective and goal-oriented, some were reported as little more than gratuitous criminality (RCVP, 2012). The report produced by the Riots, Communities and Victims Panel (2012) provided profiles of protesters. Many who engaged in these events were found to be organised criminals, violent aggressors, opportunists and spectators who looted and committed acts of violence against the public, police and property unrelated to any social and political grievances. While certain commentators interpreted these actions differently, as being made on social identity bases (Reicher and Stott, 2011), the evidence lends more credence to the idea that many were motivated by criminality (HMIC, 2011b). However, this raises the point about whether violence can ever be viewed as an act of protest?

**Violence as protest**

There is a view that frames the use of violence as an act of protest. For many its use is seen merely as criminal behaviour, yet others describe it as part and parcel of contentious politics expressed across a spectrum of protest activity (Tilly, 2003, 2006; Waddington, 1994b). Tilly (2003) highlights that often this occurs in relation to the power dynamic that exists between protesters and those in authority, where a distinction is made between violence and force. Tilly explains this as follows:
Rulers, police, philosophers, and historians often distinguish between force and violence. Force might include legitimate self-defense but not unprovoked aggression. Violence refers to damage that does not enjoy legal protection...a large share of the collective violence in the episodes that people call riots, rebellions, or revolutions directly involves governmental agents as purveyors or objects of damage. (Tilly, 2003, pp. 27-28)

In the usual course of protest events, the police often lay claim to the use of force, usually with legal protection or justification. However, protesters find it much harder, if not impossible to do so. There are clearly circumstances where state endorsed use of force is violence, and protester violence is force used in the face of provocation (Bunyan, 1976; Tilly, 2003; Waddington, 2007). It is not so easy to dismiss protesters use of violence as ipso facto criminal activity. In addition, protester use of violence is usually directed at targets of symbolic value. What Tilly (2003) highlights is that the variable nature of force and violence, depending on the contexts in which they occur, are deserving of a more sophisticated level of analysis.

In the extreme, as a means of overthrowing an oppressive regime, it seems unlikely that change would come about without resort to forceful, violent means. In more liberal democracies we might expect violence to achieve much less and play into the hands of critics and conservative commentators (Meyer and Tarrow, 1998; Opp, 2009). However, the threat of violence is a different matter. Indeed, the inference or possibility that violence might be resorted to, can sometimes mobilise wider support and attract attention for protest causes (Waddington, 1994a, 1994b). Arguably, some protesters identify that the use of violence or its threat can be a powerful tool of expression and posturing, with a recognition that a minority of protester(s) will use or support violence. For the police this is problematic since dealing with outbreaks of violence requires careful consideration. At stake is public opinion if the police do not intervene and public safety where passers-by or counter-protesters are affected. Police intervention brings its own challenges, such as inappropriate handling of protesters or an inability to deal with violence (due to numbers). Both carry a risk of exacerbating the situation or of injury to police, public and protesters alike with the wider consequences signalling a breakdown of social order.

In summary, protest defies a unanimous and homogeneous definition. The presence of terms such as SM and protest group occlude the picture further. Opp (2009) summarises certain defining criteria from the literature:

We define protest as joint action of individuals aimed at achieving their goal by influencing decisions of a target. A protest group is defined as a collectivity of actors who want to achieve their shared goal by influencing the decisions of a target. A social movement is a type of protest group with several distinguishing characteristics such as size and the degree of organisation. (Opp, 2009, p. 44)
As descriptive and critical as many accounts of the policing of protest are, few if any provide reflection on what protest actually means in the research context. Taking a more parsimonious approach to the literature, I rely on a definition of protest to apply to my empirical research as follows:

*A protest is a regular or irregular event comprising collective behaviour created by the actions of individuals, intended to achieve shared or personal objective(s) by influencing a target or targets.*

As an operational definition it allows for actions to be wide-ranging as long as they are driven by the objectives of a collective. They may be legal or illegal, violent or peaceful, regular or irregular (in whether they are formally organised or spontaneously coordinated) and part of a wider SM or not. In this definition, the target may be an individual, the state or something less tangible (in terms of a policy, opposing ideology or social situation). It does not include violence which is not in support or pursuance of the stated goals or intentions of the collective, considering these to be individual acts of offending unrelated to the protest itself. However, it is accepted that the ethical considerations for the present work, arising from the researcher’s occupation as a police officer, influence the extent to which inquiry can take all of these situations into account.

Thus far, the chapter has outlined and discussed the notion of protest and some key features of social movements as they relate to protest activity. Levels of organisation and coordination have been identified and the way in which protest activity is categorised. We have seen that while the breadth and depth vary in many conceptions of the term ‘protest’, little if any consensus exists about its meaning. Instead, we are provided with something of a general rubric under which common characteristics emerge. What can we learn from reflecting on types of protest and social movements? In short, it serves to demonstrate the sheer complexities of protest contexts and their policing, underlining precisely why we need to understand the nuances associated with the construction and shaping of perceptions of police legitimacy.

The policing of protest is especially challenging, due to the very nature of protest itself, sometimes designed to disrupt, at times violent, carrying the element of surprise and with the risk of the police being de-legitimised (Waddington, 1991, 1994b). Therefore, we might consider that the policing of protest is sufficiently qualitatively different from other forms of general policing activity.
The use of social media in protest

Internet-based and social media phenomena are much more recent, yet highly influential additions to the world of protest. They are discussed here because it is apparent that they are used extensively in the framing of protest and for communicating narratives about the police and policing of protests. The use of social media by protest groups was made clear during the empirical research (see chapter six).

During the mid to late 2000s social media technology and its use erupted due in part to the technological advances in hardware and broadband internet. The contribution of social and economic factors such as affordable technology, the fashionable status of social media to a younger, technically “savvy” generation and the development of software has cemented social media use on a worldwide level (Howard et al, 2011). In terms of policing, protesters’ use of social media to promote narratives and potentially mobilise people to action is less problematic than the actual physical existence and actions of the group once and if the virtual becomes realised as protest behaviour. The reasons for this come from a situation where the police can just as equally access, monitor and contribute to social media, and that there is insufficient evidence that an online community will manifest as protest in the real world. Thus, the questions for policing become those of what constitutes social media, what contribution does it actually make to protest and how should policing make use of it?

Social media are broadly defined as social instruments of communication that utilise public communication networks, most notably the internet (Dewing, 2010). The introduction of Web 2.0 technology enabled not just the publication of information, but interaction and the ability to contribute directly to it in real time (Dewing, 2010). In using social media, protest organisers and protesters can publish and exchange photographs, moving images, news stories, share opinions and participate in discussion about protest activity and policing responses. Hosted via a number of websites and mobile applications, commonly used social media are, web logs (otherwise termed “blogs”), collective websites that can be modified by participants (often referred to as a wiki), social network sites which allow people to publish a profile, adopt lists of other users and interact with them. Micro-blogging services such as Twitter allow the publishing and sharing of updates, and media sharing sites enable the distribution of video footage and photographs (such as YouTube, Pinterest and Instagram) (Dewing, 2010).

Protests across the world, involving the mobilisation of vast amounts of people have relied significantly on the use of social media to communicate messages and organise activities (Shirky, 2011). The coordinating power of social media is clearly demonstrated in a number of accounts of protest activities such as anti-religion protests in India, education
protests in Chile, South Korean food protests and the wave of Arab Spring uprisings from 2009 onwards (Baker, 2012; Howard and Hussain, 2011; Khamis and Vaughn, 2011; Segerberg and Bennett, 2011; Tufekci and Wilson, 2012). The concurrent expansion in the availability and use of social media and levels of protest activity across the world lends weight to the idea that the two may be related (Valenzuela, 2013). Valenzuela (2013) claims that various research contexts support the notion that people engaging in protests commonly use social media. So far, research suggests multiform ways in which social media impact on activism (Chadwick and Howard, 2008; Valenzuela, 2013). The main influences range from the provision of information to enable mobilisation, coordination of activities such as demonstrations and the exchange of news or narratives about political causes and events. Whether certain social media serve to influence particular types of protest groups or activities is less well known. However, the use of a particular form of social media may be influenced by ideological preferences of the group. As an example, some anarchist and anti-establishment groups eschew the mainstream press and most commonly use the Indymedia platform as a means to report on protest events and activity (HMIC, 2011b).

Information and its communication is key to mobilising participation in protest events on a number of levels. Logistical information needs to be spread concerning locations, times and potential contact information and tactically, organisers may wish to share the types of protest activity that will be engaged in, tolerated and supported (Lemert, 1981). It is highly unlikely that this type of information will be made available through mainstream media outlets. Social media enable group collaboration and mobilisation through the formation of activist networks and support the creation and maintenance of collective identities. The latter point underlines the pivotal function of social networks in constructing social identities supportive of protest action and behaviours (Breur, 2012). This is relevant when considering the ESIM approach to protest policing since it relies on the assumption of an emerging identity as a consequence of treatment at the hands of the police. However, such identities are clearly capable of forming outside of the immediate policing context. My own empirical research highlights that narratives about policing and protest issues are created, communicated, and play a role in constructing and shaping protester perceptions of police legitimacy (see chapter six).

Specific studies relating to individual participation report a positive association between the use of social media and protest activity (Papacharissi, 2010). One explanation for this relates to the formation and expression of social identity. According to Valenzuela (2013) group identity in political activism is promoted by intra-group feedback, peer acceptance and reinforcement of group norms which are enabled through social media. Interactive, information hubs commonly seen in the form of newsfeeds allow the rapid and
sustained dissemination of narratives about protest activities and causes, which are accessed on a self-selecting basis. However, the reasons behind the association between social media use and actual physical participation in protest are not entirely clear and the possibility of a causal relationship is “underwhelming” (Breur, 2012, p.1).

What can be extrapolated is that social media certainly informs participation in protest on at least three levels. First, in creating a virtual space for the association of ideas and expression with like-minded or related individuals. Secondly, by acting as a mechanism for disseminating information to mobilise and share resources. Thirdly, in becoming a source of pre and within event news, narratives and information. These levels inform the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of policing and are reinforced by research that indicates the strength of psychological and attitudinal factors in feeding social media content and how people use it (Breur, 2012; Shirky, 2011). Factors such as anger, fear, sense of grievance or outrage can motivate participation and are capable of being communicated and informed by social media.

Politically motivated protest groups rely heavily on social media as the means to promote ideology and narratives as a coordinating tool for protest activity (Shirky, 2011). The development of narratives about the protest cause is essential to establishing broad support, particularly where protest is aimed at state authority or its agents, and where political positions are being adopted. Crucially, the mainstream press or media may not always reflect what organisers or participants consider to be a desirable representation of events or facts (McLeod, 2010). There can be exceptions to this, since research following the English riots of August 2011 highlighted that mainstream news media were a significant point of reference for rioters and bystanders, above and beyond social media (RCVP, 2012). Nevertheless, a broad evidence base demonstrates that narratives are constructed and communicated via social media to provide participants with knowledge and information prior to events or as they unfold (Breur, 2012; Norris, 2000; Tufekci and Wilson, 2012; Segerberg and Bennett, 2011; Shah et al, 2005).

However, it is worth acknowledging that even the public digital space in which social media exist can be occupied or dominated by a “digital elite” capable of shaping the origin and direction of the information being communicated (Breur, 2012, p.1). It appears to be something of a myth that social media content related to protest and mobilisation is a socially created smorgasbord of thoughts, opinions, facts, images and news. Poell and Van Dijck (2015) demonstrate that digital leadership plays a role in creating and shaping the content held on social media platforms. In a digital sense these act as “connective leaders” who steer the content, discussion and sharing of information as page administrators, or through the process
of re-tweeting and trending discussion threads (Poell and Borra, 2011; Poell and Van Dijck, 2015). It would appear that many users are less well informed about this technocratic aspect to social media.

In summary, there are reasons to conclude that people involved in protest do use social media to a considerable extent, but not necessarily that social media predicts or increases protest behaviour in the physical world. While some evidence suggests the use of social media can be predictive of self-reported attendance levels at demonstrations, this is by no means ubiquitously reported. Valenzuela (2013, p. 935) interprets social media more as “a tool for, rather than a cause of action”. The three roles of social media in protest appear to be networking, a mobilising agent, and as the means to construct and communicate narratives. Whilst social media and their role in protest is a phenomenon that changes with advances in the technology available, there are a number of theories and models that seek to explain protest behaviour and disorder. A selection of these are discussed below.

Theories and models of protest and public disorder

A number of theories and models attempt to explain the development of violence and disorder at protests. We have seen in the earlier discussion that PJ and the ESIM assume that violence and disorder stem from a failure of policing to create perceptions of police legitimacy. Whilst not intended as an exhaustive compendium, the following discussion focuses on those that appear particularly relevant to my field of inquiry. However, it is worth emphasising that the thesis is primarily concerned with police legitimacy and not with explaining the causes and development of violence and disorder. The aim of critically analysing specific theories here is to highlight that the CDM (see chapter six) is distinctly different from models that rely on the “tinder and spark” thesis. The discussion covers five, related theories and explanations of disorder and riots, 1) the theory of collective behaviour (Smelser, 1962), 2) the model of riot dynamics (Hundley, 1968), 3) the stage theory of riot process (Spiegel, 1969), 4) the “tinder and spark” explanation of riot causality (Benyon, 1987) and 5) the Flashpoints model of disorder (Waddington et al, 1987). The Flashpoints model draws upon the other four approaches and is therefore discussed in greater detail.

The theory of collective behaviour

In a US context, Smelser (1962) made an ambitious, sociologically-based attempt to explain all forms of collective behaviour covering cultural fashions, religious revivals, political and economic movements, mob lynchings, protest and race riots. The theory highlights structural and contextual elements together with a precipitating (or “spark”) factor in collective behaviour. According to Waddington (2007) it is based on the notion that hostile behaviour tends to
involve groups that are deviant (often the young, unemployed or migrant). In the context of disorder, a series of six determining factors are identified, 1) structural conduciveness, 2) structural strain, 3) the growth and spread of generalised hostile beliefs, 4) a precipitating factor, 5) mobilisation of actors and 6) social control.

Smelser (1962) posited that all of these factors need to converge, yet according to Waddington (2007) the combined effect of two are seen as sufficient to trigger an outburst of disorder. The first, the precipitating factor, is defined as “incidents, rumours, sudden threats or deprivations which amplify an existing, widespread belief” (Waddington, 2007, p. 41). The second, the mobilisation of actors to action requires leadership and communication. The extent to which disorder spreads is dependent on the social control asserted by the police (Smelser, 1962). Smelser (1962, p. 267) proposes that to deal with disorder the police should: interrupt communication and the spread of beliefs; disrupt leadership to confound mobilisation; and take an unconditional attitude in dealing with violence. The efficacy of the theory in adequately explaining public disorder is challenged by Waddington (2007) on a number of levels including: that it is wrong to view rioters as deviant and disorder as irrational; the theory takes little if any account of cultural differences and historical relations between rioters and the police; that the police interventions suggested may escalate disorder rather than reduce it (Waddington, 1992; Waddington, 2007; Waddington et al, 1989). Smelser’s model might be better seen in its cultural and historical setting to understand its appeal and significance at the time.

The model of riot dynamics

Hundley (1968) may be viewed as building on Smelser’s theory with his explanatory account of the dynamics of riots in the US, relying on data from a study of witnesses to urban riots he identifies three elements to disorder and rioting. First, the preceding conditions such as inequality or deprivation, a lack of avenues to address grievances and shared views that rioting is necessary. Secondly, immediate conditions such as communication of grievance and rumour together with a triggering event that epitomises the grievance(s). Thirdly, internal dynamics such as the rioters gathering together, mobilisation and leadership (Hundley, 1968). The presence or absence of police activity when these three elements converge is seen as pivotal together with rioter views of police legitimacy to the development of disorder. In short, where police actions are viewed as legitimate (note that no defining criteria are given for what legitimacy means in this context) then violence is unlikely, even where police numbers are few. There are two scenarios according to this model wherein disorder occurs. First, where acts of incivility are encountered by potential rioters, regardless of police numbers (Hundley, 1968, Waddington, 2007), the point here is that it is the perception that the police are asserting
dominance in the situation that triggers the disorder. Second, where the police are seen as ineffective, lacking appropriate control of the situation and allow “deviant behaviour to go unpunished” (Waddington, 2007, p.43). Hundley (1968) claims that at this stage, even if the police decide to withdraw, disorder will continue and the only way to resolve it is by force of numbers. Given its particular focus on specific “ghetto riots”, Hundley’s model of the dynamics of disorder receives little consensus today, yet it carries the notion of a triggering event often shared by other approaches.

**The stage theory of riot process**

This explanation for the development of riots is based on Spiegel’s (1969) study of race riots in the US. The premise is that riots occur due to an underlying and antecedent belief system that one section of society is being treated or “valued” less (Spiegel, 1969, p. 120; Waddington, 2007). In Spiegel’s analysis this is principally along racial lines with black residents feeling that they and their grievances are less valued by the authorities than white ones. However, disparity occurs within black communities with so-called moderate members being valued more than dissenting or militant ones (Waddington, 2007). According to Spiegel (1969) a riot occurs as rumour of particular injustice circulates, comprising four stages. The first is a trigger or precipitating incident by which the rioter’s underlying belief system is substantiated. Spiegel (1969, p. 120) describes it as “a concrete illustration of the beliefs”. An example of a trigger might be a police shooting or an act of police brutality.

The second stage is a confrontation between the police and potential rioters usually based in the street, where specific individuals verbalise community resentments and attempt to rally support behind them. According to Waddington (2007) this stage relies on the notion of contagion for the resentment and hostilities to spread. The response of authority to the demands of the crowd are said to give ebb and flow to the hostility, where a “genuine readiness to listen and resolve complaints” (Spiegel, 1969, p. 123) is likely to result in it subsiding. However, should this fail, disorder enters a third stage, the roman holiday where disorder spreads outwards, in isolated pockets away from the original confrontation. Usually involving younger males, violence is directed at specific targets (often along racial divides) with what Spiegel refers to as “angry intoxication indistinguishable from glee” (1969, p. 123). Police activity at this stage dictates whether the riot enters the fourth state of siege. Whilst not qualifying precisely what under or over-policing is, Spiegel notes that, too little allows rioters licence to literally “run riot”, while too much brutality at the wrong time exacerbates the situation. Spiegel (1969) summarises the position as one in which:
...the police must endeavour to strike an effective balance: they should strive to be firm but discriminating in their actions from the outset, making arrests selectively and without unnecessary use of force. (Spiegel, 1969, p. 122)

The particular context of the research underpinning this model and its content shares much in common with Hundley (1968). While some parallels can be drawn to 21st century events in the US and UK concerning police shootings and brutality (particularly involving black and minority ethnic people), the model’s reliance on principles founded by Le Bon’s (1895) study of crowds and classical psychological reductionism render it anachronistic.

The “tinder and spark” explanation of riot causality

While the “tinder and spark” explanation encompasses more of a collection of ways to interpret British urban riots in the 1980s, it uses the idea of background conditions that are somehow ignited to become disorder (Waddington, 2007). Since it bears much in common with those discussed previously, I devote less space to it here. Benyon (1987, p. 34) summarises specific, related background conditions (the tinder) to riots consisting of: race discrimination and disadvantage, material deprivation, unemployment, exclusion and powerlessness, and hostility to and mistrust of the police. The latter condition appears specifically related to repressive stop-and-search and perceived police harassment. In any case, a trigger event (the spark) is necessary to ignite disorder, usually involving an encounter between the police and black people (Benyon, 1987). Waddington (2007) acknowledges that these background conditions provide a useful framework for understanding riots, but he adds that additional variables can be identified, specific to a British context. Waddington (2007) notes that:

British studies also highlight the importance of cultural differences between the police and African-Caribbean youths, an ideological climate encouraging hostility, and the particular dynamics and locations of daily interactions acting as precursors to the [British] riots. (Waddington, 2007, p. 46)

These additional variables, Benyon’s (1987) background conditions and the paramilitary policing of the 1980s are deemed responsible by some authors for the British urban riots of the time (Lea and Young, 1993).

The Flashpoints model of disorder

Waddington et al (1989) took inspiration from the earlier work of those theorists outlined above to develop the Flashpoints model of disorder. Waddington (2007) explains the purpose in doing so as being:

The main objective of the [Flashpoints] model was to incorporate relevant variables into a general framework for explaining the circumstances in which disorder (emphasis added) is likely to break out or, alternatively fail to ignite. (Waddington, 2007, p. 49)
The model provides a multi-levelled analytic framework for explaining the causes and triggers of public disorder, as such it does not examine or model the construction and shaping of police legitimacy. The Flashpoints model is predominantly a sociologically-based one originally consisting of six interdependent levels: structural, political/ideological, cultural, contextual, situational, and interactional (Waddington, 2007, p. 49). Each level is discussed below.

The structural level accounts for factors such as material deprivation, social and political exclusion and lack of opportunity and the extent to which they can be changed through the prevailing social and political structures. These are seen as “underlying [the] collective grievances and resentment in society” (Waddington, 2007, p. 49). Accordingly, conflict is said to occur if groups are not able to improve their situation (Waddington et al, 1989), two observations can be made concerning this level. First, the material inequalities relate to specific notions of “class, gender and ethnicity” (Waddington et al, 1989, p. 158). Secondly, it involves what Waddington identifies as “ideological alienation from the state” (Waddington, 2007, p. 49). Thus, according to Waddington et al (1989) groups need not be personally affected by material inequality to have an ideological alienation from the state. Waddington et al (1989) explain that:

Groups whose material situation is not disadvantaged may feel and ideological alienation (emphasis in original) from the state. Students and nuclear disarmer who are not personally victims of inequality may feel that the state is committed to activities that they find morally repugnant. Thus, whether the initial grievance is material or ideological, what is crucial is the group’s perception of its relationship to the state (emphasis in original) and its front-line representatives, the police force. (Waddington et al, 1989, p. 160)

The structural level appears then to encompass different elements within it, those of moral values, alignment with the state and authority and political views occurring at personal and group levels.

The political/ideological level deals with the way that the groups demands are seen and dealt with by key institutions. The terms political and ideological are being applied here by reference to “key political and ideological institutions” (Waddington et al, 1989, p. 160), such as politicians, the police, media and judiciary. Waddington et al (1989) emphasise that the degree of political power that a group feels it has, impacts on whether it will be likely to resort to using violence in furthering its claims:

The experience of protestors of political marginalization and ideological vilification may lessen their resistance to violence. One consideration is whether violence is culturally endorsed [by the group]. (Waddington et al, 1989, p. 161)

An additional consequence of vilification by the authorities is posited as not only fueling protester resentments, but somehow encourages police repression (Waddington, 2007).
However, the process of how and why police repression follows is unclear in the Flashpoints model.

The *cultural* level deals with protesters definitions of themselves and others, usually informed by culture and sub-culture. The term "cultural" is defined by Waddington et al (1989) as being:

…all the ways in which groups of people understand the social world and their place within it, their definitions of the rules which do or should govern behaviour and how they define themselves and other social groups. (Waddington et al, 1989, p. 162)

This level appears to share similarity with the ESIM approach to crowds (Stott, 2009), inasmuch as it highlights the creation of in and out-groups: implying rules, norms and stereotypes based on the situation and interpretations of it. However, the focus of Flashpoints is on the relationship between culture and violence. Waddington et al (1989) emphasise this in the following terms:

Participants in a potentially conflictual situation can still come to a compromise and accommodate each other’s objectives. It is possible for the police and pickets to evolve a set of agreed norms about what is acceptable on a picket line, a good clean shove being permissible whereas throwing bricks is not. (Waddington et al, 1989, p. 163)

However, we should note that whether such agreement occurs is contingent on the other interdependent levels of the flashpoints model.

The *contextual* level captures the potential for disorder that derives from communication processes occurring in the lead up to a protest event. Principally, according to Waddington (2007, p. 50) these are viewed as potentially preparing both police and protesters for a worst-case scenario. The communication processes involved appear as rumour and gossip, history or recent incidents between the parties, media exposure and potentially inflammatory statements being made. The contextual level is considered as predefining the response of the police or protesters to conflict (Waddington et al, 1989). Waddington et al (1989) note that the police are likely to nurture grievances just as much as protesters do (citing events at Orgreave, South Yorkshire during the 1984 miners’ strike, as being in part, revenge for those at Saltley, West Midlands in 1972 (Waddington et al, 1989, p. 168)). However, it appears that pre-event communication and liaison between the parties may avert the worst-case being realized. This level is concerned with the relations between the police and protest group(s).

The *situational* level addresses certain spatial determinants of disorder, such as the symbolic nature of certain places, buildings and locations. Some of which may be the object
of the protesters’ attention. Furthermore, it can relate to notions of access and availability of locations, whether access to an area is contested or the protesters’ “turf” is encroached upon by the police (Waddington, 2007, p. 50). Waddington (2007) proposes that organization and tactics applied by both police and protesters may be relevant in whether disorder breaks out. He claims that violence is less likely where protesters self-manage by having stewards and the organisers espouse peaceful protest. Similarly, disorder is less likely where the police adopt a less paramilitary approach, such as all the trappings of “riot-clad reinforcement, dogs and horses” (Waddington, 2007, pp. 50-51).

The *interactional* level seeks to explain the influence of face-to-face contact between the police and protesters on disorder. It is suggested that at this level a flashpoint or flashpoints may occur that act as the spark to the tinder existing in the other levels of the model. This is explained by Waddington and Critcher (2000) in the following terms:

In highly charged situations, a particular incident (the throwing of a brick, an arrest or police charge) may spark off disorder. Such ‘flashpoints’ are interpreted symbolically as indicating the underlying attitude of the other side. (2000, p. 106)

A criticism levelled at the model is whether a single flashpoint is responsible for triggering disorder and that riots can happen without any such flashpoint or long after one occurs (Keith, 1993; Otten et al, 2001; Waddington, 1991, 1994b). It should be noted that many riots and disorders occur without any perceptible flashpoint at all (Waddington, 1991, 1994b). However, this objection is countered by Waddington (2007):

"It is important to assume that there is a need for the model to allow for variations in the nature of precipitating incidents…Likewise it is also important to assume that there may be several flashpoints in the course of one particular event, some of which do not ignite, others of which may initially ignite only to then die down, and one or more of which explode so intensely as to consume the whole event. (Waddington, 2007, p. 52)"

Critically, there appears to be a certain contradiction in calling something a flashpoint that does not ignite and the reasons as to why it does not seem unclear.

The original version of the Flashpoints model contains little reference to police traditions, culture or doctrines specifically related to public order. In response to criticisms, Waddington (2010) added a further level, that of *structuration* to take these into account. He suggests that this enhances the original model by focusing on the influences of police conduct that derive from traditions in policing, systems of accountability and the ‘missions’ or operating procedures governing police strategy and tactics in public order situations (Waddington D, 2010, p. 346). Inclusion of this additional level apparently bolsters the *interactional* level of the model by providing better “contextual understanding of police agency” (Jordan, 2015, p. 28).
However, the Flashpoints model is still not widely regarded as the best framework for the analysis of disorder in every circumstance (Bagguley and Hussain, 2003; Hussain and Bagguley, 2005). Hussain and Bagguley (2005) highlight issues about how to quantify the actual levels of economic inequality needed for disorder to erupt and the power imbalances between the police and the crowd. In addition, they echo P.A.J. Waddington’s (1991, 1994b) concern about the agency of a single flashpoint (or not) in sparking disorder. Indeed, we might note that if quantifying the critical levels required for disorder is problematic, it would be difficult to apply the model predictively. In short, criticisms of the Flashpoints model seem to relate to the necessity for any of the conditions being present before disorder breaks out. That said, Flashpoints does provide a detailed explanation of the many factors that can be found after disorder occurs, having been applied to the analyses of a number of protest events (King and Waddington, 2005; Lo Shiu-hing, 2006; Waddington, 1992, 2007). Therefore, its efficacy is as a tool for post hoc analysis.

The Flashpoints model is clearly one of disorder. This is made explicit by its original purpose and claim to be “an explanatory framework which is flexible enough to encompass a variety of [disorder] types” (Waddington et al, 1987, p. 159). As such, it has more utility as an analytic tool post-event about why disorder broke out or not. A detailed examination of the Flashpoints model shows that it is not an explanatory model of police legitimacy and protester attitudes to cooperation and compliance with the law and/or the police. The critical analysis of “tinder and spark” inspired theories such as the Flashpoints model specifically demonstrates that the CDM of police legitimacy is not synonymous with it. Unsurprisingly, given the similar context of the research the CDM shares similarity in its empirical data with Flashpoints. This is no different from the similarities that Flashpoints might share with the “tinder and spark” theories. However, the CDM significantly differs from the Flashpoints model of disorder in its focus and explanatory power.

As we have seen, the Flashpoints model is primarily concerned with explaining the initiation of disorder (or absence), the CDM is concerned with perceptions of police legitimacy. Flashpoints is a sociologically-based model, the CDM rests heavily on a social psychological and philosophical base. The levels in the Flashpoints model provide little, if any explanation of the factors associated with the construction and shaping of perceptions of police legitimacy. Legitimacy in Flashpoints is a term reserved for “the ways in which the group’s declared ends and the means proposed are subject to ideological processes” (Waddington et al, 1989, p.161). Indeed, in the original publication of the Flashpoints model Waddington et al (1989, p. 157) make clear that in so doing they are attempting to theorize the factors found to be “the crucial determinants of order and disorder”. Furthermore, the use of the term “contextual” by the CDM is entirely different from that intended by the Flashpoints model. The CDM uses the
term to depict the policing situation(s) in and by which protesters’ perceptions are formed and constructed, whilst Flashpoints uses it to denote “a set of existing relations between the police and dissenting groups” (Waddington et al, 1989, p. 163). The Flashpoints model of disorder does not deal with police legitimacy in any way similar to that of the thesis.

The complexity and many fold levels of the Flashpoints model (now seven) might indicate one reason why it has not gained widespread appeal in policing practice as a tool for managing protest. However, one model that has done so is the ESIM, which we will discuss in detail below.

**The ESIM approach to policing protest and public order**

The most prominent and current influence on the policing of protest and crowds in the UK is based on the ESIM (derived from the social identity and self-categorization theories from the field of social psychology). In the Introduction to the thesis, the link between PJ and the ESIM was demonstrated, explaining how the thesis engages them both in its investigation of the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy. For this reason, the ESIM is given more detailed examination here.

The ESIM is primarily a model of crowd dynamics and as such lays claim to explaining how policing contributes to perceptions of police legitimacy and the development of collective violence (Reicher et al, 2004; Stott, 2009). Notwithstanding the significance of the other frameworks and models outlined above, ESIM-derived best practice currently provides the driving force behind protest policing and crowd management in the UK. Indeed, the revised manual of guidance *Keeping the Peace* (ACPO, 2010) and the recommendations contained in a variety of HMIC reports post G20, London, 2009, rely heavily upon the work and influence of the main protagonists in this field of study (HMIC, 2009a; 2009b). These recommendations are exalted as the means to:

…shape the future of national public order policing and drive changes in our preparation for protest and our relationships with those involved. (HMIC, 2009b, p.2)

The discipline of social psychology offers a significant amount of empirical research that seeks to account for the development of collective disorder. Research in the field of social identity is most relevant to the policing of protest given its emphasis on the situational and interactional dynamics and its dominance in policing appears as yet unchallenged. In a submission to HMIC, Stott (2009) declared the ESIM approach as:

…the leading scientific theory of crowd psychology. It provides a theoretical basis for accurately explaining and predicting the nature of crowd behaviour,
particularly as this relates to the emergence of collective ‘disorder’. (Stott, 2009, p. 2)

On this basis, it has built considerable influence within protest, public order policing and crowd management in the UK. However, in light of the antecedents and contingents to perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to cooperation and compliance, we have reason to question the claim. I will outline below the key tenets of the ESIM and how it has developed (Reicher, 1984, 1987, 2003; Stott and Reicher, 1998a).

The ESIM is based on the social identity theory developed by Tajfel and Turner (1979) which was originally formulated to explain intergroup prejudice and discrimination. Social identity theory posits that a person has not one, but several identities that correspond to perceived group memberships or affiliations into which a person enters through a process of self-categorization. An individual is deemed to have multiple social identities derived from perceived membership of various social groups. These social groups can be existing ones or formed during a social encounter, such as protest or crowd situations. In general terms, those who perceive that they share the same social identity behave in ways that act against outsiders, but for their confederates. Thus, creating a “them” and “us” situation, this is typically referred to as an in-group and out-group dynamic (Reicher, 2003).

A precursor to the ESIM, the social identity model (SIM) used social identity theory as a basis to explain how people in crowd events shift from behaving singularly to behaving in terms of a contextually specific and common social identity (Reicher, 1984, 1987). The SIM defines psychologically what behaviours are viewed as acceptable and valid for the crowd members and who or what has influence within it. Reicher (1984) asserts that it is this common shared identity which counts as normative behaviour in a crowd context, which accounts for peaceful or violent norms being formed and expressed during contact with the police. Whilst it is acknowledged to provide a rebuttal to the traditions of classical psychological reductionism, the original SIM model demonstrates one key flaw, in that it explains what people do in a riot or disorder but does not fully explain how the psychological processes influence the emergence and escalation of violence and disorder. The anomaly is reportedly addressed with the development of the ESIM (Stott, 1998; Stott and Pearson, 2007; Stott et al, 2001).

In a study of the Poll Tax riots of 1990, Stott (1998) examined how a riot develops due to changes in crowd members social identities as a direct result of their perceptions of police legitimacy. The protesters in this case perceived that they were acting legitimately, whereas the police defined them as illegitimate and potentially violent. The police had the power and instrumental authority to impose itself upon the crowd, leading to a context in which
participants’ social identity changed and led to a cycle of disorder and escalated police use of force (Stott, 1998; Stott and Drury, 2000). Notably, by presenting this as a change, Stott (1998) implies that crowd members initially held different notions of police legitimacy prior to contact with the police. The role of antecedent attitudes to police legitimacy and cooperation seems less relevant to the ESIM and the interpretation of the concept of legitimacy are not made explicit or systematically examined in the research. While PJ and the ESIM are demonstrably linked it is unclear if they share identical conceptions of the terminology they use.

Stott (2009) elaborates on the precise effect of a social identity that perceives the police as illegitimate in the following way:

The central point is that perceptions of police illegitimacy within the crowd can be the central driver for an escalation of conflict. In such circumstances even participants harbouring no prior intention of engaging in confrontation may become hostile toward the police as a means of reasserting perceived rights. (Stott, 2009, p.10)

In the Poll Tax riot example, the result was that protesters came to see violent conflict as increasingly legitimate and therefore united together in opposing the police. This is described by ESIM proponents as a cycle wherein the police escalate their response to conflict with the crowd in a reciprocal manner which drives a cycle of behaviours (Stott et al, 2001; Stott and Drury, 2000). The relationship between the policing of protest and crowd behaviour is reflected in the observations of della Porta and Reiter (1998). These concern the causes and effects of police conduct, policing strategy within the crowd and the influence exerted on the quality of interaction.

We can draw two points from this, 1) that police behaviour and tactics are considered to be a direct influence upon the emerging social identities of crowd members and their corresponding perceptions of police legitimacy, and 2) that these add to what is deemed as acceptable behaviour by the crowd. However, it should be noted that the ESIM places great emphasis on the emergence of protester notions of police illegitimacy. In so doing it gives little weight if any, to nuances arising from pre-existing attitudes and orientations toward police legitimacy and compliance and cooperation. Ostensibly, the ESIM relies upon an acceptance that these emerge dynamically during the event, based upon experiences of contact with the police. Therefore, the ESIM, in explaining the development of crowd conflict appears to provide a feasible, but arguably limited explanation of the full range and subtlety of factors involved in the construction and shaping of perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to compliance and cooperation. This represents a significant point of difference between the ESIM and the CDM, since the latter seeks to capture sources of such influences, emergent or otherwise.
In the ESIM group identity is associated with the perceived presence of another group, either within the crowd or outside of it. Protest events usually involve face to face encounters between groups and counter-protest groups or between groups and the police. In protest events, it is often the police who epitomize the idea of the “outgroup” identified in the ESIM (Reicher, 2003; Reicher et al., 2004; Stott, 2009). Reicher et al (2007) argue that the outcome of such encounters is dependent on the way that the crowd and the “other” interact. However, the events which stimulate violence will vary from crowd to crowd as a function of different notions of legitimacy or a crowd’s history with groups such as the police or counter-protesters (Adang and Standaar, 1993), this serves to highlight again the importance of policing context.

In contrast to the ESIM, protester perceptions of legitimacy can exist as a distal factor and independent of any real-time encounter with the police (Adang and Standaar, 1993). What this means is that attitudes and beliefs concerning the police and the protest context may be present in individuals or as part of a shared social identity, quite outwith police actions at the time. The presence of these alone may contribute to the emergence of conflict and serve as a perceptual filter through which the police are viewed, which influences protester willingness to cooperate and comply.

We might ponder that at least some attending protests will have negative views about the police already and be unlikely to be persuaded otherwise through legitimate contact. That said, the most influential in social identity terms, may well be those who come to protests with benevolent or neutral perceptions of police legitimacy since the theoretical premise of the ESIM is that they can be harnessed to influence other protesters during the course of events. I present empirical evidence that highlights two key points relevant to this discussion. First, protesters exhibit self-regulation based upon their personal and shared values, also recognising the potential futility of attempting ‘self-policing’ in certain protest contexts. Secondly, protesters may consider their experience of contact with the police in a neutral or benevolent way, yet not express any inclination to cooperate with the police or the law.

According to PJ, personal attitudes inform peoples’ perceptions of police legitimacy and correspond with self-reported levels of cooperation and compliance (Jackson and Bradford, 2010b; Tyler, 1990, 2006). In developing an explanatory framework for the nuances associated with the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and their attitudes to cooperation and compliance, my empirical research measures and explores peoples’ attitudes and beliefs. Therefore, it is important to examine whether and to what extent protesters’ attitudes can be linked to their behaviour.
The link between protester attitudes and behaviour

Having examined the ESIM, which is a social psychologically-based model, I discuss here the place of the individual within the crowd and identify where responsibility for personal and collective behaviour lies. While the emphasis has been a discussion of crowds in general, the starting point is at the individual and personal level. This is where perceptions of legitimacy lie, attitudes to the police are (re)formed and behaviours potentially ensue. The seat of attitudes and decisions to engage, support or confront the police patently resides at the individual level, albeit sometimes expressed through a group identity. People make individual choices, notwithstanding that they are social beings with social identities and that personal decision-making may be informed or influenced by the social context (Adang, 2011; Madenson and Knutsson, 2011; Mcphail, 1991). Whilst it is outside the remit of the thesis, it should be noted that any link between attitudes and behaviour applies just as well to police officers engaged in the policing of protests, as it does protesters.

An elementary study of the literature on social identity might lead to a premature conclusion that people act in a crowd based on either a shared identity or retain a singular, individual one in which case they would be part of a group by mere geography and presence alone. Jetten and Postmes (2006, p.4) summarise this as social identity sometimes being “treated as an on/off switch” as if a person sits at one pole or the other. In fact, this is far from the case and was recognized from its inception as erroneous (Tajfel, 1978; Jetten and Postmes, 2006). A person’s behaviour can be described as existing along:

A continuum with purely interpersonal behavior at one extreme and purely intergroup behavior at the other...but does not treat the individual self and the group as fundamentally opposed or antagonistic. Indeed, in social identity theory both individual and group behavior is perceived as equally valid forms of self-expression. Nonetheless, by putting interpersonal and intergroup at opposite ends of a continuum, they have become each other’s opposites. (Jetten and Postmes, 2006, p.4)

However, collective behaviour does not occur in an homogenous fashion based purely on the prevailing social identity. It is simply not a case of group ‘A’ locked in a reciprocal encounter with group ‘B’. Instead, it is a more fluid and dynamic affair in which individual, intragroup and intergroup processes are at work. Where many sub-groups are present within a larger one, some psychologically bound, sharing ideological influences and others by mere physical presence alone. The dimensions in which such influences operate can be a combination of the personal, social or causal (related to group aims or protest causes).
Observations of several large-scale protests and crowd events demonstrate that the majority of participants do not engage in violence purely by their physical presence, and crowds do not become dangerous merely because of a numerical mass (Adang, 2011; Mcphail, 1991; Waddington, 1994b). In a psychologically bound group the role of the personal, cognitive processes at work can often be adumbrated, there are two factors that need to be taken into account. First, personal attitudes that accompany intergroup conflict are “determined by a continuing process of self-definition” (Tajfel, 1974, p.67). However, such self-definition to maintain ingroup/outgroup dynamics is a cognitive and deliberate one, in which “people do not lose control of their actions simply because they participate in a large gathering” (Madenson and Knutsson, 2011, p.3). Secondly, individuals seek to establish a social identity in order to construct meaning for the context in which they find themselves. What these two factors mean in practice is that individuals in crowds are able to “influence the course of action through communication, negotiation, strategic and autonomous behaviours” (Jetten and Postmes, 2006, p.5). In policing terms this is reassuring, since it suggests the presence of individuals able and willing to engage and be engaged through communication and capable of interpreting police contact within a personal frame of reference, which may influence perceptions of legitimacy. Conversely, a frame of reference might exist that is oppositional to policing and remain so.

However, individual perceptions of police legitimacy remain key in all aspects and at all junctures along the continuum outlined above. Indeed, social identity evolved to articulate the links between individual perceptions and group identity and behaviours. This being the case, there is adequate reason to examine the role of individual attitudes to the police and the agency that they have in police legitimacy and compliance and cooperation. In an abstract model, it may seem probable for groups to be influenced, however groups don’t hold perceptions. To rely on this, risks applying some notion of “groupthink” and a prevailing group mind that in essence is classical, psychological reductionism. Rather, any police action aimed at influencing the wider group must be aimed at individuals or focused on understanding why they may not be so influenced. Individuals may define themselves in personal and collective terms and move along a continuum in either direction depending upon the prevailing influences. Turner et al (2006) summarise this:

There is no Chinese wall between the individuality and groupness of people. One cannot be reduced to or subsumed by the other but neither should any false dichotomy be invented to deny the living reality of people in which being an individual and being a group member function collaboratively. (Turner et al, 2006, p. 264)
Based upon observations of crowd events, Adang (2011, p. 62) implies that individual choice in behaviour is both rational and deliberate, where people “prepare themselves, pursue goals and clearly take the risks into account”. Collective behaviour, however complex it may look at times, comprises sequences alternating between individual and social activity with variance in the mode and form of behaviours (Mcphail, 1991). Notably, individual choice guides behaviour, insofar as people control and self-regulate in pursuit of their own goals and aims (Mcphail, 1991).

Where might this leave us in terms of the ESIM’s analysis of the impact of police contact in protest and perceptions of police legitimacy? Firstly, people will unite with others where their individual views and experiences coalesce with a collective one, particularly where they share a common fate at the hands of the police, such is the essence of ESIM. Secondly, those who previously held negative views about the police or state will be vindicated in that view, which serves to galvanise their position. Disconcertingly, a number of those who may have seen the police previously as legitimate might be swayed according to the ESIM approach. Reicher (2003) explains it thus:

In a number of studies involving crowd events, including football matches, student demos, tax protests and environmental protest a common dynamic has been found to underlie processes of change. Each of these events had different psychological crowds, with different identities and different intentions co-existing within the physical crowd. Such change as occurred was among “moderate” elements of the crowd who understood those policing them as neutral guarantors of social order. As a consequence of being impeded in carrying out legitimate activities and in response to being treated as dangerous and oppositional by police, moderate crowd members in turn came to see police as illegitimate opposition. (Reicher, 2003, p. 201)

The ESIM account seeks to demonstrate the significance of the impact of police contact on empirical legitimacy. Notwithstanding that the basis on which Reicher (2003, p. 201) categorises people as “moderate” is unclear, it does underline the importance of the police understanding this as a potential agent in the initiation and escalation of violence and disorder. However, it should be recognised that there are limits to this proposition because the asymmetry of policing (Skogan, 2006, 2012) means that there may well be those for whom no amount of positive or benevolent police contact will engender legitimacy. In addition, Braithwaite (2009) identifies that in some instances the measures taken by the police to induce perceptions of legitimacy can be interpreted as cynical attempts and actually prove counterproductive.

The ESIM implies that protesters attitudes and behaviours are driven by their experience of contact with the police. However, there is reason to consider that individuals do
not attend protests as blank canvasses upon which attitudes and behaviours are drawn by other protesters or the police. Haslam et al (2010) explain this in the following way:

Individuals do not come to social encounters with a mind that is ‘tabula rasa’ and then proceed to mechanically process information in a dispassionate, uninvolved manner in order to decide whether or not a particular person should be seen as a member of a particular group. Rather, (it) categorization depends on the perceivers prior expectations, many of which derive from existing group memberships and prior encounters. (Haslam et al, 2010, p.349)

Therefore, it is by no means conclusive that emerging notions of police legitimacy in time and space, guarantees a shift in social identity as claimed by the ESIM. Prior expectations referred to here may serve as filters in the minds of protesters, through which their experiences of policing pass (Haslam et al, 2010). My empirical research suggests that perceptions of the policing of protest events may indeed be viewed through a combination of filters derived from personal and group-inspired constructions of policing, levels of engagement and distancing, power and identity relationships and pre-existing ideology. I will explore in detail below some of the specific conditions under which personal attitudes can configure behaviour and highlight the opportunity that they have to shape cooperation and compliance with the law and police.

The rational nature of crowd behaviour and the proposition that individuals do not lose a sense of self-control in the crowd leads us to consider the reference points upon which crowd members rely. An answer to this is that their public behaviour is significantly influenced by external social influences or ones that they have internalized as a form of self-regulatory mechanism (Myers et al, 2010). These influences may come from others prototypical behaviour or exist in the prevailing context as group norms or group ideology. Whilst a reliance on the idea that attitudes generally determine behaviour may be spurious (Batson et al,1997; Batson and Thomson, 2001; Wicker,1969), this may have more to do with attempting to correspond a general attitude with very specific behaviour (Bohner and Schwarz, 2003). As an example, a general dislike of the government would be a poor indicator that a person would in fact set fire to a government building. Thus, in general terms, it may appear to be the case that attitudes do not beget behaviour or prove to be a reliable predictor of such.

However, it has been demonstrated that there is a strong correlation between attitude and behaviour under certain specific conditions (Myers et al, 2010; Sigull and Page,1971). In circumstances where external restraining influences are minimal, people will declare certain attitudes if they perceive that others are more likely to be accepting of them. This indicates that where the prevailing social influences and context support the expression and acting out of attitudes, the behaviour is much more likely to occur (Sigull and Page,1971; Hofmann et al, 2005). Furthermore, the closer the alignment of a specific attitude to a specific behaviour, then
the greater likelihood exists for it to be acted upon. This is otherwise known as the “correspondence principle”, where both are said to be alike in their “degree of specification” (Bohner and Schwarz, 2003, p.425).

If we apply this in protest situations, those with an ideological opposition to the authority of the police, the law or state may be more inclined to act in a way that demonstrates and supports it. In situations where there are attitudes that specific direct action and violence are acceptable, it might be more likely to occur. Such a position can be adopted despite exemplary conduct by the police. Research elsewhere has identified that measures taken by criminal justice agents that are aimed at securing legitimacy can prove counter-productive for people who are diametrically opposed to the police or the law (Braithwaite, 2009; Cherney and Murphy, 2011).

The correspondence principle is one supported by the theory of reasoned action (TRA) (Ajzán and Fishbein,1977, 2005). The TRA posits that certain dependents operate to influence our conscious behaviour. Namely, the expectations of others and the value placed on them, the congruency of the attitude with the behaviour and the potency of the attitude in terms of its contextual saliency. This can occur in situations where people share context, experience greater self-awareness or feel provocation (Myers et al, 2010). A type of awareness process can be demonstrated in the framing of protest events and the priming of attitudes prior to events, this occurs in social movement organizations, pre-event communications, publicity and the wider media (Klandermans,1997; Opp, 2009). What is pertinent to the thesis is that engagement in or support for protest activities have both attitudinal and behavioural aspects (Klandermans,1997). Therefore, generating and harnessing these is often key to the success of the protest, its objectives and progress, which may compete with police measures aimed at increasing perceptions of legitimacy and compliance and cooperation. Together, the points discussed highlight the importance of understanding the nuances of context of the policing situation.

In summary, what can we learn about the effect of attitudes on behaviour in protest events? Where influence from other individuals can be found within the context of the protest, and they support individual attitudes, corresponding behaviour is more likely to be seen as normative and prototypical (Myers et al, 2010). Arguably, where attitudes about police illegitimacy already exist and are perceived as shared or supported by others, behaviour is more likely to follow. Group norms and values play a role in aligning peoples’ attitudes with their behaviour. While this pathway from attitudes to behaviour is often a fragile one, the relationship can be argued to be stronger in the group context where attitudes are seen as normative and prototypical. Indeed, people may act out behaviours in order to “validate their
group membership to themselves...[and] publicly performed behaviour can lead to more enduring internal attitudinal and self-representational change” (Terry and Hogg, 1996, p.776). Although not overtly stated in the ESIM, we might conclude given its basis in social identity ala Reicher (1984) that prototypical members of a group are a significant source of information and feedback upon which attitudes and behaviour are formed. Behaviours in protest events may be defined with reference to assumed group norms that set the parameters for individuals by:

Pay[ing] close attention to identity consistent behaviour of fellow ingroup members, particularly those who are highly prototypical, in order to learn precise situation-specific and identity consistent behaviours to engage in. (Hogg, 2001, p. 63)

What this tells us is that there are complex dynamics at work that inform protesters’ attitudes, their relationships with other protesters and the police, and define the limit and extent of their behaviours. This is a highly pertinent point contained within the social identity tradition that I would argue is germane to perceptions of police legitimacy and compliance. It is not inconceivable that perceptions of and behaviours in relation to the police can be underpinned by these dynamics. We know that during dynamic and spontaneous situations, individuals refer to their personal mechanisms in making judgements about what constitutes normative behaviour and how others (like the police or fellow protesters) might be categorised (Haslam et al, 2010). The link between attitudes and behaviour can be seen to be highly contextually specific and needs to be understood as contextually-driven.

In conclusion, this chapter set out to demonstrate the need for a more nuanced understanding of the contextually based influences associated with protest perceptions of police legitimacy and compliance and cooperation. It highlighted the complexities of protest contexts and their policing. It has examined what protest means, exploring levels of its organization and coordination. In so doing, it identified an operational definition that frames the empirical research. The chapter also investigated the impact of social media in protest, highlighting their use for networking, mobilising protest, and as the means to construct and communicate narratives about the police and protest causes. A selection of theories and models of disorder, have been outlined and critically examined. Specifically, those derived from the “tinder and spark” perspective. A more detailed examination of the Flashpoints model has been made to identify its contribution to our understanding of the causes of disorder. This identified that it is not a model of police legitimacy, with explanatory power about the construction and shaping of protesters’ perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to cooperation and compliance.
With its current dominance in British policing, the origin and development of the ESIM has been examined, highlighting its reliance on the notion of *emerging* perceptions of police illegitimacy arising from police contact as the basis for collective violence. Limitations relating to its failure in acknowledging antecedent attitudes about the police and pre-existing ideology have been raised. Finally, the chapter has demonstrated the theoretical link between protesters’ attitudes and their behaviour, and the circumstances in which this can occur.

Scholars, policy makers and police leaders often seek typologies and categories to apply to protest and policing, as we have seen from the discussion above. However, these can prove less useful, since the dialogic nature of police legitimacy requires greater reflection in action than they allow. The danger is that typologies and categories tend to over simplify and generalize about protesters, protest and policing to such an extent that it misses the nuances. To do so provides us with only a partial understanding of the processes and mechanisms at work in the construction and shaping of perceptions of police legitimacy. Ultimately, the review of related theories and models highlights a straightforward, but important observation, that any one model has limited explanatory power, since the contexts of protest are fluid, dynamic and have great complexity. Therefore, a contextually driven approach to police legitimacy is required.

The following chapter will critically analyse key developments and attempts to legitimize the policing of protest and public order in the UK, since the London G20, 2009 protests.
Chapter 4

Developments in the legitimisation of protest and public order policing

“I was at G20 and the Climate camp, I’ve seen what the police can do and people should know about police brutality. It is state endorsed violence aimed at destroying protest”.
(Interviewee 6, March for Jobs protest)

“We set up a campaign after Ian’s death, we didn’t think we’d get far. Statistically, you are more likely to die at the hands of the police than in the general population…There are more murderers in the police force than in any other section of the population”.
(Interviewee 1, Justice for Ian Tomlinson protest)

This chapter analyses some of the attempts to legitimize the policing of protest and public order in the UK since London G20, 2009. It draws on academic and “grey” literature sources in a critique of recommendations and changes to police training and policy, intelligence gathering, tactical flexibility and the police use of force. In examining several HMIC reports and reviews from the London G20, 2009 onwards, I highlight their impact, and the consequences for protesters and the police. In fact, these now represent four major reviews and sets of recommendations between 2009 and 2011, that set the landscape we currently see. However, I will demonstrate that these should not be considered free of controversy and have contributed to confusion in resolving many of the issues facing the perceived legitimacy of the policing of protest and public order in the UK.

Whilst certainly not the first time in the history of British policing that a death can be associated with protest and public order, arguably the London, G20, 2009 initiated a period that has accelerated in advance of all expectations. It provided something of a watershed for the policing of protest and public order in the UK. HMIC (2011a) highlight the significance of it in the following terms:

The character of protest is evolving in terms of: the numbers involved; spread across the country; associated sporadic violence; disruption caused; short notice or no-notice events, and swift changes in protest tactics. After a few, relatively quiet years, this is a new period of public order policing (emphasis added) one which is faster moving and more unpredictable. Foreseeing the character of events will prove more difficult and, in some cases, their nature and mood will only become apparent on the day. What seems evident is a willingness to disrupt the public and test police. Police tactics have to be as adaptable as possible to the circumstances to keep the peace for all of us. The fine judgement required to strike the right balance between competing rights and needs is getting harder. (HMIC, 2011a, p.2)

Reviews and recommendations for protest and public order policing

It is clear that public order policing required more than window dressing in the aftermath of Ian Tomlinson’s death at the London G20, 2009. According to HMIC (2011a, 2011b) in order to
succeed it required greater public consent and support, informed by debate about the nature of policing priorities, the role and responsibilities of the police and public expectations of policing in such circumstances.

The mandate under which HMIC most recently operated can be summed up in the wake of the August, 2011 English riots and the so termed Rules of Engagement (HMIC, 2011b). Central to these rules is the development of a national framework aimed at providing greater certainty for the public and the police on the approach to dealing with protest and public disorder. This framework includes clear objectives for the early resolution of disorder and sets out rules of engagement between the police and public. It provides guidance on pre-emptive action and the police use of force, public order tactics, and training. Considering that this was in light of criticisms of the slow police response to the 2011 riots, it is unsurprising that HMIC (2011b) called for:

Go forward tactics, training to nationally consistent standards and including the capability to use a range of levels of force (given different scenarios) to save lives, protect the public and disrupt criminality. These tactics should be informed by the law on public order and the use of force to enable officers and commanders to be both professionally confident and competent in the use of their powers to keep the peace. (HMIC, 2011b, p.8)

The inference is that in some way the police had unilaterally adopted a “hands off” approach and an unwillingness to engage with public disorder. I will examine the main themes contained in these rules of engagement in the discussion below and argue that in competition with earlier HMIC recommendations after London, G20, 2009 (HMIC, 2009a, 2009b), they contribute to something of an identity crisis for the policing of protest and public order.

The use of force

The use of force has been mired in controversy since the use of the military under the “old” policing arrangements and since the new police were formed in 1829 (Emsley, 2009; Rawlings, 2002). The police use of coercion and force understandably raises human rights considerations, and its improper or excessive use potentially undermines police claims to legitimacy. This can be structural in terms of the rules and procedures followed by the police or empirical, that is, as experienced and perceived by the public. The use of force is linked directly to levels of public trust and confidence in the police (HMIC, 2011a, 2011b).

The current rules of engagement explain that it is critical for the police to be clear with the public concerning the circumstances in which force will be used, and they provide contextual examples of the type of police tactics that are recommended in specific protest scenarios. However, these are not always supported by the weight of public opinion it would
Ipsos MORI (2009) were commissioned by HMIC to undertake a survey in the wake of London G20, 2009 (based on 1,726 face-to-face interviews) with a nationally representative sample of respondents aged 15 years or more in England and Wales. The purpose was primarily to understand public attitudes toward the police and opinions on police performance at the G20 protests, but it also examined the level of public tolerance for the use of force and police tactics. Respondents were found to be twice as likely to opt for a situation that gives police the freedom to use force against protesters, necessary to keep public order, as opt for a situation where the police should never use force (Ipsos MORI, 2009).

When presented with a list of protest behaviours that commonly occur during large-scale protest, respondents were asked to evaluate whether the police use of force was justifiable. The use of force was defined as a police officer using their baton to strike a protester. The results indicated that as protest behaviour escalates, more people consider the use of force to be justified. The use of force was most strongly supported when police were faced with acts of physical violence from a protester (82% of respondents) (Ipsos MORI, 2009).

Similar findings can be found in a public opinion survey commissioned by HMIC (2011b) after the August 2011 urban riots (based on 2000 respondents). People felt very strongly about actions that should have been taken by the police to deal with the crowds. All police methods including containment (kettling), use of batons, water cannon and attenuated energy projectiles (rubber “bullets”) for crowd control were strongly supported by more than three-quarters of respondents. A third of people thought that firearms should be used by the police in public disorder (HMIC, 2011a).

When it comes to perceptions of police tactics it is interesting to note assumptions that the public can make without any reference to media or factual information, since in the same survey people believed that the police had used more forceful tactics than they actually had. A number (23%) believed that the police were already using water cannons in mainland Britain to deal with such events (HMIC, 2011b). This is the background to the finding that almost half (49%) of respondents believed that the police used too little force to deal with events during the August 2011 disorders. Notably, those in Haringey and Croydon, perhaps the foci of the most serious disorder, were more likely to think this at 56% and 57% respectively (HMIC, 2011b). These examples perhaps highlight the perversity associated with an insistence on using public consensus as the basis for police legitimacy.

Where the restriction of movement and use of containment or “kettling” was examined there was a perception that such tactics may be justifiable to deal with incidents of disruption to the general public’s day-to-day activities. In fact, 76% believed that holding protesters in a
controlled area was acceptable, with the number increasing to 82% where protesters threatened public or private property (HMIC, 2011b). Notwithstanding the political aspects of dealing with the aftermath of a man’s death, we might question why with evidence of greater public support for the use of force, the police had shied away from the use of containment and punitive tactics after G20 (2009), adopting a more hands off, 'no surprises' approach to the policing of protest and public order situations. Certainly, HMIC sought to bring about such a policing model and placed great emphasis on the ESIM-based approaches to policing crowds and dialogue-based policing tactics through protest liaison teams (PLTs) (HMIC, 2009a, 2009b, 2011a, 2011b; Stott, 2009). The main characteristics of the “new” policing model from G20, 2009, based on a 'no surprises' approach, assumes peaceful protest as a starting point. It is a model aimed at dealing with the question of how best the police should adapt to the modern day demands of public order policing, while retaining the core values of the British model of policing epitomised by principles associated with Sir Robert Peel and the enduring notion of policing by consent.

To answer that question HMIC (2009a, 2009b) made recommendations on how protests should be policed in England and Wales. The areas covered in the recommendations reiterated the police use of force, the use of stop and search and overt photography, consistency of practices around public order training standards and additional training for officers. The police service (certainly the Metropolitan Police, who were to some degree the main focus of HMIC observations post G20, 2009) began in earnest to execute the new model of policing public order (HMIC, 2009b, 2011a, 2011b). However, this was to be short lived in practice and the consequences of the review arguably led to a degree of reticence and paralysis on the part of the police service to respond more robustly to later disorders. For instance, after the student-led protests at cuts to education funding in 2010 where the offices of the Conservative party HQ were overrun, questions were asked about how the police could possibly have let it happen and why a more punitive approach was not used. Greater numbers gathered than had been anticipated by the police and following an HMIC review, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner at the time Sir Paul Stephenson (HMIC, 2011a) stated that:

The game has changed. The nature of protest is evolving in terms of: the numbers involved; spread across the country; associated sporadic violence; disruption being caused; short notice or no-notice events and swift changes in protest tactics. After a few, relatively quiet years, this is a new period of public order policing, one which is faster moving and more unpredictable. (HMIC, 2011a, p.3)

How then might this new period of public order policing be addressed? HMIC produced yet another review and more recommendations that would cement the previous ones in a definitive document “Policing Public Order” (HMIC, 2011a).
The sense was that the police service had delivered on the majority of earlier recommendations made in the post G20, 2009 review. However, progress was slow and nationally fragmented relating to tactics, flexibility, leadership, and clarity on the use of force. Continuing to respond to the whole spectrum of protest would require finessing of existing police tactics, adapting them to handle the risks and spiralling costs of instrumental policing approaches. The police were exhorted that they must prevail in all circumstances to keep the peace, but within confined budgets (HMIC, 2011a).

What then was presented as a new template to finesse the policing of protest and public order? With an acceptance that delivering national change would take up to two years for a new training curriculum and national standards to be put in place, achieving national consensus contributed to its delay. Even were consensus to be reached, issues of local interpretation remain. HMIC (2011a) aspired to have national consensus on training and tactics yet promoted local flexibility as essential to delivering effective solutions for the policing of public order. Critically, on the one hand we have measures aimed at a “one size fits all” and on the other a call for more local flexibility at the point where the “boots hit the ground”. However, local interpretation of national guidance often results in different working practices which may be “visible and problematic when officers from other places operate together” (HMIC, 2011a, p.17). This situation creates something of a postcode lottery in the treatment of protesters.

HMIC (2011a) examined the mechanism for developing new guidance and training in order to implement their recommended changes, by reviewing a number of protests and public order policing operations. What they observed was a demonstrable change in the police planning processes for events, greater acknowledgment of the legal requirements, increased attempts at dialogue with protest groups, and reaching out to potential protesters and communities. HMIC (2011a) recognised that:

The investment made by forces in community engagement before, during and after events has been impressive and undoubtedly assisted in achieving operational objectives and maintaining the peace, as well as enhancing community and public confidence. (HMIC, 2011a, p.34)

Finally, subject to the national perspective held by the National Policing Improvement Agency (at the time), police forces appeared to be getting it right and were applauded for implementing the recommendations from the London, G20, 2009 review.

However, the momentum and emphasis on this type of policing model contributed to the police suffering something of a setback in the August riots of 2011. Renewed vigour and emphasis by the police on assuming a starting position of peaceful protest, facilitating lawful
protest and avoiding the use of force for fear of reprisals, have been cited as having a direct impact on police decision making. Notwithstanding that HMIC (2011a) had issued guidance on the use of force that was intended to provide clarity on its application in certain protest scenarios, all of these considerations created a perfect storm for the events of 6-11th August 2011.

Speculation and analyses about the causes and extent of the 2011 riots abound from various perspectives, but a common denominator appears to be that the policing style was in some degree to blame for their inception and proliferation. Some commentators report that the riots were borne out of a sense of injustice and a symptom of deeper community resentments towards the police (HMIC, 2011b; RCVP, 2012; Stott and Reicher, 2011), others dispute that interpretation and claim them as nothing more than criminal activity by mindless individuals aside from any genuine social grievances (Lammy, 2011; Winlow and Hall, 2012). Others decried the feeble police responses to quell disorder and their failure to maintain peace and order. The police faced criticisms for standing by, not intervening sooner and being reluctant to engage with protesters and rioters (HMIC, 2011b). Inevitably, HMIC (2011b) conducted another review with the remit to ensure that in future:

The public order policing response is as effective as it can be and that HMIC conduct work to support clearer guidance to forces on the size of deployments, the need for mutual aid, pre-emptive action, public order tactics, the number of officers (including commanders) trained in public order policing and an appropriate arrests policy. (HMIC, 2011b, p.38)

However, considering the substantial influence of previous HMIC reviews of protest and public order policing and the frenetic activity within the police service to address perceived shortcomings (2009a, 2009b), it is perhaps remarkable that a further re-think was being contemplated so soon. A re-think premised on the basis that police forces up and down the country had been forced to adapt tactics to address the challenges of the riots. Arguably, tactics that had come from the earlier HMIC recommendations and the newly revised manual of guidance “Keeping the Peace” (ACPO, 2010).

HMIC (2011b) ultimately conceded that there was a need to reconsider the efficacy of previous approaches to protest and public order. The recommendation was made that a range of tactics, not requiring massive resource implications be developed “to ensure the peace is not lost from the streets” (HMIC, 2011b, p.2). Notably, the revised manual of guidance laid out a menu of police tactics. Bearing in mind that the revisions took place in part due to the London G20, 2009 review recommendations, it was now implied that they did not meet the needs of public order policing for spontaneous protest, rioting and disorder. Following analysis of the
August 2011 riots and disorders, HMIC (2011b) concluded that the manual was no longer fit for purpose:

[The manual] needs to be reassessed so that it can usefully take account of the dangers presented by the swift co-ordination and spread of disorder. (HMIC, 2011b, p.2)

Previous emphasis on using the principles of the ESIM in underpinning protest and public order policing strategy, command and tactics was overshadowed. An over reliance on the ESIM, developed from and used principally in managing football and sporting event crowds, was now assessed as being less useful in managing protest and public order (HMIC, 2011a, 2011b). This caused something of a riposte from proponents of the ESIM and dialogue-based policing who highlighted concerns that now was not the time to revert to more repressive and regressive policing (Hoggett and Stott, 2012; Stott and Reicher, 2011).

Additional considerations in the wake of the August 2011 riots that differed from previous HMIC diktats came with a recognition that police command needed to be more flexible and adaptable in delegating command. We might note that the rigid command and control structure used in protest and public order policing, does not lend itself to flexibility and reflection in action. Ground commanders are usually reluctant to self-deploy, go outside the chain of command or make unilateral decisions, with preference given to communicating upwards and responding to instructions.

HMIC (2011b) stated that officers need to be trained to think innovatively and be flexible to ensure that life and property remain protected. Some commanders considered that there were opportunities to make early arrests and interventions that were not taken in the 2011 riots because in traditional public order tactics the common resource unit is a Police Support Unit (PSU), and they were reluctant to sub-divide their resources (HMIC, 2011a). Whether the command models in current use are sufficient is not a novel question, indeed they lack responsiveness in pacey and complex situations. HMIC have questioned whether a more devolved approach to command would allow officers to act more rapidly (HMIC, 2011b). However, if police commanders are to develop reflective practice in action, they need to be trained and willing to understand the nuances of the construction and shaping of perceptions of police legitimacy and be empowered to act accordingly.

What the HMIC review (2011b) contributed was a number of reiterated recommendations and calls for the development of yet another framework for the policing of protest and public disorder. A framework for resolving situations relying on three key elements, 1) improved intelligence functions, 2) greater tactical flexibility, and 3) more guidance on the police use of force. Each is examined below.
Improving intelligence functions in public order policing

There is recognition that after the event(s), intelligence can be viewed as the missing link in police responses to public disorder arising from large scale events such as protests (HMIC, 2011b). Police intelligence requirements can be viewed in two ways through national tension monitoring, and at local community levels. National tension monitoring has historically been conducted by the National Community Tension Team (NCTT) coordinating the national delivery of monitoring activity by collating information from local police forces, local authorities and various government agencies. This is aimed at building a profile of emerging issues and tensions within communities that assists in developing policing interventions such as community engagement and public reassurance patrolling. However, in the wake of the 2011 disorders HMIC (2011b) called for a national hub of information to be established, with the mission to aggregate the collection, management and dissemination of public order intelligence and information. It is claimed that such a mechanism would act as:

…a radar for the Police Service and put them on the front foot by scanning the wider environment to look for precursor signs and signals, from both open source material and police databases. (HMIC, 2011b, p. 85)

Furthermore, this new function would serve as the police repository for data required to complete a national public order threat and risk assessment. However, I contend that this new approach runs the risk of repeating the mistakes of the past unless it utilises a fresh and nuanced approach to what information and intelligence is gathered and how it is framed. I make this point on the basis that after the August 2011 riots, HMIC discovered that in order to manage the sheer volume available to the police, the collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence tended to be directed at known problems and people, rather than a flexible and holistic perspective (HMIC, 2011b). According to HMIC (2011b) this anomaly is at both national and neighbourhood levels, the importance of developing an informed intelligence picture is acknowledged, but presently there is not the capacity to do so in a meaningful and structured way at the different levels of policing.

Intelligence requirements are focused requests for information relating to a particular person or issue. However, this does not go far enough in establishing the range of influences that inform protester perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to compliance and cooperation. Both the structure of intelligence gathering and its content often lacks format and detail. HMIC (2011b) highlight that such information and intelligence is widely submitted on the basis of what staff believe to be important, rather than responding to specific and relevant requirements. Thus, HMIC (2011b, p.86) highlight that there “is a strong possibility the current focus is inducing a situation where the police are unsighted in respect of a range of risks”. This
means that the nuances associated with police legitimacy in the protest context are less well known. I argue that the CDM of police legitimacy represents a framework by which focused information and intelligence gathering can occur about protestor constructions of policing, pre-existing ideologies, protestor levels of engagement and distancing, and power and identity relationships. Information about these could improve the management of protest and its outcomes.

Dialogue-based policing has emerged as a police tactic aimed at legitimising the management of protest and public order over a relatively short period of time (explicitly defined as a tactic) (HMIC, 2009b, HMIC, 2011a, 2011b). Dialogue-based policing approaches emerged in part as a result of the Swedish police experience of protests at EU summits in Gothenburg, 2001 (Holgersson and Knutsson, 2009; Peterson and Oskarsson, 2006). The Swedish authorities called for the development of a new policing tactic that would rely on the social psychological basis of the ESIM (HMIC, 2009b; Holgersson and Knutsson, 2009). Criticisms highlighted in the Swedish report were reflected in those of HMIC (2009a) with regard to disproportionate measures adopted by the police, negative stereotyping of protesters, indiscriminate use of coercion and the lack of planning for protest policing (Holgersson and Knutsson, 2009; HMIC, 2009a).

The principles of the dialogue-based tactic can be summarised under the headings of: facilitation, dialogue, counter-part perspective, differentiation, signal value and state (SOU, 2002). It is the dialogue element that we will examine in detail since it related specifically to perceived deficiencies in UK policing previously (HMIC, 2009a, 2009b). By applying an ESIM-based approach the objective of dialogue policing is to achieve a degree of self-policing by the crowd (notwithstanding that the term is contested) and to explain, discuss or negotiate the conditions for the protest. In practice this means that specialist dialogue police officers working in pairs mingle and engage with the crowd before, during and after the event. However, whilst dialogue is presented as the means to negotiated management of protest, we might also heed opposing views that operational aims sometimes render dialogue as nothing but subtle forms of police coercion (Stott et al, 2013; Waddington, 1994b; Wahlstrom, 2007).

In a UK context the use of protest liaison officers or teams (PLO/PLTs) has proliferated since G20, 2009 with a recorded number in 2013 of 296 trained PLOs across England and Wales (CoP, 2013). PLO/PLTs are also listed as a tactical option to be encouraged before, during and after protest and public order events (HMIC, 2009a, 2009b, 2011b). Yet, we might observe that they are perhaps not empowered with the degree of autonomy and operational independence that they have in the Swedish policing context (SOU, 2002). Consequently, PLO/PLTs can be viewed with suspicion, being engaged by protesters on a highly self-
selecting basis and have limited efficacy in communicating and managing protest in the U.K. in a meaningful way (HMIC, 2009a, 2009b, 2011b).

The dialogue tactic itself comprises the elements: negotiation, mediation, suggestion, communication and monitoring (Reicher, 2011). Negotiation involves facilitating compromises and agreements between the police commander and protesters. Mediation is intended to explain the police perception to the crowd and vice versa in order to assist a mutual understanding of the situation and reduce negative stereotypes of each other. Suggestion is intended to provide options and solutions to each side in order to negate the risk of conflict and violence. Communication concerns the exchange of information between the police and protesters. Monitoring provides an assessment of the mood of the crowd members, preparedness for conflict and information to commanders about the effects of police actions. Proponents of the ESIM clearly view the effective use of the tactic as creating and sustaining perceptions of police legitimacy and reducing conflict and violence (Reicher, 2011). In practice, PLO/PLTs can sometimes be viewed as nothing more than intelligence gatherers.

Police reports highlight that it is often unclear how PLO/PLTs feedback the intelligence/information that they obtain and that there should be a clear distinction between protester liaison and operational policing of protest. Stott et al (2013, p.55) propose that PLTs can make a positive contribution where there are “transparent operational and structural divisions between PLTs and the criminal intelligence resources applied by the police to protests”.

Notwithstanding any controversy about whether PLO/PLTs are communicators, intelligence gatherers or both, police knowledge of the cultures, identities and ideologies are pivotal to the success of any dialogue-based approach (Reicher, 2011; Stott et al, 2013). I do not concern myself here with the debate as to whether they should or should not be gathering intelligence. Arguably, they are police officers first and foremost, separating roles and requirements in Stott’s terms can in practice prove highly difficult or be notional at best. However, if the key characteristic of the liaison role according to Stott et al (2013, p.14) is to “identify ‘influential’ people in crowds in order to work with them in the interests of promoting ‘self-regulation’ and therefore peaceful protest”, there exists an argument for dialogue to be conducted by non-police officers. This is because in its purist form what is being required of them does not require a warranted status or the execution of any police powers. After all is said and done, policing functions are increasingly provided by non-police officers and there are many examples of police staff engaged in intelligence roles.
**Tactical flexibility**

The second element of the proposed framework for public order policing relates to tactical flexibility (HMIC, 2011b). One of the roles of police leaders is to reflect upon police responses to protests and identify the lessons learned, whether the tactics employed to facilitate lawful protest, manage civil disobedience and disorder are appropriate or require development. HMIC (2011b) have suggested a number of questions to aid reflection in the wake of the 2011 riots, covering a range of topics such as use of social media and communication, target hardening, use of physical barriers instead of police presence, focused containment of protesters, devolved command levels, information gathering and sharing, limitations and protections of the rights to protest and recognition by those organising and taking part in protests that it is unacceptable for the police to be used as a target for violence or to vent their frustrations. The latter might be seen as a laudable yet unrealistic proposition. However, what we notice here is again a focus on reflection after the event, the idea of the “debrief”. Arguably, this might help with planning for future events, but rather misses the importance of reflection in action.

Tactical flexibility means that police responses must be appropriately robust and effective, yet within the tradition of the British policing model of community engagement and consent, acting decisively whilst using the minimum force necessary to safeguard life and property (HMIC, 2011b). However, whilst policing by consent may be true in a wider sense, acknowledgement should be made that this is subjective and has contextual limitations, since policing is a particularly “conflict ridden enterprise” (Reiner, 2010, p. 69).

These assertions by HMIC are simplistic in light of the wide array of factors that appear to influence protester perceptions of the law, police and their legitimacy. An over reliance on the HMIC approach to change the face of public order policing risks repeating past mistakes and creating confusion for public and police alike. However, the two key objectives of embedding common national learning standards for public order and communicating new tactics and practice to senior command teams and officers remains their mission for developing police tactical flexibility (HMIC, 2011b).

There is recognition by HMIC that public consent can only be achieved through a public debate about policing priorities and by establishing realistic public expectations of what can be achieved in public order policing (subject to legal constraints). If the contingencies of PJ and the ESIM in the shape of asymmetry, the dialogic nature of police legitimacy and social distancing and motivational postures are applied to this analysis, we might conclude that only those who are aligned and engaged with the police and the authorities are likely to contribute to any debate. Yet to what extent might we rely on the notion of policing by consent in protest.
and public order policing tactics? The British way of policing relies heavily on the idea of policing by consent none more so perhaps than in public order policing (HMIC, 2009a, 2009b, 2011a, 2011b). However, the term carries something of a paradox about it.

Policing by its operational nature is discriminatory, whether through the application of discretion in exercising the law, the targeting of particular individuals or groups or in terms of a power dynamic (Waddington, 1994b, 1999). To truly police with the consent of some sections of the community, the police would, in certain contexts and encounters be paralysed into inactivity. Ultimately, people who do not wish to receive police attention will have it whether they approve of it or not (Waddington, 1994a, 1999). In the contexts of protest the term is ubiquitously applied under the rubric “no surprises” and facilitative, negotiated management styles of policing. Yet, can the policing of protest ever be entirely consensual? To what degree do the police always retain control of the parameters and terms upon which protest takes place? Restriction and restraint, not necessarily overt, can be tacitly applied through the acceptance of police terms and conditions by protesters and event organisers (Waddington, 1994b). In this way, protesters concede because they know that there is a cost for not doing so, and in any negotiations the police ultimately hold the power (Waddington, 1994b).

However, this is not the same for those who place themselves outside of the formal mechanisms, what we might call the disengaged, dismissive and defiant who fall outside of this consensual contract. These situations signal the potential that for protesters and police alike, “the gloves are off” and that policing by consent is suspended. As Waddington (1994b) points out the problem is that policing by consent is:

…still policing and policing entails the potential ultimately to use coercive power. ‘Consent’ cannot mean genuinely informed and unconstrained agreement for that would imply the abrogation of police authority itself. (Waddington, 1994b, p.200)

A reliance on the idea that the police can always align themselves with the values of certain groups and be representative of them (as per the concepts of moral alignment and personal values in PJ) is doubtful, since consent can be considered to be highly context specific.

The revised framework for the policing of protest and public order revisits the use of force and aims to inform public discussion about it (HMIC, 2011a, 2011b). However, as I have alluded to earlier in the chapter the debate needs to go wider since at least as far back as G20, London 2009 and thereafter, public opinion appears to infer a more robust stance on the use of force than the police service takes. HMIC (2011b) caveat this by noting that:
Policing is not just about public support. By definition not everyone they arrest is supportive. Officers constantly have to work to win public confidence, but in their use of force they are accountable to the courts and the rule of law. Perceptions apart, they must act lawfully (emphasis added). (HMIC, 2011b, p.85)

On the one hand, we have the importance of public consensus, on the other, objective criteria (by law) about how force will be used and judged by the courts. In order to use force appropriately officers need to know that they are acting lawfully and that they are likely to have support from most people in the communities they police. HMIC (2011a, 2011b) identified that improved officer training in the law is necessary, but this will be insufficient alone. There is also a need to develop a shared understanding between the police and the public of the tactics that might be used in different scenarios. My own empirical research highlights protesters’ assessments of poor legal knowledge in police officers and their perceptions about police tactics. In the latter case, even relatively benign activities such as traffic control during marches can be viewed with suspicion and misinterpreted by protesters. There must be an acceptance in any debate of the significance of protester perceptions of police activity and a recognition that public consensus is unlikely.

In summary, where might this leave the attempts to legitimise protest and public order policing in Britain today? The recommended national framework continues to be pursued and sets out three expectations: the early resolution of disorder; mobilisation planning to ensure police forces are prepared for disorder; and the circumstances in which a range of police tactics (including the use of vehicles, water cannon and attenuating energy projectiles) can be considered (HMIC, 2011b). Ultimately this framework is intended to serve as the rules of engagement for protest and public order policing now. However, what is the impact and consequences of the somewhat contradictory recommendations and changes that have occurred since London G20, 2009?

The impact and consequences of HMIC recommendations for the policing of protest and public order.

What are the consequences of the convoluted and meandering course being steered through the world of protest and public order policing? Realistically, we can expect further reviews and recommendations to come post hoc, reflecting the increasing nature of protest, disorder and critiques of police involvement. For now, it will suffice to summarise the impact and consequences to date, I suggest that there is something of an identity crisis for the policing of protest and public order in the UK, created in part by the melange of reviews and contradictory guidance on offer. This observation can be made on five bases.
First, the police service lacks confidence in its ability to police protest and disorder effectively. Following very positive activity to meet the original recommendations in *Adapting to Protest* (HMIC, 2009a) and *Adapting to Protest 2: Nurturing the British model of policing* (HMIC, 2009b) the police had two major surprises in the form of the Student protests, 2010 and the August riots, 2011. Surprising, because in attempting to implement the *en vogue* policing model (derived from the ESIM and the policing of football and sporting event crowds) based on facilitating protester rights, taking a no surprises approach and using dialogue to establish greater legitimacy, they failed. That is not to say that the model *per se* is a failure or that heavy handed indiscriminate policing is desirable. However, the contingents and antecedents of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and cooperation and compliance remain unaccounted for. The perceived failures of protest and public order policing have served to erode both public and police confidence and the view that the police will not be supported endures in such terms as “if we [the police] use force, we are not confident we will be supported with all the media attention and the threat of legal action” (HMIC, 2011b, p.14).

Secondly, confusion arises from the training and guidance that officers at all levels receive. One minute being told go “soft” on protesters and now going hard on “rioters” (HMIC, 2011b). It can be difficult in the heat of disorder to establish who exactly is exercising a legitimate right to protest, who is a passer-by, who is intent on criminality and at what point one becomes the other or vice versa, such is the nature of the policing context. HMIC (2011a, 2011b) recognised that both officers and commanders experience frustration and degrees of cynicism about the strength of political and public desire for a robust policing response, while being trained and exhorted to operate in a more circumspect manner. The belief is that, were something untoward to happen, that same political and public support would rapidly evaporate.

Thirdly, following the G20, London 2009 and the incident leading to the tragic death of Ian Tomlinson, officers’ fear of accusations of heavy handedness impact negatively on their decision-making. Observers and commentators would do well to consider that *Adapting to Protest 1* (HMIC, 2009a) and its follow-up reviews have exerted considerable pressure on changes to the policing of protest, changes that HMIC now imply are erroneous (HMIC, 2011b). Consequently, if HMIC believed them to be inadequate, having recommended them previously then what is the police service and the public to make of it?

Fourthly, the issue of apparent clarity on the police use of force, which arguably is a defining feature of the public police with its state mandate and ability to use force on citizens (Bittner, 1970; Reiner, 2012; Waddington, 1994b, 1999), remains unresolved. HMIC and the College of Policing (CoP, 2015, HMIC, 2011a, 2011b) have considered and published legal advice on what constitutes the appropriate police use of force. However, I would argue that it
provides no greater clarity than the existing legal position in England and Wales, namely that officers are accountable and responsible for their individual use of force and must be able to justify their actions in law. This is a longstanding situation covered under Common law principles, the Criminal Law Act 1967 and the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Instead, officers’ accountability and responsibility are simply restated among the ten key principles for the use of force in public order issued by HMIC (2011a, 2011b) and the College of Policing (CoP, 2015). As such, this neuters any claim that new guidance provides more clarity about the circumstances and criteria surrounding the proportionate use of force in protest and public order policing.

On a positive note, HMIC have consistently lobbied for a codification of public order policing since G20, 2009 (under S39a of the Police Act, 1996). This is similar to other Codes of Practice that are in force, for example PACE Code A for Stop and Search and the established PACE Code C for custody and detention. However, there appears to be no senior police and government appetite for its introduction. Arguably, a code of practice for public order policing would provide transparency, clarity and something of a yardstick for the police and public alike, in short everyone knows where they stand in terms of compliance and accountability. Structurally, a code of practice for public order would provide clear, internal rules that underpin the notion of police legality, which is a component of perceived legitimacy (Beetham, 1991).

Finally, there is inconsistency and contradiction with approaches used across other areas of policing activity. Specifically, this relates to the use of stop and search powers in protest. The police use of stop and search generally, has been a highly contentious issue for many years and arguments concerning the consequences of its disproportionate use and how it is perceived by the public are well rehearsed and documented (HMIC, 2013, 2015). However, stop and search as a preventative, early intervention tactic in public order is singled out by HMIC as a tool for managing protest and disorder (HMIC, 2009b, 2011b). Together with a call for its use in conjunction with a “proactive, deterrent [officer] presence” (HMIC, 2011b, p.7) it raises real challenges for officers and commanders seeking to secure consensual legitimacy. Protest contexts are those where such actions can so often be counterproductive and provocative to the community. Notably, the use of stop and search was cited as a causal factor for the August, 2011 riots across the UK, with its “inappropriate use having a corrosive effect on community relations” (RCVP, 2012, p.13). Oddly, HMIC (2011b, p.16) observe that when those determined on violence organise themselves at short notice to “attack the community, early decisive [stop and search] intervention through effective local mobilisation offers the best opportunity of stopping the spread of rioting”, this rather misses the point that often these are people of that community, as rioter profiles indicate (RCVP, 2012). The
benefits of stop and search tactics should be weighed against the potential negative impact on public confidence in the police. Patently, there is a distinct fracture between the HMIC recommendation for greater use of stop and search in protest and public order policing and other reviews and empirical evidence on its use and negative consequences (EHRC, 2010; HMIC, 2013, 2015; HMICFRS, 2016; RCVP, 2012).

This chapter has critically discussed attempts to legitimise the policing of protest and public order in the UK. It documented calls for a shift from repressive policing tactics to ones based on facilitation of peaceful protest on a “no surprises” basis. The chapter highlighted how this was short-lived following HMIC reviews of the August, 2011 riots and calls for more robust policing interventions. The net effect of these reviews has been demonstrated as contributing to more confusion than clarity for the police and public alike, calling into question the utility of approaches based on PJ and the ESIM. They also highlight the diversity of public opinion about how the police should respond to protest and disorder, and the validity of their tactics.

The events and aftermath of G20, London 2009 provided something of a watershed for the policing of protest and public order, one in which genuine attempts have been made to further legitimise it. Out of a concentrated period of protests and disorders in the UK, reviews and recommendations have abounded. However, they are not without contradictions that prove problematic for police legitimacy. What is clear is that the police need to acknowledge and understand the unique context of protest and its policing and develop the means to understand the nuances associated with the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to compliance and cooperation.
Chapter 5

The research strategy, methodology and processes

This chapter sets out in detail the research strategy, methodology and processes employed for the two stages of empirical research and the construction of the CDM. The strategy consists of a mixed method design, employing an exploratory, quantitative survey intended to examine the initial research questions, followed by a detailed qualitative exploration of the findings and investigation of factors associated with the construction and shaping of protest perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to cooperation and compliance.

The strategy is informed by aspects of the grounded theory method (GTM) insofar as the coding and analytic methods used, but does not claim a grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006; Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Urquhart, 2011). It is not uncommon for researchers to use the tools of grounded theorists without developing what would be described as a substantive grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006; Urquhart, 2011). While the sequencing of the research is not intended to imply distinctly separate stages and should be seen holistically, for ease of discussion, thesis structure and clarity I do refer to the exploratory quantitative survey as Phase 1 and the qualitative interviews and observations as Phase 2.

The mixed method approach

The research design can broadly be described as a sequential research study (Creswell, 2003; Robson, 2011) that investigates the influences associated with protesters’ perceptions of police legitimacy and cooperation and compliance. The approach is two-fold. First, to provide a preliminary quantitative exercise in establishing if the commonly held claims of PJ are to be found in the specific context of protest. Second, to identify and investigate themes for further qualitative investigation. I have relied upon a comparative and reflective process between the two phases of inquiry and link the findings, observations and themes from the exploratory survey with the later qualitative data collection and analytic developments of phase 2.

The study is informed by specific aspects of GTM, insofar as taking emerging findings back into the field to engage participants through structured and semi-structured interviews, non-participant observation, and analysis of video footage of protest events gathered by the researcher. In phase 2, I adopt the following process from GTM to develop the preliminary findings from the survey, 1) data collection based on the established and emerging themes and relationships, 2) initial (line-by-line) coding, 3) focused coding and category identification (Charmaz, 2006). I have relied upon note-taking to capture the conceptual developments aimed at constructing the categories and factors that eventually form the CDM of police legitimacy (see chapter six). As stated it is not intended that the work be seen as two distinct
and exclusively separate entities, the phased distinction in this chapter is made in order to provide transparency, clarity in the discussion and ease of critique of my work. It is also provided in the event that others may wish to replicate the research in the future.

I am aware that this may be uncomfortable since the terminology used might imply a pre-disposed theory that is being pursued in a positivist fashion. However, it is entirely consistent according to some authors for a GTM to be used in order to develop initial findings, and to investigate results that have been established elsewhere (Charmaz, 2006; Robson, 2011). It is both an overall strategy in conducting mixed method research and a means of coding and analysing data. Whilst commonly seen as suitable for qualitatively-based data collection there appears no requirement that this is exclusively so (Robson, 2011).

The research focuses on a “real-life” context and the dynamic social situation of protest and public order policing. This poses a problem for the researcher in that there is a requirement, following previous similar research to have a quantitative element aimed at testing the validity and reliability of the constructs associated with empirical police legitimacy, and focused qualitative research to explore their meaning and interpretation (Jansen, 2010). The first phase seeks to provide a confirmatory baseline. However, in keeping with the epistemological and ontological assumptions set out below (see p. 120) this is not to imply an external, objective social reality capable of singular, independent observation and measurement. Protest is a complex social, political and interactional activity that is highly contextualised. Survey research can and is often used in a precursory manner with the advantage that the meaning of the responses can be developed and interpreted beyond the initial quantitative statistical analysis through subsequent investigation (della Porta and Keating, 2008). Both are important if I am to be able to engage my own thesis with the assumptions and conclusions drawn from similar PJ research whilst maintaining a degree of flexibility for other explanations to emerge. The approach provides the framework for examining how perceptions of police legitimacy are constructed and shaped. I seek to interpret and explain the social situation through what Phillips and Burbules (2000, p.43) call a “rational activity based on evidence and a social activity based on power, politics and ideology”. However, this must be seen in light of the difficulties in claiming absolute knowledge about human behaviour and activity.

Whilst a positivist view seeks to define a priori variables, establish measurement, propose hypotheses and causal relationships, a constructivist view introduces the notion that people seek to make sense of their own experience and reality (Creswell, 2003). In social constructionism this hinges on the processes of personal interaction with others, and the environment rather than a concrete, independent social reality. Crotty (1998) elaborates on
the social aspects of this worldview in terms of meaning being personally created through
engagement with the world and by interaction with others in historical, social and cultural ways.
For the researcher, data collection and analysis need to take account of the setting and context
of the activity. When applied in an interpretivist dimension to social activity an approach
informed by GTM appears to offer significant benefits because of the close relationship
between the stages of coding, categorising of data and the way in which meaning and
interpretation are constructed and represented (Creswell, 2003; Urquhart, 2011).

A research strategy informed by GTM is not exclusively qualitative or quantitative and
it appears to be entirely consistent as a research approach that combines the strengths,
rigours and richness of both interpretations of the term “paradigm” (Urquhart, 2011). Moreover,
we should remain cognisant that the qualitative “paradigm” has many within it (Denzin and
Lincoln, 2000; Pitman and Maxwell, 1992).

Any research strategy is not entirely value free, something of which I am aware. Just
as other researchers do, I acknowledge that I carry assumptions about the social reality and
the topic area and I have needed to choose a method that provides “best fit” with similar
research and to my own research questions (Bryant and Charmaz, 2007). I echo that no one
comes to engage in research as tabula rasa when seeking any explanation of the social world.
It would be naïve to approach my research without acknowledging these assumptions and
taking necessary measures through the application of appropriate means to mitigate bias.

The benefit of the approach taken in Phase 1 is that it allows my study to use existing
constructs from similar research elsewhere to examine the relationships associated with
perceived police legitimacy and compliance and cooperation with the law. The focus of the
exploratory survey is to provide a form of ‘signposting’ to themes that can be further
investigated and engaged with in an iterative process. In short, phase 1 provides self-reported
information about what people perceive, while phase 2 investigates the processes and
influences involved with how these perceptions are shaped in order to construct a much richer
explanation (Charmaz, 2006; Creswell, 2003). The qualitative components of both phases
enable me to focus on the context of participants’ experiences and perceptions and tentatively
examine the outcomes of the initial survey, while establishing a richer explanatory narrative.
The strength of a phased approach lies in gaining more detailed information than a purely
quantitative survey would ever provide (della Porta and Keating, 2008). This strength is useful
where there appear to be unknown or additional processes at work that have not yet or cannot
be operationalized for measurement as variables (Pasick et al, 2009). Since part of my
research problem implies that there are gaps in our knowledge currently, and it seeks to
understand the construction and shaping of perceptions of police legitimacy, it is appropriate
to include this approach in my research strategy. I contend that thinking about and approaching research into protester perceptions of police legitimacy in a different way to that undertaken elsewhere, provides my study with originality and establishes opportunity to further our understanding in this area of research.

One of the challenges of a mixed method approach is how to integrate the data collected and how data produced from seemingly different world views and research approaches can provide coherent explanations? Creswell and Plano Clark (2011) provide explanations for how this can be achieved whereby the data are merged. Two data types can be connected when the analysis of one type of data leads to the requirement for the other to be collected. According to Creswell and Plano Clark (2011) this can occur in one of two ways. Firstly, a researcher may establish quantitative results that in turn lead to the subsequent collection and analysis of qualitative data. Secondly, the connecting of data can occur in different ways, such as in clarifying the research questions, identifying relevant participants and sampling requirements. My own approach uses these ideas about connecting and merging. The quantitative element provides information and value-based outcomes to inform later qualitative data collection, and develops theoretical sensitivity (Charmaz, 2006).

One of the most appropriate ways to use this combination is in a sequential design where the results of one dataset builds on or informs the other (Creswell, 2003). Utilising segments of qualitative data in the form of comments made by participants during the phase 1 survey, helps to identify aspects of police legitimacy beyond the commonly defined constructs in the PJ research elsewhere. This approach assists in linking the phase 1 analysis and findings to the themes of phase 2. In applying GTM I have taken this further by allowing for iterations backward and forward in a constant comparative manner (Charmaz, 2006).

**A note on epistemology and ontology**

For the sake of clarity and in claiming a scientific endeavour, I rely upon certain interpretations of ontology and epistemology that have informed the pursuit of the initial research questions and the emerging themes. I refer to ontology as the position being adopted regarding the nature of the social world. The assumption applied to the present work is that protesters’ realities are constructed by them, through the interplay of internal and external processes and influences. I refer to epistemology as the way in which knowledge of the social world is made possible. The assumption applied herein is that knowledge of the protester’s world is developed through social interaction and interpretation, thus rendering mine a constructivist, interpretivist position (Charmaz, 2006, 2014; Weed, 2009).
The present work focuses on perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to compliance and cooperation with the police which are somewhat abstract notions. For this reason, I do not rely upon a single, objective social reality existing beyond the participants. Instead, I rely on the idea that individuals in the research context construct their own social reality. Thus, an epistemology that direct knowledge can be gained purely through direct observation and measurement cannot be relied upon. My underlying assumption here is one of seeing observations and measurement as providing indirect indications of phenomena. The moment that I apply a survey question based on what is deemed a readily held PJ concept, I am aware that it may be limited and inadequate as a means of capturing a person’s internal world and their perception of reality. To that end it only provides a fallible and partial knowledge. I accept that I am in a sense forcing an expectation on them that implies their reality can be measured in the finite terms of the question(s). Indeed, the very words used in a survey may in fact be interpreted variously by different people in differing contexts. Thus, I have no expectation in using a survey based on operationalised constructs that I am measuring anything other than a person’s constructed social reality, and that such may be influenced by the choice and application of questions and participants’ interpretations. These observations indicate a social constructivist position (Charmaz, 2006; Weed, 2009).

As a researcher I engage with constructed realities in an interpretive manner and my research develops interactionally. I come to the research process with prior knowledge and expertise related to the policing of protest and public order, thus I acknowledge that my own values play a role and potentially influence the research process, even where mitigation is in place to reduce the effect of any bias (Charmaz, 2006). I respond to the method and my analysis in a flexible way and aim to gather data intended to seek out how “participants construct their lives and worlds” (Charmaz, 2006, p.403). Charmaz (2006) defines this approach in the following terms:

…social constructionists combine their attention to context, action and interpretation…and in using strategy informed by GT methods as producing dense analyses with explanatory power as well as conceptual understanding. (Charmaz, 2006, p.408)

The type of scientific reasoning applied in GTM is subject of considerable debate concerning whether it can claim to be inductive, deductive or abductive. Both Glaser and Strauss in their body of publications have claimed that GTM is an inductive method (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 2002; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Whether this is in part an effort to distinguish it from other sociological research methods that rely on deduction is subject of speculation by others (Anderson, 2004; Andersen & Kaspersen, 2000; Bryant & Charmaz, 2007). Induction has its own perceived shortcomings, one relating to recognising the existence
of exceptional cases and the other the subjective influence of the researcher mediating the observations (Birks et al, 2009; Bryant & Charmaz, 2007). However, the limitations of inductive thinking in GTM are recognised and some authors advocate use of the abductive method (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007; Charmaz, 2014; Reichertz, 2012).

In general terms, abduction is a circular process involving raising a hypothesis based on pre-existing knowledge or evidence and afterwards ‘creatively’ testing that hypothesis (Creswell, 2003). The process may result in new knowledge that is then tested again, influencing the hypothesis with the study ending when the researcher has the best explanation to fit the research problem (Birks et al, 2009). Abduction then makes no claim to reach any universal truth rather an inference to the best explanation. As a means of approaching social research from a constructivist perspective it has certain commending features relevant to grounded theory methods as Reichertz (2012) observes:

The great success of abduction may be traced back to two particular features, first to its indefiniteness and second to the misjudgement of the achievements of abduction that derive from this. For abduction is no longer treated as a traditional, classical means of drawing conclusions but as a new method not yet incorporated into formal logic. However, it is in every sense a means of inferencing. It is precisely in this quality of being a means of inferencing that we find the secret charm of abduction: it is a logical inference (and thereby reasonable and scientific), however it extends into the realm of profound insight and therefore generates new knowledge. (Reichertz, 2012, p.216)

**Strengths and weaknesses of the research design**

Clearly, in any research design there are strengths and weaknesses, indeed none can be free from defect. Acknowledging them and having a strategy for mitigation during the research process is required for robust and defensible science. I will discuss the relative strengths and weaknesses below and explain how they are mitigated. In general terms a mixed method approach can be highly resource intensive given the stages and the time taken to do so (Robson, 2011), sampling issues can arise and there is a need for adequate sample sizes across the qualitative and quantitative stages. Data collection, analysis and interpretation are all potential issues (Bryman, 2006; Teddlic and Yu, 2007).

Sample size is certainly an issue for the exploratory phase 1 survey given the small number gathered. It would be entirely untenable to seek any claim of generalisation from a sample of forty participants when the population from whence they came consists of potentially tens of thousands. However, in taking a social constructivist approach I acknowledge that generalisations can be partial, conditional, and situated in time and space in any case (Charmaz, 2006). Arguably, one of the limitations of PJ research are that its claims lie in generalisation of the means to create perceptions of legitimacy and foster compliance across
a realm of policing situations, without seeing the variance that comes from specific policing contexts. In social constructivism generalisation is seen as problematic and perceived as partial and conditional (Charmaz, 2006).

I only rely on the exploratory survey results and conclusions as a preliminary exercise to link my research with similar in the field of PJ. More specific challenges for my own study are perhaps two-fold. Firstly, there is the decision about which results from phase 1 are to be followed up in phase 2. Secondly, how might any differences that emerge in phase 2 be accounted for? There is an acceptance in PJ research that certain competing (confounding) variables can impact the constructs used for measuring police legitimacy, while they are often quantitatively accounted for, these competing variables are not exhaustive. In effect this means that not everything is accounted for in the quantitative measures. Thus, I contend that a research design should be capable of capturing and dealing with others that have not been operationalised as variables. The solution here lies in the flexibility provided by a GTM approach which allows for iteration between data and does not confine collection to predetermined variables. Since any approach seeking to provide explanation must be planted in the data, GTM allows for data collection that is reflective as new themes emerge and for iteration between data, the codes and categories identified during the ongoing analysis (Charmaz, 2014). It also mitigates the perceived shortfalls that I have highlighted above.

In the context of the thesis, providing representativeness is not the main focus in terms of randomisation to establish statistical generalisation to the wider population. The sampling applied to the phase 2 research is aimed at gathering data to establish categories that relate to the emerging codes and development of the CDM (Daniel, 2012; Robson, 2011).

To summarise, in phase 2 the protest events observed and the persons interviewed are selected on the basis of established themes being examined in further detail, construction of others and those emerging from the ongoing analysis. It should be noted that this is not a licence to merely exclude inconvenient exceptions or outlying data. Information obtained during data collection must be compared and contrasted throughout the analysis in a constant comparative fashion (Corbin and Strauss, 2008; Robson, 2011; Strauss and Corbin, 1998), using an iterative process (Charmaz, 2006; Weed, 2009). Theoretical sampling is considered suitable as a sampling method aimed at theory development and modelling processes. It utilises a confirmatory and dis-confirmatory approach since the researcher selects cases on their merit in advancing or demonstrating explanation. As Daniel (2012) explains:

Data are interpreted in terms of a theory and generalised to a theory, rather than to a population. Glaser (1978) indicated that in using theoretical sampling the analyst jointly collects, codes and analyses his data and decides what to collect next and where, in order to develop theory as it emerges. (Daniel, 2012, p.91)
On this basis, sample elements that give high level support or indeed critique can be selected. Elsewhere this is sometimes referred to as critical case sampling (Morse, 2009). My sampling approach will allow for the results and themes from the survey to be further examined and interpreted in light of emerging data and identified categories (Creswell et al, 2011; Daniel, 2012). Utilising theoretical sampling to stimulate further data collection around constructed categories and relationships can be done where tentative themes are developed. Charmaz (2014, p.205) describes this as the ability to “check, qualify and elaborate the body of categories and to specify the relationships”. While there are many advantages in using a certain approach informed by GTM in that it sets out processes for sampling, data collection, coding and analysis in a systematic and structured fashion, it is not without criticism. Aside from the well documented philosophical and structural schism between its original founders there are other perceived problems associated with using GTM (Charmaz, 2006; Urquhart, 2011).

The first criticism relates to the place given to existing literature and theory in the research process. In many academic traditions it is the norm to engage in a form of literature review at the outset and certainly in a deductively based approach to test hypotheses from the theory. GTM appears to downplay the significance of the literature review and its application, seeing it as in some way contaminating the researcher’s open-mindedness. However, Urquhart (2011) states that this is a common misconception. She advises that while the dictum may be that there is no need to review the previous literature this is not to say that the researcher should not. Reviewing literature might be delayed or postponed in order to prevent the researcher preconceiving categories from the data collected. However, I argue that this should be balanced against the observation that there is a difference between “an open mind and an empty head” (Dey, 1993, p.63). The researcher needs to have developed a theoretical sensitivity to the research topic that provides the ability to recognise and extract from data those elements that have significance and relevance to the research problem (Birks and Mills, 2011).

Typically, the theoretical sensitivity of a researcher has three features, 1) professional competence and experience, 2) techniques, tools and strategies and 3) development during the research process (Bryant and Charmaz, 2007). How else would we obtain the elements of theoretical sensitivity without reading and reviewing relevant literature? Urquhart (2011) answers this question with the assertion that an initial literature review does provide benefits when using a GTM approach because it investigates what theory already exists and how others might have approached the research problem. The role of the literature review and the debate within GTM on its significance is in some degree unimportant to my own approach since I am not claiming a grounded theory. However, since my methodology leverages aspects
of it, it could be interpreted that I have relied upon a form of literature review in the preceding chapters to develop an acute theoretical sensitivity. The literature review also helps to situate my own research within a theoretical framework and to meaningfully engage with the prevailing debate on PJ and ESIM as they relate to police legitimacy and protest policing.

The second criticism of using GTM relates to perceived inflexibility which stems from its systematic approach to coding data and categorising. However, this may well relate to a specific variant of the approach (Charmaz, 2006; Urquhart, 2011). Whether this is the case may be a matter of personal preference and experience, others have commented on the inflexible aspect of the Straussian paradigm (Kendall, 1999; Urquhart, 2011). However, the coding process that I have applied draws on that developed by Charmaz (2006, 2014) and provides best fit with the social constructionism underlying the present work. I draw upon the following coding process: initial coding (line by line), focused coding (comparing and coding the initial codes), identification of categories, theoretical sampling for categories and the development of factors from the categories. Notes and memo writing are utilised throughout the process to establish relationships and test and develop theoretical thinking. The coding process is elaborated in further detail in the phase 2 analysis section.

A third criticism of using GTM relates to the level of theory generated from its use. It appears this stems from the micro-level at which data is analysed, sometimes resulting in "rich and detailed" data that is not scaled up (Urquhart, 2011, p.30). This would not appear to be an inherent characteristic of GTM itself but more related to the researcher failing to scale up the theory generated through the procedures into a wider formal theory (Charmaz, 2006; Strauss, 1987). Previously, I commented on the distinction between using aspects of GTM in my own research and producing a grounded theory per se. I stress that my own research utilises an analytic approach informed by GTM and is not aimed at formulating a grounded theory in its pure sense (Charmaz, 2006, Urquhart, 2011). The process being applied produces an arrangement of factors that can be expressed as an explanatory model.

A fourth criticism comes in attaching epistemology to an approach informed by GTM. Is it positivist or interpretivist? I have already set out my own philosophical position for the present study. However, the attachment of a definitive label may limit its use and or scientific validity depending in which stable the reader resides. However, it appears in practice, given the range and diversity of research areas where GTM has been applied that this is not the case. Urquhart and Fernandez (2006) propose that it is in line with, rather than oblique to many data types and the diverse epistemological assumptions of researchers that appear to use it. Charmaz (2006) notes that GTM as an approach is epistemologically neutral and Urquhart (2011) elaborates on this statement as follows:
Indeed, it is the strength of the detailed coding processes and category formation that commended GTM to the present work, and its ability to build explanatory understanding in the form of a model.

Doubtless there will be many for whom there exist more shortcomings of this type of approach, it is not within my scope or persuasion to seek to address them all. I merely seek to explain and apply a rationale for the method which ultimately best informs the pursuit of my own research questions and which I contend provides best fit. Whatever the criticisms and shortcomings of using aspects of GTM, as others have noted elsewhere the choice of a research method and its tradition provide some defensibility for the considered researcher. In short it provides a degree of:

Shelter and support from criticism – providing that the ways of the tribe are followed. And, less cynically the fact that previously a group of researchers and methodologists have worked away at the approach over a number of years making it likely that solutions to problems and difficulties have been found. (Robson, 2011, p.150)

To conclude, I have set out the overall research strategy and methodology for the empirical research in general terms. The ontological and epistemological aspects of the thesis have been discussed and made prominent together with a justification of the strategy and methods being applied. I have identified and acknowledged strengths and perceived weaknesses. I will now explain in more detail the Phase 1 survey methodology and consider some specific issues related to the survey design and its implementation.

**Phase 1 exploratory survey method**

In this section I will set out the specific methodology for the survey questionnaire used in phase 1. The discussion includes reference to the scales used, the use of forced responses, the limitations and issues specific to Likert scales such as the level of data collected, and how they can be analysed appropriately. I explain the development of the survey, means of administration and sampling procedures together with the ethical challenges that I faced as a serving police officer and researcher, and mitigation measures applied. The phase 1 exploratory survey utilises a structured quantitative survey intended to collect data about the defined variables associated with perceptions of police legitimacy and cooperation and compliance with the police. Opportunity is also provided for qualitative data to be captured by way of comments made by the participants to certain questions as is the norm in this type of survey (Moser and Kalton, 1971; Punch, 2005). The research questions addressed by the
survey aim to establish the extent to which the claims of PJ and its correlates hold in the specific context of protest in the following ways:

- What is the relationship between protester perceptions of police legitimacy and cooperation and compliance during protest?
- What association is there between protester moral alignment with the police and cooperation in protest?
- What association is there between protester personal values about the law and cooperation and compliance in protest?
- What is the relationship between moral alignment with the police and how protesters perceive events and event treatment?
- What association is there between protester perceptions of event treatment by the police and cooperation and compliance?

The survey questionnaire gathers data about the commonly applied constructs for the concept of police legitimacy as defined in the PJ literature, and the dependent variable of cooperation and compliance with the police as a stated outcome by the participants. It also seeks to record what might be foreseen as competing (or confounding) variables. According to Jackson et al (2011) the competing variables commonly encountered and measured in this area of research are:

- Previous police contact and personal experiences of the police;
- General attitudes about the law;
- Individual values of morality.

These have been accounted for and documented in the body of research on PJ and during the development of the European Social Survey (Round 5, Trust in Police and Courts) (ESS, 2011). It is acknowledged that further competing variables exist in the study of trust in criminal justice and policing and given the complexity of the notion of police legitimacy the methods that I have applied allow for these to be captured and investigated in phase 2. Indeed, in the final analysis I argue that the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to cooperation and compliance are subject to a much wider set of influences, antecedents and contingencies than PJ allows for. Moreover, I argue that the outcomes of greater police legitimacy and cooperation and compliance are moderated by
factors not fully accounted for by PJ. The variables commonly identified and measured in the PJ literature are:

**Dependent (or outcome) variables**

- Compliance and cooperation with the police, expressed by participants as a public duty to comply with the police;
- Perceptions of event treatment by the police.

**Independent (or predictor) variables**

- Trust and confidence in the police;
- Moral alignment of the police with the participant(s);
- Perceived legality of police actions;
- Treatment by the police.

The empirical work utilises a type of investigation that is widely used in this area of research, the retrospective post-event enquiry (Punch, 2005). In practice this is because the questions were asked after participants had taken part in a protest. The quantitative survey method is commonly used where a number of variables are identified and can be operationalised in the form of survey questions that can be administered in a naturally occurring situation (in this case at protest events). The approach has the advantages of ease of application, user friendliness, reduced response fatigue, consistency in both application and recording by the interviewer and timeliness in challenging environments such as protest events. It must be noted that due to the small sample size (n=40) statistical significance would be confounded. Therefore, the survey is descriptive only. Notwithstanding the statistical test limitations with Likert scales, seeking correlations and generalising to a wider population is not possible or desirable with a sample of 40 participants. However, the findings of the survey serve as a confirmatory exercise and to inform themes for later investigation and data collection in phase 2. This is entirely consistent with interpretations of a mixed method research design (Creswell, 2003; Creswell and Plano Clark, 2011; della Porta and Keating, 2008; Robson, 2011).

**Survey scales and related issues**

The scale applied to the survey questions is a Likert, 5-point scale (Likert, 1932) with the exception of certain introductory questions (for example, categories such as demographics and previous police contact). For the constructs operationalisation and in order to cover the
variables, each has a suite of three questions in the survey (twenty-one questions in total). It is acknowledged that there is a trend in quantitative social research for the use of 11-point scales. While the ESS (2011) (from which my survey partially draws questions) uses 11-points, I have relied upon a reduced scale. There are two key reasons for this, a theoretical and a practical one.

The case for 11-point scales providing optimum results has not been made beyond all doubt (Uslaner, 2002, 2010) while 5 to 7-points appear to reach a compromise. The compromise arrives in giving too little choice to participants or too much choice so as to confound them (Johns, 2010). An 11-point scale may imply a greater discrimination between response options than actually exists or participants cannot place themselves along it. Conversely, too few points, less than 5, may fail to provide enough intensity particularly in the case of attitude and opinion measurement. Evidence suggests that data collected using less than 5-points or more than 7 may become less accurate (Carifo and Perla, 2007; DeVellis, 2003). That said there are no substantial compelling grounds for lauding 5-point scales in preference to 7. Long scales, those in excess of 7 may mean that labelling the response options in a meaningful way becomes confusing and difficult for participants. This is highly pertinent given evidence that suggests detailed and discriminant labelling captures better quality data (Carifo and Perla, 2007; Devellis, 2003).

The European social survey (ESS, 2011) upon which many of my own survey questions are based, relies upon the 11-point scale presumably intending that it provides better results and advantages over 5 or 7-point scales. However, the template for the ESS does not discuss the rationale associated with 11-point scales (ESS, 2011). I have chosen not to use these in my own survey and have reduced the scales in the questions taken from the ESS. Partly this is a pragmatic approach, in order to lessen response fatigue, speed up completion in the field and to reduce confusion amongst participants. However, there is also a methodological reason elaborated in detail by others concerning the real value of 11-point scales (Uslaner, 2010).

Two key issues arise with such scales that are worthy of consideration. First, the problem of “clumping”, the tendency for participants to give responses in the mid-range of item response options. Although in fairness this can also be the case in lesser scales too. However, there is evidence to indicate that clumping is a particular issue with 11-point scales particular to measuring trust and related concepts (Uslaner, 2010). The second issue relates to the implication that an 11-point scale has more discrimination than may be felt and subsequently confuses the respondent whilst seeking improved precision. The provision of too many options can confuse participants and precipitate what is described as sub optimal choices (Schwartz, 2003). Whilst there has been a move toward 11-point scales, can they offer significant benefit
over and above others and on that basis render all others redundant? An 11-point scale may quite simply demand too much of participants. Evidence exists of reliability in 11-point scales elsewhere (Hooghe and Reeskens, 2007; Scherpenzeel and Saris, 1993; Zmerli and Newton 2008). However, if people are confused with the amount of options provided by an 11-point scale they might be expected to cluster around the centre options, a phenomenon demonstrated in several analyses of surveys used in measuring trust. Clumping around the midpoint has been shown to be systematic across a range of questions and surveys on trust (Uslaner, 2010). The available reference points in 11-point scales may be so extreme as to require more precision than people can realistically make. On balance the case for keeping an 11-point scale in my own survey questions is not conclusively made, therefore I have adapted them accordingly to provide a measurement tool that is both practical for use in the field and methodologically sound.

**Forcing responses on participants**

It is often the practice to provide odd numbers of response options in a survey in order to provide opportunity for a neutral midpoint, usually, in the guise of “don’t know” or “neither” options. Likert (1932) actually applied the term “undecided” originally but convention has evolved since then. However, there are circumstances where it may be appropriate and desirable to force responses from participants and avoid the so-called “fence-sitters” (Johns, 2005), since participants may use this option as a means to avoid reporting a choice which they see as less acceptable to the researcher or to avoid making a committed choice at all. Where there is likely to be an intense strength of attitude or feeling or its presence is key to the variables being measured, forcing a choice may be desirable and appropriate from the researcher’s perspective (Johns, 2005, 2010). For this reason, my survey uses question response options that tend to avoid those of “don’t know” (with a notable exception elaborated below). The option to record a “neither” response is provided where appropriate. There are specific questions that utilise a semantic differential scale (Osgood, 1952), which due to the numerical values of the response options, do provide a “don’t know” option, since there is no “neutral” position provided in the item response labels in verbal form. These are highlighted later in the detailed discussion of the survey questions.

In practical terms, conducting fieldwork in the challenging environment of a crowd situation or protest means that extended time for the completion of a barrage of questions and response options is not viable. Any scale applied to a survey in these dynamic situations needs to be clearly explained, easily understood by participants and delivered in such a manner as to maximise data quality, lessen bureaucracy and reduce response fatigue. It is acknowledged that the use of telephone surveys, panel studies and market research campaigns are afforded the luxury of somewhat more lengthy interviews, however, this is not the reality of fieldwork in
my area of study. Guidance on constructing and using surveys commends the researcher to adopt as straightforward approach as possible, therein lies the tension between convenience and the quality of data. Johns (2010) summarises the dilemma facing the researcher thus:

…quite often in survey design, then, there is a trade-off between convenience— for both researcher and respondent— and data quality. In that case, it is all the more important to follow simple rules both for individual items and for composite scales. (Johns, 2010, p.11)

Balancing the challenges of the fieldwork environment, the needs of the participant and collecting quality data has been the driving force in my own survey design whilst securing evidence in support of the method, scales and response options applied.

**Issues relating to Likert scales**

While popular and ubiquitous the Likert scale has specific challenges inherent with its application. There are three main criticisms relating to Likert scales, the error of central tendency, acquiescence bias and issues around the level of quantitative data that they gather. The error of central tendency relates to the general phenomenon that responses centre around a particular value or characteristic. In terms of Likert scales this is evident because participants can tend to avoid selecting the extreme points on a scale and gather at the centre, this has been discussed in detail above in the section on scale size, item response values and clumping.

Acquiescence bias relates to the tendency for participants to agree with an item value regardless of content (Garland, 1991; Winkler et al, 1982). This is often the case where attitudes are being measured and the attitude structure is not well known. However, arguably in the context of the present work this attitude structure has been demonstrated in previous empirical research (ESS, 2011). The impact of acquiescence is that measurement accuracy can be reduced on sensitive issues and associations between similarly worded items that are not conceptually linked can be higher (Winkler et al, 1982). It has been identified that higher levels of positive responses occur in interviews relating to acquiescence bias. Acquiescence in that context is defined by Holbrook et al (2003, p.286) as “a culturally based tendency to agree because it is easier than to disagree”. However, a review of literature on this topic indicates that this most commonly occurs in health-related research, sexuality issues and drug and alcohol research (Tourangeau and Yau, 2007). Additionally, the effect is seen less in self-administered questionnaires and is more of a problem in non-face-to-face interviews, for example telephone surveys (Holbrook et al, 2003).

Improved accuracy in response rates has been demonstrated where face-to-face interviews with clear instructions occur and control of completion of the survey by the
researcher occurs with anonymity in completion (Tourangeau et al, 2000). Overall, research is inconsistent and inconclusive in this area, although it appears that there are steps the researcher can take to minimise the acquiescence effect both by design and in manipulating the data in analysis. The effect can be minimised by careful attention to the variables being captured and the connections between them. This is particularly the case where concepts that are operationalized have little or no provenance or the survey items have not been piloted, such attention relates to wording, format, content and context (Podsakoff et al, 2003). Wording relates to question construction and syntax which can be tested in a pilot stage and by using items with a peer reviewed provenance. Both are the case in respect of the present work. In terms of format, different response labels can diminish acquiescence bias where verbal labels are used and the use of negative or positive number values is avoided (Podsakoff et al, 2003; Tourangeau et al, 2000).

It has been suggested that the use of negatively worded labels mitigate the bias (Barnette, 2000). While this might be the case the practice has been shown to be damaging to internal consistency, which as a disadvantage weighs against doing so. The present work relies on existing protocol that avoids negatively worded labels on the Likert scale items within the questionnaire. By creating logical breaks in the survey layout, the researcher can lessen the acquiescence effect. This makes previous responses less salient and relevant and creates a gap in the survey chronology and interpretation, the result has a positive impact on participant cognition. Examples of such gaps are section breaks, introductory comments, chronology of themes and explanatory notes being provided (Podsakoff et al, 2003).

The discussion of the survey questionnaire and question provenance below highlights that most if not all of the measures aimed at reducing the impact of acquiescence bias have been attempted in the phase 1 survey.

**The nominal versus ordinal data debate**

I will discuss here the specific issue of data type commonly associated with Likert scales. This is because it is contested and incorrectly applied at times. An understanding of what level of data are collected informs the statistical tests to be applied in my later analysis and what conclusions can validly be drawn. As we shall see there are debates concerning the levels of measurement and whether data obtained by Likert scales can or should be analysed using parametric or non-parametric tests.

Likert scales are ubiquitous in the measurement of attitudes and are undoubtedly useful in giving a range of responses to value statements or specific questions. The response options in Likert scales have a rank order, but the intervals between these values are not equal
(Jamieson, 2004). Traditionally, Likert scales are assumed to offer a level of measurement providing ordinal data. However, it has become common practice for researchers to treat the data as if the intervals are equal. Ordinal data can be described as “data in which an ordering or ranking of responses is possible but no measure of distance is possible” (Allen and Seaman, 2007, p.1). Jamieson (2004) identifies that the legitimacy of assuming an interval scale for Likert type categories is of fundamental concern to a research study since descriptive and inferential statistical tests differ for ordinal and interval variables. She contends that if the wrong statistical technique is used, the researcher runs the risk of drawing incorrect conclusions, misrepresenting their findings or misleading others. Specifically, the mean (and standard deviation) are unsuitable for ordinal data. Most sources on the matter iterate that for ordinal data the median or mode should be used as the measure of central tendency (Field, 2009). The mathematics applied to calculate the former are inappropriate for ordinal data since the numbers generally represent what are verbal responses. Most parametric analyses are based on normal distribution (Allen and Seaman, 2007). Ordinal data may be described using frequencies and percentages (Jamieson, 2004). Researchers are generally advised that ordinal data should be dealt with by using non-parametric tests. There is continuing debate over whether ordinal scales can be treated as interval. It appears to have become common practice to treat Likert scales as if they somehow yield interval data and to apply parametric testing improperly (Blaikie, 2003; Jamieson, 2004; Knapp, 1990; Kuzon et al, 1996). Some authors allude to treating Likert scale data as if they are greater than ordinal but somehow less than interval, this is somewhat confusing and lacks scientific consensus (Sani and Todman, 2006). Clearly, an informed and evidence-based method must be selected from the outset before data are coded and entered into any database for analysis.

Issues concerning levels of measurement, the appropriateness of mean, standard deviation and parametric statistics and the purpose of the analysis need to be resolved in the design stage of any research study (Jamieson, 2004; McCrum-Gardner, 2007). Non-parametric tests should be deployed if the data are obviously ordinal in nature. Where the data can be demonstrated to be classed as interval the sample size and normal distribution should be taken into account. Jamieson (2004, p.2) summarises the controversy and the weight that we should give to it as follows:

The average of fair and good is not fair-and-a half this is true even when one assigns integers to represent fair and good. (Jamieson, 2004, p.2)

In order to comply with long held and well supported convention I treat the phase 1 quantitative data as ordinal in nature and do not make parametric assumptions concerning their treatment.
The use of non-parametric statistics

Non-parametric test methods are generally less powerful than parametric ones (Field, 2009; Rowntree, 1981). Mean and standard deviation are not considered valid parameters for descriptive statistics when data is ordinal. Non-parametrics that are based on measures such as range, rank and median are more appropriate. Further non-parametric tests based on distribution free assumptions such as tabulations, frequencies, contingency tables and Pearson’s Chi square can be employed with ordinal data (Allen and Seaman, 2007). Non-parametric methods that can be applied to Likert scale data are Mann-Whitney U test, Chi-square test, Fisher’s exact correlation coefficient and Wilcoxon signed rank test provided that the test assumptions are met. The statistical tests applied to the phase 1 data will be elaborated further in the analysis and results section of my thesis. In summary, data obtained by Likert scales should not involve parametric statistics because it is ordinal in nature as discussed above. Some researchers advocate doing so as a pilot analysis only. In keeping with tradition and the mainstream arguments concerning such matters, I will employ non-parametric methods to provide the descriptive analysis and tests for association.

Developing and testing of the phase 1 survey questionnaire

I will now discuss how the survey questionnaire was developed, tested in the pilot stage, the method of administration, sampling frame and ethical considerations. I conclude with an annotated explanation of the survey items (a copy of the questionnaire is shown at Appendix 4).

The constructs associated with police legitimacy have been operationalised in a series of questions and related scales elsewhere. Most notably this occurred in Tyler’s seminal work on PJ in his “Chicago Study” (Tyler, 1990, 2006) and latterly as part of the European Social Survey (ESS) for which Jackson et al (2011) published a suite of measures for trust in criminal justice and police legitimacy. These measures have undergone extensive panel development and a validation process. Permission was obtained from the authors above for the use of certain questions from both studies. Due to the unique nature of the phase 1 survey and the challenges of conducting fieldwork in a dynamic protest environment some questions have been adapted. Specifically, such adaptation occurs around the size of the scalars used and the number of questions used to measure each construct in order to balance quality of information gained without making completion onerous on the participant. This allows for a more ‘user friendly’ questionnaire for participants that can be used in the field, reducing response fatigue and encouraging completion of the survey questions by participants. Arguably, there is a fine balance to be achieved between a rigorous, extended questionnaire regime and pragmatic parsimony. I have attempted to strike a balance between them.
Focus group and pilot stages

A pilot stage in the development of any survey is usually recommended to establish the adequacy of the questionnaire, the non-response rate to be anticipated and variability within the population being surveyed (Creswell, 2003; Moser and Kalton, 1971; Punch, 2005). Non-response rates become more critical to the investigation where the means of administration is online surveys, remote completion (such as handed out to respondents to be returned later) and telephone surveys. These are key reasons, other than cost and lack of control in who is actually completing the survey that the present work relies upon face-to-face interviews by the author. A further reason relates to the intention to capture qualitative data segments from participants for analysis. There is a specific consideration on the means of administration of my survey that is discussed later in terms of confidentiality and ethics.

Pilot studies usually produce too small a number to be useful statistically. However, they do provide valuable supporting evidence where issues later arise. It is perhaps in the area of adequacy that pre-testing and pilot studies yield useful information to the researcher. This stage of development enables evidence to be gained of the use-ability of the survey, clarity and meaning of the questions, instructions and its efficiency (Moser and Kalton, 1971; Robson, 2011). The use of dialogue with participants during and following completion is essential in identifying how they interpret the questions and response options, whether they need qualification (which identifies a poorly worded question or response option) and whether the questions “flow” properly. In summary, pre-testing and piloting the survey questionnaire results in design improvement and increased efficiency. This was achieved in the present work by conducting a street focus group and initial pilot which is described below. It should be noted that in GTM fashion I have used all of the data obtained, including that from the pilot stage in my subsequent analysis.

Street focus group and pilot of the survey

The initial draft of the survey questionnaire was drawn from existing sources as outlined above and then developed through a 'street' focus group. In these situations, convenience sampling on a self-selecting basis was applied in order to gather a small group of participants to discuss the content and the experience of completing the structured questionnaire. In the focus group a total of five participants at the Occupy London Stock exchange (Occupy LSX) protest, 2011 were approached by the researcher and asked to take part in a spontaneous focus group. The group comprised three males and two females, with five other people agreeing to verbal discussion with the researcher but not wishing to complete a written questionnaire. The participants were selected on the basis that they were taking part in an organised protest that was subject of police contact over a number of days. They were invited to take part and the
process explained and documented (consent forms and information sheets given) as would be the case in all future interviews. Following individual completion of the questionnaires all participants, including the two who had not recorded written responses but agreed to read and review the questionnaire were asked about the format and structure of the questionnaire, the clarity of the questions and response options and any other related feedback that they wished to give about the survey and the policing of the event. Due to the issues of trust and confidentiality this was not audio recorded but researcher notes were made contemporaneously. The discussion revealed three issues as described below.

1. **The need to record ethnicity?**

   Both female participants questioned the requirement to record ethnicity on the form and asked about the relevance of it. I explained that the purpose was to capture demographic information in order to establish any bias or observations about ethnic background of those taking part in protest events. I explained that it was self-defined by the participant and not imposed by the researcher. The explanation appeared to alleviate any concerns and it should be noted that this issue has never occurred since.

2. **Whether a “Don’t know” option is required on questions that have “Neither” as a response option?**

   Two male participants questioned the inclusion of both categories on the question response options. The view centred around the observation that “...if I don't know then I can select the neither can't I?” (Interview SQ1), and “Yeah the neither box seems ok as one option to me” (Interview SQ3).

3. **Self-completion as opposed to researcher administered**

   The procedure adopted was for the researcher to explain the process, seek consent and hand out the information sheets and then invite the participant to self-complete the survey questionnaire. The question posed by the researcher was whether this was preferable or if they would prefer to have the researcher administer it. The consensus was that they preferred doing it themselves and handing it back once completed. The point was made that it was useful having the researcher at hand in case they had any questions or needed clarification, in the following examples:

   “[…!] doing it [the survey] myself rather than feeling like it's a test or something” (Interviewee SQ3), and “I've done these before and it's a bit weird replying with someone standing there asking questions and writing it down, it's on the street and all?” (Interviewee SQ2).
These views were taken into account and the survey questionnaire adapted in respect of the response options and the method of administration to enable participants to self-complete the questionnaires. Following the focus group, a revised version of the questionnaire was then applied in future interviews.

**The survey questionnaire**

Here I provide a description of the measures contained in each question or suite of questions that relate to the constructs of PJ. Where any adaptations have been made to the original sources these are highlighted and explained. Regardless of any demonstrable provenance, in keeping with convention the scales covering the variables under examination have been subject to reliability testing using Cronbach’s alpha coefficient (α) (Cronbach, 1951). Where this has been the case the α value is reported below. The survey questionnaire is organised into the following sections with twenty-five questions in total:

- Demographic questions on age, gender and self-defined ethnicity;
- Previous contact and experience of the police;
- General trust and confidence in the police;
- Moral alignment with the police;
- Perceptions of police legality and integrity;
- Personal morality and attitude to the rule of law;
- Event specific perceptions of police activity and behaviour;
- Perceptions of cooperation and compliance expressed as a public duty during protest.

The survey begins with an introductory statement explaining the purpose of the first six questions, as asking about the protester and their general views about the UK police before they took part in the protest event.

Questions 1-3 relate to demographic information about the participants age, sex and self-defined ethnicity, which are generic crime survey type questions in common usage (BCS, 2008; ESS, 2011). The age ranges are recorded in multiples of 5 years with two exceptions, the 16-19 year age group and the over 80 years. In the former case this is because of the ethical issues related to interviewing children under the age of 16 years without a parent or guardian present. It was considered by the author to be unrealistic to expect that such would be available during and after a protest event and that even if they were it would prove problematic in the field to
carry out an extended consent process that such interviewing would require. Therefore, 16 years was the lowest age. Also, this is because during the literature review stage of the work, it was clear that this age group is rarely represented in the demographic of persons attending protest events and it mirrored the data collection methods applied in similar studies.

It is acknowledged that the use of age ranges in this manner has inherent limitations as to statistical analysis, given that they do not provide exact number values for the purposes of descriptive statistics such as the mean. That said, it is identical to the approach used in other like studies (ESS, 2011). Whilst it appears to be a given that research studies collect gender information, it is interesting to note that during the initial pilot stage of the survey development its use was questioned. When the questionnaire was piloted at the Occupy London Stock Exchange (Occupy LSX) event 2011, two of the respondents asked the author why this was necessary. While to the researcher, it may appear obvious that we should collect demographic details such as gender to ensure that our research is not gender biased this may not be so for the respondents.

Question 3 records participant’s ethnicity using the 16-point self-defined coding system (ESS, 2011; Home Office, 2011). This system is widely used in policing research and census studies and is copied in this present work from the Policing Families and Communities survey questions and British Crime survey questionnaire (Home Office, 2001, 2011, BCS, 2008).

Questions 4-5 are designed to gather data about previous contact and overall trust and confidence in the police by asking:

| Q4 In the past two years did the police approach you, stop you or make contact with you for any reason? If Yes, go to Q5. If No (or Don't know), go to Q6. |
|---|---|---|
| Yes- | No- | (Don’t Know) |

Explanatory notes are provided for the researcher and participant in order to explain the context and meaning of the term ‘police contact’ these are intended to ensure consistency each time that the question is delivered. The definitions of police contact being applied are as follows:

“Approach” as in to ask you for information or because they suspect you of a crime or to ask you to do or stop doing something;

“Contact” as in public or police initiated, for example, you approached the police or they you in a formal way. This is intended to cover circumstances such as being a victim or suspect of an offence or incident, not trivial matters such as asking for directions.
Question 5 is also provided with an explanatory note to enable consistency of interpretation. “Treated” is explained as being how the police responded to or dealt with the participant.

Jackson et al (2011) suggest that contact and satisfaction levels are important to collect information about in order to maximize predictions of trust. The ESS (2011) uses four questions under this heading but is reduced to three in the present work, a pattern that is repeated throughout in order to make the survey more manageable in the field and to reduce participants' response fatigue. The questions are drawn from the ESS Round 5 questionnaire on Trust in Police and Courts (ESS, 2011). However, the questions used differ slightly in that they have the “don’t know” response option removed with the exception of Q4 which caters for the occasion where a participant cannot remember. There are two reasons for this, first, in attempt to reduce the overall time taken for the questionnaire to be administered in a crowded protest situation. Second, where a participant cannot recall or does not express a view this is captured under the “neither” response category. The latter point was highlighted in the Street Focus group stage of questionnaire development.

Questions 6 and 7 record information about overall confidence in the police. The type of question is referred to elsewhere as a base or top line indicator of trust and confidence (BCS, 2008; Scribbins, 2010) or a single indicator measure of overall confidence in the police (Jackson et al, 2011). The present work includes a short comment section where participants can elaborate or explain further about why they have responded to these questions in this way. The researcher allows the participant to write a response, this is not intended to be a probed discussion merely an opportunity to clarify any of the responses to the questions above by virtue of a written cue. It should be noted that there is a subtle difference in these two questions, in that Q6 relates to how the police perform in terms of overall effectiveness. Whilst Q7 relates to a feeling of confidence derived from taking everything into account concerning the police. Trust in police fairness appears to have a greater impact on perceptions of legitimacy than does police effectiveness (ESS, 2011).
Q6 Taking everything you know about the police into account do they do a good job or a bad job?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very good job</th>
<th>Good job</th>
<th>Neither good or bad job</th>
<th>Bad job</th>
<th>Very bad job</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

(α = .759)

Q7 Taking everything I know about the police into account I have confidence in the police.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very good job</th>
<th>Good job</th>
<th>Neither good or bad job</th>
<th>Bad job</th>
<th>Very bad job</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

(α = .672)

The next suite of questions provided by questions 8-11 relate to participant views about the UK police in general terms not related to the specific protest event itself which are covered in a later section of the questionnaire. The concept being operationalized in these questions is moral alignment with the police. Moral alignment implies that the participant perceives that the police have a justifiable right to exist, that they represent the views and shared values of the public or community that they serve in the sense that the police “represent and enact the appropriate social and moral values that shape behavior” (Jackson et al, 2011, p.23).

Q8 The police generally treat people fairly

Q9 I generally support how the police usually act.

Q10 The police generally have the same sense of right and wrong as I do.

Q11 The police stand for values that are important to me.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither agree or disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

(α Q8 = .814, Q9 = .767, Q10 = .789, Q11 = .823 overall scale reliability α = .854)

The response options for these questions have been reduced to five, in contrast to the ESS. The ESS provides for a “don’t know” option, this has been excluded in my survey for the reasons explained above. Explanatory notes are provided for researcher and participant to enable consistency and clarity, these are defined as:

“Fairly” in the sense of being unbiased and without prejudice;

“A sense of right and wrong” is described in terms of feeling morally right or wrong;
“Standing for values” means in the sense of the police upholding, defending or promoting rights. It is posited that moral alignment with the police predicts or shapes compliance, otherwise called the obligation to obey (ESS, 2011).

While questions 12-14 also relate to the UK police in general terms, they are specifically intended to collect data on protester perceptions of police legality and alleged wrongdoing. The concept operationalized here relates to the way that the police are perceived to follow the rules in respect of having integrity and lawfully exercising their authority. In short that the police are bound by and follow the same laws and rules that they apply to others. The response options differ from the previous questions in that they are set out along a semantic differential scale. This is done for two main reasons. First, to avoid responses where the participant repeats previous positions on the scale, since it requires the question to be read and responded to in a different way to the questions above it. Second, it reflects the style used and contained in the ESS, retaining the integrity of the development of those questions as indicators of police legality. However, the scale is reduced from the original 11-point to 6, including the “don’t know” option. The latter is included on this item since the semantic scale cannot provide a verbal, neutral position of “neither”. The previous discussion on the merits of scale sizes describes the rationale behind the adoption in the present work.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q12</th>
<th>How often would you say that the police take bribes?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q13</td>
<td>How often would you say that the police deliberately give false evidence to the courts?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q14</td>
<td>How often would you say the police use more force than is legally allowed when making arrests?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Never</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>Always</th>
<th>(Don’t Know)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

(α Q12-.718, Q13-.717, Q14-.716 overall scale reliability α=.719)

Explanatory notes are provided for these questions and defined in the following terms:

“Bribes” as in money or any other inducement to influence them;

“Evidence” as in witness testimony or other materials provided to a court as part of a prosecution.

Questions 15-17 are designed to capture participants’ personal views about the law in general. This is referred to in the present work as personal values in keeping with Tyler (2006). The reason that it is being captured comes from the notion that personal values about the law in
general have been identified as competing variables to take into account (Jackson et al, 2011; Tyler, 2006). The questions are taken (with permission) from the original survey conducted by Tyler in his Chicago Study (Tyler, 1990, 2006). The full suite of questions in Tyler’s study contained four questions. Again, in order to reduce response fatigue and maximize data collection in the field environment the author has chosen to use three questions and remove the “don’t know” response option.

| Q15 | I always try to follow the law even if I think it is wrong. |
| Q16 | Disobeying the law is hardly ever justified. |
| Q17 | It is hard to blame someone for breaking the law if they can get away with it. |
| Strongly disagree | Disagree | Neither agree or disagree | Agree | Strongly agree |

(α Q15 -.403, Q16 -.601, Q17 -.714, overall scale reliability α=.687)

Whilst questions 6-8 covered general views about trust and confidence in the police, in order to provide a contextual assessment, specific questions concerning trust and confidence in the policing of the protest event itself are included in questions 18-22 inclusive (the scale shown applies to all five questions). This is done in order to capture competing factors that may manifest as co-variables in the analysis. Question 18 includes a short section where participants can elaborate or explain further about why they have responded to the question in that way. The researcher allows the participant to write, this is not intended to be a structured discussion merely an opportunity to clarify the response and the data segments were coded later using the GTM.

| Q18 | Overall, did the police do a bad job or a good job in policing the event? |
| Very bad job | Bad job | Neither good or bad job | Good job | Very good job |

| Q19 | I had confidence in the way that the police dealt with the event. |
| Q20 | How dissatisfied or satisfied were you with the way that you were treated by the police during the event? |
| Q21 | The police treated people fairly at the event. |
I would support how the police acted during the event.

Explanatory notes are provided and defined in the following terms:

“Treated” (Q20) in the sense of how the police responded and dealt with people, note that this also includes others and not just the individual for the reason that perceptions of the police may be mediated and gained vicariously;

“Fairly” (Q21) as in they were unbiased and without prejudice;

“Support” (Q22) in terms of backing the police actions during the policing of the event.

Questions 23-25 inclusive capture the dependent variable of compliance and cooperation. The concept is operationalized in terms of the felt obligation of a public duty to cooperate with the police in the following ways: support for police decisions, even where they disagree with them; doing what the police say even when they didn’t understand the reason; doing what the police say even where they didn’t like the way they were being treated.

At their core these questions rely on the perceived legitimacy of the police specifically in terms of protest events as a psychological property (ala Tyler’s (2006) model of PJ) and expressed consent as defined by Beetham (1991, 2013) otherwise known as a perceived “obligation to obey” (ESS, 2011, p.21). This notion is derived from other research findings that the self-reported obligation to follow police directives is a predictor of compliance and cooperation. Jackson et al (2011) summarise this idea as follows:

…people justify the existence of legal authorities when they feel they have an obligation to obey the rules set forth by the legal system and enforced by the authorities, such as the police. (Jackson et al, 2011, p.22)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q23</th>
<th>To what extent is it your duty to support the decisions made by the police even if you disagree with them?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q24</td>
<td>To what extent is it your duty to do what the police tell you even if you didn’t understand or agree with the reason(s)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q25</td>
<td>To what extent is it your duty to do what the police tell you to do even if you didn’t like how they were treating you?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Not at all my duty | Completely my duty
---|---
0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4

(α Q23-.839, Q24-.891, Q25-.802, scale reliability overall α = .896)
The item response values adopt a semantic differential type, as in the original survey by Tyler (2006) with the exclusion of the “don’t know” option, this is done in order to restrict so called “fence sitters” and evoke a forced response of one intensity or another.

An explanatory note is applied to the term “duty” in these questions and is clarified as being a public, moral duty as a citizen to the state. This raises a dilemma in that it assumes that the individual recognizes the state and sees themselves as a “citizen”. However, the same rationale has been applied in the ESS (2011) and other research into crowds, protest and PJ. On that basis it is included here. The questionnaire concludes with a general opportunity for participants to add to any of their responses and the questions within the survey and a salutation for taking part. Any qualitative data recorded here were coded using the GTM and contributed to the content of categories constructed in phase 2.

In summary, the phase 1 survey was conducted using a twenty-five question structured and themed questionnaire that draws on existing research measures used in this field. It relies on what are considered to be reliable indicators of the relevant concepts related to measuring public trust, confidence and police legitimacy (ESS, 2011; Tyler, 2006).

**Phase 1 sampling frame**

In general terms the sampling frame applied to the phase 1 survey is based on probability sampling (Daniel, 2012). Probability sampling is intended to give each member of the population a “known and non-zero probability” of being selected (Daniel, 2012, p.66). Put simply, that each member had a chance of being selected. However, one of the difficulties experienced with this approach is that groups in protest events do not gather in any linear fashion to make using such a sampling frame achievable and realistic. In these circumstances, it is recognised that an element of convenience sampling applies, for example where a particular group or section of the crowd present themselves or the interviewer with the opportunity to engage. This does not invalidate the approach. Much research carried out in this area has made significant use of convenience sampling (see Adang, 2011; Hoggett and Stott, 2008; Stott and Drury, 2000). However, the strengths of probability sampling are that it provides opportunity for representative samples from the population, statistical inferences can be drawn from the sample and it reduces bias. However, it is acknowledged that representativeness and power of inference are not viable in the present work given the small sample size, and the latter point is not entirely removed on the basis that the researcher approached the group in a particular time and place (given the size of the crowds and physical environment) to decide a starting point for engaging with respondents. The thesis does not stand upon statistical inference or associations between the defined variables in Phase 1. However, in keeping with tradition systematic, random selection was attempted by using a
system in which every fifth participant was approached by the researcher to be interviewed. This was abandoned when it was clear that people congregated in groups and moved around, making such a linear approach impossible.

Survey Administration

I will describe here the process used to administer the phase 1 survey. Protest events were selected based on the definitional criteria of protest set out previously in the thesis. I attempted to establish beforehand the starting or muster point for an event. This may have been advertised in pre-event media releases or on open source social media sites. I then attended the start point at an early stage to acquaint myself with the surroundings and contextualise the event, whilst not scientific I found it helped to get a “feel” for an event in the build up to it by having a physical presence. I recorded observations of the event throughout by using a selection of handwritten field notes which were later transcribed, video and still photography. It also provided opportunity for gathering video footage for later analysis in phase 2, the method of interviewing and non-participant observations applied in phase 2 deserves singular treatment and is discussed in detail later.

I followed the route of the event, usually at the front, most often where the Press and Media can be found and often a police presence. This has the added benefit of monitoring police response and activities and crowd reactions to it. Where spontaneous protests, sit downs or break away groups occurred I found it useful to “shadow” police as to the route and direction of the protest in a non-participant manner but close enough to see and hear events taking place. Most organised events had a predetermined end point where participants loitered at the conclusion of the protest or one emerged after a period of time where it had not been established beforehand. In staying with the crowd, I was in the best position to gauge the appropriate time to begin engagement with participants. The events attended here in phase 1 all had predetermined finish places in Trafalgar Square, Embankment and Hyde Park respectively. I selected a starting point to apply the sampling frame and approached a participant. The initial approach to a participant followed a certain pattern. I would begin by engaging the person in conversation around the event and whether they had attended it since the start. Usually this was in terms of a question such as “Have you taken part in the event today?”, “What did you think of the event today?”, “Did you meet at the starting point?” This was done in order to clearly establish that the person met the criteria for taking part in the survey and to assist with rapport building prior to the interview process. I then explained that I was conducting research into people’s perceptions of the police and the policing of the event and whether they would agree to take part by filling in a short survey questionnaire. Once this
had been explained I highlighted that the survey was anonymous and that it could in no way personally identify them.

At this stage I was ethically obliged to explain that I was a serving police officer but that the research was in no way connected to my work. During the fieldwork I had only two persons decline to take part in a survey when my position of employment became known. In order to maximise cooperation and reduce hostility I made the decision that it would not be appropriate to disclose my employment at the very start of the conversation but to do so prior to gaining consent and issuing the study information sheet. I provided the participant with opportunity for a study information sheet to explain the background, what they are required to do, the process and confidentiality measures. The opportunity existed for them to sign the consent form and have a copy. I then clarified any questions before proceeding.

The survey was administered in each and every case according to the defined structure and wording on the questionnaire. At the conclusion of the participant completing the questionnaire, I checked through each question to ensure completion and for any missing or corrupted data. (The study information and consent sheets can be found at Appendices 2 and 3. These are produced in accordance with Canterbury Christ Church University’s Ethics compliance policy).

**Phase 2 method and process**

I have discussed the research strategy and phase 1 survey methodology above. Here I will set out specific considerations for the phase 2 methodology and outline the reasoning behind its application. The purpose of phase 2 of the study was to take the findings of the phase 1 survey back into the field to qualitatively address the question of what additional factors influence the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to compliance and cooperation. The aim being to synthesise the findings of the survey, develop new themes based on non-participant observations and qualitative interviews with protesters and develop an explanatory model for the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy.

Clearly, by taking an established body of theoretical knowledge and empirical findings from PJ, testing it through phase 1, establishing outcomes and themes to take back into the field using an iterative process, and producing an explanatory model I rely on abductive thinking. I chose the GTM approach since it provides a particular way to learn about this type of social situation and is a means to develop greater understanding of the influences at work in protest contexts.
The challenge I faced was in planning a research study in an under-researched area of PJ such as this. Such questions arise about who should be interviewed, what should be observed, what should I inquire of participants and situations? However, as Charmaz (2006, p.178) notes GTMs analysis “shapes the conceptual content and direction of the research study, the emerging analysis may lead to adopting multiple methods of data collection and to pursuing inquiry in several sites”. In ontological and epistemological terms, a method built in this way serves the thesis well. I claim that a method based on constructivism provides a research process capable of focusing on the many social processes and influences at work in protest, one that sees “…human beings as active agents in their lives and in their worlds rather than as passive recipients of larger social forces” (Charmaz, 2006, p.7). The constructivist aspect to my method is demonstrated in the data collection process with a focus on interaction with the data and ultimately recognition of my role in shaping interpretations of them. The discussion as to whether grounded theory per se should incorporate a constructivist approach is an ongoing debate beyond the remit of the thesis.

In the main I have utilised a research process in a Charmazian way and much of the language and terms applied are those from that variant of GTM (Charmaz, 2006, 2014). However, cognisant that I am not claiming a grounded theory it is highlighted that I fall short of applying the term “theoretical concept” at the highest level of analysis, preferring the less grandiose term explanatory “factor”. In this conception the phrase “factor” is intended to mean a definable set of influences, that impact on the construction and shaping of protesters’ perceptions of police legitimacy and their attitudes to compliance and cooperation. They are defined by having properties and characteristics derived from the empirical data. The CDM identifies four factors that are used to conceptualise it as an explanatory framework. The main stages of the phase 2 research process are as follows:

- Data collection based on phase 1 results and emerging themes;
- Analysis;
  - Coding (line by line and focused),
  - Memos and notes,
  - Defining the properties of sub-categories and categories,
  - Factor construction;
- Theoretical sampling (based on the categories and factors);
- Saturation;
- Mapping of factors into an explanatory model.

Phase 2 relies upon the collection of qualitative data from face-to-face interviews with protesters, non-participant observation by the researcher, still photography and video recordings of protest events. The qualitative interviews followed a structure that became more
defined as the study progressed. Particularly where specific categories to be probed or examined in the latter stages of the research study had been developed and required “filling out” as factors of the CDM (Charmaz, 2006, 2014).

**Qualitative interviews**

The purpose of the interviews and observations in phase 2 was twofold. Firstly, to provide a richer, contextual understanding of the findings of phase 1. Specifically, about relationships between the aspects of police legitimacy according to PJ. Secondly, to establish and test emerging themes that are not covered by PJ measures. In order to do so differing degrees of interview structure were required, the initial sampling adopting a more unstructured approach, while the focused and theoretical sampling demanded a more structured one. Therefore, I relied upon different interview plans depending on the interview situation (an example is shown in Appendix 6). The interview plans did not dictate a predefined structure or specific questions. Topics and themes were included to help focus the researcher’s attention with the aim of developing a rich dataset as the research progressed (Charmaz, 2006). Developing interview plans for theoretical sampling is more complex since they focus on defined categories and relationships that require examination. Indeed, the expectation in applying GTM is that the interview guide *should* evolve as the study progresses (Birks and Mills, 2011). Consequently, I elaborated the guides around the categories and themes that became of interest to the explanatory framework. In much the same way the direct observations and analysis of video footage relied upon an initial coding process that became more focused and structured around the categories and factors as the analysis proceeded. Where I have relied on video footage I have transcribed it into the written word. On a practical level, the digital recording of interviews in the field was not possible and interviews relied upon note-taking at the time or immediately after the event. While there is an acceptance that audio recording is not a necessity, it clearly has advantages in providing reliability, validity and security of data. However, in some settings the very presence of a recording device can be counterproductive by making participants feel uncomfortable or inhibited (Birks and Mills, 2011, Devers and Robinson, 2002). This aspect was magnified in the present work. Both the ethical challenge of being a serving police officer and of conducting interviews in crowded, noisy, dynamic protest settings made it less desirable to audio record interviews.

Observations and notations made in the field are important contemporaneous records for analysis in a grounded theory method (Birks and Mills, 2011). To that end handwritten notes were used to capture observations and verbatim responses by participants that were later transposed to the coding matrices (all handwritten notes have been securely retained in accordance with the University ethics regulations).
Participants and sample size

The question as to how many interviews or observations are required is a common one in qualitative research design (Punch, 2005). In simple terms, perhaps the answer is as many as is necessary to find out all you need to know. In the early stages of a study such as this it may not be possible to know the full extent of the nature and type of data required, participant numbers or how, where and when you will generate them (Birks and Mills, 2011). In adopting a process informed by GTM it is clear that a rigid approach cannot be applied in advance and that the decision on what constitutes adequacy of the empirical data must relate to the concept of theoretical saturation (Charmaz, 2006). However, the decreasing return of gaining new insights combined with time restraints do ultimately lead to a point where the researcher can confidently terminate data collection. It is not simply a case of numerical frequency of codes to establish sufficiency of data collection and generation. According to Morse (1995, p.148) researchers “cease data collection when they have enough data to build a comprehensive and convincing theory, that is saturation occurs”.

The strength in using GTM comes from the comparative method and the iterative process that helps saturation and sufficiency of data. This is not to say that the researcher need return their findings to participants in order to check understanding and as a means to somehow validate it, otherwise known as member checking (Charmaz, 2006). A salient point to note in the research context of protest is that participants' beliefs and understanding about the social world are not static entities, but rather as Birks and Mills (2011, p.99) note are “...subject to change and influenced by the context of the day, making them inherently unreliable as absolute truth”. This implies that research is a snapshot in time and space with little point in returning to the field for further validation of what has been recorded. I do not rely on member checking for two reasons, one a practical and ethical one and the other methodological. In the first, it would not be possible to trace a participant given the guaranteed anonymity that they are given. In the second, Charmaz (2006) points out that member checking is redundant in GTM as a source of verifying categories and concepts in the analysis.

The decision making for selecting participants for the present study is made in light of the themes and categories emerging from the data analysis (including that gained from phase 1). In other words, the researcher finds those that may provide the best understanding of the emerging categories (Thomson, 2011). Who better to ask about protest and police legitimacy than protesters themselves, because they have experienced the phenomenon being studied. Hence, the researcher can increase the quality of data. However, an initial sample is required and such was provided in phase 1 in terms of providing the baseline data and findings for further investigation.
The coding process
The recording (written or otherwise) of interviews and activity is fundamental to data collection and the later analysis if we are to avoid claims of nothing more than anecdotalism. To that end throughout the interviews, communications and observations I have sought to record precise words and actions that have later been transposed into the coding framework. However, this is balanced with an acknowledgement that you cannot report everything because it overlooks the theory driven aspect of field work and places an unrealistic burden on the researcher (Silverman, 2007; Wolcott, 1990).

The first step in the analysis is systematic coding of the interview and observations data. I have relied upon an interpretation of coding offered by Charmaz (2006, 2014) as the means of categorising segments of data with a descriptive name or label that summarises and accounts for each datum. In broad terms the coding is the first step in understanding and defining what the data are about and it is what connects data collection with the later development of the categories and explanatory factors (Charmaz, 2006). Thus, the coding process applied herein has two phases, 1) initial (line-by-line) and 2) focused (Birks and Mills, 2011; Charmaz, 2014). To enable the reader to visualise how the coding process was applied to the original interview or observation notes an illustrative extract for one participant can be seen below (see table 5.1).

Table 5.1 Illustrative extract from the coding of interview and observation notes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>TUC Demo 17/10/14 Occupy Parliament square breakaway group. (OPS)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Initial coding</strong></th>
<th><strong>Focused coding</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interview OPS 1- Taken from interview notes DL-What do you think to the way that the event is being policed? OPS1-Well let’s face it they [the police] have a job to do...but come on over the top? Most people here ain’t gonna kick off are they, it’ll be the usual nutters and they don’t need an excuse much. The majority are here to make a point, we’ve had enough...this is the way to get the point across, voting don’t work (sic). Real change only comes through people doing this I think”</td>
<td>Accepting the police presence and role they play. Aligning with some police activity – more generally Feeling disagreement about policing appropriateness. Reactions can be over the top. Identifies minority groups and troublemakers. Assessing fellow protesters as different from others and here for a reason. Finding the system frustrating – Doing something to change things. Being disappointed with the usual system of change. Feeling of frustration and wanting to change it. Not getting what they wanted, political dissatisfaction Being let down and disconnected from politicians/society. Differing version of what democracy means to them.</td>
<td>Policing roles and responsibilities Thinking about policing (ALIGNMENT) Policing heavy handedness (TACTICS) Distinguishing protesters and creating typologies. Sense of group purpose (TYPE OF PROTESTER, RULE SETTING and REGULATION, IDENTITY) Using the system – voting and protest – (CHANGE AGENTS) Alignment/dissatisfaction with state processes A sense of disengagement- (DISTANCING/DISENGAGEMENT) Re-imagining democracy- political basis for protest (IDEOLOGY)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Initial coding**

The first phase of coding that is applied is initial line-by-line coding. I rely on an interpretation of initial coding issued by Charmaz (2014) in that it is the early process of engaging with and defining the data with the purpose of defining what is happening and what the data means. To avoid imposing any preconceived ideas in the analysis I have coded where possible using gerunds, and to use verbatim the words of the respondents. Whenever possible using gerunds is aimed at identifying processes in active terms by keeping the researcher as close to the participants meanings, actions and perspectives (Charmaz, 2006). The process that I have applied uses *line-by-line* coding of the transcripts and notes. This form of coding works as a useful mechanism for catching ideas that might otherwise have escaped attention, had the analysis been more thematic in nature or relied on larger data segment size (Charmaz, 2006). However, it should be noted that due to the nature of conversations and observations in the context of protest events, which often include incomplete sentences or lines without apparent meaning, I have chosen to use the segment size as more of a guideline than as a rigid rule to be applied. This may be why my initial coding occasionally refers to more than one item in the transcript or observation notes.

**Focused coding**

Focused coding is applied after the initial line-by-line coding. I apply the interpretation of focused coding as being a process in which the most frequent and/or significant codes are identified and related to larger batches of data (Charmaz, 2006, 2014). The aim of using this approach is to identify codes with analytic power and use them tentatively to establish categories for development. In practical terms I have performed focused coding by being alert to recurring words, items and actions in the initial codes, to those which relate to the research questions and through the lens of theoretical sensitivity those that made most analytic sense. In applying focused coding, I was able to identify gaps in emerging categories that served to inform further data collection.

In summary, at its simplest level coding means categorising segments of data with names or labels that summarise and account for each datum, the initial line by line and focused coding provided by GTM connects data collection, category formation and the explanatory factors that form the model developed.

**Memos and notes**

Writing memos and notes is a recognised step in GTM for the purposes of analysing ideas and creatively thinking about codes and categories. Charmaz (2014, p.343) explains that they
are a pivotal step, particularly between data collection and drafting the thesis. The main purpose of memo-writing is to “prompt the researcher to analyse the data and to develop codes into categories early in the research process” (emphasis added). While I have made it clear that I do not claim a grounded theory and arguably have not applied memo-writing in the manner that a grounded theorist might understand it to be, I have utilised memos and notes to provide a mental space for noting down my thoughts and ideas under development and to link categories and sub categories, in this sense some early notes may bear no resemblance to the words, ideas and categories presented in the final analysis.

**Defining the properties of sub-categories and categories**

The coding process provides a wealth of initial and focused codes, tentative relationships and inferences. The focused codes require a greater sense of structure that can be used to elevate them and combine them into conceptual constructs. I have relied upon the notion of categories and sub-categories to provide this structure and the bases on which the factors and CDM can be built. Categories provide the means of developing the analytic framework and comprise the key themes of any explanation and can be understood as abstract ‘building blocks’ holding together several bodies of data into a cogent entity (Charmaz, 2006).

According to Charmaz (2014) a category can be defined as:

> The analytic step of selecting certain codes as having over riding significance or abstracting themes and patterns into an analytic concept. As the researcher categorises he or she raises the conceptual level of the analysis from description to a more abstract theoretical level. (Charmaz, 2014, p.341)

In deciding which focused codes to elevate to categories I have applied certain criteria that can be derived from Charmaz (2006, 2014). The criteria are as follows (in no hierarchy):

- The *frequency* of code (whether in the same interview or observation or among a body of them);
- The *relevance* of the code (in terms of the research questions or emerging themes);
- The *significance* of the code to the participant (indicated explicitly as well as inferred).

Ultimately, in congruence with my constructivist approach I acknowledge that the choice of categories is not an objective one. The constructivist view of facts and values as being linked means a recognition that what I see or do not see may be influenced by values (Charmaz, 2014). I make no claim that my choices in coding or categorising are the only ones to be made. However, I do claim that they are made on an informed basis and on the grounds of a robust
interactional process with the empirical data that can be evidenced, guided by theoretical sensitivity and on a research strategy that has theoretical provenance.

Sub-categories, similar to categories, are compiled codes that together create a coherent body of information. However, sub-categories are sub-ordinate to categories and thus function more as a related element to a category. Charmaz (2014, p.298) notes that “categories do not work well if they are cluttered and many fold, sub-categories help to subjugate their content in order to handle the “work” of analysis”. However, they need to be used with care if they are not to confuse and distract the reader who cannot readily see the relevance or link between sub-categories and categories. I rely on the use of sub-categories in those circumstances where a category has properties that are complex and derive from a number of related ideas and the sub-categories lend support or related information to the category being presented. However, please note that sub-categories are not used in every category that I have constructed.

**Constructing the factors of the CDM**

Thus far I have described the coding process and how codes are elevated to categories or sub-categories. The next step in the analysis is the construction of the factors as distinct entities that constitute the explanatory model. The term factor in this context is used to denote a collection of information, definable by characteristics and properties that combines with others to support an explanation. It is not invoked to imply statistical or other form of measurement. The factors are described in detail in chapter six. Within the various interpretations and application of GTM, conceptual terminology is at times contested and confusing. Charmaz (2006) relies on the notion of theoretical concept, whilst others may refer to core categories (Birks and Mills, 2011; Strauss, 1987; Strauss and Corbin,1998). In not claiming a grounded theory, I will not apply the term theoretical concept as the product of the coding process, to avoid methodological controversy beyond the remit of the thesis. What I do produce are factors built from sub-categories or categories, upon which the explanatory framework in the form of a model sits.

A visual representation of the research process from the initial coding, focused coding and categorization to explanatory model is provided below (figure 5.1). Please note that whilst only two columns are shown for the purpose of illustration, the final analysis identifies and constructs four factors in total.
Reliability and validity of the phase 2 empirical research

It may be pertinent to discuss here the reliability and validity of the research process since without demonstrable rigour research is “worthless, becomes fiction, and loses its utility” (Morse, 2002, p.14). Consequently, a great amount of attention is paid to establishing reliability and validity in all research methods. Whether one relies on more traditional interpretations of reliability and validity in qualitative research, the argument can be made that the terms apply in general to any paradigm as overarching principles. Kvale (1989, p.18) notes that to validate is “to investigate, to check, to question, and to theorise”. Further, reliability concerns the consistency and trustworthiness of the findings, while validity can be said to be about the truthfulness, correctness and relative strength of an argument. In short, whether the methods being applied investigate what they purport to do (Kvale, 1989).

The notion of trustworthiness was introduced in the 1980s (Guba and Lincoln, 1981, 1985) and comprises the four main ideas of credibility, transferability, dependability and conformability. The means of establishing trustworthiness in qualitative inquiry consists of audit trails, the notion of member checking in both coding and confirmation of findings with participants, and establishing negative cases (Guba & Lincoln, 1981, 1982). However, Guba and Lincoln (1989) developed further criteria commensurate with constructivist assumptions about the world, that can be used to evaluate such research. Notwithstanding their tentativeness about the criteria, they have been influential in the development of standards used to evaluate the quality of qualitative inquiry. Morse (2002, p.13) notes that “reliability and
validity have been subtly replaced by criteria and standards for evaluation of the overall significance, relevance, impact, and utility of completed research”. Some evidence suggests that the usual orthodoxy of reliability and validity do not fit with the constructivist worldview, it being more aligned to objectivist approaches (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008, Kvale, 1989). To this end I must substantiate a way to establish the reliability and validity of my research that is congruent with the worldview adopted by the thesis.

In broad terms verification in any qualitative research comes from applying a process of “checking, confirming, making sure, being certain and refers to the mechanisms used during the research process to ensuring reliability and validity of the study. These mechanisms are woven into every step of the inquiry to construct a solid product” (Morse, 2009, p.9). The mechanisms referred to are part of the developing research process, with an effective research process moving between design and implementation to ensure congruence between the stages and cycles of data collection and analysis (Creswell et al, 2011; Kvale, 1989). This sounds very much in the way of GTM. What might these verification strategies look like in the context of the present work?

By using aspects of GTM, my research process has verification strategies to ensure that the reliability and validity of data are provided, ensuring methodological congruence, sampling sufficiency, data collection and analysis and model development. Methodological congruence is provided by the manner in which the research problem and the method(s) applied to it matches the data collection and analysis. I acknowledge that in leveraging GTM the research process is not linear, it being an iterative and cyclical one. Charmaz (2006, 2014) provides a set of criteria aimed at validating research in the constructivist approach. The criteria she sets out are credibility, originality, resonance and usefulness (Charmaz, 2006).

Credibility refers to whether there is sufficient evidence from the data to support the assertions being made. Originality relates to whether the research contributes insight or new rendering of data. Resonance refers to whether the analytic insight is found in participants’ reported experiences of the world and usefulness as to whether the research has utility in the area being studied and is able to initiate new areas of research and inquiry.

My research method shares much in common with Charmaz’s criteria, relying as it does on her approach to GTM and constructivism, yet I rely on four additional concepts to demonstrate the validity and reliability of the research and relate them to the stages of my research process. The criteria are taken from Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008) (they adapt those of Guba and Lincoln (1989) as outlined above) who elaborate on the concepts of dependability, transferability, credibility and conformability. Each are summarised below.
together with explanation as to how they are specifically applied to my thesis. It will be noted that there is some interrelation between the criteria and how they can be demonstrated.

**Dependability**

The notion of dependability of the empirical research relates to demonstrating that the research process is logical, auditable and documented so as to provide trustworthiness. Guba and Lincoln (1985) have stressed the close ties between credibility and dependability, noting that in research practice demonstrating the former goes some way in ensuring the latter (Shenton, 2004). It appears that this is achieved by combining methods, and the processes used should be reported in detail in order for another researcher to repeat the work (if not necessarily to see the same results) (Shenton, 2004). In order to provide dependability, I have provided detail about the data collection methods applied. Written records of interviews and field notes have been made and retained. Observations recorded by visual media have been transcribed and used for the coding and analysis, often in support of the interview content. There is a detailed account of the research methodology, the analysis and the iterative process. Albeit that GTM per se does not utilise it, I have resorted to a linear structure in the way that the phase 2 research process is documented to provide a logical progression and readable account.

**Transferability**

The notion of transferability refers to the researcher demonstrating similarity between their research and other related research. This is not intended as merely replicating others’ findings or studies, but to establish and demonstrate that a similarity is found in similar research contexts. I have utilised a mixed method approach in a two-staged design that empirically tests the assumptions of PJ and ESIM research, linked it to my research problem and developed the findings from phase 1 into the second phase of the study. Whilst I have demonstrated similarities in the findings I also identified differences that have informed the phase 2 inquiry. The CDM of police legitimacy demonstrates that reference to similar research can be found in the categories and factors of my own empirical study.

**Credibility**

The notion of credibility establishes the credentials that the researcher has by being familiar with the topic and that the data are “sufficient to merit the claims” of the thesis (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008, p. 294). It also dictates that there are logical relationships between data and the categories, and whether another researcher taking the same evidence might reach similar conclusions.
Building and presenting a background knowledge of the area of study is contested within earlier grounded theory method (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). However, Charmaz (2006, 2014) disputes this and in principle supports the notion of reviewing and understanding the area of research prior to data analysis. In keeping with this principle, I have spent time reviewing and analysing the theoretical positions and literature relevant to the study. This has defined the theoretical framework surrounding my research problem and further developed my theoretical sensitivity. In addition, the professional background, qualifications and experience of the researcher is considered by some authors as important in establishing their credibility and that of their work (Patton, 1990). Alkin et al (1979) imply that trust in the researcher is of equal importance to the adequacy of the research methods.

In using the data collection, sampling processes, coding and categorising, and iterative features of GTM I have developed the research process in a logical fashion that can be demonstrated throughout the analyses. Detailed description of these aspects is a significant way of promoting the credibility of the thesis (Van Maanen, 1983).

**Conformability**

Conformability is the idea that the data and findings are linked and can be interpreted easily by others. A detailed methodological description assists the reader to evaluate the extent to which the data and the concepts from them may be accepted (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008). In support of this I have provided an audit trail which allows the reader to map the course of the study stage-by-stage. In doing so I have provided substantial detail of the research process with examples of the coding and analysis, in order to provide an auditable process.

In summary, I have described how the requirement to demonstrate the reliability and validity of my empirical research has been met. After completion of the thesis I reflected on the research process and how it might be improved, these reflections concern the use of qualitative data analysis tools and ethical challenges.

**Reflections on the use of qualitative data analysis software**

The use of computer-based qualitative data analysis (QDA) packages has invigorated qualitative research since the early 1980s (Bryman, 2015; John and Johnson, 2000). Utilising an approach informed by GTM, with its defined processes for coding and analysis required careful data management and the option to use a computer programme might be considered useful. The range of packages available offers effective data management, analysis and retention. The power of the software to organise and interrogate data is unquestionable, however it remains a tool and cannot replace the critical thinking of a researcher. Researchers should be mindful of the shortfalls of commercially driven and sometimes rigid software
packages. I was concerned about using deterministic and rigid processes that might have framed my ideas in line with the requirements of the programme. The impact of this is that it might have predetermined what data and themes came to the fore. Whilst some see this as a positive (Brown, 1996) others are less sanguine (Coffey et al, 1996; John and Johnson, 2000).

The pitfalls of using QDA packages can be summarised as privileged coding, retrieval methods, increased pressure on researchers to focus on volume and breadth rather than on depth and meaning, time and effort spent in learning to use complex computer packages, increased commercialism (with frequent version releases), and distraction from the real work of analysis (John and Johnson, 2000). John and Johnson (2000) recommend that researchers pause to consider the capabilities of the package, their own computer literacy and knowledge of the package, the time required to gain these skills and the “fit” of the package to their research. The decision to use a QDA programme has to be based on the scope of the study and the data that you have available.

A QDA package such as NVivo was not used for data recording and analysis in phase 2 and the decision was a deliberate one after I underwent training in NVivo. This was for three reasons: 1) I felt that it mediated my contact with the data; 2) data entry would be laborious given that I had already invested in making extensive field notes and recordings; and 3) the type and amount of data collected was manageable without it. Instead, I relied on manual processes to record data and conduct the analysis using my notes, audio and visual recordings, post-it notes, indexed logs and annotated diagrams. Given the size of the interview sample (n=79) and the way in which GTM requires the researcher to be intimately in touch with the data and emerging themes, I found a manual process more appealing. In spite of not using a QDA package, I was still able to meet the rigours demanded of robust empirical inquiry.

However, the question arises as to whether I would do so again. On reflection, I acknowledge the usefulness of a QDA package and in retrospect would consider using one for qualitative research. Whilst it is time consuming to learn the package and do the initial data entry, it streamlines the management of the data and speeds up the analytic process.

**Reflections on ethical issues and challenges for the researcher**

During my PhD candidateship I was a serving police inspector based in London. Clearly, my status as both a researcher and serving police officer presented ethical challenges. In addition, trust issues were likely to occur with the protesters being interviewed since the interviews require informed consent according to the ethics compliance protocol. Furthermore, if I were to encounter criminal offences being committed by a participant or they made a disclosure to me, my duty to act as a police officer may have interfered with my position as a researcher and present a conflict of interest. For this reason, I chose not to collect any personal
information from participants other than demographic information in order to ensure their anonymity. Any video or still photography occurred in an overt manner, in public where no expectation of privacy could have been made and it was not directed at individuals or used to identify anyone.

The survey questions were so crafted as to avoid any general reference to criminal activity by the participant or specific to the protest event itself. This was intentional to mitigate any conflict of interest between being a researcher and a police officer. In essence it has been necessary to create a virtual “firewall” between myself and the participants in order to guarantee their right to anonymity and in an effort to foster a sense of trust and confidence in the process. For this reason, it was not possible to follow up any participants in a longitudinal study, or via social media or email post-event. Whilst perhaps limiting further research opportunities, this approach does guarantee anonymity and protects the participants’ personal interests as well as my own professional ones under the Police Code of Ethics. I acknowledge the limitation that this has placed on the research. However, it has not prevented sampling based on emerging themes that I have taken back into phase 2. It is acknowledged that the use of other interview strategies could have been used to survey participants’ perceptions, such as the use of third party interviewers and online surveys. However, these are not without difficulty.

The use of most other means of interviewing rely upon having contact details and some means of identifying persons taking part, for example telephone numbers, email addresses, physical addresses. Given my unique position as a researcher and police officer, and the need for anonymity for the participant these were not appropriate. Furthermore, there are specific issues with methods such as online surveys since they carry no guarantee about who is completing them and blanket targeting with them can yield low response rates. Similarly, telephone surveys carried out later carry the same problems and in present day circumstances people are often reluctant to give out telephone numbers because of nuisance calls. The use of third party researchers was an option that I considered, however I dismissed it on the grounds that:

- I could not guarantee that the same interview process would be applied in each and every case;
- Considerable briefing and training would be required for the interviewer(s);
- To do so would likely incur cost for an interviewer’s time;
- Health and personal safety issues may arise by placing an interviewer in protest situations;
• I could not rely on the interpretation and construction of situations and events that were mediated through another researcher’s observations.

The ethical dimensions of being a police officer and a researcher have been touched upon but not how in real terms, protesters can be approached, engaged with and interviewed. Interviewing in such circumstances is difficult enough for any researcher yet made harder when also a warranted police officer. This is potentially due to the levels of suspicion from participants, legal constraints on the officer who is never by definition entirely “off duty” and the ramifications of being wrongly identified as an associate of certain extreme groups (such as the English Defence League, Britain First, Anti-fascist Action (Antifa) and Black Bloc activities).

So, how does a serving police officer overcome these and successfully interview people at protests? The initial approach to participants in phase 2 was similar to that used in phase 1 described above. However, given the less structured interview process and more dynamic environment required in phase 2, it is worth additional explanation.

After identifying the protest events to attend as outlined above, I spent time physically moving amongst protesters. Either alongside them at a march or amongst their midst at a static event. On occasions this involved shadowing the police presence where there was one. For instance, where a group might break away or divert from the main event. Sometimes, this involved protesters focusing their attention on counter-protest groups or iconic premises.

The reason for spending time with protesters was to gauge their mood and intent, and the likelihood of them being amenable to my approach. I found it helpful to accept leaflets and literature about the various protest events and issues that were offered by protesters. This served to make it easier to engage people in conversation, raised my own awareness about the issues that were important to them and helped to overcome any of their suspicions about me. A useful source of information came from vendors of magazines and newspapers such as the Socialist Worker and Searchlight. On several occasions I purchased copies and openly engaged them in conversation to find out about protest issues and the events of the day. The added benefit of this was that other protesters saw me engaging with the vendors and it helped to break down any potential barriers when they were approached.

Adopting a position alongside protesters enabled me to establish if there were any health and safety issues that I needed to take into account, arising from physical threat, fireworks, missiles etc. In this sense, I made a dynamic risk assessment whether to continue the approach or withdraw. This was effective, since at no time during the field work was I subjected to threats or assault or in danger of such. The control measures that I operated were to carry a charged mobile phone, inform friends and family where I was and what I was doing, visibly display my university ID card, ensure that I didn’t stray too far from public areas and that I knew where the police presence was. The latter measure was for two reasons. Firstly,
in case I should need assistance in the event of it being unsafe and secondly, in order to gauge
the police response to the protest. Understandably, my knowledge of police public order tactics
is such that I could predict whether a cordon, containment or crowd intervention (such as an
arrest snatch squad) was being prepared for or considered by watching police activity and
movements. Where I could see this happening, I withdrew from the situation to prevent my
being caught up in it and moved on elsewhere. Removing myself from these situations also
protected me from being a witness to criminal offences or being placed in a professional
dilemma to act against a suspect. As my confidence grew in the field, I developed an approach
which meant that I could stand away from such situations, particularly where counter-
protesters confronted each other, observe, and wait until people had dispersed before
approaching them for interview.

Once I was satisfied that it was safe to do so, I would approach individuals or small
groups and engage them in conversation about the protest event and ask if they would mind
taking part in the research. If they agreed, I then explained that I was a police officer by
occupation but that I was there as a researcher. I was keen to avoid creating unnecessary
suspicion and pre-empted concerns about confidentiality by saying that I would not be visually
or audio recording, would only take written notes at the time if they were agreeable to my doing
so and that they could see what I had written down if they wished. I utilised a template to
structure the interview and record the notes (see Appendix 6). The template developed to
reflect the themes as the fieldwork progressed. Still photography and video recording were
used during non-participant observation at some protest events to supplement my note-taking.
This had the benefit of being capable of review post-event.

Overall, the approach proved to be successful and I was often surprised at how
engaging people were. Anecdotally, in one case a visiting protester from Germany told me
how pleasant he found the UK police and took delight in showing me gaps in his teeth, courtesy
of the German Federal police. In summary, the fieldwork was both challenging and exciting as
a researcher. My professional expertise in public order policing together with a thoughtful,
sensitive approach as a researcher led to some unique and rich data being obtained.

In conclusion, this chapter has described in detail the research strategy, methodology
and processes for the phase 1 quantitative survey and the qualitatively based phase 2. It has
explained the abductive method of reasoning applied to the thesis and described the research
process that was adopted for data collection, sampling and saturation, analysis, coding and
categorising. I have set out the means by which the research meets the requirements of
reliability and validity. The discussion provided reflections on how the interviews and
observations were carried out and the challenges and ethical dilemmas of being both a
researcher and serving police officer at the time.
The chapter that follows deals with the phase 1 statistical analysis and findings, followed by a narrative about the phase 2 analysis. The combination of both analyses culminates in the development and presentation of a contextually driven model of police legitimacy.
Chapter 6

Analysis, results and discussion

This chapter provides the analysis, results and discussion of findings for both phases of the study. It begins with descriptive analysis of the phase 1 quantitative survey, describing who the participants were, followed by the results and discussion of the statistical analyses of association between the variables. The chapter highlights the key themes that were taken from phase 1 for investigation in phase 2 and provides a narrative from the content of the qualitative interviews and observations. It concludes with the construction and presentation of a contextually driven model of police legitimacy (CDM).

Descriptive statistics for the phase 1 sample

Structured quantitative interviews were conducted with participants at London-based protest events between November 2011 and October 2012. The fieldwork was conducted by the researcher personally, also attending the protest events as a non-participant observer. The phase 1 sample comprises 40 face-to-face interviews carried out at the following events:

- Occupy London Stock Exchange protest (Occupy LSX) November 2011 (3 interviews included from the pilot stage of the survey);
- The Trades Union Congress (TUC) London rally 2011 (14 interviews);
- March for Jobs (M4J) 2012 (11 interviews);
- The Trades Union Congress (TUC) London rally 2012 (12 interviews).

The following explains the coding process, analyses and results. Data were collected using the survey questionnaire (version 23.0) and responses were coded numerically for entry into an IBM SPSS (version 21.0) codebook. Further detail of the coding sheet is shown at Appendix 5. The process adopted to manage data involved structuring the codebook, data entry, screening for errors, scale testing for reliability, initial data exploration using descriptive statistics, variable manipulation and modification using the technique of visual binning and non-parametric statistical tests for association and correlation.

It will be clear from the summary of descriptive statistics below that the sample is not taken from a population that is normally (Gaussian) distributed. Therefore, the data are not suitable for parametric statistics that relate to correlation and association. Notwithstanding this, in any case the ordinal data obtained by Likert scales should not be subjected to parametric testing (Field, 2009).
The scale items for the survey questions were subject of reliability testing using Cronbach’s alpha coefficient (α) (Cronbach, 1951). This statistical test measures the internal consistency of a scale (Cronbach, 1951; Field, 2009; Pallant, 2012) and the α scores are shown under each survey question in the preceding chapter. Following alpha tests, each of the question responses were subject of frequency distribution testing using the suite of descriptive statistics contained in IBM SPSS (version 21.0). Once the distributions were established and any potential errors identified in data entry or processing, new variables were created from the individual items and the scores summated for each of the variables using the SPSS technique of visual binning. Visual binning is the process of creating groups or categories from the variables and is commonly applied in SPSS analyses where several survey items are used to capture data for the variables under examination (Field, 2009). New variables created were subject of additional frequency distribution testing before being analysed for association and correlation (SPSS outputs are shown at Appendix 5). The variables created covered the following concepts related to PJ:

- General trust and confidence in police;
- Moral alignment with the police;
- Police legality;
- Personal values about the law;
- Event specific trust and confidence including perceptions of treatment by police;
- Cooperation and compliance with the police.

Where appropriate the median (mdn), mode (md) and interquartile range (IQR) are reported as the measures of central tendency and dispersion because standard deviation is not appropriate where data are not normally distributed (as is the case here). Population distributions were established as not normal by applying the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test.

Descriptive statistics have been applied to each item within the survey questionnaire and for any new variables created for analyses. Each construct under examination was represented by summing the scores for specific items measuring the PJ variables. Where categories were required for the test to be applied the variables were created utilising the technique of visual binning and manipulated into three distinct categories for each variable (high, medium and low scores). The IBM SPSS default function provides integer cut off points to create these three categories (Field, 2009). The creation of only two categories was considered but rejected as it would require a median split. The median split is a means of reducing continuous variables to categorical ones for analysis but is considered inappropriate or unreliable in these circumstances because it is too “clumsy” in offering sufficient
discrimination between the scale item responses (Field, 2009), particularly in the area of attitude assessment. Furthermore, it would imply that the data are interval in nature. Any additional comments made by participants during the quantitative interviews were recorded on the survey questionnaires and treated as qualitative data segments and later coded. Subsequently they were used in phase 2 to inform the initial and focused codes and category formation according to the iterative process (Birks and Mills, 2011; Charmaz, 2006).

A summary of descriptive statistics for the sample are provided in the tables below. Those for the constructs associated with police legitimacy together with the SPSS outputs are shown in the appendices (Appendix 6). The sample (n=40) comprises 57.5% male (n=23) and 42.5% female participants (n=17) with a modal age range of 20-24yrs and mdn of 35-39yrs (shown in figure 6.1 below).

![Phase 1 age range histogram](image)

**Figure 6.1 Phase 1 age range histogram.**

**Self-defined ethnicity**

The sample is represented by the following self-defined ethnic backgrounds, White British 72.5% (n=29), white other 15% (n=6), other mixed 2.5% (n=1), Chinese 2.5% (n=1) and other 7.5% (n=3) see Table 6.1 below.
Table 6.1 Distribution of self-defined ethnicity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self-defined ethnicity</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White British</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>72.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White other</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any other mixed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other stated</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Previous Contact with the Police**

Participants who had previous contact with the police (within the past two years) prior to the protest events accounted for 62.5% (n=25) of the sample (n=40), see Table 6.2.

Table 6.2 Distribution of scores for previous contact with police.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protester previous contact with police</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Statistical tests for association**

In the first instance data were analysed using Pearson’s Chi-squared ($\chi^2$) test for association (Field, 2009; Pearson, 1900). However, the data were to found to violate the test assumptions, therefore more appropriate statistical tests were applied. Due to the small size of the sample it was appropriate to apply Fisher’s Exact test (Fisher, 1922) and Spearman’s rho ($r_s$) correlation coefficient (Field, 2009; Pallant, 2012, Spearman, 1910). The latter does not rely on the same test assumptions as some other tests for association and is usually considered to be its non-parametric substitute where data are available as ranked scores (Field, 2009). Kendall’s Tau test (1938) is sometimes used as an alternative to $r_s$ in cases where the sample has a large amount of tied ranks. However, since this is not the case here $r_s$ is considered more appropriate. The likelihood ratios (LR), levels of variance and degrees of freedom (df) are also reported where applicable.
Broadly, two scenarios were tested, firstly the relationships between the independent variables with self-reported levels of cooperation and compliance with the police at protest events and secondly, the relationship between independent variables and protester perceptions of event treatment at the hands of the police. Analyses were conducted using non-parametric tests as previously discussed, specifically these were:

- Pearson's Chi-squared test of independence ($x^2$);
- Fisher’s Exact test ($p$ value);
- Spearman's rho correlation coefficient ($r_s$).

The test assumptions for Pearson’s Chi-squared test require a minimum expected cell frequency of five or more or at least 80% of the cells (Pallant, 2012). Due to the small sample size and the rigours of the cross tabulation, the test was violated as they relate to the minimum cell counts (even after correction). Fisher’s Exact test ($p$) is particularly relevant where small samples are encountered and hence was used in the analysis (Field, 2009; Pallant, 2012). In each case the $p$ value is reported together with the likelihood ratio (LR). According to some researchers the LR is widely used in tandem with Fisher's Exact test in analyses of small sample sizes because the LR rejects the null hypothesis if the value is too small (Pallant, 2012). As a general guideline the values are applied and interpreted as follows:

- $\geq 10$ are deemed “large” and often conclusive;
- $5 \leq 10$ are deemed moderate;
- $2 \leq 5$ small, $\geq 1 \leq 2$ minimal;
- $\leq 1$ no change or minimal.

As a test for relationships between variables, Spearman's rho ($r_s$) correlation coefficient (Spearman, 1910) can be interpreted by reference to the following values:

- Where $r_s$ is $0.10 - 0.29$ a small/weak association exists;
- Where $r_s$ is $0.30 - 0.49$ a medium/moderate association exists;
- Where $r_s$ is $0.50 - 0.64$ a large/strong association exists.

The rho value ($r_s$) is often reported in tandem with a measure of the level of variance. The level of variance indicates how much one variable accounts for variance in another and will be reported herein, in essence the level of variance is represented by the square of the $r$ value expressed as a % rating. (Field, 2009; Pallant, 2012). The IBM SPSS (v 21.0) test outputs
showing the full range of analytic products are included in Appendix 6. A summary of the test results for association and significance are shown at table 6.3 and 6.4 below.

Table 6.3 Summary of tests for association related to protester perceptions of police treatment at events.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>rs value</th>
<th>p value</th>
<th>Variance %</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>LR***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Previous police contact</td>
<td>.241*</td>
<td>3.044</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust and confidence in police</td>
<td>.451**</td>
<td>13.371</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16.202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police legality</td>
<td>.086</td>
<td>5.141</td>
<td>-17.2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral alignment with police</td>
<td>.694**</td>
<td>22.838</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>28.128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal values about the law</td>
<td>.496**</td>
<td>22.553</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>28.196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police legitimacy</td>
<td>.563**</td>
<td>10.164</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12.678</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significant at .140 (2 tailed)
** Significant at 0.01 (1 tailed)
*** Higher the LR the greater the significance of the association

n=40. Unweighted data

Participants’ previous contact with the police prior to a protest event can be seen to have a weak, positive, significant association with perceptions of event treatment (p = 3.044). Whilst more general trust and confidence in the police has a strong, positive significant association with the way that people perceived their treatment by the police at the event (p =13.371).

The associations between the variables and participants’ views attitudes to compliance and cooperation with the police are summarised below in table 6.4.
Table 6.4 Summary of tests for association related to protester levels of compliance and cooperation at events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>$r_s$ value</th>
<th>$p$ value</th>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>LR***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Previous police contact</td>
<td>.284*</td>
<td>2.918</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust and confidence in police</td>
<td>.499**</td>
<td>7.814</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceptions of event treatment</td>
<td>.726**</td>
<td>23.404</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>27.338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral alignment with police</td>
<td>.582**</td>
<td>21.571</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25.502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal values about the law</td>
<td>.673**</td>
<td>10.091</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10.997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police legality</td>
<td>.279</td>
<td>4.298</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police legitimacy</td>
<td>.709**</td>
<td>12.669</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15.466</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significant at 0.075 (1 tailed)

** Significant at 0.01 (2 tailed)

*** Higher the LR the greater the significance of the association

n=40. Unweighted data.

Previous contact with the police has a weak positive significant association with attitudes to compliance and cooperation with police at protest events ($p = 2.918$). Whilst general trust and confidence in the police has a moderate positive significant association with levels of compliance and cooperation with police ($p = 7.814$).

**Discussion of the phase 1 results and implications for phase 2**

In light of the results reported in tables 6.3 and 6.4 above, the evidence for or against the research questions is considered below. However, a cautionary note should be applied to the interpretation of the phase 1 results on a number of levels. First, since they describe the analyses of data for a small sample population (n=40) in no way can or should a generalisation be made to the wider population. Secondly, relationships cannot be assumed to be directionally linear. This is due to the inter-relatedness of the concepts from which police legitimacy is formed. In common with much PJ research it cannot be stated that any one has pre-eminence over another nor that relationships are in any way causal. Thirdly, it can be considered that non-parametric statistics are less powerful than parametric (notwithstanding that ordinal data are not suitable for parametric testing). However, taking these limitations into consideration the results do provide evidence of the relationships covered by the research
questions. In considering whether the claims of PJ and its correlates of police legitimacy and compliance and cooperation hold in protest situations, the research questions are answered below.

What is the relationship between protester perceptions of police legitimacy and cooperation and compliance at protest events?

The results indicate that there is a strong positive association between protester perceptions of police legitimacy with their levels of cooperation and compliance. In terms of a null hypothesis that there is no relationship, it can be rejected and support is found for an association.

What association is there between protester moral alignment with the police and cooperation and compliance at protest events?

The results indicate that there is a strong positive association between moral alignment with the police and cooperation and compliance levels. In terms of a null hypothesis that there is no relationship, it can be rejected and support is found for an association.

What association is there between protester personal values about the law and cooperation and compliance at protest events?

The results indicate that there is a strong positive association between protester personal values about the law and cooperation and compliance levels. In terms of a null hypothesis that there is no relationship, it can be rejected and support is found for an association.

What is the relationship between moral alignment with the police and how protesters perceive their treatment at protests?

The results indicate that there is a strong positive and significant association between moral alignment with the police and perceptions of event policing and treatment. In terms of a null hypothesis that there is no relationship, it can be rejected and support is found for an association.

What association is there between protester perceptions of treatment by the police and attitudes to cooperation and compliance?

The results indicate that there is a strong positive association between protester perceptions of treatment by the police at an event with cooperation and compliance levels. In terms of a
null hypothesis that there is no association, it can be rejected and support is found for a relationship.

Whilst these results echo what we might expect in PJ terms and they broadly support the conclusions drawn in similar PJ research, the greater question arises about the extent to which additional factors not covered by the PJ variables are associated with the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to compliance and cooperation. The indications from the phase 1 analysis and the previously documented contingencies to PJ outcomes are that relationships between the constituents of police legitimacy may indeed be moderated in the specific context of protest. This statement is made on four bases.

Firstly, protesters’ moral alignment with the police and their personal values about the law are both strongly associated with assessments about how they are treated by the police. This is a key component of police legitimacy and compliance and cooperation as its corollary.

Secondly, moral alignment and personal values about the law can be antecedent to the actual protest event itself or contact with the police. Indeed, the results show that previous contact with the police is only weakly associated with perceptions of event treatment and compliance levels. This perhaps indicates that moral alignment and personal values do not carry equal weight among the constituents of the constructs being applied.

Thirdly, it is apparent from the results for perceptions of event treatment (shown in table 6.3 above) that 69.2% (n=27) rated the police as doing a ‘good job’ in policing the protest event, yet this was not reflected in the compliance and cooperation levels. If we follow the PJ thesis concerning fair and respectful treatment then we might have expected to see greater expressions of compliance and cooperation as a corollary of benign or positive assessments of event policing. However, participants seemed capable of neutral or positive assessments about the policing of a protest event but still held negative attitudes to compliance and cooperation with the police.

Fourthly, support for the latter point can be found in the qualitative statements made by participants during the survey which indicate that additional influences may indeed impact the perceptions of police legitimacy and compliance and cooperation as commonly measured in PJ. Comments were made such as:

“The police support the system and I want to change it. The police did a good job today but it’s not for me to agree with them”. (Interviewee SQ1)

“The police protect the rich – it’s all about that”. (Interviewee SQ7)

“[The] police do a bad job they’re consistently disproportionate in their response, victimising people, corrupt at worst. The tactics like metal barriers are confrontational, the police define what they do as legal and I don’t support them”. (Interviewee SQ18)
“Policing at protests is government sanctioned and it’s organised to suppress effective direct action”. (Interviewee SQ26)

“The attitudes of the police are largely disconnected and disinterested to the needs and concerns of protesters, why should I do what they say?”. (Interviewee SQ35)

“It’s not my duty to support the police at protests”. (Interviewee SQ36)

On the four bases discussed above there is reason to be less sanguine about how and by what route attempts to enhance protester perceptions of police legitimacy produce compliance and cooperation. The implication is that the route from perceptions of treatment by the police to assessments of their legitimacy and compliance and cooperation are somehow moderated by attitudes and beliefs that are relevant to the context. These do not appear to be adequately covered by the measures that operationalise the constituent constructs of PJ. The qualitative comments made by protesters show that there is scope for further examination of the influences associated with the construction and shaping of perceptions of police legitimacy.

In conclusion, the purpose of the phase 1 exploratory survey was twofold, firstly, to provide a preliminary exercise to test the applicability of PJ concepts in the context of protest and secondly to identify aspects of their constituents for further qualitative, empirical investigation. The findings of the phase 1 analyses are broadly supportive of the related PJ research findings discussed earlier. The broad claims of PJ relating to assessments of police legitimacy and how compliance and cooperation is secured, both through self-regulation and normative compliance are consistent with my own findings. Protester perceptions of fair and respectful treatment at the hands of the police are associated with greater expressions of cooperation and compliance with the police as a felt obligation and positive assessments of police legitimacy are linked to self-reported cooperation and compliance levels. However, there are a number of contingents to the evaluations being made by protesters and the route from event treatment to cooperation and compliance is not clear. Moral alignment and personal value systems appear significant in protesters’ perceptions of police legitimacy and their attitudes to compliance and cooperation with the police and the law. Moreover, additional influences appear to be at work in how protesters construct and shape their perceptions of the law, the police, their treatment at the hands of the police and in overall assessments of police legitimacy prior to and within protest situations.

What does this mean for PJ and ESIM as they relate to the policing of protest? Potentially, policing strategy and tactics based entirely on the tenets of these approaches have limited application and efficacy in the context of protest. While I of course do not rebuff the significant weight of theoretical and empirical evidence for PJ and ESIM in policing, I argue that they provide insufficient explanation of the full range of influences that are at work in the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and their attitudes to
compliance and cooperation. Phase 2 of the investigation now turns to qualitatively investigating and explaining these potential influences.

**Phase 2 data analysis and construction of factors**

Phase 2 of the study aims to deal with the research question of what additional factors influence the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to cooperation and compliance? The phase 2 analysis is based on data collected at a number of London-based protest events between 2010 and 2015. A total of 13 protest events were attended, from which 79 qualitative interviews were carried out and non-participant observations were made (see table 6.5 below). Each event has a unique reference number shown in brackets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Interviews</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Justice for Ian Tomlinson (J4IT) 2010</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Additional video footage recorded by the researcher during the event for analysis and notes taken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Democracy rally (DR) 2010</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Still photographs and notes taken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupy London Stock Exchange (Occupy LSX) 2011</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Observation and notes taken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March for Jobs rally (M4J) 2011</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Additional video footage recorded by the researcher during the event for analysis and notes taken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students against Cuts (SAC) 2011</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Additional video footage recorded by the researcher during the event for analysis and notes taken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trades Union Congress (TUC) N30 March 2011</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Still photographs and notes taken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trades Union Congress (TUC) March 2012</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Still photographs and notes taken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupy Parliament Square (OPS) 2014</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Still photographs and notes taken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Abortion protest (Ab) 2015</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Observation and notes taken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imprisonment for Public Protection (IPP) protest 2015</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Observation and notes taken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reimagine Democracy rally (RID) 2015</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Observation and notes taken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The People’s Assembly (TPA) rally 2015</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Still photographs and notes taken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unite Against Fascism (UAF) rally 2015</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Still photographs and notes taken.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Through the analysis, four factors are identified and developed into the CDM of police legitimacy. The factors are as follows:

1. Protester constructions of policing;
2. Power and identity relationships;
3. Levels of protester engagement and distancing;
4. Pre-existing ideology.

The reader should note that the order of presentation is not intended to imply any hierarchy or pre-eminence of factors. In keeping with the GTM applied to the research the factors consist of categories with supporting subcategories (Charmaz, 2006). The narrative that follows draws on the content and context of protesters’ experiences, behaviours, comments and responses. Where possible these are supported by additional video footage, still photography and notes taken by the researcher. In the narrative each participant and protest event can be identified by a unique reference (see Appendix 7 for a log of data used).

The CDM (see figure 6.2 below) is an attempt to theorize the factors found through the empirical research to be influential in the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to compliance and cooperation.

![Figure 6.2 The contextually driven model (CDM) of police legitimacy: An explanatory model of factors associated with the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to compliance and cooperation.](image-url)
Protester constructions of policing

The first factor identified from the empirical research is protester constructions of policing. Protesters made evaluations about what the police represent as an organisation and how the police deal with protest events. These evaluations appeared to derive from their personal contact with the police, and vicariously mediated through other people or media sources. The three main categories that were found to underpin this factor are identified as: types of policing, police integrity, and narratives about policing. These are set out below together with comments and evidence from the interviews and observations.

Types of policing

Protesters expressed an acute sense of the nature and type of policing used at protest events. They perceived that a different style of policing was adopted at protests, a range of tactics and in some cases a particular type of officer or “unit”, whether or not they were explicitly identified as such by clothing or equipment. Furthermore, they identified broader policing roles and that there was a distinction between general uniformed police duties and specific public order or protest policing duties. Protesters’ assessments of types of policing appeared to be made from police tactics, use of equipment, police roles and non-police stewarding at events. Protesters identified issues with how well the police communicated with them, for example where a participant was asked about levels of tactical communication by the police at protests they perceived it as:

“Intimidating and with a sense of arrogance and superiority, never explaining their actions or that good at communicating with us”. (Interviewee SQ21)

Yet participants appeared to see communication as the unilateral responsibility of the police when asked whether they would engage with the police to ask for information in the following examples:

DL- Would you approach the police for information about what’s happening or why they are doing certain things?

“Why would I? It’s not my responsibility to find out what’s happening from them”. (Interviewee UAF1)

Similarly:

DL – No one seems to know what’s planned for the event?

“No, we’ll see what happens”.

DL – Would you approach the police to ask what they know and what’s happening?

“No, I don’t do that, we’ll find out soon enough, they don’t really talk to us much anyway”. (Interviewee J4IT5)
A theme emerged of poor tactical communication between the police and crowd members, with organisers giving crowd members instructions directly or mediated by the police giving information to them for broadcasting to protesters. The police appeared ill equipped at times to provide multi-channel and effective communication to ameliorate negative perceptions of police activities. This is an enduring problem identified elsewhere from a number of reviews of large scale protests and disorders (HMIC, 2009a, 2011a, 2011b).

The use of non-police equipment such as metal barriers instead of physical police lines or cordons, whilst well intentioned can be perceived as being confrontational or unnecessary. A participant reporting the policing of an event as being poor explains:

DL - What makes you think the police did a bad job of policing the event today?
“The tactics like the metal barriers are confrontational and unnecessary”. (Interviewee SQ18)

While another commented on the use of metal barriers saying:

“What do they [the police] think this is Beirut?”. (Interviewee SQ8)

It appeared that the mere presence of certain types of otherwise benign equipment for managing crowds can be perceived negatively and detract from positive perceptions of police performance in managing events. This is noteworthy given HMIC (2011b) recommendations to consider the increased use of barrier systems for crowd management. While it certainly reduces potential for conflict through physical contact between protesters and the police it can be counter-productive. Not least because it reduces face-to-face communication between the police and crowd members.

Containment or “kettling” of groups has become a much-contested policing tactic even when apparently applied to keep factions apart, and in order to facilitate the right to protest. Protester perceptions of it can be counter to how its use is intended. An example from a Unite against Fascism rally illustrates the point where a police presence in the form of two lines (cordons) keeping opposing factions apart was perceived as follows:

“They have police protection that’s what mate. Who protects a few fascists? The police that’s who of course!”.

DL - But maybe the police line is there for you too, perhaps to stop violence happening or helping you to protest at the same time against them?

“Yes I guess. No, we don’t need it, look (points to a large UAF crowd). But they do (points to a Britain First group) to stop us getting to them that’s what. Typical of the police!”.

DL - So the police, in protecting people, are in the way is that what you mean?
“Well they are in a way [...] it’s not like we need protecting, do we? The police won’t stay here long, we have all day if we need to”.

DL - But aren't the police trying to be fair to everyone including your group?

“I don’t want or need that, that’s the point of resistance. The police become pointless”. (Interviewee UAF3)

The situations in which police cordons were used but did not obstruct the free movement of participants were also perceived negatively or the motives for their use potentially misunderstood. Observations at a Students against Cuts rally and an interview with a participant illustrate the point thus:

DL - The police seem to have a line across the road but people can still walk between them. What do you think of that?

“Not sure why they are there if they are letting people through anyway, though I’ve seen it before, once you’re in there they close up and you’re stuck in”.

At this point missiles were thrown from one side of the crowd towards police lines:

DL – It seems that others are not happy about it either from the things being thrown?

“Yeah but I suppose it won’t help now […] the police line will close up ’cos it was open before”.

DL – So in a sense it was more about the presence of the police line there for the missiles to be thrown over, is that what you are saying?

“It seems that way to me, unless they thought they had been kettled, it can be hard to see when you’re in it [the crowd]. But who else would they be throwing at?”.

(Interviewee SAC1)

The use of police tactics for the benefit of keeping order or protecting the rights of more than one group can be perceived negatively, as more of an encumbrance or illegitimate protection of an opposing faction in the eyes of others regardless of any objective police intention.

There were police tactics used to facilitate crowd safety at planned and spontaneous protests that appeared to go entirely unnoticed and failed to attract any positive recognition such as the protection of march routes, sites of static protest activity and traffic management. Observations of a spontaneous breakaway group in support of the Justice for Ian Tomlinson campaign march demonstrated this when the road became congested and protesters were in danger from the passing of heavy traffic:

“Officers approach a group in the road and tell them about the traffic and the lorries coming over the bridge, a man in a pig mask stands behind an officer mimicking and mocking him in front of the group”. (Observation notes J4IT6)
In the same event a series of police interventions aimed at facilitating the progress of the march went unnoticed and then suffered a degree of dissent with jeering and whistling by protesters at the police officers who were stopping the traffic to let the march progress.

Thus, it appeared that protesters’ assessments of police tactics were made within a frame of reference to the event itself, and their own aims and value systems. There was little recognition about the role of police tactics in protecting their safety and ensuring the exercise of the right to protest. At times this appeared independent of any intention by the police or what by objective standards might be considered as entirely appropriate and desirable policing interventions.

**Police roles**

There were perceptions expressed of a distinction between general day-to-day police duties and protest specific policing, in some sense the latter was given special attention with an indication that it is somehow different from everyday police activity. The role of the police in what they should be doing in the minds of protesters was verbalised. Proteger perceptions of the specific nature of protest policing can be sharply seen in these two examples:

“I’ve been to a lot of protests and the police are usually bad at the job, it [the police] brings out the thugs and provokes people”. (Interviewee SQ17)

“On things like this they get the Met TSG out, thugs, psycho-goon TSG”. (Interviewee J4IT5)

The demarcation between perceptions of “normal” and protest policing was made on the basis that the latter is somehow disconnected from day-to-day policing activity, and is illustrated in the following examples:

“There’s a distinction between the normal police and the riot police, police took the role of protecting premises and property, like Fortnum and Mason[^3] and the Ritz, the stewards dealt with the march”. (Interviewee SQ32)

DL - Would you say that applies to all policing then – like traffic or local bobbies in your area?

“That’s different they’re not the same as this lot are they”. (Interviewee UAF9)

“Incidents isolated from day-to-day policing such as kettling, the Jean Charles de Menezes thing and Tomlinson detract from what the police do and are”. (Interviewee SQ12)

“It’s the police […] they might be okay one time and then not the next. Like my locals are okay, [they] let me off speeding (laughs) but here it’s different”. (Interviewee RID4)

[^3]: This refers to another protest event where the Metropolitan Police intervened to eject a sit-in demonstration and were perceived to have used police lines to protect property and goods at both premises.
“The general police do a good job but it depends on which force and the geography you’re in”. (Interviewee SQ3)

“The majority of police on a day-to-day basis are satisfactory but they are used politically especially at demos”. (Interviewee SQ5)

These examples demonstrated a cognitive process whereby protesters consciously separated isolated incidents of general police activity from protest policing, at times this process was informed by assessments of individual police forces and locality.

The role of police officers in policing protest insofar as what they are there to do and should or should not concern themselves with was highlighted. When asked about the police presence, their involvement can be ignored or perceived as unnecessary to protesters. The example below taken from an Anti-abortion protest where graphic images were on display highlights the point:

DL - What do you think about the police presence here?

“I didn’t really notice […] yeah there are some (looks across the road), no one spoke to us today about what we’re doing, so I didn’t notice them to be honest”.

DL - Would you expect them to get involved at all?

“No, I don’t see why. It’s not police business is it really? They shouldn’t get involved. We’re just here to get the message across to voters and MPs. You know it’s not a police issue is it? We’re not doing anything illegal it’s an organised campaign to raise awareness and influence voters”.

DL - What about if the police asked you to stop or change what you are doing?

“The [protest] issue is important and I’d say, just for a short time that we are doing it. We are entitled to and no one should stop it. What harm are we doing? This is the only way – by lobbying, it’s not for the police to interfere with that, it’s not like we are doing something wrong you know”. (Interviewee Ab671)

Protester perceptions of police interventions in their protest activities were influenced by whether they believed that they were doing something illegal or that it was not a police matter.

The use of stewards has increased in the management of organised protests and indeed it is often encouraged by the police and event organisers themselves. Interestingly, their presence and use of tactics similar to those employed by the police were generally well received and complied with, as this example taken from observation notes on the use of police-style cordons illustrates:

“Stewards began to gather – around 20 plus at the front of a march and create a box cordon at the head of the demo ready for the move off. This is a police style tactic. The march moves slowly off with stewards at the head in box formation and along the sides to stop overspill into the opposite carriageway as it moves through Oxford Circus and
into Regent Street to Piccadilly. The police presence is limited to traffic police at the front and rear and on junctions to stop traffic and act as safety management for the march. Stewards in tabards control the pace and movement of the march with a moving box cordon which appears to be adhering to its authority and instructions". (Observation Tac1)

However, stewards perceived their role as having limitations and boundaries, anticipating that there were certain groups or activities that were the sole remit of the police, in the following examples from observations of a group of six protesters dressed in black climbing up onto road furniture and chanting swear words next to where a steward was standing and directing the march:

DL – I noticed that you didn’t speak to that group, any reasons for that?

“No point (shrugs) they wouldn’t talk to me or do what I said anyway, why would they? They do what they want at gigs like this. It’s all a game, if the police were bothered they’d do something”. (Interviewee UAF1)

Similarly, another steward observes:

“It’s not my job. I’m here for the march not any of this (points to other protesters breaking away from the march), it’s the usual, the cops will sort it out. They wouldn’t take any notice of me anyway they’re not like the majority of people today are they?”. (Interviewee UAF4)

Those with responsibilities for stewarding protests appeared to distinguish their role from that of the police. That certain activities were for the police alone to deal with and they perceived that there were types of protester who would not acknowledge the authority of stewards, in this sense they were the “property” of the police.

**Police integrity**

Protesters made assessments about the reliability and trustworthiness of the police based on perceived lawfulness of police actions, reports of wrongdoing, dishonesty and “scandals”. The police use of coercive force and suspicion about police motives also informed views about police integrity and the extent to which the police were seen to act proportionately. The category of police integrity is linked to two subcategories of police legality which captures assessments of officers’ legal knowledge and use of powers, and trust which covers perceptions of the police being honest, sincere and “doing the right thing”. Notably, trust did not appear to arise in the context of police effectiveness, as in how good or bad they are at their job, in solving crime or dealing with anti-social behaviour (which are the more commonly applied measures elsewhere by HMIC in PEEL assessment). Protesters’ perceptions of police integrity were highlighted in the following comments:
“The police are corrupt. They over police rallies and demos”. (Interviewee SQ11)

“The police incite violence, arrest people at random and use disproportionate violence against protesters”. (Interviewee SQ22)

“My experience shows that protests of this size and nature tend to turn more violent later when media coverage is less on police conduct”. (Interviewee SQ35)

“I have had some bad experience of other demos. But you see cases all the time, the police lies, corruption, Plebgate & that”. (Interviewee RID2)

Some protesters also commented on the number of integrity issues concerning officers taking bribes and being corrupt:

“I expect that I might be horrified at the results [about bribes] if I really knew”. (Interviewee SQ4)

“The police do a bad job, things like Fortnum and Mason, deaths in custody, racial prejudice, complicity with their notes to perjure themselves and to conquer protesters”. (Interviewee SQ23)

These views represented perceptions about policing both generally and within the context of protest that considered it corrupt and of provoking violence, with officers willing to lie in their evidence. Participants also expressed a suspicion that police corruption may be more widespread than known. Notably, reference was made to “scandals” involving individual police officers and that officers behaved differently when media attention was upon them.

A subcategory was identified about police legality, specifically related to officers’ knowledge and application of their legal powers. Observation and interviews following a police officer speaking with a group about protesting in Parliament Square, London revealed the following:

“You have no right to stop me, protest is my right. You tell me the law that says why I can’t or shouldn’t sit or stand here and just make my point of view? You don’t have the power to do that….my address? I don’t need to give you it and I won’t, it’s not my role in life to do so for the police. It’s my to challenge you. And people like me (turns to others), there are so few of us and they (points to the police) don’t get it. You’ll only concoct something against me”. (Interviewee OPS3)

The notion that protesters and those acting on their behalf at protest events scrutinised police actions and were cognisant of police powers can be seen in an account from legal observers (who are often used by protest groups to monitor police activity):

DL - What do you think about the policing of today’s event?

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4 “Plebgate” is a reference to a scandal in the United Kingdom about an altercation between a Conservative Party MP and police officers. The officers were alleged to have concocted evidence to support an allegation of wrongdoing by the MP.

5 This refers to a previous protest event where the Metropolitan Police intervened to eject a sit-in demonstration and used police lines to protect property and goods at the premises.
“It’s been ok so far we just note down movements, officer details, warrant numbers and actions, in case clients raise issues later. But no issues so far. People just don’t trust them [the police] since G20”.

DL – Why since G20 specifically?

“Well, the warrant number thing officers had no ID and people I speak to are definitely more suspicious now, like a heightened awareness to it”.

DL - The police must be aware of what you’re doing and act accordingly maybe?

“Maybe, but you’d be surprised, or maybe not (laughs) some don't even know the law or that they’re under scrutiny. Our legal knowledge is greater than most police these days”. (Interviewee LO2)

There is a sense expressed here of anticipated indiscretions by the police that required evidence being recorded on protesters’ behalf, and notably that the need arose from occasions of police wrongdoing at previous protests. Other participants expressed a belief that knowledge of the law is lacking in frontline officers at protests in the following terms:

“Like I say we organise and meet beforehand and it’s a static so we don’t need to apply for police permission. Not like these [police] here would know anyway...we know the law better than they do”. (Interviewee DR1)

If there is a presumption that the police do not understand the law as well as some protesters do, its corollary appeared to be that the police do not follow their own rules either through ignorance or design:

“The police are a law unto themselves”. (Interviewee J4ITS1)

Issues of trust in the police were also identified. While we might anticipate a significant category of trust in its own right, certainly from the theorising on trust and confidence within PJ, it appeared more in the context of perceptions of police dishonesty, and often expressed in the following terms:

“We’ll remember the 100s if not 1000s, that’s what we’re fighting for. For Justice! You [the police] cannot be trusted […] fuck the police state and what it stands for. They all tell lies and you can’t be trusted”. (Interviewee J4ITS1)

“People rely on us because they don’t trust the police versions of these protest events”. (Interviewee RID3)

Narratives

The category of narratives concerns protesters’ accounts of policing and comes from a number of sources that are distal and proximal in nature, ranging from previous contact with the police, experience at protest events, media publicity and folklore. A theme of previous police
wrongdoing emerged in the narratives that were either personally constructed, vicariously obtained or both. Take the following examples from a march organised to protest against the decision by the Crown Prosecution Service not to charge a police officer over the death of Ian Tomlinson at the G20, 2009 and a speech delivered at a Unite against Fascism rally:

“We set up the campaign immediately after Ian’s death, we didn’t think we’d get far. Statistically, you are more likely to die at the hands of the police more than in the general population. Since 1969 there have been more murderers in the police force than in any other section of the population. We want people to know about the extent of organised police violence in the country”. (Interviewee J4ITS1)

“Remember, if you’re on the street and you’re black or dark you know. You know what the police are in this country. You’re badly treated and treated differently at the hands of the police. We applaud police protection of mosques and for minorities, but they must do more than that”. (Interviewee UAFS1)

These illustrate the way that narratives about policing are created and communicated and the place that they occupy in constructing and shaping protesters’ perceptions of police legitimacy. Participants sensed that information abounds and is available from a number of sources regarding the “truth” about policing past, present and future:

DL – What do you think about that comment the [UAF] speaker just made?

“I think he has got a point, the police do pick on kids and that”. 

DL- He said that they protect people too?

“It’s not enough is it, people are suspicious when they hear such things about the police”.

DL – What’s the alternative then or the more than that he referred to?

“Well people should refuse to buy into their [the police] lies. The myths that are peddled, the stories are true it’s all out there. The students, police deaths, spies, it’s all there. The main news avoids it, but if you look you can find it”. (Interviewee UAF10)

And again:

DL - You say the police are tied up in the system, how do you know that?

“Look around you…history tells us that. Cable Street, Brixton, poll tax and all those it’s a pattern in policing, people aren’t blind”.

DL – You seem young enough not to have been at those events though?

“Ha ha, yeah of course. But it’s well known about the police in this country if you read accounts”. (Interviewee TPA3)

These sentiments resonate with Braithwaite’s idea (2009, 2011) about the casting of authority in a “villainous” role in order to create justification for social distance and motivational postures.
Protesters’ perceptions of previous contact with the police derived from personal and vicarious experiences, and appeared to influence the construction of narratives about the policing of protest:

“I’ve had no personal experience, but I am aware that friends growing up in London had different experiences with the police. I’ve been to a lot of protests and they [the police] are usually bad at doing their jobs, they usually bring out their thugs and provoke people”. (Interviewee SQ17)

“Listen, I was at G20 and Climate camp and I seen (sic) what the police do and people should know about police brutality. It’s state endorsed violence aimed at destroying protest”. (Interviewee SQ6)

" I have no experience at rallies like this, but I’m sure bad things happen, don’t they? By the law of averages there must be something in what you hear”. (Interviewee TPA5)

Narratives such as these often appeared to be informed by historical accounts of the police, related not just to protest policing but wider police activity and reports of alleged wrongdoing. Rationally, some participants identified that they had no personal experience upon which to base the narratives, but the perception endured that there must at least be something in the accounts that were being reported by sources that they trusted. That there is “no smoke without fire”.

In summary the factor of protester constructions of policing is constructed from three main areas. Firstly, from types of policing incorporating perceptions of police tactics and police roles both generally and specific to protest events. Secondly, from protesters’ views of police integrity with regard to the lawfulness of police activity and of perceived police wrongdoing. The notion of trust in the police appears tied up with assessments of how honest and sincere the police are perceived to be, not how well they perform their duties and functions. Protesters anticipate indiscretions by the police based on perceptions of previous contact with the police. Thirdly, from narratives that are created and communicated about police actions. These narratives come from historic accounts and personal or vicarious reports of police contact. Narratives that have been constructed are communicated through a number of media such as web-based material, written leaflets and flyers, social media applications and speeches.

Evaluations are made of police tactics wherein benign or well-intentioned police activity or use of equipment can be seen as unnecessary and provocative to protesters. There is a sense that benign police interventions go unnoticed until they are interpreted within a frame of reference that sees them negatively. Police actions to control traffic or maintain crowd safety may be seen negatively, even where it appears to keep warring factions in a crowd apart or protect the rights of opposing groups. Policing at protests can be singled out and perceived as a distinctly different type of policing from the general day-to-day police functions. The use of stewards to manage protest appears well accepted by protesters, yet stewards have clear boundaries about their remit and the type of protester and behaviour that they would deal with.
In short, protesters create representations of the police and how they operate in the context of the policing of protests.

**Power and identity relationships**

The second factor identified by the empirical research is *power and identity relationships*. Protesters expressed a feeling of power and identity both individually and for their group. The *power and identity relationships* factor was concerned with the means of them delivering change, in being able to influence someone or something, and it carried a strong sense of making a difference. This required something of a value-based position for the participant, positioning them and the protest relative to the police or state authority in a perceived power dynamic. The factor identified social and group identities that were often formed prior to protest events and that appeared to be required for meaningful collective action. The main categories that underpin the factor are: change agents, identities, and empowerment. These are set out below using comments and evidence from the interviews and observations.

**Change agents**

Protesters identified the role that they play in raising awareness about the issues pertinent to the protest and perceived being a force for change. The role appeared to be one fuelled by a sense of grievance, of not being satisfied with a democracy seen as different to their own interpretation, and a desire for an alternative vision of society. Protesters saw themselves and the act of protest as the means of bringing about change, sometimes feeling a sense of duty or responsibility to do so.

The following example from the Occupy Parliament Square protest illustrates these points:

“Look, I voted. But what was the point, I didn’t vote for cuts, for private firms to take over, for bedroom tax, for student fees, wrecking the country did I? But that’s what we got. It’s little about people like me and it’s a social crisis is what’s happened. People can’t carry on struggling with things like keeping a roof over the head, feeding their families, paying bills and fuel poverty. Come on, that’s not democracy. It’s an insult. We want an alternative to all that. You know there is one, it takes people getting together, standing up and saying this ain’t right. The system its wrong and we’ll change it. People see in the papers, fights and all that but forget the real point is about the cuts, the politicians. We are doing something to change the system. Imagine if everyone did that. It’s my place to challenge the police, authority and people like me (turns to others present) like there are so few of us and they (points to the Palace of Westminster) don’t get it but the only way to change it to make them listen”.  
(Interviewee OPS1)

The notion that the system is broken and in need of an alternative was echoed by others:

“The political system is broken. An election won’t fix it. The mainstream all feed racism and islamophobia. This is about launching a national campaign with people joining
Protesters expressed a vision of a different type of system. They expressed the notion that they and their group or campaign was the agent of change, by making a stand against the authorities, including the police. The ways of doing so ranging from legitimate peaceful protest to direct action and acts of violence. They depicted their role as being the challenger(s) with a sense of social or political duty and responsibility for protesting on behalf of others. A patchwork of issues such as racism, social crises and failed democracy were sometimes conflated to provide a foundation upon which these change agents stood, positioning the protest in political terms relative to the state and the police.

**Identities**

Protesters described a sense of identification with or against other protesters and protest causes. They recognised that others may not share their real or imagined motives and standards of behaviour. The perception was that there may be minority elements within the group(s) who do not follow or share agreed or acceptable levels of behaviour. These standards of behaviour in some cases were made explicit by way of stated rules and preferred ways of being, to some degree they were “policed” by members of the group. There was a sense that behaviour falling outside of these established or expected norms detracted from the main purpose of the protest and a level of group leadership or hierarchy was reported in some instances. These examples from the Occupy Parliament Square event illustrate the points:

**"Let’s face it they [the police] have a job to do, but come on this is over the top? Most people here ain't gonna kick off are they, it'll be the usual nutters and they don't need an excuse much. The majority are here to make a point, we've had enough. This is the way to get the point across, voting don’t (sic) work. Real change only comes through people doing this I think". (Interviewee OPS1)**

**DL - When you say there's no violence here today, what's your take on using violent protest then?**

**“Doing it? No, not for me, it takes away from what the message is and gives them (points to police) an excuse to blame us. People see in the paper, fights and that but forget the real point is about the cuts, politicians, changing the system. I know you get people who come for it [violence] but most want to get the point across”.**

**DL - But you don’t?**
“No, I said, It's a personal choice. The people here look, they choose to do what’s going on. This about setting the camp up, nothing else. It’s a shared vision, we have agreements right, at least we stick by what we say. (Points to a placard placed on grass). We have a code, if you want, based on non-violent behaviour, no discrimination, sobriety, shared responsibility and respect”.

DL - That seems a tall order to comply with?

“Maybe, but don’t forget, it’s a stated intent, we all signed up to that when we decided to be part of this action didn’t we? It’s like they are values and we’ll stick to it, if people wanna (sic) be part of the camp then that’s that or they can leave. We have no place for violence and intimidation here”.

DL - Does that apply to contact with the police?

“I’m not saying that there aren’t some who might lose it, that’s a personal thing isn’t it? But the theory is, we make a stand for what we believe in and we make our choices, we might be flouting some law that says we can’t camp here, but that’s different from bashing the cops when they tell us to leave isn’t it? But some can’t see that”.

DL – How would you get them to leave the group?

“Physically, we can’t I guess […] but I would ask them to leave. Tell them they aren’t welcome in the group but it’s a free country, I suppose people could just ignore it”. (Interviewee OPS2)

In another example from the Occupy London Stock Exchange protest, a protester distinguishes between who they see as “genuine” protesters and those not part of their group:

“It’s peaceful, the usual suspects are here […] but it’s nothing to do with the camp. They know it, they turn up unannounced, [they are] nothing to do with us”. (Interviewee SQ3)

**Empowerment**

Protesters reported a sense of empowerment and conveyed a notion of strength and solidarity in numbers. The sense of power enabled them to act in ways in which they might not otherwise have done as an individual in opposition to the police. Further, that they could engage in activity within the protest setting that they could or would not do in everyday life. Paradoxically, some protesters reported a sense of gaining the moral high ground by refraining from using or supporting levels of force. They described an acute awareness of the capacity and capability of their group to act. This was seen in the following exchanges at the Occupy Parliament Square and The Peoples’ Assembly protest events:

“Look at it, if all these people don’t like what they were doing [the police] they couldn’t do a thing about it. The people will decide, not the police. You know it, he knows that, it’s always a choice, but with all these people here, we could do what we want right now. The police can’t stop this can they?”. (Interviewee OPS4)
DL - There are plenty of police around the square by the look of it?

“They haven’t done anything have they, either they haven’t been needed or they can’t anyway, there’s too many of us. The people decide don’t they. I don’t think they (the police) want to be here. It’s all politics and what it looks like, that’s why they get involved”.

DL - What do you feel about cooperating with the police then, if they asked you to do something or stop?

“We want to occupy the square for a while, they couldn’t stop it. It’s a public right, like a duty to stand up for something...that’s why the rally was set up and there’s too many of us and it makes no difference what the Met do. We have a code see (points to a banner) ...non-violence, [violence] it gets in the way. There are some (points to some protesters with face masks on and in black clothing) but they don’t represent us. Playing up isn’t the point of the protest”. (Interviewee TPA1)

DL - With all these people here what should happen do you think?

“Direct action. Voting does nothing. Direct action does. Protest has to be more than just standing around”. (Interviewee TPA2)

DL - But the police might not let that happen?

“No, not with so many of us we could, if people wanted it, flood the green [the square]. The police couldn't stop it”. (Interviewee TPA2)

These comments highlight protesters’ recognition that by weight of numbers they could overcome police efforts to limit their actions. Significantly, personal choice and value-based judgements appeared to inform their decisions whether to cooperate or resist. They also identified that within a group setting they may be able to engage in activity that individually would be riskier and potentially lead to arrest. The following example from the Justice for Ian Tomlinson march where a protester is shouting insults and swear words at the police highlights this:

DL - Would you do that if you were walking alone?

“No obviously not, they would arrest me, right? But they can’t here with all of us. Would they arrest all of us?”. 

DL - So, in numbers you think the police are less likely to take action against individuals?

“At the time [...] I suppose it depends on what you did, like they probably have photos and that but for shouting they either can’t or wouldn’t risk it. There’s masses of us and we’d look after each other”.

DL - What does that mean? That you would intervene?

“Yeah, I like to think that we’d protect each other, we the people, it’s where the real power lies”. (Interviewee J4IT2)
The sense was conveyed that the police were less likely, able or willing to act given the weight of numbers of participants and the likelihood that it would cause other protesters to intervene. Protesters’ decisions to resist the police or not were made as part of their personal value systems. An expectation of involvement by other protesters was inferred and this was linked to the notion of “people power” described as ‘we the people’ and a feeling of solidarity through the act of resistance.

In summary, power and identity relationships accounted for the capacity and capability that protesters felt they had in achieving the protest aims. Protesters appeared to describe themselves as change agents in opposition to the status quo, as the means to bring about change and the establishment of an alternative situation or system. Change agents saw themselves as having a role defined as a sense of duty or responsibility to use protest to further their causes(s) and sometimes of acting on behalf of others. There was a recognition of certain types of protester and forms of protest that may be viewed as acceptable or unacceptable depending on group or personal value-systems, rules or expected standards of behaviour. Feelings of empowerment derived from a sense of being part of something, of having greater strength and power in numbers and having the ability and opportunity to act in concert to advance the protest aims. This may or may not involve opposing the police yet is often expressed as being regulated through a personal or group-based value system. Commonly, people expressed making decisions according to an individualised sense of right and wrong, one that might not always correspond to the law.

**Levels of protester engagement and distancing**

The third factor developed from the empirical data concerns *levels of protester engagement and distancing*. Protesters reported various levels of engagement and distancing with the police, the law and the state. The factor is built upon protester expressions of alignment with the police, the law and authority. It is related to PJ with regard to moral alignment with the police, personal values about the law and attitudes to cooperation and compliance. All of which are constituents of police legitimacy according to PJ theory. The main categories that underpin the factor are 1) police alignment, 2) personal values, and 3) compliance. These are set out below using comments and evidence from the interviews and observations.
Police alignment

Protesters expressed different levels of alignment with the police. They were described in terms of the level of identification that participants felt with the police and how the police were or were not representative of them and their values. Protesters reported that in exercising their rights and freedoms the police may be in opposition and misaligned with protesters’ values. Evidence for police alignment can be found in the following examples from the Occupy Parliament Square protest:

DL - If the police have a job to do, what do you think about cooperating with them?

“Mm (laughs), I’m not new to this, I’ve been on a few protests now. I say this, first it’s a right in a free democracy, it’s a right to protest. Second, they will do what the government tells them. I am not here to do what the government says, that’s why I’m protesting and I’m not here to agree with the police”. (Interviewee OPS1)

A police officer approached a female protester to engage with her and the following exchange occurred:

“I’m not listening to you (walks off from police officer talking to her), because you can’t tell me what to do”. (Interviewee OPS3)

A physical display of dismissive defiance is shown in the latter example by the protester walking away and choosing not to engage with the police officer. The sense of the police being an irrelevance and unrepresentative to some protesters was demonstrated in the following example at a Unite against Fascism rally:

DL - Aren’t the police trying to be fair to everyone, including your group?

“I don’t want or need that, that’s the point of resistance. The police become pointless”. (Interviewee UAF3)

In another example from the Justice for Ian Tomlinson campaign march, the police are seen as being utterly unrepresentative of the people:

“We’re about to start a riot and why not? I have no respect for any of you now. None of you! Effectively we live in a police state. We have lost the freedoms which over the generations we won in this country. So, what have we now is just blindingly obvious. We have an upside-down police force. We have a police force that kills you. Arrests you if you’re innocent and if you’re guilty let you go free. They don’t represent us. I don’t recognise what they stand for”. (Interviewee J4ITS1)

The examples above illustrate the various levels of social distancing, resistance and defiance according to Braithwaite (2009, 2010, 2011), both in physical terms as the case of the protester walking away ignoring police officers and psychologically by expressions of a loss of respect for the police. Indeed, the police can be perceived as being altogether opposed to the act of protest itself as a democratic right:
“They seem to be against protest, it’s not like we are doing something wrong when this is our right”. (Interviewee SQ30)

DL - From what you were saying you don’t seem to think the police facilitate protest?

“No. I don’t think that’s their role, well it should be, but I don’t think most see it that way”. (Interviewee UAF9)

Protesters in these cases framed the police as being opposed to protest and whilst their role should be to facilitate it, that the police do not see it as such.

**Personal values**

The category of personal values depicts protesters’ attitudes about the law and the legal system. They appeared to carry the locus of right and wrong in their own personal value systems and of what the law should or should not represent. There was a strong sense that cooperation with the law was a personal matter and what was perceived by participants as “minor” offending (based on their own values and opinion) was permissible relative to the weight of the issues that the protest was about. Personal values incorporated a degree of legal recognition, that is to say how valid they believed the law to be and if they recognised its validity.

The following exchange occurred at the Occupy Parliament Square event and highlights the point about recognition of the law:

“We aren’t doing anything wrong, there’s no violence, I’m here to do what I need to and not what they think I should be doing”.

DL - Why is that?

“Well, standing on a green [the square] compared to standing up for cuts and everything that is going on, it’s nothing in comparison. It’s their laws not mine”.

DL - Their?

“Well, standing on a green [the square] compared to standing up for cuts and everything that is going on, it’s nothing in comparison. It’s their laws not mine”.

The extent to which other protesters’ behaviour was viewed as acceptable or not was described in the following terms:

DL - So are you saying that for you it’s a personal choice whether to use violence to get what you want?

“Yeah, there’s levels though I think. Trespass or whatever they call it is one thing, but for me fighting or throwing things that’s something else”.

DL - Would you recognize the police as having the rule of law?

“No really. It’s our law not theirs but the police don’t uphold our rights I think”.

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DL - When you say there’s no violence – why do you think that is?

“If people wanted to they would, but they obviously don’t, it’s a personal choice thing”. (Interviewee OPS4)

An element of calculation by protesters of the potential costs associated with engaging in criminal acts was also identified:

DL - So the reason you wouldn’t get involved in criminal acts is more to do with what you might lose?

“Yes, really it’s not worth it for me is it? I guess if you have nothing to lose then you might, but personally I couldn’t do that”. (Interviewee RID4)

Another protester highlights the personal choices to be made:

DL - Are you saying then here today, it’s like you have your own rules to follow and not that of the law?

“Pretty much [...] the legal system is wrong anyway and criminalises people for the wrong things. For rip off bankers it’s ok. Don’t pay taxes and they’ll lock you up. What kind of law is that? It’s a personal assessment, a country needs laws or it would be barbaric, people would run amok [...] so there has to be something like that in place. Some don’t like it but that’s the way it is”.

DL - So would you follow those laws yourself?

“Well yeah, I would, but then that’s because I think it’s the right thing to do. But others don’t, it’s got to come down to your own standards hasn’t it?”. (Interviewee TPA2)

Here in these examples protesters articulated that compliance with the law was very much a personal choice. A choice informed by a number of factors that needed to be taken into account such as their personal value systems, the consequences to the individual and wider society. However, a strong sense of the law being unfairly applied by authority and of the powerful in society not being held to account was expressed and used to rationalise protesters’ decisions.

Compliance

The category of compliance is concerned with participants’ willingness to comply with police requests and directions at protest events. According to PJ and the ESIM compliance and cooperation is a corollary of perceived police legitimacy which is produced by fair, respectful and proportionate treatment by the police. However, protesters reported a distinctly different explanation of the relationship between how they perceived their treatment by the police and their readiness to cooperate. Examples from The Peoples’ Assembly march and Occupy London Stock Exchange event highlight the relationship as follows:
DL – How was the event policed today do you think?

“Okay, not much happened today, the police went along with it”.

DL – So, how would you feel about cooperating with them, say if they stopped you going where you wanted to?

“No, no way. That’s the whole idea, to revolt. Not to do what they want us to”. (Interviewee TPA6)

And again, on complying with the police:

DL - How would you feel about doing what they told you, like leaving the camp or moving on?

“No, we’re staying. They [the police] support the system and this about changing it”. (Interviewee SQ2)

Even after recognising that the police had acted benignly, another protester makes clear his position on compliance:

DL – What do you think of the way the police have handled the event today?

“They followed us around a bit but I can’t say I’ve had any issues with them”.

DL – So you’ve had no problems with them today?

“No really, no”.

DL – If they asked you to join the main march or disperse, what would you do about that?

“It’s not happening. I didn’t come here to follow their instructions”. (Interviewee TPA2)

In these examples, protesters reported experiencing benign or positive encounters with police activity. However, there was no corresponding expressions of compliance or cooperation with police requests. Compliance as a stated intention appeared to be linked to personal value systems and unrelated to the positive qualities of police contact. In short, fair and respectful treatment by the police did not necessarily correspond with greater expressions of compliance and cooperation.

In summary, levels of protester engagement and distancing identified the alignment that protesters felt with the police and what they represent. The notion conveyed is one shared with PJ in the use of the term “alignment”, in that it includes the extent to which the police are perceived as representative of protesters’ values and facilitative of their aims. Of course, whilst desirable there are occasions when the police cannot align to these consensual values.
Significantly, personal value systems about the law appeared to influence protesters’ motivational postures towards the police and the rule of law. This component of the CDM resonates with the theoretical perspective of motivational posturing and social distancing identified as a contingency to PJ (Braithwaite, 2003, 2009, 2011). Within the CDM, levels of engagement and distancing can be seen to range from full cooperation with the police and the law based on a personally felt obligation to comply, to extreme dismissive resistance or defiance in the form of complete disengagement from the police. Between these positions a number might be found whereby protesters engage with and utilise the democratic processes to lobby and protest within the law, expressing resistance yet complying through fear of sanction.

**Pre-existing ideology**

The fourth factor developed from the empirical data is *pre-existing ideology*. It concerns the presence and influence of political and issue-based agendas on the protest. Ideology appeared as the means of positioning protesters within a political context and related to the expression and presence of a set of personal or group inspired beliefs. These beliefs influenced protesters’ actions and/or evaluations of the police as agents of the state. Protester perceptions of the police as therefore political in nature were identified. *Pre-existing ideology* also impacted ways in which protest groups defined and supported each other. The main categories that underpin this factor are, 1) political bases, 2) issue bases and 3) state agents.

**Political bases**

The category of political bases identified the presence and expression of political standpoints and beliefs about the existence and nature of policing and the state. Protesters often framed their protest in political terms and cast the police as part of the political system that they perceived as being aligned to the government and the powerful (often expressed as the “rich” in their accounts). This served to position the protest and protesters in degrees of opposition to the police and state authority. During the Justice for Ian Tomlinson campaign march, Occupy Parliament Square and Unite against Fascism rallies, this position was voiced in the following terms:

“That’s the point, protest is meant to smash the capitalist state and their police”.

DL – You think that the police support Capitalism in some way?

“This protest represents a political struggle for many of us today and the police are a product of capitalism. If we had the kind of country that we wanted then there wouldn’t be a police (sic)”. (Interviewee J4IT1)

And on the perceived partisan nature of protest policing:
DL – You didn’t seem too happy about what the police were asking you to do?

“No way, they have no right, it’s disgusting how they behave. They should be over in there (points to the Houses of Parliament). The Met chief, he’ll probably be a Lord or Sir something, sick, they’re all in some big club together behind closed doors. People are not stupid”. (Interviewee OPS5)

Another protester shouted – “Austerity breeds fascism smash the fascist police” and is then interviewed:

DL - You were talking about the fascist police, what makes you think the police are fascist in this country?

“It’s all political isn’t it. The boys in blue. The government, it’s blue. They even wear the same colour. The police are the face of right wing politics as far as I’m concerned”. (Interviewee UAF2)

The notion of the police as being allies of the rich and powerful and not guardians of the poor and less privileged was also expressed:

“The police are puppets. The people will do what the people do, that’s the working class struggle regardless its always been. The police aren’t there to facilitate that struggle, are they?”.

DL - What are they there to facilitate then?

“It’s about their political masters, the legal system, powers, laws, the rich, take the war on terror as an example. It’s just an excuse to shift the blame onto the oppressed and the police use their powers to do that here”.

DL - Ok but where would you see the police in a “new world”?

“Personally, I don’t. I’m not a police fan. But politically, I admit, you need one, a police force. But a new socialism would mean real change for the police in this country. No racism, no scapegoating anymore. More accountability for what the police do. They will not be allowed to continue as part of the rich imperialist agenda”. (Interviewee UAF9).

The views expressed above highlight how the police can be painted as protecting the rich and powerful and being part of the state machinery. Some protesters saw the role of protest as being to break up the existing political structure and replacing it with one in which the police did not exist or were markedly different. Take this other example from The Peoples’ Assembly march:

“We’re not starting a class war – we’re ending it and the police are part of it”.

DL - Part of what?

“The structure […] the war’s not about kicking the Tories out, it’s the whole thing and yes the police are wrapped up in the structure”. (Interviewee TPA5)
Protesters positioned themselves and their protest as engaged in a class struggle or “war” in which the police were viewed as partisan and inextricably linked to the authorities and system of government.

**Issue bases**

Issue bases related to the dogmatic positions taken by protesters, often related to racial, religious or specific campaign issues. They were ideological in the sense that they were based on or related to a set of ideas and ideals. These concerned the protest causes, where they were couched in terms that were not explicitly political or made on the basis of political ideology. These may be single protest issues or multiple ones with protest occurring in a focused or coalition arrangement. Multiple issues were sometimes conflated within one protest event. Protesters described being opportunistic and utilised protest events that were not their primary concern for the purposes of promoting their own. Evidence for these issue bases can be found in the following examples from a Unite against Fascism rally where banners identified a multitude of groups and affiliations. The issues ranged from racism, anti-austerity, Save the NHS and Ban the UKIP party. A protester hands out “Against Racism” leaflets and is interviewed:

DL – What’s the leaflet about?

“Racism and hatred, it’s about why islamophobia is wrong. Islam is peaceful and its people”.

DL - Oh I see. I didn’t realise that the event was about that as an issue?

“Well yeah, but it’s like everyone’s together. There’s lots of different people handing out things at these events, we support each other”.

DL - So your main reason for attending isn’t about austerity and the other protest issues, it’s more to promote this issue for you?

“Yeah […] when people come out like this they pick up lots of information on others’ campaigns”. (Interviewee UAF2)

Further interviews with a UAF supporter at a rally in support of victims of police violence highlighted the dominance of a single issue for some participants, often based on race:

“They [UKIP supporters] have no rights. I don’t believe in a democracy like that. It lets people spread lies and filthy views. I don’t want to live in a country like that, that’s gotta (sic) change you know”.

DL - Is that a reason you came out today – to change things?

“Yeah, I’m incensed about it, it must change. Austerity breeds fascism like that lot. We need to get the message out that we won’t tolerate it. Any coverage, any way is a win”. (Interviewee UAF6)
An additional example of the conflation of issues at an organised event can be seen from the Justice for Ian Tomlinson campaign march where a protester in the road was carrying a sign saying “Fuck the law. Not the poor”:

DL - What brought you to today’s event?

“I wanted to show some support for the [Tomlinson] family”.

DL - I noticed that your banner talks about the banks and the poor though, and not Ian Tomlinson?

“Well, the bankers profit while people starve, it’s wrong. So that’s why I’m raising it”. (Interviewee J4IT3)

However, protesters made assumptions about their peer groups and identified with them on the basis that there must at least be *some* common ideological link between them:

DL - There seems to be a lot of different banners and supporters for diverse issues today, not necessarily for the Occupy group, does that happen a lot?

“I wouldn’t say they were that different, they all have some link […i] you’re not gonna see a young tory flag are you (laughs)?”.

DL - So you see them as linked in some way?

“Well, it just wouldn’t mix well would it if groups had competing agendas. I mean not like fascists or that, but to work together you need similar ideas as a starting point”.

DL - So groups that are against each other, you think won’t work together in a protest setting?

“That’s a bit obvious”.

DL –But to some degree, people use the same opportunity to protest about their specific issues?

“Yes they do, sometimes it’s difficult to separate them, but to some extent we must all be on the same side I guess”. (Interviewee OPS4)

These examples demonstrate that even in the face of what appeared to be different protest agendas, protesters felt an affinity for each other and their causes. However, this clearly has limitations. Some protesters reported that the protest issues or groups representing them might be perceived so disparate as to be antagonistic to each other. In the following account by a *Searchlight* magazine seller at a Unite against Fascism rally the point is highlighted:

DL - So are the majority well behaved?
“Yeah, you can see that can’t you (looks surprised). There’s always a few, like extremists. Like back there earlier, the black and reds⁶. But that’s on both sides. Some of them hate us too”.

DL - You?

“Searchlight. Certain groups don’t think we’re extreme enough. There’s always a few, they like a scrap with the fascists. See all these (pointing to other small groups) they don’t want that either. To get mixed up with that lot”.

DL – So are you saying that although you share a cause, opposed to what you see as fascism, you don’t always agree and support each other on the way to protest?

“In the main yeah. We are non-violent, but they don’t agree and like Antifa or whatever, they will use very direct action and violence. It’s part of their ethos”. (Interviewee UAF8)

A further example relating to an Anti-abortion protest highlighted the negative impact of competing ideals on protesters working in coalition together:

DL - I wondered if you joined other protest events to get the point across and gain wider support?

“This is a specific campaign group. I haven’t heard of that, it’s difficult because not everyone supports what we do”.

DL- In what sense?

“The pro-choice lobby, women’s rights and that, they wouldn’t agree with us on this campaign”. (Interviewee Ab671)

Groups may have shared a platform in the physical context of a protest event, yet protesters discerned that whilst they agreed on a broader level, there may be deeper, ideological issue-based ones that served to divide them, and in some cases, they were irreconcilable.

**State agents**

The category of state agents appeared as a significant one for protesters. Many expressed a strong sense of the police as the face and operational arm of the state. On one level the police were perceived to be partisan, not representative of the people and serving the needs of the state usually characterised as the government or “the system”. A perception was voiced that the police had a bias towards protecting property and the interests of the “rich”. This was highlighted at The Peoples’ Assembly march when a protester was interviewed about the use of Bitcoin (a virtual currency) and expressed how the police were viewed as part of the “system”:

⁶ Clothing and flags with these colours displayed are often used to denote anarchist affiliated individuals and groups.
“The government and their puppets, the banks, the police. Bitcoin is about freedom and they can't control it”.

DL - You see the police as tied up with them?

“Maybe not each cop [...] But as a whole the police are part of the machinery”. (Interviewee TPA3)

And again, at the Re-imagining Democracy gathering:

“The whole system is broken down [...] the police are part of it and they prop it up. They are too close to it”.

DL - When you say it what does that mean?

“The government, the status quo. The police are part of the problem, not the solution if you ask me”. (Interviewee RID5)

During another observation and interview a protester commented on the researcher’s own role as a police officer in a system that is perceived to imprison people unfairly:

“The police you say? The police put our families in there [prison], not you personally, but you know what I mean. You’re one of them, it’s [the police] all part of the state system”. (Interviewee IPP1)

The police are also characterised as being part of a broken structure and as participating in maintaining that system. There was a sense that the police are an integral part of it. However, what this system is appears to be a conflation of the many derided targets of the protest. The perception that the police are used politically as state agents is revealed in the following examples:

“The police are used politically especially in demos like the student demos”. (Interviewee SQ5)

“Policing of protests is government sanctioned and organised to suppress effective direct action”. (Interviewee SQ26)

“The police are part of the state. Nothing but the puppets of the coalition in this country, used to support the cuts and the banks. They exist to undermine the proletariat, you know that”. (Interviewee UAF9)

A categorisation of the police as being in support of undermining the poor and working class was made at several protest events in the following terms:

“The police protect the interests of the rich not the poor”. (Interviewee SQ6)

“They protect the rich it’s all about that”. (Interviewee SQ7)

“I feel threatened not protected by them. They are more about property than people”. (Interviewee SQ19)

“Fuck the law, not the poor I say. We live in a police state, smash it and their police”. (Interviewee J4IT1)
In summary, the factor of pre-existing ideology comprises a variety of personal and group ideas and ideals that influence the framing of protest and the police. It demonstrates competing agendas even within a single protest event. Some groups, although sharing broader political bases appear not to work closely together and recognise boundaries between how they operate. These boundaries influence the lengths to which they are prepared to go in protest or in support of each other. Protesters expressed what might be known as a free rider approach (Opp, 2009) and “piggy backed” events for their own ends, this involved using the opportunities of affiliation between groups and their physical size to further their own protest.

In conclusion, the four factors of protester constructions of policing, power and identity relationships, levels of protester engagement and distancing and pre-existing ideology (see figure 6.2 above) capture the range of influences that can be associated with the construction and shaping of protesters’ perceptions of police legitimacy and their attitudes to compliance and cooperation. The CDM synthesises aspects of PJ and the ESIM, also drawing on the contingencies of motivational posturing, social distancing (Braithwaite, 2009, 2011) and the asymmetry of policing (Skogan, 2006, 2012). The content of the four factors can be seen to emanate at and inform three levels, 1) the personal (individual), 2) the social (group) and 3) the causal (protest issue). While the factors have no pre-eminence or hierarchy we can see from their content that they are inter-related at these three levels. The CDM of police legitimacy can be viewed as representing the attitudes, behaviours and “signs and symptoms” associated with the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and compliance and cooperation with the police and the law.
The chapter that follows summarises the main points of the thesis and the empirical research. It highlights the limitations of the research and sets out theoretical and professional practice implications and recommendations. The theoretical and empirical focus of this thesis has been on police legitimacy. It has argued that police legitimacy, defined empirically, needs to be understood with regard to the policing context. The thesis claims an original contribution to the field by identifying contextually based influences represented by the CDM that are associated with the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and their attitudes to compliance and cooperation. This contribution is significant for two reasons. Firstly, it is the first time that research of this type has been conducted in this way by using the PJ theoretical framework in the specific context of protest policing. Secondly, the findings challenge existing thinking about the development of perceptions of police legitimacy and compliance and cooperation with the police at protests. The pre-eminence of PJ and the ESIM approaches to policing is called into question by the theoretical analysis and empirical aspects of the thesis.

The introduction to the thesis set out its theoretical base and it discussed various ways in which the legitimacy of the police can be viewed. Whilst PJ and the ESIM utilise an interpretation that is empirically-based, one that sees legitimacy as coming from peoples’ perceptions of fair and respectful treatment and processes at the hands of authority, other interpretations exist. Legitimacy can also be established objectively through moral argument. Human rights, and the obligation of the state to protect peoples’ rights, highlight this point. However, the introduction also highlighted that legitimacy can be construed as sharing elements from both interpretations in something of a hybrid model. Beetham (1991) identifies that legitimacy is multi-dimensional by combining distinct levels relating to conformity to set rules, rule justification through shared beliefs, and consensual support. Thus, when discussing police legitimacy, we need to be clear which interpretation is being applied and its limitations. The thesis began by using PJ’s empirical interpretation of legitimacy, that is through protesters’ perceptions of police legitimacy. The following research questions were addressed:

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7 The term “model” is used to denote an explanatory framework that is constructed from the empirical data and informed by related theories. The coding and analysis of the data was informed by grounded theory method, but the thesis does not claim a grounded theory.

8 Irrespective of whether we believe human rights can be established objectively, it is beyond question that their efficacy and meaning can only be established if they are accepted and assumed to be objective moral criteria. In this respect, human rights are distinct from, and more than legal rights.
• To what extent do the broad claims of PJ and the correlates of police legitimacy and compliance and cooperation hold in protest situations?

• What additional factors can be associated with the construction and shaping of perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to compliance and cooperation?

These have been examined theoretically through critical analysis and empirically by a mixed method sequential research study.

In order to demonstrate the influence of PJ chapter one critically documented the rise from its US origins to become orthodoxy in UK policing. The discussion highlighted how PJ has become common parlance and pervades many aspects of policing such as police reform, policing models, internal assessments of police legitimacy and integrity, crime control and protest and public order policing. Critically, antecedents and contingencies to the claims made by PJ and the ESIM about police legitimacy and compliance were examined and presented. These came from three main sources: the asymmetrical nature of the relationship between the police and public (Skogan, 2006, 2012); the dialogic nature of police legitimacy that is not reflected in PJ (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; Cherney and Murphy, 2011; Tankebe, 2013); and the phenomena of motivational posturing and social distancing (Braithwaite, 2009). Additional support for these was found in the empirical data that underpin the factors of the CDM of police legitimacy (see chapter 6).

In an attempt to highlight the distinct and special nature of the policing context, chapter two examined the foundations and trends of the policing of protest and public order. The historical background to policing in England and Wales under the old watch arrangements to the birth of the new police in 1829 was discussed. It documented some pivotal moments in the policing of protest and public order that led to reform with a shift from the use of the military to the civil police. It also detailed the ways in which crowds have been understood from classical psychological reductionism, that is the idea of the “mob”, to modern day social psychological models of crowd dynamics. The key points of the debate about the paramilitarisation of policing were examined together with the observation by some authors of a return to repressive regimes in the policing of protest.

In chapter three the focus shifted from the policing of protest and public order to the act of protest itself. The chapter covered four main topics. Firstly, what constitutes protest and social movements and how peoples’ intentions and actions are framed, organised and acted upon. The analysis explored types of protest activity and levels of organisation and coordination. From the academic literature some defining criteria for protest were provided that informed the contextual framework of the empirical research. Secondly, chapter three
examined the role that social media play in framing protest events, establishing communication networks and a means of sharing and mobilising resources. Thirdly, it critically discussed theories and models of public disorder, specifically those broadly called “tinder and spark” explanations of riot and disorder (Waddington, 2007). The origin and development of the ESIM was examined with a critical look at its claim about the influence of emerging perceptions of police illegitimacy in the escalation of collective violence (Reicher, 2011; Stott, 2009, Stott, 2011). The chapter concluded by identifying a link between protesters' attitudes and their behaviour, highlighting the importance of the context and conditions under which attitudes influence behaviour.

Having critically analysed the policing of protest and public order and dimensions of the act of protest, chapter four sought to examine attempts in the UK to legitimize the policing of it since London G20, 2009. The critique drew on academic and “grey” literature sources in an examination of specific recommendations and changes to police training and policy, intelligence gathering, tactical flexibility and the police use of force. It demonstrated that these are not free of controversy, having contributed to confusion and contradiction in resolving many of the issues facing the legitimacy of the policing of protest and public order in the UK.

Chapters five and six concentrated on the empirical research content of the thesis in setting out the research strategy, methodology and processes that were employed for the two stages of research and the construction of the CDM of police legitimacy. It described the mixed method design that employed an exploratory structured, quantitative survey followed by a detailed qualitative exploration of the findings and investigation of factors associated with the construction and shaping of protesters' perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to cooperation and compliance. Chapter six provided the statistical analysis of the quantitative data and a narrative concerning the development of the four factors: 1) protesters' constructions of policing, 2) power and identity relationships, 3) levels of engagement and distancing, and 4) pre-existing ideology, that underpin the CDM of police legitimacy.

The broad claims of PJ relating to assessments of police legitimacy and how compliance and cooperation is secured through self-regulation and normative compliance are consistent with my own initial findings. Protester perceptions of fair and respectful treatment at the hands of the police are associated with greater expressions of cooperation and compliance with the police and positive assessments of police legitimacy are linked to self-reported cooperation and compliance levels. However, there are a number of contingents to the evaluations made by protesters and the route from assessments of treatment to cooperation and compliance is not as clear as PJ posits. The CDM of police legitimacy (presented in chapter 6) maps the additional influences that appear to be at work in how
protesters construct and shape their perceptions of the law, the police, their treatment at the hands of the police and in overall assessments of police legitimacy prior to and during protest situations.

Why develop a contextually-based model at all, since PJ and the ESIM appear to provide longstanding, influential, empirically based explanations for the presence and development of perceptions of police legitimacy? The reason is that neither approach wholly accounts for the array of contextual influences that are at work in the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to compliance and cooperation. PJ and ESIM are general models that are psychologically-based. Moreover, neither approach provides the police in practice with a heuristic tool to identify and manage the nuances of protest policing. Particularly, this relates to information and intelligence gathering by the police, the bases upon which to engage and communicate with protesters and police decision-making. Therefore, the CDM of police legitimacy adds a new dimension to these aspects of protest policing. It is clear from the critical analysis that PJ and the ESIM are theoretically linked on the premise that compliance with the law emanates from perceptions of legitimacy “created” by police activity (Hoggett and Stott, 2010; Stott, 2009; Stott and Drury, 2000; Stott and Reicher, 1998b). However, with the vast body of empirical research in PJ there is a scarcity that applies it specifically to protest and public order policing and the more qualitative aspects remain largely under investigated (Mazerolle et al, 2013).

While the ESIM has been the vade mecum for the training and practice of protest policing its efficacy in dealing with every protest and public order scenario has been called into question since the August 2011 English riots. Moreover, problems arise with the ESIM on three fronts. Firstly, it lacks recognition of the influence of antecedent attitudes towards the police and the law. Secondly, protesters’ pre-existing attitudes appear exaggerated in protest and public order situations. Thirdly, its over reliance on the notion of “self-policing” as a regulating mechanism of behaviour in crowds. Arguably, the empirical basis for the ESIM’s dominance in the policing of crowds and sporting events has gone unchallenged for a number of years until events questioned its general efficacy and application to all protest and public order situations (HMIC, 2011a, 2011b). In short, the ESIM approach might work in some situations where there is no disorder, but not so where it has already broken out. That situation requires a more nuanced approach.

The factors of the CDM indicate that the PJ and ESIM accounts of the construction and shaping of perceptions of police legitimacy provide insufficient, contextually-based explanatory power for their presence and development. According to Stott’s (Stott, 2009) underlying analysis, the ESIM works on the basis that preventing perceptions of police
illegitimacy being formed through the actions of the police rests solely on identities being *contemporaneously* formed within a crowd: an identity formed in *response* to perceived indiscriminate policing. In short, his argument is that if we prevent perceptions of police illegitimacy forming then we can stop conflict arising. However, this fails to recognise the diversity and impact of distal and proximal influences that are identified by the CDM. Negative perceptions of police legitimacy may be pre-conceived and endure above and beyond fair and respectful policing interventions at protest events. Similarly, PJ’s emphasis is on fair and respectful treatment by the police as the key process and driver of perceived police legitimacy. PJ rests on a version of legitimacy that is empirically based and theoretically limited, i.e. by perceptions of fairness *not* by any objective standards or those that can be argued by other interpretations of legitimacy. Notably, PJ’s emphasis appears to be on the individual (personal) level, whilst ESIM’s is on the group (interactive) level. Therefore, in providing contextual explanations of the influences associated with the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy neither PJ or the ESIM go far enough in recognising a combination of the personal, interactive and causal dimensions at work.

As I have demonstrated through the empirical data the police can be perceived as dealing with an event fairly yet accrue no expressions of compliance and cooperation, this undermines one of the key claims of PJ theory. In addition, with its emphasis on facilitating the “legitimate aims” of the group, and in treating members in a non-homogenous manner the ESIM fails to account for why in the face of fair and accommodating policing and benign police activity, resistance and expressions of hostility still arise and fulminate. It is accepted that the mechanism for this in the ESIM appears to be that of shared social identity between group members in opposition to the police, but it still fails to acknowledge underlying antecedents and contingencies to police legitimacy. In contrast, the CDM of police legitimacy is concerned with what lies beneath and beyond to provide a more nuanced and contextually-based understanding.

The critical analysis of “tinder and spark” inspired theories of disorder such as the Flashpoints model (Waddington et al, 1989) (see chapter 3) specifically demonstrates that the CDM of police legitimacy is not synonymous with it. Unsurprisingly, given the similar context of the research the CDM shares some similarity in its empirical data with Flashpoints. This similarity is no different from the way in which Flashpoints might share similarities with the “tinder and spark” theories that preceded it and upon which it is based. The CDM differs significantly from the Flashpoints model of disorder in both its *focus* and *explanatory* power. Moreover, the Flashpoints model is primarily concerned with explaining the initiation of public disorder (or its absence) whilst the CDM is concerned with police legitimacy. Flashpoints is a sociologically-based model, the CDM rests on a social psychological and philosophical base.
The levels in the Flashpoints model provide little if any explanation of the factors associated with the construction and shaping of perceptions of police legitimacy. Legitimacy in the Flashpoints model is a term reserved for “the ways in which the group’s declared ends and the means proposed are subject to ideological processes” (Waddington et al, 1989, p.161). Indeed, in the original publication of the Flashpoints model Waddington et al (1989, p.157) make clear that in so doing they are attempting to theorize the factors found to be “the crucial determinants of order and disorder”. Furthermore, the use of the term “contextual” in the CDM is entirely different from that intended by Flashpoints, since it uses the term to depict the policing situation in which protesters’ perceptions are constructed and shaped, whilst Flashpoints uses it to denote “a set of existing relations (emphasis added) between the police and dissenting groups” (Waddington et al, 1989, p.163). The Flashpoints model of disorder does not tackle police legitimacy in the same way to that of my thesis.

Limitations of the research

The thesis has certain limitations and its findings would require further development before claims of wider generalisation might be made. The four main limitations arise from, 1) the sample size for phase 1, 2) specificity of the field work, 3) ethical considerations and 4) delineation of the factors. Each is discussed in turn below.

There is a small sample size in the phase 1 exploratory survey (n=40) and it is acknowledged that participants came from particular types of protest events that were all based in London. To that end the findings may relate specifically to these, but not necessarily beyond those events. The matter of sample size has been addressed in chapter 5 and attention is drawn to the point that the phase 1 survey was intended to serve as a preliminary exercise to test the concepts of PJ with no expectation of any statistical significance or in establishing a claim to generalisation beyond the events investigated. The overtly political elements of the data obtained in phase 2 may have been informed by the emphasis on certain types of protest events (such as those against austerity measures and TUC demonstrations). To this end the thesis may be specific to a particular form or forms of protest activity. That said the thesis raises valid theoretical, policy and professional practice considerations of utility.

The empirical research does not relate to any one police force, however given that London is served by four police organisations and some of the protests took place in areas within their jurisdiction (Metropolitan Police Service, City of London Police, British Transport Police and Ministry of Defence Police) it may relate directly to policing by these organisations only. Large scale protest in London is often policed through a partnership arrangement involving these police forces, which was the case during the period of the empirical research. Future research might involve empirical study in other police jurisdictions in the UK and beyond with a view to establishing if the claims hold elsewhere. Certainly, in order to challenge
the claims of PJ as a generalised approach to developing police legitimacy and public compliance and cooperation, the research requires application to other policing contexts beyond that of protest and public order. However, what the CDM does highlight are the limitations of PJ and the ESIM in the most volatile of protest situations. Whilst they make an important contribution in ensuring that the police do not cause disorder by their actions, there will be times when it occurs irrespective of what the police do. In these situations, policing needs to make an appeal to objective legitimacy for its actions, and not one based on consensus.

Due to the ethical considerations and limitations arising from the author being a serving police officer at the time of the research certain protest groups could not be engaged with or interviewed, such as those openly identified as English Defence League, Britain First, Antifa and those involved in Black Bloc actions. It is acknowledged that others have previously carried out research with members of such groups regarding attitudes to racism, hate crime and harassment (Gadd and Dixon, 2011; Winlow et al, 2017). This limitation has meant that so-called extreme left and right-wing groups or those applying violent direct action could not be represented by my data and analysis. Further, to guarantee participant anonymity and to guard against the researcher being embroiled in later criminal proceedings as a witness, a more longitudinal approach could not be used. The latter would have provided opportunity to gauge if and to what extent participants’ perceptions changed over time and from event to event. Future research might employ a strategy that follows participants’ journeys and experiences across several protest events over a prolonged period. This would be in order to ascertain the extent to which perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to compliance and cooperation vary and whether or not these hold across differing policing contexts.

The CDM of police legitimacy comprises factors derived from a number of categories developed from the empirical data and it is accepted that further research and delineation would be required for any claim of these as theoretical concepts underpinning a generalised theory. However, I maintain that the four factors are sufficiently and substantially populated with empirical data to provide them with characteristics that give weight to the claims of the thesis. Whilst the data described the relationships, associations and influences for the sample alone it is intended that the CDM be applied in future empirical research aimed at establishing its theoretical utility and as a heuristic tool in professional policing practice.

There are theoretical, policy and professional practice implications of the thesis and each is discussed below.
**Theoretical implications.**

There are four theoretical implications of the thesis that can be identified as follows, 1) the dimensions of empirical legitimacy (as applied by PJ and the ESIM), 2) the operationalisation of concepts used in PJ research, 3) the role of antecedents and contingencies and 4) the concept of “self-policing” in groups.

**Dimensions of empirical legitimacy.**

The first implication concerns the concept of legitimacy that is applied in the PJ and ESIM approaches to policing. PJ identifies at length and emphatically with empirical legitimacy, that is views about police legitimacy based on consensus. The ESIM appears less overtly concerned with philosophical aspects to the notion of legitimacy yet by association it clearly adopts a similar position. However, empirical legitimacy is but one variant of the concept. There are theoretical and practical limitations in carrying out policing activities completely on the basis of empirical legitimacy. This is not least because policing is a highly contentious venture at times, often being conducted outwith consensus. There are occasions and situations in which the police must act without consensual agreement in order to protect and secure the rights of others or wider society. Pursuing legitimacy exclusively through empirical means renders policing and its outcomes highly context specific and therein lies the problem for both PJ and the ESIM. Police legitimacy reliant on establishing consensus with the policed may indeed fail when their expectations are not or cannot be met. Much PJ research has been conducted in specific policing initiatives from which it has then become generalised to every policing context (Mazerolle et al, 2013; Myhill and Quinton, 2010). Arguably, PJ’s utility in delivering widespread and generalised perceptions of police legitimacy and cooperation and compliance is questionable. The policing of protest is highly context specific and raises the question as to whether the PJ and ESIM approaches to policing can or should be applied all of the time in every circumstance with any expectation of efficacy. As Reiner (2010) highlights:

> Policing is an inherently conflict-ridden enterprise…the essential function and distinctive resource of the police is the potential use of legitimate force [and] if there was universal consensus about norms, values and appropriate modes of social behaviour there would be no need for a police force. In most situations there is somebody being policed against whose assent to policing is brittle. (Reiner, 2010, p.69).

Therefore, whilst it may be desirable to strive to achieve consensus in policing protests, an over reliance on empirical legitimacy as the means to do so might leave both the police and the policed bewildered and disappointed.
The operationalisation of concepts used in PJ research

The second theoretical implication of the thesis relates to the way concepts are operationalised as variables in PJ research. On the one hand the general claim of PJ that perceptions of police legitimacy are associated with expressions of compliance and cooperation, holds in the protest events studied here. However, the thesis identifies theoretical and empirical antecedents and contingents arising from the asymmetry of policing (Skogan, 2006, 2012), motivational posturing and social distancing (Braithwaite, 2009, 2010), and the four factors of the CDM. These challenge the constituents of the concepts currently operationalised in PJ research. In short, they do not capture the full range of variables sometimes found in protest and public order policing. It is noteworthy from the empirical data in this respect that protesters held benign or positive assessments of contact with the police at protest events but did not express any desire to cooperate or comply. In PJ terms, this suggests moral alignment between the police and protesters’ values, does not guarantee perceptions of police legitimacy as predicted by PJ theory. This is not surprising given that PJ recognises the competition that variables such as individual perceptions of previous police contact, personal values about the law and personal morality can bring. There is some clarity in the operationalised variables used by PJ, but they do not sufficiently capture all available data and relationships that are relevant in protest.

Problems also arise in the way that the idea of a public “duty” to cooperate with authority is operationalised and the idea of alignment between peoples’ personal values and the law. These problems are recognised by authors who highlight a potential for discrepant understandings of what constitutes a public “duty” to comply with the law and the police, and on what basis such judgements are made (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; Murphy and Cherney, 2012). Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) highlight a misplaced reliance in PJ on the notion that the law arises from societal values and that the peoples’ values mirror the value-worth of the law. Whilst this might be the case it is not universally so.

Perhaps the time has come to acknowledge that the empirical findings through PJ research have exceeded its theoretical framework. This is because most PJ research still uses Tyler’s (1990) original theory that was developed to explain why people comply with the law, and research has abounded into areas beyond his original theoretical framework. Moreover, as a general theory of compliance PJ might not have utility in every policing context, particularly in those such as protest where the police are so often seen as agents of the state and in which people more readily challenge the law and authority. Whilst obvious, protest scenarios are ones in which people often feel aggrieved about something that the state has done or is doing and wish to bring about change. These can only serve to magnify the
significance of context and intensify antecedents and contingencies to perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to compliance and cooperation. Political demonstrations are a legitimate part of liberal democratic society but are not a “normal” everyday feature. Therefore, those engaged in protest are either doing something unusual and extraordinary, or if engaged routinely in protest, they are extraordinary individuals. This observation is a challenge for PJ theory which assumes a background of stability and order in society.

The role of antecedents and contingents.

The third theoretical implication of the thesis arises for both the ESIM and PJ. The ESIM’s theoretical claims have been examined alongside those of PJ since it currently appears to have pre-eminence as the means of understanding crowd dynamics, the development of collective conflict and (dis)order and for informing policing strategies based on facilitation and dialogue. Indeed, the two are increasingly linked in cognate literature about police legitimacy. However, while there is sometimes reference to the impact of historic grievances and social influences on social identities in crowds, the weight of antecedent notions of police (il)legitimacy appear downplayed as a precursory or predisposed mechanism operating at the personal, social and causal levels. In the ESIM, as we have seen there is a reliance on the emergent nature of notions of police illegitimacy at the time as a result of contact with the police.

In answering the research question of what additional factors can be associated with the construction and shaping of protesters perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to cooperation and compliance, a number are identified in the empirical data underpinning the CDM. The data demonstrate a wider range of contingents and antecedents than both PJ and the ESIM allow. Elsewhere, it has been a noted criticism of PJ research that antecedent beliefs about police legitimacy have a stronger impact than it suggests on interpretations of police activity and public perceptions of them (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; Smith, 2007). The present work resonates with this observation and contributes further empirical evidence for it.

Social identity-based approaches to protest and public order policing in the form of the ESIM rely upon a somewhat unilateral approach that police tactics shape protesters’ social identity and determine the nature of group behaviour (Stott, 2009). I have argued that such a narrow focus does not provide sufficient explanatory power without due regard to the antecedents of protester attitudes to policing and preconceived notions of police legitimacy. I contend that any model reliant upon the agency of protesters’ perceptions must by necessity acknowledge and account for the presence and impact of these. In modelling a range of contextual influences in the CDM, it provides a tool for managing the policing of protest and
public order. The CDM enhances our understanding about why social identity-based approaches do or do not work every time in every circumstance.

The concept of self-policing in groups

The fourth theoretical implication relates to the notion of “self-policing” in crowd dynamics and adherence to group values. It is a contestable concept that might better be verbalised as protesters “controlling themselves” (Waddington, 1994b, p.195). The CDM highlights that people regulate themselves based on their personal values and assessments of right and wrong. Further, that whilst they may share moral alignment to a set of group rules, this is a personal choice and others may not share the same commitment.

Arguably, the use of the term “policing” implies that there is resort to or risk of sanction for non-compliance. Therefore, we might ask on what basis would strangers “police” each other in a group context? If we are to reject the classical reductionist notion of group think and the mob mentality then we must accept that individuals in crowds retain a personal, individual responsibility for their actions. Thus “self-policing” in the form of self-regulation may be a more accurate description of what occurs in protest crowds, understood on the basis of a personal value system rather than adherence to the requests or demands of other group members. Whilst the ESIM uses “self-policing” to denote a crowd regulating its behaviour in a positive way, that is to reduce conflict and disorder, it does not necessarily mean compliance with the law or those in authority. Understanding the moral parameters of protesters is useful for the police, even where they are in opposition to the law and policing. The CDM is an approach that gives a nuanced understanding of these parameters and opens opportunities for legitimate police responses.

The concept of “self-policing” used in the ESIM needs further clarity for its presence and utility to be thoroughly examined and tested empirically. Specifically, by addressing the questions of how it is conducted, by whom and on what basis, when it occurs in relation to points of contact with the police, how and why crowd members engage in it and on what basis they respond or not. Presently, it lacks definition and substance for its operationalisation by which it can be tested.

Policy and professional practice implications

Policy makers and those charged with the strategic implementation of policy might consider whether and to what extent PJ and the ESIM approaches to policing continue to be fit for purpose in light of what the CDM offers and the theoretical implications outlined above. Panaceas for policing and crime control seldom deliver what they promise with any longevity. From a professional practice perspective, a criticism levelled at academia is that for all the
research and theorising, sometimes little translates to policing practice (notwithstanding the clamour for “evidence-based policing”). As both an early career academic and a former practitioner I have sought to translate the theoretical and empirical content of the thesis into something of tangible use in the “real world” of policing. On balance, I would argue that caution be applied before PJ and the ESIM in their present forms become the mainstay for policy making and the practice of policing focusing on police legitimacy and crime control. Specifically, I identify three main implications of the thesis for policy and professional practice relating to: internal assessments of police legitimacy (under PEEL); training relating to protest and public order policing; police intelligence and information gathering for protest and public order events. These are set out below.

**Internal assessments of police legitimacy.**

In light of the critical analysis provided in chapter one, HMICFRS might reconsider the criteria used for assessing police legitimacy in PEEL inspections. It is clear that the present agenda is based on a conflation of procedural and organisational justice that is reliant on the notion of police legitimacy that suffers the problems already discussed. Specifically, this relates to the PEEL inspection criteria that a police force is legitimate where it has public consent, staff operating fairly, reasonably, effectively and lawfully and the trust and cooperation of the public (HMIC, 2016). However, as we have seen the police can behave entirely to the letter of the law yet garner little or no public support. Apart from limiting itself to a reliance on the letter of the law yet garner little or no public support. Apart from limiting itself to a reliance on the letter of the law yet garner little or no public support. Apart from limiting itself to a reliance on the letter of the law yet garner little or no public support.

Training relating to protest and public order policing.

HMICFRS and police forces might reconsider the content and conduct of police training and tactical guidance for protest and public order policing. It has an over reliance on the ESIM and PJ. Policing is political, highly context specific and not entirely consensual at the tactical and operational levels. That is not to say that pursuing fair and respectful treatment and aspiring to consensual legitimacy is not in some way a public good, but this is an altogether different proposition from one that sees it as the exclusive route to police legitimacy and cooperation and compliance in each and every policing circumstance. Thus, training and guidance in the area of protest and public order policing cannot hinge on such a general approach without significant, context specific empirical support. We have seen evidence of a potential reversal
relating to the use of the ESIM for the policing of public disorder in the wake of the August 2011 riots. However, PJ continues to gain broad appeal across policing in the UK, without the accompanying context specific empirical support.

Whilst I have argued that there are limitations to the ESIM approach to establishing police legitimacy and questioned the notion of “self-policing” in crowds, it may not be appropriate to dismiss it entirely. Instead, it is better to seek ways in which some of the underlying features of the ESIM can be enhanced by it embracing the presence and impact of contextually- based influences and the antecedents and contingents to legitimacy as the CDM does. By placing less reliance on the idea of emerging social identities and by clarifying the concept of “self-policing” this is achievable. “Self-policing” is not necessarily synonymous with compliance and cooperation with the law and authority.

In the final analysis, PJ and the ESIM assume that violence and disorder is a failure of policing to create perceptions of police legitimacy. However, this is problematic for the policing of protest and public order for three reasons. Firstly, it may not be the case of a failure of policing at all because there are occasions when violence occurs despite the police use of PJ and the ESIM approaches. Secondly, making this assumption may serve to demoralise the police and undermines their trust in using PJ and the ESIM. Thirdly, an insistence on the police use of them denies the legitimacy of other ways of dealing with such violence and disorder, in a considered and informed way. The CDM gives us a better understanding of the motivations behind perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to compliance and cooperation.

An acceptance that in specific policing contexts attitudes do beget behaviour might reconcile the scenario of when ESIM-based policing does not work in reducing conflict and disorder: rather than seeing it as merely behaviour emanating from a reaction to police tactics. The CDM acknowledges the ESIM’s use of social identity and group norms within its constituent factors, while drawing upon a greater pool of contextual influences. It provides an enhanced heuristic tool for the policing of protest and public order. As such, the content and future development of training and policy in this area of policing should be revised.

**Intelligence and information gathering for policing protest and public order events.**

Enhancing the way that intelligence and information relating to protest is gathered will better inform its management and police decision-making. Strategically, in terms of the quality and standardisation of national and force-wide threat assessments for both pre-planned and spontaneous protest and public order situations. Tactically, in terms of enhancing dialogue-based approaches with protesters and crowds. At both levels I would argue that introducing
the CDM as a template is likely to yield a more detailed and structured intelligence product than the current that is aimed at the “usual suspects and crime problems” associated with protest and public order events (HMIC, 2014b).

The dialogue-based approach to policing protest and public order that is advocated by the ESIM involves mediation (gaining mutual understanding), suggestion (providing and communicating options and solutions) and monitoring (of crowd mood, intentions and effects of police actions). A framework based on identifying and engaging with: 

- protestor constructions of policing; 
- levels of engagement and distancing; 
- power and identity relationships; and 
- pre-existing ideology

offers two benefits. Firstly, it would complement the mediation and monitoring aspects of dialogue by demonstrating that the police are cognisant of and interested in understanding protesters’ motivations, intentions and grievances. Secondly, it would improve the quantity and quality of the intelligence and information gathered which will assist in focusing police interventions with protesters. The CDM of police legitimacy provides a new framework by which information and intelligence can be gathered in a structured, usable and standardised format. I would encourage its extended application in dialogue-based policing approaches to protest and public order. This perhaps represents a future area of research.

**Context is everything**

Few would argue against attempts to enhance police legitimacy through fair and respectful treatment and processes. Certainly, I do not in this thesis. There is little doubt that focusing on improving these is a wholly desirable aim for the police and public. However, PJ and the ESIM do provide a soft explanation that does not withstand collision with the weight of theoretical and empirical evidence concerning the influences at work in the construction and shaping of protesters’ perceptions of police legitimacy and their attitudes to compliance and cooperation. Therefore, a contextually driven model of police legitimacy is required. One that accounts for the diversity of antecedents and contingencies to police legitimacy and recognises the relevance of the policing context. The thesis has argued that police legitimacy, defined empirically, needs to be understood with regard to the policing context.

The policing of protest and public order is at times a fraught venture and if the content and arguments of the thesis teach us anything the message is threefold. Firstly, that protestor perceptions of police legitimacy and their attitudes to compliance and cooperation are not always synchronous with contemporaneous contact with the police. However well intended or delivered that contact is or is perceived to be, there are many contextually driven influences behind them. Secondly, that our conceptualising of police legitimacy cannot necessarily be
based on consensus, that is to say, through subjectivity and what people view as acceptable to them, whether or not it serves the rest of civil society. Whilst there are demonstrable factors that impact on the construction and shaping of empirical legitimacy and its correlates, this does not negate the argument that the law, its authority and that of its agents are justifiably legitimate by objective criteria. Thirdly, that in the context of protest, at times the best policing can do is engage in a contextually focused manner, act legitimately in the face of opposition or apathy and remain cognisant of the limitations inherent in the PJ and ESIM approaches.

Ultimately, basing the policing of protest and public order on the agency of empirical legitimacy without acknowledging its antecedents and contingencies, and the significance of context risks failing the police and public alike. Where perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to compliance and cooperation are concerned, context is everything.
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Appendix 1 Ethics clearance.

28 July 2010 Ref: 11/SAS/087C

Mr David Lydon
c/o Department of Law and Criminal Justice Studies
Faculty of Social and Applied Sciences

Dear David,

Confirmation of ethics compliance for your study “The impact of police and protester contact during protest events on protester perceptions of police legitimacy.”

I have received a completed and countersigned Ethics Review Checklist dated 11 July 2010 for the above project. Because you have answered “No” to all of the questions in Section B of the form, no further ethical review will be required under the terms of this University’s Research Ethics and Governance Procedures.

In confirming compliance for your study, I must remind you that it is your responsibility to follow, as appropriate, the policies and procedures set out in the Research Governance Handbook (http://www.canterbury.ac.uk/research/governance/index.asp) and any relevant academic or professional guidelines. This includes providing, if appropriate, information sheets and consent forms, and ensuring confidentiality in the storage and use of data. Any significant change in the question, design or conduct of the study over its course should be notified to the Research Office, and may require a new application for ethics approval. You are also required to inform me once this research study has been completed. Wishing you every success with your research.

Yours sincerely

Roger Bone
Research Governance Manager
Tel: +44 (0)1227 782940 ext 3272 (enter at prompt)
Email: roger.bone@canterbury.ac.uk
cc: Dr Dominic Wood
Police legitimacy and the policing of protest: An investigation of the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy

INFORMATION SHEET

The Department of Law and Criminal Justice Studies at Canterbury Christ Church University (CCCU) is conducting research into perceptions of police legitimacy. The research seeks to examine the impact of contact with the police during protest events on views of trust and confidence and attitudes to cooperation and compliance. The research aims to identify whether people’s experiences during protest influence their perceptions of trust and confidence in the police and to determine the impact of this on attitudes to comply and cooperate with the law.

The research is being conducted by field-based survey interviews and researcher observation supported by video and still photography.

It consists of structured and semi structured interviews with people attending protest events. The interviews consist of a structured survey questionnaire with opportunity to comment on specific answers and in situ interviews with people at protest events.

The principal researcher for the study is David Lydon who is a post graduate student at Canterbury Christ Church University and a serving Police officer. The research is unconnected to the researcher’s employment status or role as a police officer.

Background

Public confidence and trust in the police is vital to a successful relationship between the police and public. The research is aimed at investigating perceptions of police legitimacy at protest events and attitudes to cooperation with the police. The information generated by this research will be used as the basis for a post-graduate thesis. It is anticipated that the findings will influence the policing of protest and demonstrations in England and Wales and enhance the way that the police engage with the public during protest events.

What will you be required to do?

You will be invited to take part in an interview using a questionnaire whilst participating in a protest event or be willing to participate in answering questions by the researcher. The questionnaire will be administered by the researcher and you will have opportunity to comment on some questions to clarify the answers given.

To participate in this research, you must:

Have opportunity to sign the consent form.

Participate by completing a questionnaire at the protest event or answer questions asked by the researcher before, during or after the event.
Procedures
After participating in the protest event you may be asked to complete a questionnaire or interview. The questionnaire/interview will ask you questions about:

Your previous experience of the police;

Your experience of attending protest events in the past;

Your views on the contact with the police during the specific event

The level of satisfaction that you felt in terms of:

Quality of police contact;

Fair and just treatment;

Treated with respect and dignity;

How well the police did their job;

Your general perceptions as a result of the contact on trust and confidence in the police after the event and willingness to comply with police requests and the law.

Confidentiality
All data and any personal information will be stored securely and in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. Please note that the questionnaire itself does not require any personal details that could be used to establish your name, address or identity in any way.

The data collected will only be accessed by David Lydon. All electronic data will be stored on the researcher’s computer in password protected files, paper documents will be stored in a secure cabinet which only the researcher has access to.

After completion of the study, all data anonymised (i.e. all personal information associated with the data will be removed). Please note that you under no obligation to provide any personal, identifying information.

The retention period for material has been set at 12 months after completion of the thesis submission. After this period all confidential material will be destroyed. To guarantee anonymity the researcher will not ask you for personal contact details or specifically about any behaviour that may constitute a criminal offence.

Deciding Whether to Participate
If you have any questions or concerns about the study, procedures or requirements for participation in the study do not hesitate to contact me or the University.

Should you decide to participate, involvement is voluntary and you will be free to withdraw at any time from the interview processes.

Do you have any Questions?
Please contact David Lydon at:

The Department of Law and Criminal Justice Studies,

Canterbury Christ Church University,

North Holmes Road, Canterbury, KENT.CT1 1QU.or email: dpl10@canterbury.ac.uk
CONSENT FORM

Title of Research Project: Police legitimacy and the policing of protest: An investigation of the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy.

Name of Researcher: David LYDON

Contact details:
Address:
School of Law, Criminal Justice and Computing
Canterbury Christ Church University
North Holmes Road
Canterbury

Tel: 07894603304

Email: dpl10@canterbury.ac.uk

1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.

2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, without giving any reason and that I have the right to be anonymous.

3. I understand that any personal information that I may provide to the researcher(s) will be kept strictly confidential.

4. I agree to take part in the above study.

_________________________  __________________            __________________
Name of Participant (if given)  Date  Signature

_________________________  __________________            __________________
Name of Person taking consent  Date  Signature

(if different from researcher)
I would like to ask some questions about you and your general views about the U.K. police before you took part in the event. Please answer ALL of the questions in the survey.

### Q1
Please circle below to indicate your age range.

|-----------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-----|

### Q2
Gender (Please tick to indicate)

- Male-
- Female-

### Q3
To which of these ethnic groups do you consider you belong?

(Please tick only ONE in the box below).

| Ethnic Group | 1 White – British | 2 White – Irish | 3 White – Other White Background | 4 Mixed – White and Black Caribbean | 5 Mixed – White and Black African | 6 Mixed – White and Asian | 7 Mixed – Any Other Mixed Background | 8 Asian or Asian British – Indian | 9 Asian or Asian British – Pakistani | 10 Asian or Asian British – Bangladeshi | 11 Asian or Asian British – Other Asian Background | 12 Black or Black British – Caribbean | 13 Black or Black British – African | 14 Black or Black British – Other Black Background | 15 Chinese | 16 Other |
**Q4**

In the past two years did the police approach you, stop you or make contact with you for any reason? If **Yes**, go to Q5. If **No (or Don't know)**, go to Q6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes-</th>
<th>No-</th>
<th>(Don’t Know)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Q5**

How dissatisfied or satisfied were you with the way the police treated you the last time that this happened?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very dissatisfied</th>
<th>Dissatisfied</th>
<th>Neither satisfied or dissatisfied</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Very satisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Q6**

Taking everything you know about the police into account do they do a good job or a bad job?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very good job</th>
<th>Good job</th>
<th>Neither good or bad job</th>
<th>Bad job</th>
<th>Very bad job</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Q6 Cont. - Why do you say that?**

........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

**Q7**

Taking everything I know about the police into account I have confidence in the police.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither agree or disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Q8**
The police generally treat people fairly\(^9\).

\(^9\)Fairly in the sense of Unbiased and without prejudice.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q9</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither agree or disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I generally support how the police usually act.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q10</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither agree or disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The police generally have the same sense of right and wrong(^\text{10}) as I do.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q11</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither agree or disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The police stand(^\text{11}) for values that are important to me.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please answer the following questions below using the scale provided where 0 is never and 4 is always.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q12</th>
<th>How often would you say that the police take bribes(^\text{12})?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Treated in the sense of how the police responded to and deal with people.

\(^{10}\)Sense of right and wrong’ in terms of ‘feeling of morally right or wrong from a personal point of view’.

‘Stand’ as in the sense of ‘defend/uphold/promote’

\(^{12}\)Bribe as in money or any other inducement to influence them.
Q13 | How often would you say that the police deliberately give false evidence\(^{13}\) to the courts?  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q14 | How often would you say the police use more force than is legally allowed when making arrests?  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following questions concern your personal beliefs about following the law *in general*. Please indicate your views to the statements below using the scale provided.

Q15 | I always try to follow the law even if I think it is wrong.  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Neither agree or disagree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q16 | Disobeying the law is hardly ever justified.  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Neither agree or disagree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q17 | It is hard to blame someone for breaking the law if they can get away with it.  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Neither agree or disagree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{13}\) Evidence as in witness testimony or other materials provided to a court as part of the prosecution case
Below are specific questions about the *policing of the event* itself. Based on your personal experience of the event please consider the statements and indicate your views using the scale provided.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q18</th>
<th>Overall, did the police do a bad job or a good job in policing the event?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very bad job</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why do you say that?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q19</th>
<th>I had confidence in the way that the police dealt with the event.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q20</th>
<th>How dissatisfied or satisfied were you with the way that you were treated(^\text{14}) by the police during the event?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extremely dissatisfied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q21</th>
<th>The police treated people fairly(^\text{15}) at the event.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{14}\)Treated in the sense of how the police responded to and deal with people.

\(^{15}\)Unbiased and without prejudice.
Q22  I would support\textsuperscript{16} how the police acted during the event.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither agree or disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The following questions are about what you see as your public duty\textsuperscript{17} towards the police \textit{during} your participation in the event. Please indicate your views where 0 is not at all your duty and 4 is completely your duty.

Q23  To what extent is it your duty to support the decisions made by the police even if you disagree with them?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not at all my duty</th>
<th>Completely my duty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q24  To what extent is it your duty to do what the police tell you even if you didn’t understand or agree with the reason(s)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not at all my duty</th>
<th>Completely my duty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q25  To what extent is it your duty to do what the police tell you to do even if you didn’t like how they were treating you?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not at all my duty</th>
<th>Completely my duty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Any other comment(s) about the issues raised by this questionnaire that you would like to add?

\textsuperscript{16} Support as in ‘back’ their actions
\textsuperscript{17} ‘Duty’ in the sense of your public, moral duty to the state as a citizen.
### Appendices

#### 5 SPSS outputs and distributions

**Demographics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age range</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16-19 years</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24 years</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>75.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29 years</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>80.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34 years</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>83.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39 years</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>89.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44 years</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>90.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49 years</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>93.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-54 years</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>98.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-59 years</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>65</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Descriptive Statistics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>4.480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid N (listwise)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(General Trust and Confidence/Everything into account)
### Tests of Normality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kolmogorov-Smirnov&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Shapiro-Wilk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Statistic</td>
<td>df</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q9 (Moral Alignment/Support for police actions generally)</td>
<td>.312</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q10 (Moral Alignment/Same sense of right and wrong)</td>
<td>.240</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q11 (Moral Alignment/Stand for Values)</td>
<td>.245</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Lilliefors Significance Correction
Tests of Normality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kolmogorov-Smirnov</th>
<th>Shapiro-Wilk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Statistic</td>
<td>df</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q15 (I Try to follow the Law)</td>
<td>.189</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q16 (Justification to disobey the Law)</td>
<td>.284</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q17 (Hard to blame Law breakers)</td>
<td>.295</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Lilliefors Significance Correction
### Visual binned variables for analysis

**Notes**

Output Created: 29-JAN-2014 21:49:24

Data: C:\Users\Dave\Documents\DatasetV5.sav

Active Dataset: DataSet1

Filter: <none>

Weight: <none>

Split File: <none>

N of Rows in Working Data File: 65

User defined missing values are treated as missing.

All non-missing data are used.

**Syntax**

```plaintext
DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=TotalGenTrust TotalEventTreatment TotalCompliance TotalMoralAlign TotalPolLegal TotalPersValues /STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX KURTOSIS SKEWNESS.
```

**Descriptive Statistics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Skewness</th>
<th>Kurtosis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TotalGeneralTrust</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>11.00</td>
<td>7.0250</td>
<td>2.52665</td>
<td>-.009</td>
<td>.374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TotalEventTreat</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>16.00</td>
<td>12.3077</td>
<td>2.98376</td>
<td>-.553</td>
<td>.378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TotalCompandCoop</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>5.5750</td>
<td>2.36304</td>
<td>.466</td>
<td>.374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TotalMoralAlignment</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>6.0500</td>
<td>2.34193</td>
<td>.681</td>
<td>.374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TotalPoliceLegality</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>13.00</td>
<td>8.2083</td>
<td>2.04257</td>
<td>.160</td>
<td>.472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TotalPersonalValues</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>4.4000</td>
<td>1.91887</td>
<td>.585</td>
<td>.374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid N (listwise)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Resources**

Processor Time: 00:00:00.00

Elapsed Time: 00:00:00.00
### Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Skewness</th>
<th>Kurtosis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Statistic</td>
<td>Statistic</td>
<td>Statistic</td>
<td>Statistic</td>
<td>Statistic</td>
<td>Std. Error</td>
<td>Statistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Police Legitimacy</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>14.00</td>
<td>41.00</td>
<td>25.9583</td>
<td>7.74304</td>
<td>.293</td>
<td>.472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid N (listwise)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Missing Value Handling

User-defined missing values for dependent variables are treated as missing.

Statistics are based on cases with no missing values for the dependent variable or factor(s) being analyzed.

EXAMINE VARIABLES=TotalGenTrust /PLOT BOXPLOT HISTOGRAM NPPLOT /COMPARE GROUPS /STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES EXTREME /CINTERVAL 95 /MISSING PAIRWISE /NOTOTAL.

### Case Processing Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total General Trust and Confidence</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>61.5%</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Descriptives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>7.0250</td>
<td>.39950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Bound</td>
<td>6.2169</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Bound</td>
<td>7.8331</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95% Confidence Interval</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5% Trimmed Mean</td>
<td>7.0278</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>7.0000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance</td>
<td>6.384</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Deviation</td>
<td>2.52665</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum</td>
<td>11.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interquartile Range</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skewness</td>
<td>-.009</td>
<td>.374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurtosis</td>
<td>-.932</td>
<td>.733</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Extreme Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Number</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowest</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>33</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Tests of Normality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kolmogorov-Smirnov&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Shapiro-Wilk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Statistic</td>
<td>df</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TotalGeneralTrustandConfidence</td>
<td>.104</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>*</sup> This is a lower bound of the true significance.

<sup>a</sup> Lilliefors Significance Correction
Variable: Total General Trust and Confidence

Histogram:

Normal Q-Q Plot of Total General Trust and Confidence:

Detrended Normal Q-Q Plot of Total General Trust and Confidence:
### Syntax

```
EXAMINE 
VARIABLES=TotalEventTreatment 
/PLOT BOXPLOT HISTOGRAM NPLOT 
/COMPARE GROUPS 
/STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES 
EXTREME 
/CINTERVAL 95 
/MISSING PAIRWISE 
/NOTOTAL.
```
# Case Processing Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Valid</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TotalEventTreat</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Descriptives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>12.3077</td>
<td>.47778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95% Confidence Interval for Mean</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Bound</td>
<td>11.3405</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Bound</td>
<td>13.2749</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5% Trimmed Mean</td>
<td>12.4558</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>13.0000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance</td>
<td>8.903</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TotalEventTreat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Deviation</td>
<td>2.98376</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum</td>
<td>16.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interquartile Range</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skewness</td>
<td>-0.553</td>
<td>.378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurtosis</td>
<td>-1.188</td>
<td>.741</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Extreme Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Number</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TotalEventTreat</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>39</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lowest</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Only a partial list of cases with the value 16.00 are shown in the table of upper extremes.
Tests of Normality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kolmogorov-Smirnov&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Shapiro-Wilk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Statistic</td>
<td>df</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Event Treat</td>
<td>.176</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Lilliefors Significance Correction

Variable: Total Event Treatment

Histogram

Normal Q-Q Plot of TotalEventTreat

Detrended Normal Q-Q Plot of TotalEventTreat
Input

Data
Active Dataset C:\Users\Dave\Documents\DatasetV5.sav
Filter <none>
Weight <none>
Split File <none>

N of Rows in Working Data File 65

Missing Value Handling
Definition of Missing User-defined missing values for dependent variables are treated as missing.
Cases Used Statistics are based on cases with no missing values for the dependent variable or factor(s) being analyzed.

Syntax
EXAMINE VARIABLES=TotalCompliance
/PLOT BOXPLOT HISTOGRAM NPPLOT
/COMPARE GROUPS
/STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES EXTREME
/CINTERVAL 95
/MISSING PAIRWISE /NOTOTAL.

Resources
Processor Time 00:00:00.70
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.72

Case Processing Summary

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Valid</th>
<th>Missing</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TotalComandCooperation</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>61.5%</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Descriptives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TotalCompandCooperation</strong></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>5.5750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>95% Confidence Interval for Mean</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower Bound</td>
<td>4.8193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Upper Bound</td>
<td>6.3307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5% Trimmed Mean</td>
<td>5.5278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Median</td>
<td>4.5000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Variance</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Std. Deviation</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>3.00</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Maximum</td>
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<td>Range</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interquartile Range</td>
<td>4.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Skewness</td>
<td>.466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kurtosis</td>
<td>-1.436</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Extreme Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Number</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>36</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lowest</td>
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<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Only a partial list of cases with the value 9.00 are shown in the table of upper extremes.

<sup>b</sup> Only a partial list of cases with the value 3.00 are shown in the table of lower extremes.

### Tests of Normality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kolmogorov-Smirnov&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Shapiro-Wilk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Statistic</td>
<td>df</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TotalCompandCooperation</strong></td>
<td>.247</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Lilliefors Significance Correction
Variable: Total Compliance and Cooperation

Histogram

Normal Q-Q Plot of Total Compliance and Cooperation

Detrended Normal Q-Q Plot of Total Compliance and Cooperation
### Input Data

- **Active Dataset**: Dataset1
- **Filter**: <none>
- **Weight**: <none>
- **Split File**: <none>
- **N of Rows in Working Data File**: 65

### Missing Value Handling

- **Definition of Missing**: User-defined missing values for dependent variables are treated as missing.
- **Cases Used**: Statistics are based on cases with no missing values for the dependent variable or factor(s) being analyzed.

### Syntax

```plaintext
EXAMINE VARIABLES=TotalMoralAlign
/PLOT BOXPLOT HISTOGRAM NPPLOT
/COMPARE GROUPS
/STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES
/EXTREME
/CINTERVAL 95
/MISSING PAIRWISE
/NOTOTAL.
```

### Resources

- **Processor Time**: 00:00:00.86
- **Elapsed Time**: 00:00:00.83

---

### Output

- **Comments**

---

### Notes

- **Output Created**
- **Comments**
- **Data**
  - **Active Dataset**: Dataset1
- **Filter**: <none>
- **Weight**: <none>
- **Split File**: <none>
- **N of Rows in Working Data File**: 65

### Syntax

```plaintext
EXAMINE VARIABLES=TotalMoralAlign
/PLOT BOXPLOT HISTOGRAM NPPLOT
/COMPARE GROUPS
/STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES
/EXTREME
/CINTERVAL 95
/MISSING PAIRWISE
/NOTOTAL.
```
### Case Processing Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Valid</th>
<th>Missing</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TotalMoralAlignment</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>61.5%</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Descriptives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>6.0500</td>
<td>.37029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Bound</td>
<td>5.3010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Bound</td>
<td>6.7990</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95% Confidence Interval for Mean</td>
<td>5% Trimmed Mean</td>
<td>5.9167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>6.0000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance</td>
<td>5.485</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TotalMoralAlignment</td>
<td>Std. Deviation</td>
<td>2.34193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interquartile Range</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skewness</td>
<td>.681</td>
<td>.374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurtosis</td>
<td>-1.177</td>
<td>.733</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Extreme Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Number</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowest</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Only a partial list of cases with the value 9.00 are shown in the table of upper extremes.
Tests of Normality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Kolmogorov-Smirnov&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Shapiro-Wilk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Statistic</td>
<td>df</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TotalMoralAlignment</td>
<td>.184</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Lilliefors Significance Correction

Variable: Total Moral Alignment

![Image of a histogram, Normal Q-Q plot, and Detrended Normal Q-Q plot for Total Moral Alignment.](image-url)
Output Created

29-JAN-2014 22:15:18

Comments

Data
Active Dataset
C:sers\Dave\Documents\DatasetV5.sav
Dataset1

Filter
<none>

Weight
<none>

Split File
<none>

N of Rows in Working Data File
65

Definition of Missing
User-defined missing values for dependent variables are treated as missing.

Cases Used
Statistics are based on cases with no missing values for the dependent variable or factor(s) being analyzed.

EXAMINE VARIABLES=TotalPoliceLegality
/PLOT BOXPLOT HISTOGRAM NPLOT
/COMPARE GROUPS
/STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES
EXTREME
/CINTERVAL 95
/MISSING PAIRWISE
/NOTOTAL.

Syntax

Resources
Processor Time
00:00:00.70

Elapsed Time
00:00:00.72

Case Processing Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Valid</th>
<th>Missing</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TotalPoliceLegality</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>36.9%</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Descriptives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>8.2083</td>
<td>.41694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Bound</td>
<td>7.3458</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Bound</td>
<td>9.0708</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95% Confidence Interval for Mean</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5% Trimmed Mean</td>
<td>8.1389</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>9.0000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance</td>
<td>4.172</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Deviation</td>
<td>2.04257</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum</td>
<td>13.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interquartile Range</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skewness</td>
<td>.160</td>
<td>.472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurtosis</td>
<td>-.160</td>
<td>.918</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TotalPoliceLegality**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Std. Deviation</td>
<td>2.04257</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum</td>
<td>13.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interquartile Range</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skewness</td>
<td>.160</td>
<td>.472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurtosis</td>
<td>-.160</td>
<td>.918</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Extreme Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Case Number</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TotalPoliceLegality</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowest</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **a.** Only a partial list of cases with the value 9.00 are shown in the table of upper extremes.
- **b.** Only a partial list of cases with the value 6.00 are shown in the table of lower extremes.

### Tests of Normality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kolmogorov-Smirnov</th>
<th>Shapiro-Wilk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Statistic</td>
<td>df</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TotalPoliceLegality</td>
<td>.193</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **a.** Lilliefors Significance Correction
**Input**

- Data
  - Active Dataset: C:\Users\Dave\Documents\DatasetV5.sav
  - Filter: <none>
  - Weight: <none>
  - Split File: <none>

**N of Rows in Working Data File**: 65

**Definition of Missing**

- User-defined missing values for dependent variables are treated as missing.

**Cases Used**

Statistics are based on cases with no missing values for the dependent variable or factor(s) being analyzed.

**Syntax**

- EXAMINE VARIABLES=TotalPersValues
- /PLOT BOXPLOT HISTOGRAM NPPLOT
- /COMPARE GROUPS
- /STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES EXTREME
- /CINTERVAL 95
- /MISSING PAIRWISE
- /NOTOTAL.

**Resources**

- Processor Time: 00:00:00.76
- Elapsed Time: 00:00:00.83

**Case Processing Summary**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Valid</th>
<th>Missing</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TotalPersonalValues</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>61.5%</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Descriptives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TotalPersonalValues</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>4.4000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>95% CI</td>
<td>Lower Bound</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Upper Bound</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5% Trimmed</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Median</td>
<td>4.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Variance</td>
<td>3.682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Std. Deviation</td>
<td>1.9187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Std. Error</td>
<td>.374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minimum</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maximum</td>
<td>9.00</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Range</td>
<td>7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interquartile Range</td>
<td>2.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Skewness</td>
<td>.585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kurtosis</td>
<td>-.161</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Extreme Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Number</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Highest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Number</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TotalPersonalValues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Number</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lowest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Number</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

*a. Only a partial list of cases with the value 7.00 are shown in the table of upper extremes.*

*b. Only a partial list of cases with the value 2.00 are shown in the table of lower extremes.*
Tests of Normality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kolmogorov-Smirnov</th>
<th>Shapiro-Wilk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Statistic</td>
<td>df</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TotalPersonalValues</td>
<td>.142</td>
<td>.041</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Lilliefors Significance Correction

**Variable: Total Personal Values**

![Histogram](image)

- **Total Personal Values**
- **Expected Normal**
- **Detrended Normal Q-Q Plot**

**Observed Value**

![Observation Data](image)
Notes

Data
Active Dataset
DataSet1
Filter
<none>
Weight
<none>
Split File
<none>
N of Rows in Working Data File
65

Definition of Missing
User-defined missing values for dependent variables are treated as missing.

Cases Used
Statistics are based on cases with no missing values for the dependent variable or factor(s) being analyzed.

EXAMINE VARIABLES=TotalPoliceLegitimacy /PLOT BOXPLOT HISTOGRAM NPLOT /COMPARE GROUPS /STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES EXTREME /CINTERVAL 95 /MISSING PAIRWISE /NOTOTAL.

Syntax

Missing Value Handling

Cases Used

Statistics

Resources
Processor Time
00:00:00.76
Elapsed Time
00:00:00.84

Case Processing Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Valid</th>
<th>Missing</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TotalPoliceLegitimacy</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>36.9%</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Descriptives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>25.9583</td>
<td>1.58054</td>
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<td>95% Confidence Interval for Mean</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Upper Bound</td>
<td>29.2279</td>
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<tr>
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<td>25.8056</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>24.5000</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Deviation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum</td>
<td>41.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
<td>27.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interquartile Range</td>
<td>11.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skewness</td>
<td>.293</td>
<td>.472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurtosis</td>
<td>- .661</td>
<td>.918</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Extreme Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Number</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TotalPoliceLegitimacy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lowest</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Tests of Normality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kolmogorov-Smirnova</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TotalPoliceLegitimacy</td>
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<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shapiro-Wilk</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TotalPoliceLegitimacy</td>
<td>.959</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This is a lower bound of the true significance.
  a. Lilliefors Significance Correction
Variable: Total Police Legitimacy

Histogram

Normal Q-Q Plot of TotalPoliceLegitimacy

Detrended Normal Q-Q Plot of TotalPoliceLegitimacy
Phase 1 trust and confidence histogram.
### Frequency distributions for the binned variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General trust and confidence in the police score values</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.00</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>40</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Distribution of scores for general trust and confidence in the police.

**Phase 1 moral alignment with police histogram.**
### Protester moral alignment with the police score values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>8.00</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>40</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
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N.B. The higher value the more favourable assessments by participants

---

**Phase 1 police legality histogram.**
Protester perceptions of police legality score values

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Percentage</th>
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<td>4.2%</td>
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</table>

Total: 24* 100%

*n=24 due to the Don't Know option for scale items which effects the overall scoring of the variable. N.B. The higher value the more favourable assessments by participants.

Distribution of scores for perceptions of police legality.

Phase 1 personal values about the law histogram.
Protester personal values about the law

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<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
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</table>

N.B. The higher value the more favourable assessments by participants

Distribution of scores for personal values about the law.

Phase 1 perceptions of event treatment histogram.
Phase 1 perceptions of confidence histogram.

Phase 1 satisfaction level histogram.

Phase 1 perceptions of fair treatment histogram.
Phase 1 personal support histogram.

Phase 1 total event treatment histogram.
### Protester perceptions of event treatment by the police

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<tr>
<td>16.00</td>
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*1 missing entry on a respondents survey entry.

N.B. The higher value the more favourable assessments by participants.

**Distribution of scores for protester perceptions of event treatment.**

![Histogram](image)

**Phase 1 total police legitimacy histogram.**
### Protests perceptions of police legitimacy

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N.B. The higher the value the more favourable assessments by participants.

**Distribution of scores for protester perceptions of police legitimacy.**
Phase 1 total compliance and cooperation histogram.

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<th>Percentage</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>40</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N.B. The higher the value the more favourable assessments by participants

Distribution of scores for protester levels of compliance and cooperation.
Phase 1 scatterplot for general trust and confidence.

Phase 1 scatterplot for event treatment.

Phase 1 scatterplot for moral alignment.
Phase 1 scatterplot for personal values.

Phase 1 scatterplot for police legality.

Phase 1 scatterplot for police legitimacy.
Appendix 6 Interview plan template.

Phase 2 Interview/Observation template

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date-</th>
<th>Event-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Location-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Time commenced-               | Time concluded-             |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview/Focus group/Observation/Notes (Select)</th>
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</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constructions of policing</th>
<th>Engagement and distancing</th>
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</thead>
</table>

Constructions of policing

Engagement and distancing
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power and identity</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Addt. Notes</td>
<td>Any emerging/repeating themes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Observation Notes (any supporting video/photographic?)
## Appendix 7 Phase 2 factors data index.

### Factor – Constructions of policing

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<td>UAF1</td>
<td>Tactics and functionality</td>
</tr>
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<td>SQ18</td>
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</tr>
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<td>SQ8</td>
<td>Tactics and functionality</td>
</tr>
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<td>UAF3</td>
<td>Tactics and functionality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students against Cuts 2011</td>
<td>SAC1</td>
<td>Tactics and functionality</td>
</tr>
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<td>Justice for Ian Tomlinson march 2009</td>
<td>J4IT5</td>
<td>Tactics and functionality</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>SDV10</td>
<td>Tactics and functionality</td>
</tr>
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<td>SQ3</td>
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<td>SQ5</td>
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<td>Police roles</td>
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<td>Police roles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>UAF4</td>
<td>Police roles</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>RID3</td>
<td>Police Integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>OPS3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re Imagine Democracy rally 2015 (legal observer)</td>
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<td>Change agents</td>
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<td>Change agents</td>
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### Factor – Engagement and distancing

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