UK pension sustainability and fund manager governance: agent duties to the principal

Shevchenko, K., McManus, R. and Haddock-Fraser, J. (2015) UK pension sustainability and fund manager governance: agent duties to the principal. Journal of Sustainable Finance and Investment, 54 (4). pp. 205-209. ISSN 2043-0795.

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Abstract

Sustainable investing includes the application of non-financial (Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG)) criteria to asset selection in institutional investor portfolios (Capelle-Blancard and Mojon 2011). The article explores the implications for applying ESG screening to the institutional investors making the asset selections. Institutional investors are a heterogeneous group of investors, with fund managers specifically being some of the largest listed organisations globally (Ingley and van der Walt 2004). Whether their own corporate management duties to fiduciary governance (the G in ESG) benefiting their shareholders has any material impact on the financial returns outcomes of the pension asset management contract, and specifically whether there is a fiduciary conflict favouring of the exclusive best interest of fund management shareholders is the question addressed by the paper.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: UK pensions; fund managers; sustainable investing; ESG; corporate governance; fiduciary duties; Principal-Agent theory
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Divisions: Faculty of Social and Applied Sciences > The Business School
Depositing User: Richard McManus
Date Deposited: 13 Oct 2015 13:49
Last Modified: 17 May 2017 08:58
URI: https://create.canterbury.ac.uk/id/eprint/13825

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Last edited: 29/06/2016 12:23:00