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Maple Leaf Zeitgeist?  
Assessing Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s First Six Months¹

Amelia Hadfield

As Canadian elections go, October 2015 was a stunner. The 43-year old Justin Trudeau, an MP since only 2008, led the centrist Liberals to an emphatic victory. After one of the longest election campaigns in Canadian history, the new head of the Liberal Party overturned nearly a decade of Conservative government under PM Stephen Harper, replacing the Tory majority with the first liberal majority in 15 years, securing 184 of the 338 districts across the country. Apart from the seemingly endless media coverage of the new Prime Minister, in which comparisons ranged from his dynastic inheritance, to a glamorous man of the people (or more whimsically the Canadian Robin to US President Obama’s Batman), Trudeau now has a number of interesting opportunities. Primarily, his strategy is to reverse a range of Tory policies at home, recalibrate Canadian key aspects of foreign policy abroad, and ultimately, rehabilitate key aspects of the Canadian national identity. The following article briefly explores the impact of Justin Trudeau within all three of these areas in the first half year of his premiership.

Election Tactics

The 2015 electoral campaign was unusual from the outset. Generally, Canadian campaigns are limited, low-key and unevenly managed affairs. This one however ran from August till October, and remained high profile throughout, as well as being adeptly stage-managed. Rehabilitating national perceptions of the Liberals as Canada’s ‘natural governing party’, and Trudeau himself as an electable leader was key. The 2011 election saw Conservative PM Stephen Harper capture a majority of 166 seats in the 308-seat House of Commons, squaring off against the New Democratic Party (NDP) as the official opposition. Although his public persona had first emerged in 2000 with the oration given at the funeral of his father, former Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Justin Trudeau only gained serious political attention after a decisive win in 2008 as MP for the Montreal suburb of Papineau: an ethnically diverse neighbourhood with a more vocal independence movement than the traditional Liberal heartland of west Montreal, first cultivated by his father. In earning his electoral stripes, Justin then inherited the mantle of his father’s liberal legacy when he slipped swiftly into the driving seat of the Liberal party in April 2013. At this point however, the young Trudeau had to confront the various dimensions of the Trudeau identity: his father’s legacy his own political inexperience, and by early 2015, representing both the ‘anyone but Harper’ option, and a more electable choice than the NDP.

In managing the election, ‘Team Trudeau’ stuck closely to a range of unrelentingly positive messages. This contrasted sharply with Harper’s Conservatives relied on incessant negativism, warning in party terms that ‘Voting Liberal will cost you’, and in personal terms that Justin was an ingénue with an overblown family background. Reminiscent both of the US elections of President Obama, and the current in/out EU Referendum in the UK, the polarizing tactics of ‘hope vs. fear’, ‘experienced vs unproven’ were deployed by both sides. Ultimately, the key duality that galvanized Canadians was the sense of ‘passion vs dispassion’ emanating from the respective Liberal and Conservative camps. Trudeau gradually emerged as the confident source of all things possible, while Harper was increasingly portrayed as calculating at best, and opprobrious at worst in his attitudes to domestic and foreign affairs.¹ The irony that Trudeau was indeed inexperienced enough to represent the ‘anyone’ in the ‘anyone but Harper’ catchline that typified the final weeks of the campaign was astutely recalibrated by his team to represent Justin’s seemingly indefatigable political optimism and personal energy, combined with his ability to engage personally with Canadians.

¹ Portions of this article were presented at a conference organised at Université Paris Diderot by Dr Mélanie Torrent, entitled ‘Asylum, exile and the politics of trans-border solidarity in the contemporary Commonwealth’, on 1 April, 2016. Thanks are due to the insightful feedback received from this conference as well as two reviewers from The Round Table.
Cabinet Canada

In establishing his cabinet, Trudeau’s first reforms as Prime Minister were simple, but effective. He opted for a team that is generally young (mostly under 50), ethnically diverse and most notably, reflective of gender parity. The result made headlines both locally and internationally. Taken together, the 15 men and 15 women Cabinet were chosen to represent ‘a generational change and a commitment to reflecting Canada’s diversity’. In practical terms, the result produced a ‘cabinet that looks like Canada’. Asked to justify his rationale for his Cabinet composition, Trudeau rattled off a triple word score reminiscent of his father’s infamous ‘just watch me’ catchphrase: stating simply, ‘because it’s 2015.’ Are these choices therefore genuinely indicative of change, or an astute use of tokenism? Former journalist Chrystia Freeland is Minister for International Trade, Maryam Monsef (who 20 years ago sought asylum in Canada from Afghanistan) is charged with the democratic reform portfolio, alongside three Sikh politicians and two aboriginal MPs, including Jody Wilson Raybould, a former Crown prosecutor and First Nations leader from British Columbia. Cabinet newcomers are however balanced by the Liberal old guard, including former party leader Stéphane Dion who oversees foreign affairs, while Maritime MP Dominic LeBlanc becomes government leader in the House of Commons.

Lastly, in terms of ministerial authority, Trudeau has attempted to undo the centralizing control exercised by the prime minister’s office (PMO) which, under Harper, increasingly dominated the policy decisions of his own ministers, and much interaction between government, media, researchers and the public in general. Trudeau campaigned hard for a more open and transparent government; his choice of cabinet is therefore as instructive as his defiant message that ‘[g]overnment by cabinet is back’.

Prime Minister Selfie?

Trudeau must now balance stage management and the management of state. From the swearing-in ceremony to the Christmas ‘Ottawa Illuminations’, Trudeau, his ministers, and his entourage have rejected the customary black car treatment and security protocol, opting instead to arrive by bus, wading into crowds to pose for selfies, and popping up at metro stations and airports (media coverage of these events rather unhelpfully refers to Canadians during such event as ‘fans’ rather than citizens). Meanwhile, an enhanced engagement is continuing with the media, with Trudeau routinely available for journalists in the Parliament’s press theatre, forthcoming in terms of ‘wide-ranging, roundtable interviews with the Canadian Press’, and accessible at the range of international forums, from the Malta Commonwealth CHOGM in November 2015 to the World Economic Forum annual conference in Davos, Switzerland in January 2016.

Is Trudeau’s courtship of the media sharp, or merely showy? There are a variety of answers. In terms of projecting himself, Trudeau is clearly attempting to reconstitute not only the Liberal leadership of Canada in terms of its inhouse political culture, but remake the ethos of ‘Liberal Canada’ more broadly in terms of a national identity. Accordingly, a new and engaging PM who interviewed with American Vogue magazine on his first full day in office, followed by a New York Times interview in his completely re-furnished office (a smaller desk in the corner allowing everyone to ‘sit down and actually have discussions’) suggests a genuineness that has eluded many a Canadian politician in the past (the exception perhaps being the former NDP leader Jack Leyton). Questioned about the role of image-making, Trudeau suggested that media and government both constitute exercises in engagement, in that both operate by broadcasting from a given source, with the express purpose of being received by a specific audience. Trudeau argues that self-promotion in this sense ‘is really about good democratic governance’, arguing that ‘I need people to stay involved and stay engaged and stay positive about what we’re doing’. From this perspective, image-making may be slick in an instrumental sense, but it also ‘represent[s] a two-way contract – giving citizens license to demand better of government and Trudeau license to expect better of them’. The post-Harper lesson is therefore to avoid the danger of disconnect: i.e. appearing not only distant, but also dispassionate. Much like his southern counterpart, ‘there’s something made-for-social-media about Trudeau.’ The risk of course is ‘that it can only end in

2 [http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/13/magazine/trudeaus-canada-again.html?_r=0]
crushing disappointment – that it’s all too good to be true, that there may be little of substance behind the slick photo opportunities’. Substance is indeed the issue. Trudeau is still regarded by many Canadians as both an heir to the Trudeau name, and a Liberal party maverick, making him a truly ‘strange kind of poster boy for a more egalitarian Canada’. To outflank the risk, Trudeau’s choice of policies by which to rebuild himself, party, and the country as a whole, is therefore crucial.

Migration Policy: Maple Leaf Zeitgeist

As *The Guardian* recently pointed out, ‘Canada, land of wholesome outdoor sports and apologizing profusely for things that weren’t your fault, is undeniably having a moment.’ In policy terms, Trudeau appears to have plugged at the micro level into a liberal zeitgeist, and at the macro level, tapped a deep need for a rehabilitated, post-Conservative Canadian identity. The policy of choice is migration, which operates as a barometer of domestic attitudes towards inclusiveness, separates Canada definitively from the US in terms of attitudes to multiculturalism, and Europe in terms of practical responses. US President Barack Obama has done his level best to instill progressive attitudes regarding the thorny issue of economic migrants from Mexico and South America, and asylum policy more generally. However, the 2016 Republican electoral campaign, fueled by earlier GOP and Tea Party attitudes have together undermined many of Obama’s approaches. The EU too has produced wide-ranging *voltas face* to the unparalleled migration challenges facing the continent, shifting from the humanitarian responses by European Commission President Jean-Claude Junker and German Chancellor Angela Merkel in late 2015, to far more pragmatic attitudes and forbidding policies.

Admittedly, this is not a convenient like-to-like scenario. Canadian geography is both foil and fillip for the country’s geopolitical choices and its immigration and asylum policies. Nevertheless, there are stark differences between US, European and Canadian responses to external migration pressures and domestic Islamist terror attacks., Foregrounded both by the October 2014 shootouts on Parliament Hill and the House of Commons, the Conservative attitude under Harper favored an increase in Canadian armed forces operating in US-led anti-ISIS coalitions, matched by tightened immigration and migration opportunities, and the proposed ‘Barbaric Cultural Practice’ policy (forbidding the wearing cultural and religious garments). Trudeau favored a reversal of this position, stating that Canada will ‘withdraw its six fighter jets from the U.S.-led mission, pledging instead to increase the number of military trainers on the ground’. Migration has since 2015 been painful topic, when the Harper government had to combat accusations that the family of the drowned toddler, Alan Kurdi, washed ashore on a Turkish beach, had originally been denied entry into Canada. Migration policy during 2015 ‘stressed security, and seemed cautious’ but domestically was perceived as hard-hearted, and ‘not one that made Canadians proud’. As explored further at the end of the article, Trudeau has reversed the general tone of Canadian migration policy, tapping instead into an image of ‘compassionate Canadians’. This appears both more humanitarian abroad, whilst accompanied by voluntarist attitudes locally using ‘refugee sponsorship and volunteer[ing] to work in settlement services’. This in turn has enabled the federal government to promise Canadian homes to 25,000 Syrians by the end of 2015. Canadian media coverage suggests that federal and provincial responses are for the most part aligned in this respect. Leading the humanitarian charge by personally welcoming Syrians at Toronto Pearson airport, Trudeau not only scored a personal hit, but upped the provincial ante by ‘personally helping refugees into warm coats, while declaring, “You’re safe at home now.”’

Hardened commentators may recoil at such saccharine imagery. The majority of citizens however – particularly in their ‘local Canadian’ identity have unhesitatingly followed suit, with welcome receptions hosted by each of the provincial premiers echoed at airports up and down the country. Encouragingly, smaller provinces like New Brunswick have for example not only ‘urge[d] Ottawa to expedite funding for refugees with children’, but made clear that ‘New Brunswick needs these newcomers as much as they need New Brunswick’. From this perspective, the Canadian welcome to Syrian migrants appears largely well-managed (with a range of sponsorship options enabling entry to Canada) and authentic, with Arabic signs, Arabic columns in local newspapers, and halal meat all in increasing evidence.
2016 will likely see the Trudeau government concentrate on the *hardware* of infrastructure projects that can stimulate the economy, and budgetary software that will unroll new tax credits, new investment opportunities for SMES, and increased taxes for the top 1% of earners, possibly while lowering middle-class taxes. In terms of domestic governance, improved legislative mechanisms will be required to reverse the ‘unwieldy ‘omnibus’ legislation that bundled together unconnected matters’ used by the Conservative government. Elsewhere, more even-handed approaches are needed to improve relations between Ottawa and the First Nations, particularly in respect of the specific needs of Arctic communities in the High North.

Six months after taking office, Trudeau’s domestic overhauls have yet to prove substantive. Following the Harper Conservatives and their ‘image of heard-heartedness, suspicion and cynicism’ is effective electorally, but Canadians will demand more, and soon. Collective responsibility driven by the Cabinet plus Trudeau’s own leadership will be needed to bolster the unsteady economy, lackluster currency, and threat of precipitous job loss (particularly in Alberta with the drop in oil prices). *The Guardian* perhaps waxes too lyrical in suggesting that ‘while the US boasts of offering its citizens “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness”, it’s Canada that actually delivers on all three.’ Possibly, but there is a great deal more, from urban child poverty and uneven healthcare provisions, to feeble northern governance to which the new government needs to attend.

**The Flag and the Backpack: Canadian Abroad**

Trudeau appears to have found his groove domestically. But goodness of fit at the global level is equally important. The slew of summity that followed his election in October 2015 including G20, APEC, CHOGM, Paris COP21 and Davos meetings suggest a renewed focus on conflict mediation to tackle proximate issues, and multilateralism to deal with more global challenges. As argued by former Canadian ambassador to Russia and the EU, Jeremy Kinsman, ‘[i]n terms of broader messaging, Canada’s best international brand … has been our ability to manage pluralism, which Trudeau articulated impressively, especially for the Commonwealth. Other leaders respect it because many of them are sitting on top of powder kegs of sectarian unrest.’

**Canada-US**

‘What’s not to like?’ asked President Obama in relation to Justin Trudeau at their first news conference, in November 2015. While genial relations between the US and Canada remain something of a continental truism, the reality has differed in recent years. Obama’s relationship with PM Harper was strained at the best of times, and bilateral relations on climate change, energy and trade were the worse for it. Now in full legacy-building mode, and on the prowl for a ‘like-minded champion of liberal causes’, Obama may have found just the man in Justin Trudeau. No Canadian leader has enjoyed an official state visit to Washington in twenty years. Coup indeed for Trudeau not merely to be invited to Washington in such estate, but to have appeared simultaneously ‘unabashedly inclusive and outward-looking’ and the natural heir to global liberal leadership. Replacing Canadian commitments to hard power with military training missions and humanitarian aid, as well as ratifying the October 2015 Trans-Pacific Partnership to lower trade barriers suggest that both leaders generally see eye-to-eye in strategic terms, working together to support ‘policies of economic inclusion and diversity’. However, shared liberal attitudes to trade and foreign policy do not solve everything. The endless softwood lumber arguments, differing visions of energy security, and the changed role of Canadian forces in US-led anti-ISIL ops in Afghanistan and Iraq remain anomalies between the two neighbours.

**Commonwealth CHOGM:** In November 2015, the heads of Commonwealth states met in Valetta, Malta. For Trudeau, this international debut was a vital opportunity to rehabilitate the self-induced isolation of Canada within the Commonwealth family after the spat between Secretary General Sharma and PM Harper over the location of the 2013 CHOGM in Sri Lanka. At the time, Harper argued that CHOGM’s presence in Colombo effectively endorsed Sri Lanka’s inexcusable human rights record; he subsequently withdrew $20 million in discretionary funding from its Commonwealth contributions. As
Canada remains the second-highest Commonwealth contributor after Britain, the blow was a bitter one, followed by a two-year nadir in Canada–Commonwealth relations.

At Malta however, Trudeau presented the face of renewal, and managed to score not once but twice. First, chosen by his fellow Heads of State to toast Her Majesty the Queen at the banquet concluding the first day of the conference, Trudeau deftly paid homage to the Queen’s ‘constant presence in the life of Canada since 1935 (when she first appeared on a postage stamp), commending the monarch for having ‘seen more of Canada than almost any Canadian’. Secondly, tuning in to Malta’s climate change leitmotif, Trudeau announced Canada’s sizeable contribution towards an international climate fund (comprising $2.65 billion over five years to help developing countries fight climate change). As Canadian Commonwealth envoy Hugh Segal argues, in terms of goodness of fit, the new Canadian government and the Commonwealth are ideally suited. The Canadian government is now interested in a different catalogue: ‘soft power – development, education, human rights, education and all those important priorities’, while the Commonwealth remains a fundamentally soft power organisation operating as ‘a non-military, soft-power organization with tremendous potential... [and] an important instrument for development and reflective of a kinder, gentler approach to foreign policy, which appears to be where this government is headed’. Ironically, dynasty counts for much in both the Commonwealth and Canada. Pierre Trudeau himself began as a reluctant Commonwealth supporter. However, after hosting the second CHOGM in 1973, he not only ‘succeeded, ever so diplomatically, in taking a dusty, overly bureaucratic group by the scruff of the neck and shaking off its dust’ but transformed himself into an ardent Commonwealth champion in the process. In this mode, Justin Trudeau could perhaps consider the impact of appointing a separate minister for the Commonwealth to balance the current minister for La Francophonie (Marie-Claude Bibeau).

**Evergreen: The Politics of Climate Change**

The December 2015 COP21 Climate Change Summit in Paris was the next major international foray for Trudeau. Despite the prominence of climate change during the election campaign, Canada was not the most influential player at Paris in terms of producing mitigation commitments. The media however did not appear to notice, chiefly because Trudeau’s green credentials – while unproven – stand in such stark contrast to that of his predecessor. Harper’s government after all removed Canada from the Kyoto Protocol, angered the EU over carbon reduction policies, and displayed surprisingly robust skepticism about global warming in general; a suite of policy choices directly connected to promoting the economic and environmental viability of the high-carbon Albertan tar sands. Despite a lack of policy detail, Trudeau instead placed himself comprehensively ‘on message’, realigning Canada firmly within global CO2 mitigation efforts. This itself was counted as enough in Paris, and at home.

Splashy announcements to work with the EU, the US and China towards emission reductions is one thing. But confronting the split personality disorder of a country torn between innovative mitigation philosophies (Quebec and British Columbia) and a profound reliance on oil, as with Alberta, and natural gas (Eastern Canada) is another. Like the EU Member States, each of the provinces of Canada have markedly different environmental profiles and wide-ranging, frequently oppositional policies. On climate change – as with migration and security - Trudeau’s international high wire acts will have to translate into a sustainable domestic balance if he is to produce an evenhanded, and genuinely Canadian response to the COP21 promises made on behalf of the country as a whole.

**Canada–EU Relations**

The COP21 climate change summit also allowed Trudeau to reconfigure relations with the EU. There are similarities on both sides: both are confronting continued fossil fuel reliance in the midst of promulgating mitigation strategies; both are reliant on growing free trade deals with key states and regions; both count on the soft power impact of working within the structures of global governance, and both sides are struggling to consolidate a security and defence identity that can make a practical
difference to migration and asylum policy. At the heart of the EU-Canada Strategic Partnership lies trade and investment. After the initial euphoria of the completed Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the two sides, legal logjams in the form of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanisms followed, regarded as controversial by Canada (and the US in its current TTIP negotiations with the EU) because the provision enables companies to sue governments over legislation deemed contrary to investment. The provision is not a new one (it has existed in some fashion since the 1950s in upwards of 1,400 trade agreements between the EU and various third parties), but it required the EU to rethink, and Canada to reconsider. Still, the final outcome looks promising. Announcements in February 2016 by EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström saw suggested that the EU had made the ISDS structure more transparent, with ‘stricter procedures for selecting the arbitrators, an appeal tribunal’, with the European Commission declaring Canada ‘a strong partner to substantially reform this important but outdated system’. This neatly placed the onus on Canada to support the reforms but to subsequently accept the revamped CETA into which they will be devolved (and possibly putting pressure on the US to act similarly).

Despite such differing messages, getting CETA approved is seen as vital by both sides. A recent joint Canada-EU study found that the agreement ‘could boost Canada’s income by $12 billion annually and bilateral trade by 20 percent. Put another way, this is the economic equivalent of adding $1,000 to the average Canadian family’s income or almost 80,000 new jobs to the Canadian economy’ (Global Affairs Canada, 2016b). Numbers count for much. So do allies. Trudeau voiced his own concerns in this respect, arguing...

For Canada, CETA is a key method of delivering on a bipartisan ‘commitment to create jobs, stimulate economic growth and sustain long-term prosperity for all Canadians’ (Global Affairs Canada, 2016b). For the EU, CETA is the economic counterpart to the EU-Canada Strategic Partnership, a political structure that places Canada alongside the US, China, India and even Russia in terms of key east-west allies. For his part, Trudeau appears aware of the politics as well as the economics of trade, arguing that ‘in a world of shifting global power, it is more important than ever to leverage the Canadian-European partnership to advance our common values and interests’ (Connolly, 2016).

Im-migration Redux

‘Trudeau is what we thought Canada was’, remarked a US observer recently. The reconstruction of the Canadian political identity appears to have begun, with social media as its medium, and a twofold message of enhanced domestic governance, and a responsible attitude to the international pressures of economic immigration and political migration. How these policies will emerge to typify a resurgent Canadian identity is still unclear. As observed by former Canadian ambassador Kinsman:

[Trudeau’s] message of welcome for Syrian refugees was a confidence-building boost to the pull factor in the refugee dilemma, even if our situation, with the luxury of screening candidates from refugee camps, is hardly comparable to the challenges of Germany, Sweden, and others inundated by a mass exodus of millions of refugees that seems to obey a momentum and logic of its own.

A welcome attitude to war-wearied migrants is a good start. But Trudeau is more likely to be judged in the long-term by the sustainability of his proposed changes to Canadian immigration policy, and the promise of a rehabilitated Canadian national identity. Such changes for example include a doubling of the number of immigration applications allowed for parents and grand-parents sponsorship (to 10,000 visas per year), doubling the budget for processing immigration applications, lifting the visa requirement for Mexican travel to Canada, and controversially, restoring free access to healthcare for refugee/asylum seekers pending a decision on their case by the government, as well as easing restrictions on international students gaining Canadian citizenship.

Trudeau’s response however is not wholly explained by external pressures, but also by the historic foregrounding of such attitudes in classic Liberal ideology. In terms of political heritage, the Liberal Party of Canada has ‘traditionally been the most sympathetic Canadian political party when it comes to the immigration file’. During the 1970s, under the leadership of Pierre Trudeau, the Liberals...
successfully constructed, and then coined official support for the concept of multiculturalism: rendering it innately integrative in political terms, and Canadian in cultural terms:

Multiculturalism, in a Canadian context, means integrating newcomers into Canadian society without forcing them to shed their own unique identity and culture. This progressive stance on multiculturalism helped define Canada as a nation that is accepting of immigrants and, not surprisingly, helped win the hearts and minds of many new Canadians.78

In practical terms, these and other reforms proposed by Trudeau to reform Canada’s immigration system represent not only an enormous identity shift from the previous government’s attitude, but a veritable sea change in terms of rehabilitating the Canadian Self by genuinely and permanently habilitating a wide variety of international Others.29 Trudeau maintains that openness, plurality and inclusiveness applies as equally to the domestic components of the Canadian identity, as for its image abroad. In other words, an open Canada is one that is shaped by its multiculturalism, based on shared values of respect, compassion, solidarity, and the willingness to work hard. Trudeau has referred to this as ‘the first post-national state’.

The danger is that such laudable efforts disintegrate - along with the deeply personal touch imparted by Trudeau himself - into citizenship spin. Open-door migration policies tend to operate with something of a shelf-life relative to the original crisis, in either temporal or proximity terms. The Syrian crisis will sadly and undoubtedly be replaced by another humanitarian fallout, by it may not be accompanied by an equally receptive and instantaneous response from migrant-friendly countries like Canada. Equally, overhauled immigration policies take time to bed down, and produce results, specifically at the provincial level where the greatest amount of provisions are required. By which time, another election may be looming.

In terms of global governance, the challenge may be even greater. Trudeau has yet to carve out a sharp foreign policy agenda for Canada but he must at all costs avoid ineffective, anodyne foreign policies premised on the philosophy of ‘less for less’ rather than committing more for more (as the EU has learned to its peril). For now, Trudeau has opted for a military drawdown. Few may feel the effects. Canada has played a marginal role in its anti-ISIL efforts. It may therefore be logical to replace Canada’s venerable six CF- 18s: which as Kinsman argues are ‘statistically incidental to a military success that would have to rely on the disparate and frequently competing ground forces from Syria and Iraq’. Better perhaps to concentrate on bottom-up, security-sector reforms that rely on expanding the military training currently offered by Canada to the Kurdish Peshmurga. Although this – combined with enhanced humanitarian aid – constitutes value in a tactical sense, Trudeau has yet to identify the strategic contribution of this decision in making it ‘militarily significant’ in the eyes of its allies.30

There is no equivalent to American exceptionalism, north of the 49th parallel. Canadians rely instead on tolerance, honesty, and reliability, usually starting from their local community, and working its way up in terms of governance. Exceptionalism lies instead in the quality of its citizenship, and its perceived ability - in admittedly simple terms - to simultaneously be good, and do good in the world. With Trudeau at the helm, improved and yes – optimistic - governance is a decent start to maintaining high-quality citizenship, at home and abroad.

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1 Barbara Messamore, ‘Justin Trudeau and Canada’s 2015 Election’, The Round Table, February 2016, p. 83.
3 In late May 2016 however, the Cabinet Minister for Fisheries, First Nations MP Hunter Tootoo from Nunavut, resigned citing substance dependence, and was swiftly replaced by House Leader MP
Dominic LeBlanc. Hailing from New Brunswick, LeBlanc’s father, Romeo LeBlanc originally held the same post. Trudeau accepted the resignation, but there was little comment on the nature of the dependence itself.

4 Ibid, Murphy, op. cit. The Guardian.

5 Bruce Cheadle, ‘Justin Trudeau says image-making is a part of democratic governance’, Telegraph-Journal, December 18, 2015, p. A7.


11 Messamore, op.cit, The Round Table, p. 83.

12 Hinsliff, op. cit., The Guardian.


15 Rebecca Howland, ‘Everything from Arabic signs to halal meat as hotel fills up’, Telegraph Journal, 7 March, 2016.

16 Messamore, The Round Table, op. cit. p. 82.

17 Hinsliff, op. cit. The Guardian.


23 Ibid..


26 Ibid.


28 Ibid..

29 The ten Liberal proposals to the immigration system are as follows:

1. Double the number of immigration applications allowed for parents and grand-parents sponsorship from 5,000 to 10,000 visas per year.

2. Double the budget for processing family class immigration applications to reduce wait times

3. Increase points allocation to applicants who have siblings in Canada on their Express Entry application

4. Lift the visa requirement for Mexican travel to Canada.

5. Eliminate the $1000 Labour Market Impact Assessment fee for families seeking caregivers to care for family members with physical or mental disabilities.

6. Restoring free access to healthcare for refugee/asylum seekers pending a decision on their case by the government.
7. They have pledged to make it easier for international students to achieve Canadian Citizenship. The exact details are not specified, but they have stated they will do this by making adjustments to the Canadian Experience Class program that will ‘remove barriers’ to international students.

8. Restore the Canadian Citizenship residency time credit for international students in Canada.

9. Bypass the two year wait period for “conditional permanent residence” for spouses of sponsored individuals.

10. Restore the maximum age for dependents from 19 to 22, making it easier for immigrants to bring their older children to Canada.

30 Kinsman, op. cit, *Policy*. 