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'Do What the Afro-Americans Are Doing': Black Power and the Start of the Northern Ireland Troubles

On the night of the 2008 American elections, Derry's 'Reclaim the Spirit of '68' group welcomed two Black Panthers to a local bar named in honour of a Nicaraguan revolutionary. A member of the group, Eamonn McCann, had earlier published an opinion piece in the city's newspaper criticising the assumption that Northern Ireland's past could be understood entirely and could not be understood other than in terms of Protestant and Catholic or of British unionist and Irish nationalist. 'The fact that there was an international dimension,' he lamented, 'has virtually been written out of history'. Indeed, 'The Troubles' had many connections to what has become known as the 'global Sixties'; this article will address one of the most striking and significant strands amongst the tapestry of networks that tied Northern Ireland to the rest of the world: Black Power. For the authorities as well as the activists, Black Power was one of the languages used to interpret what was happening at the start of the Troubles. This argument draws not just upon research on the transnational history of Black Power, but also upon scholarship of the British Empire. The latter is needed because the British Empire still lingered in some parts of the globe and because the Cold War West can helpfully be seen as a series of imperial networks. The 'new imperial history' offers a guide to how a multi-sited history of the global Sixties can be written. While this perspective recognises that the United States was at the centre of power in the Cold War West, it does not privilege the North American and the Western European core. The United States did not, to use a familiar metaphor, sit in the middle of a wheel with spokes connecting it to its Cold War allies. Moreover, American ideas did not simply radiate out from the centre to the periphery where they were then adapted to local conditions. The Cold War West was a networked space -- constituted by mobile networks of people, objects and ideas. In this space
of flows, places were not so much bounded entities but rather the unique and ever-changing comings together of many different trajectories. Northern Ireland's Black Power moment offers a contained case study of how such Cold War trajectories passed through and defined a particular space. They were to leave this region transformed and to lead to imagined solidarities and real links being forged across the world.

Tony Ballantyne's monograph on Aryanism in the British Empire introduced the idea of conceiving of the imperial system as 'a complex agglomeration of overlapping webs'. This web metaphor can be employed to conceptualise transnational exchanges in the global Sixties, too. Like a nineteenth-century empire, the Cold War West was a structure: a complex construction that had been built out of a wide range of different parts, stitched together into a variety of new relationships. The image of a web also suggests the way in which cultural traffic had an integrating effect, linking disparate points around the globe into a bewildering pattern. These connections were 'horizontal' as well as 'vertical'. That is to say, they tied Western countries directly together with each other as well as tying them to the United States. The networks that were traced by America's post-1945 power and influence in the world formed the web that mattered most. However, this web had been layered on top of other webs, some of which were much older. Indeed, the transnational exchanges explored in this article also moved along the networks that made up the webs of the United Kingdom, Europe, the British Commonwealth, the Irish Diaspora and the Fourth International. Last, but not least, the web metaphor makes it easier to understand how Northern Ireland could be a colony yet also part of the metropole, peripheral yet also central: depending on which network was being viewed from what place, it could be both.

This article finds the global interconnectedness in the local story of the start of the Troubles. The first section examines the importance of London to the radicalisation of Northern Ireland's leading leftists. The focus is on the visit of the American Black Power
leader Stokely Carmichael in July 1967. This was the event from which, to quote the Metropolitan Police Special Branch, "Black Power" in this country may be said to date. The second section traces, through contemporary writings and later testimony, how these leftists brought Black Power home with them to Northern Ireland and drew on it to help transform local politics at the beginnings of the Troubles. In the third section, the focus shifts to the state: at the beginnings of the Troubles, Black Power also became one of the contexts within which the British authorities saw their intervention. The agents of the British state gathered up and stitched together, however imperfectly, information on Black Power in America, the Caribbean, London and Northern Ireland. This transnational body of knowledge was both a lens through which to monitor subversives and a resource from out of which strategies could be developed.

McCann's biography powerfully supports his own point that the beginnings of the Troubles cannot be understood if the story is kept within the borders of Northern Ireland. After attending Queen's University Belfast in the early 1960s, where he had joined the Labour Group and joked about the 1916 Rising, McCann moved to London. The capital of the United Kingdom was an important node for a number of transnational networks. Thus, McCann soon became involved with the global peace movement and then, through the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), with the Fourth International, too. At a CND demonstration in 1965, he met Gery Lawless, a former Irish Republican Army (IRA) quartermaster who now led the Trotskyist Irish Workers' Group (IWG), and not only agreed to become a member of the Che Guevara (London) branch but also to edit its newspaper, the Irish Militant. As the decade progressed, the circuits of revolt continued to thicken and multiply. In 1967, R.D. Laing and other key figures in the anti-psychiatry movement organised the Congress on the Dialectics of Liberation with the aim of bringing together activists from the United States and Western Europe. 'Groups all over the world are doing much the same as some of us are doing
here in London,' declared the head of the planning committee, 'and we want to get this transnational network established.' McCann was among those who gathered at Camden's Roundhouse.\textsuperscript{10}

The headline act at the Congress was the Black Power leader Stokely Carmichael. When he arrived in London on 15 July 1967, the first stop of an international tour, Carmichael was welcomed by a white American student radical and was watched by officers from the Metropolitan Police Special Branch.\textsuperscript{11} Since the previous summer, when he had first called for Black Power, the 26-year-old veteran of the United States civil rights movement had become used to both Sixties stardom and state surveillance.\textsuperscript{12} 'Black Power,' Carmichael told his Roundhouse audience, 'means that black people...see our struggle as closely related to liberation struggles around the world.' Indeed, he argued that 'in essence' the West's inner cities were 'populated by the peoples of the Third World'. 'These are very real colonies, in the sense that they are capital and cheap labour exploited by those who live outside the cities.' Carmichael therefore claimed that the urban riots that were 'occurring in the United States' ('and England is not far behind') should be seen as 'rebellions'. Black Power activists were 'working to increase the revolutionary consciousness' of the youths fighting on these city streets, to help them see themselves 'as part of...the Third World'. 'While we disrupt internally and aim for the eye of the octopus,' Carmichael explained, 'we are hoping that our brothers are disrupting externally to sever the tentacles of the United States.' He conceded that 'the fight must be waged from the Third World' because the 'proletariat has become the Third World' and as a result 'the only salvation'. Still, Carmichael nonetheless expected that America's urban 'rebellions' would ultimately lead to 'guerrilla warfare' coming home to the West. Power had to be taken and oppression had to be resisted. 'If white America decides to play Nazi,' he warned, 'we're going to fight back to the death.' So, what could 'white liberals'
do to help? According to Carmichael, 'their only job is to get the gun from the man' -- 'the white man who is sick', 'the one who picked up the gun'.

This message was far from new. The concept of the Third World can be traced back to the early Cold War, when Europe's non-communist left was searching for a 'third way' that was distinct from both American liberalism and Soviet socialism. The term itself was first used in 1952 by the economic historian, Alfred Sauvy, who concluded that 'the Third World' had, 'like the Third Estate, been ignored and despised and it too wants to be something'. Revolutionaries from the global south would overthrow the northern old regimes. As the 1950s came to a close, the sociologist C. Wright Mills gave a lecture on BBC radio urging his listeners to 'become internationalists'. In his influential 'Letter to the New Left', which was written in 1960, Mills asked 'Who is it that is thinking and acting in radical ways?' His answer picked out groups from 'All over the world': Cuban guerrillas, Asian student protesters, British anti-nuclear campaigners and African-American sit-in activists. Mills' New Left was a global movement of movements which was seeking social justice on an international scale as well as on national and local ones.

The Third World was not just somewhere to visit or to read about; it could also be found in the cities and on the campuses of North America and Western Europe. Michael Farrell, McCann’s close comrade at Queen's University and later in the IWG as well, encountered activists from Africa and the Middle East through his involvement in student politics. At the 1966 International Union of Socialist Youth Congress in Vienna, he met 'delegations from new African countries full of enthusiasm about political developments and giving the impression that change could be achieved'. Third World students also came to the West to attend universities. In the Federal Republic of Germany, thousands of African, Asian and Latin American students provided models of activism and models for understanding international politics. Unsurprisingly, seeing their foreign friends putting
bodies on the line and turning minds to global problems, some young West Germans were encouraged to believe that the Third World could take on the role of bringing about revolutionary change that their own country's working class had abdicated. The Vietnam War helped crystallise these theories. Just days before he attended the Congress on the Dialectics of Liberation, the critical theorist Herbert Marcuse made the argument at Berlin's Free University that the 'explosive forces in the centres of the highly developed world' -- the 'New Left' and 'racial minorities' -- could only become an 'effective revolutionary force' in 'combination [with] what is going on in the Third World'.

Why, then, did Carmichael's speech at the Roundhouse have such an impact? The reasons may be not so much to do with the message as with the messenger. Most of the other speakers at the congress were, to use Carmichael's own words, 'arm chair theoreticians' whose interests 'tended towards abstract psychology'. So, when Carmichael took to the stage, it was as if a rock star had gatecrashed an academic conference. Looking back four decades later on at the speech and his subsequent conversations with Carmichael, McCann remembered the Black Power leader as 'a big figure to conjure with'. During Carmichael's five years as a local civil rights organiser, from 1961 to 1966, he had bled for freedom: he had been arrested 27 times; had been beaten by white racists in and out of uniform; and had earned among his friends in the Student Non-violent Co-ordinating Committee (SNCC) the nickname 'The Delta Devil' for his skill behind the wheel in car chases on the back roads of Mississippi. Many Western European activists were beginning to embrace existential voluntarism, too. At the Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund's (SDS) May 1966 congress, Rudi Dutschke had called for an 'identification of the thinking with the suffering' to bridge the gulf between Western and Third World experience. Carmichael embodied that bridge. Bernward Vesper, the partner of the future Baader-Meinhof Gang member Gudrun Ensslin, was so inspired by what he heard at the Roundhouse that he brought out a pamphlet
on Black Power and 'The Causes of Guerrilla Warfare in the United States'. By September 1967, SDS had declared its solidarity with Black Power.\textsuperscript{23} That same month, the \textit{Irish Militant} urged its readers to 'do what the Afro-Americans are doing'.\textsuperscript{24} Europe's Black Power moment had started. Here, it seemed, was a way to liberate the West itself from capitalism and imperialism.

Carmichael's visit had an impact on the United Kingdom's black radicals as well.\textsuperscript{25} Shortly after Carmichael left London, the West Indian intellectual C.L.R. James gave a talk in the course of which he recalled encountering 'Stokely' ('everybody, everywhere, calls him Stokely') for the first time a year earlier in Montreal. 'I was so struck by what he was saying and the way he was saying,' he reminisced, 'that I sat down immediately and took the unusual step of writing a letter to him'. James, though, did not use his speech to suggest that British activists should slavishly follow American fashions. Indeed, he insisted that Black Power should not be understood as something simply American. 'As far as any particular country is concerned,' James said, 'we have to see [Black Power] not only in its general but in its particular application.' In this way, he was able to present Carmichael's positions as a local variation on a universal theme and 'to put Black Power in the proper place to which it belongs'. It was the latest 'banner' 'under which men have struggled for liberty and freedom' -- 'a banner for people with certain political aims, needs and attitudes'. Carmichael, according to James, was fighting a new round in the long struggle for black freedom in America, which, in turn, was a crucial part of the mass march towards socialism. As he reminded his listeners, James had played his own part in this struggle when he had helped the Socialist Workers’ Party organise African Americans in the late 1930s. He had convinced Trotsky himself that 'the independent Negro struggle for its democratic rights was part of the way to the social revolution'. Carmichael was following James; Black Power was following the road to socialism.\textsuperscript{26}
James's reading of Black Power shaped the article that McCann wrote in September 1967 on 'The Negro Revolution'.\textsuperscript{27} James also had an indirect impact upon how the Northern Irish leftists came to understand Black Power and its possible applications. American Trotskyists had adopted a Jamesian position on Black Power, too; transnational networks as well as activist groups within nation states were having Black Power moments. The previous autumn, a report submitted to the National Committee of the Young Socialist Alliance had claimed that the emergence of 'a revolutionary leadership' in the 'northern and southern ghettos' was 'most important not only to the efforts of the black people, but also to the struggles unleashed by the whole working class'.\textsuperscript{28} Around this time, Farrell set up his own Young Socialist Alliance in Belfast, 'that would bring...together' 'the younger political activists', and got 'in touch with [the] group of the same name in the United States'. Farrell received 'a lot of literature from them', so 'we were able to follow the debates inside the civil rights movement'.\textsuperscript{29} To begin with, at least, Farrell and McCann followed the Jamesian line.

Back in London, after Carmichael's visit, Special Branch had become concerned about how white American radicals were seeking to match the militancy of their black comrades -- and the impact that this was having on leftists in the United Kingdom. A report from November 1967 noted that earlier in the year a group of white civil-rights veterans had formed 'The Resistance', taking SNCC as a model for organising draft resisters. 'It is known,' the report continued, 'that at least three leading members of The Resistance...have visited London in the past two months to urge the Americans here to increased efforts.' The group's founder had told a September 1967 meeting of the Stop-It Committee, an anti-war body set up by American students, that 'The Resistance is working principally to achieve two ends: the confrontation and partial polarization of forces...and the steady disruption of normal day-by-day patterns'. The chair of the Stop-It Committee, Harry Pincus, had been observed by Special Branch that summer collecting Carmichael from Heathrow and joining his entourage
for much of the British tour, including the Congress on the Dialectics of Liberation.\textsuperscript{30} As 1968 began, Pincus and McCann were brought into more regular contact by the preparations for the first Grosvenor Square march, which the intelligence services predicted would be 'violent, paralleling recent demonstrations on the continent'. A Stop-It Committee circular acquired by Special Branch celebrated how the 'project [was] involving us deeply and constructively in working with British anti-war groups to build resistance'.\textsuperscript{31} The Stop-It Committee's main British partner was the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign (VSC), which McCann had become actively involved with through the London Trotskyist network. Black Power was having an indirect as well as a direct influence upon McCann's thinking. Writing in the October 1967 \textit{Irish Militant}, he had declared 'solidarity with the Vietnamese National Liberation Front'. McCann called on 'socialists in Western Europe' to provide a 'diversion of attention' and for 'the imperialists [to be] confronted in all countries'.\textsuperscript{32} On 22 March 1968, socialists confronted the imperialists in London. According to the \textit{Guardian}, the marchers 'seemed determined to stay until they had provoked a violent response of some sort from the police, and this intention became paramount once they entered Grosvenor Square'.\textsuperscript{33} McCann and his comrades from around the world had moved from protest to resistance.

The impact of Black Power on Northern Ireland's leftists has to be understood within the wider contexts of the latter's interest in both the Third World and the American civil rights movement. Nonetheless, Black Power had a distinct appeal: it was a more realistic and accessible model than the national liberation struggles; it was a more relevant and aggressive model than Martin Luther King's early campaigns.\textsuperscript{34} When McCann and Farrell came home to Northern Ireland, they brought Black Power with them, too -- using it as a toolkit of revolutionary techniques and as a language through which the province's politics could be
comprehended and contested. This, though, was not a uniform process. Even in a country as small as Northern Ireland, there was significant local variation.

McCann moved back to Derry after the first Grosvenor Square march. Northern Ireland's second city stood on the border with the Republic of Ireland, and had a largely Irish nationalist population -- only a gerrymander kept the Ulster Unionists in power there. McCann recalled that his metropolitan political education had given him 'a conviction that this was the way forward', 'that we could possibly sweep over the local, provincial politics of Northern Ireland by introducing the international dimension to it'. This conviction was what he brought to the ad-hoc alliance of Republican and Labour left-wingers which had formed just before his return. At this group's first protest, an occupation of the Guildhall's council chamber, a spokesperson read out a prepared statement which ended 'we believe that the only long-term solution to the social concerns which beset Derry lies in the establishment of workers' power'. Local aspirations and transnational agendas were put into an on-going dialogue in which each side was constantly shifting their positions. The frontier town of Derry may seem to be on the edge of the global Sixties but it proved to be a productive space in which to test out revolutionary ideas. Under McCann's guidance, the Derry radicals came to recognise themselves in the Black Power activists; this was a means both of framing their campaign for international publics and of emboldening and empowering themselves. The leftists adopted the civil rights song 'We Shall Overcome' as their anthem, took up SNCC's rallying cry 'one man, one vote' as their own and referred to themselves as 'the white Negroes of Derry'. McCann was here bringing out the anti-colonial strand within Black Power as opposed to those that emphasised blackness and pan-Africanism. He was also performing a contemporary variation upon the long-running Irish nationalist theme of parallels and analogies. For example, during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, as Christopher Bayly has sketched, 'persistent connections and comparisons' were made between
Irish and Indian nationalists. The Black Power analogy, though, did not resonate with the wider community. In August 1968, at a poorly supported occupation of the council chamber, one of the activists complained that 'there were not people in Derry prepared to fight...as the blacks in America were fighting'. But, Black Power offered the tiny band of 'white Negroes' a way out of the political margins. Carmichael had called on American leftists to 'create disturbances...keep pushing the system...until they have to hit back [because] once your enemy hits back, then your revolution starts'. This advice was now heeded across the Atlantic. On 5 September 1968, the Derry radicals warned that they were going to 'fight to force the powers-that-be to act' -- to build 'houses for the homeless or a new wing to Crumlin Road Prison'. McCann had guided his local comrades from protest to resistance.

'Everyone in Derry,' McCann acknowledged a few years later on, knew that the 'one certain way to ensure a head-on clash with the authorities was to organise a non-Unionist march through the city centre.' So, on 5 October 1968, Derry's first 'civil rights march' lined up outside the railway station and the police lined up opposite to stop them from taking the banned route into the old walled city. The desired head-on clash, though, did not come straightaway: the front ranks were pushed up into the police cordon, yet the two sides quickly separated after this initial contact and an improvised meeting followed. According to the testimony he himself gave at his subsequent trial, McCann told this meeting that he was 'not advising anyone to rush the police cordon' nor was he as 'a private individual' going to 'stop anyone'. When the chief marshal used a loud hailer to tell the marchers that the meeting was over, the leftists directed 'Sieg Heil' taunts and a fusillade of missiles at the police. The officer in charge ordered his men to draw batons and 'clear the mob'. One of the radicals later recalled watching 'the first riot'. 'McCann and I sort of looked at one another...and he said: "God, the revolution has started!".'
In Belfast, Farrell had been looking for an issue that would serve as a 'bridge to involvement' for Queen's University students; he now had it. On 9 October 1968, hundreds of students protested against police brutality by marching from their campus towards city hall. After unionist extremists started counter-demonstrating in the main square, the police chose to separate the two sides rather than to force the march through along the agreed route. The students responded by holding a sit-down protest and by transforming the march into a movement, the People's Democracy. 'Student Power,' the university newspaper declared, 'had come to Belfast.' Kevin Boyle, a young lecturer popular with the students, subsequently admitted that this movement was actually manipulated from the start by a couple of veteran activists. Indeed, Farrell was present at the first meeting and came to play an increasing role in People's Democracy. The Communists, by contrast, were much less successful. A People's Democracy newssheet applauded the 'admirable disrespect shown to the Stalinist hack...who came up to caution the students about "militancy"'. Black Power was helping to drive this militancy. Boyle produced for the students a 'List of Books on Black Politics', which had on it *SNCC: The New Abolitionists, The Autobiography of Malcolm X, Look Out, Whitey! Black Power's Gonna' Get Your Mama, Soul on Ice* and *The Wretched of the Earth*. A meeting debated what strategy 'Revolutionary Socialists' should adopt towards Britain's 'coloured immigrants'. People's Democracy publications urged students to make 'the relations of domination...apparent' by 'provok[ing]' 'the bureaucracy...into showing its dictatorial nature' -- something which could not be done by 'protest action'. That said, recent events in Paris and Chicago were also exerting an influence upon the movement.

When the Northern Irish government promised a package of concessions at the end of November 1968, a majority of students wanted to meet the authorities half way and voted to put their protests on hold. Farrell, however, was well placed to make sure that revolt did not give way to reform. The faction around Farrell exploited participatory democracy and the
Christmas vacation to secure a small vote in favour of marching from Belfast to Derry in the New Year. Farrell explicitly took as his model SNCC's Selma to Montgomery march in 1965, which had been savagely beaten off the street by local law enforcement. The inquiry into the start of the Troubles concluded that Farrell had been seeking 'a calculated martyrdom'. He found it at Burntollet Bridge, in the unionist heartland, when off-duty special constables ambushed the marchers. News of this outrage provoked rioting in nearby Derry that was far fiercer than what had happened on 5 October 1968.

During the early months of 1969, further acts of police brutality and loyalist vigilantism moved the Derry and Belfast movements away from non-violence and towards self-defence. Black Power provided the leftists with a language that they could use to negotiate this shift in direction. But, Black Power did not map out a single path. Indeed, when the New Left Review interviewed Farrell and McCann on 20 April 1969, each man wanted to take a different revolutionary road. Out of all the material that Farrell had received from the American Young Socialist Alliance, it was the writings of George Breitman, who had been a founding member of the Socialist Workers' Party, that 'particularly impressed' him. In a pamphlet based on a lecture that Breitman gave to the Chicago Young Socialists, the veteran Trotskyist set out 'How A Minority Can Change Society' by, among other things, '[forcing] concessions from the ruling class', '[helping] to educate and radicalize' and, ultimately, '[becoming] part of the general movement of the exploited and oppressed to abolish capitalism and proceed towards socialism'. Farrell believed that the Catholic minority could change Northern Ireland's 'neo-colonial' society. 'We have radicalised the Catholic working class to quite a considerable extent,' he argued. Leftists should therefore try to get 'the local Catholic population to take over and run its own affairs, a sort of "Catholic power", which would take 'a socialist form'. After 'Protestant workers' saw that these 'socialist councils' 'fulfil[ed] class demands rather than creed demands', Farrell reasoned, they would 'want to
create councils for themselves or merge with the Catholics in them'. In this way, the 'reform of Northern Ireland' could be transformed into 'a revolution in Ireland'. Farrell was offering here the most basic translation of the Jamesian reading of Black Power: Catholics in Northern Ireland occupied a position analogous to blacks in the United States; oppressed minorities would pursue socialist policies if they came to power; the working-class members of the majority would respond by joining the revolution. Unsurprisingly, McCann mocked his old comrade's strategy throughout the interview. Farrell nonetheless continued to 'insist that we have to explore the radical possibilities of the base that we do have, at this moment, among the working class, and that base is the Catholic section of the working class'.

Although McCann shared the same socialist orientation as Farrell, he dismissed the 'Catholic power' 'assessment' as 'very wrong'. 'Ulster is not [emphasis in the original] just a colonial state;' he countered, 'it is in many respects, though not in all respects, an ordinary bourgeois state.' McCann worried that 'some English comrades' saw the Protestants as 'white sahibs'. (This may also have been an attack on the suggestion made by Farrell at a People's Democracy meeting that unionists were Ireland's *pieds-noirs*.) Rather than set up councils,' McCann told the *New Left Review*, 'we must try to set up some sort of radical socialist front between republicans and ourselves.' This idea was not just the product of McCann's experiences working with Republican radicals in Derry. He was also taking into account that the IRA's Dublin leadership had for a number of years subscribed to a version of Third Worldism. Following the defeat of the 1956-62 military campaign, the Republican movement had turned outwards in an effort to revive the Irish revolutionary tradition. 'There are two camps today in the world,' the Director of Political Education wrote in a 1963 strategy paper, 'the rich nations and the poor nations.' 'By tradition and inclination Ireland is the senior member of the latter.' He wanted Republicans to 'throw in our lot with Africa and jointly...achieve independence from imperialism'. Since the start of 1969, IRA volunteers in
Northern Ireland had begun to turn these words into actions and take on the role of urban guerrillas. Indeed, the same day as the *New Left Review* interview, the IRA's Belfast commander ordered his men to firebomb 10 post offices so as to 'draw' police officers away from their latest battle with rioters in Derry. By the autumn of 1969, McCann himself was having small-arms training with other Labour activists in a secret IRA camp across the Irish border. 'It was exciting,' he remembered a few years later, 'and enabled one to feel that...one was involved in a REAL revolution.' McCann had chosen Black Power's urban guerrilla tendency over the Jamesian reading.

This choice, in part, reflected how there had been a dramatic escalation over the summer in the levels of violence. On 12 August 1969, the police pursued a gang of youthful rioters into the Irish nationalist district of Derry -- and the forces of law and order were chased back out by a large crowd whose 'determination was so unanimous,' a local priest later testified, 'that I could only regard it as a community in revolt.' Behind the barricades of 'Free Derry', McCann -- while admitting that it was 'impossible to build a socialist society in one ghetto' -- called for free bus rides, fair rents and equal pay for women. Like some Black Power activists, he was hoping that an act of violence by the masses had the potential to set off a revolution. However, the new revolutionary socialist narrative resonated much less with the people of the 'liberated area' than the old Irish nationalist one did. The defining event of Free Derry was a 'liberation' *fleadh cheoil* (festival of music) at which traditional Irish dancing and folk music were performed by artists from all over the island. The radicals were reduced to giving Black Power salutes when the Irish national anthem was played to mark the close of the show. McCann's fears about 'Catholic power' had been proved right.

With their local influence draining away, the leftists chose to make use of their rising foreign fame to tell their story of what was happening in Northern Ireland to international publics. Boyle and two other People's Democracy activists, Eilis McDermott and Bernadette
Devlin, began their tour of the United States in New York, where the Mayor gave the last key to the city. The American media's superficial coverage of the early Troubles had written revolutionary socialism out of the narrative. Politicians, though, quickly came to realise that the leftists believed, as McDermott put it in an article for a People's Democracy newsletter, the 'Black Panthers [had] more to offer to our movement in terms of advice and support than have many of the sentimental Irish-American populations'.

In Philadelphia, Devlin invited an African-American tenor to sing 'We Shall Overcome' at her fundraising event and met with local Black Power leaders; in Detroit, she did not start her speech until a crowd of black people waiting outside the venue had been admitted; and in Chicago, she refused to shake the Mayor's hand because she regarded him as a racist. When McCann visited New York in March 1970, he handed the key given to Devlin over to the Black Panthers as a 'gesture of solidarity with the Black liberation...movement'. 'I have been here only two days,' he informed journalists, 'and I have met a lot of Irish Americans who want equal rights across the ocean, but don't want them here.' 'The more we alienate...Irish American hypocrites, so much the better.' Back in Derry, McCann defended the Black Panthers against the accusation that they were 'anti-white'. They are...endlessly insistent of the necessity to seek and accept the support of white groups.

Returning to James once more, McCann presented Black Power as a banner around which people were marching towards freedom.

Rising Up Angry -- a leftist grouping that employed Black Power approaches in order to organise in Chicago's poor white communities -- welcomed McCann's 'gesture of solidarity'. As Black Power had been successfully adapted to the needs of the Irish, they maintained that Irish Americans, too, could take their proper place in a radical 'Rainbow Coalition' made up African Americans, Puerto Ricans and whites. 'All power to all the people in Ireland, Vietnam, here in America and all over the world,' cheered the Rising Up Angry newspaper, 'who are getting it together so that exploitation, discrimination and oppression
can be stopped.' That autumn, McCann and Devlin were invited to speak in Paris about 'la lutte Populaire Irlandaise' at an event sponsored by the Black Panthers as well as the Palestinian Liberation Organisation and the African National Congress. It seemed to other Western European leftists that their Northern Irish comrades had succeeded in bridging the gulf between Western and Third World experiences. Devlin did not disappoint the thousands who came to hear her. The 'people of Ireland' were going to 'take what is rightfully theirs' and bring about 'the destruction of the capitalist system', even though they were fighting against 'the greatest imperial army in the world'. There is no doubt that this time,' she concluded, 'it must be la lutte finale.' Urban guerrillas fighting alongside national liberation movements against the forces of imperialism to bring about a socialist revolution made sense to people who were rushing through lives made up of riots and road trips. As early as December 1968, Boyle had confessed to a friend that he was 'shocked by the lack of time to do things, think out matters that appear urgent and important'. 'It makes me wonder if I am not deceiving myself.'

During the periods when he was back in Derry, McCann -- again inspired by American Black Power activists -- tried to organise the gangs of young rioters that had grown up in the city since 5 October 1968. Working once more alongside the Republican radicals, McCann returned from the United States in April 1970 with the intention of giving a political lead to the 'little Che Guevaras.' The leftists screened a Black Panther propaganda film which, McCann remembered, ended with 'R&B voice' shouting 'Up against the wall, motherfucker!' and caused the audience to 'roar and cheer.' British intelligence was impressed by McCann's early attempts to 'steer' 'the youths' -- who they assessed to be 'the major threat to stability' in Derry -- away from 'hooligan preoccupations towards politics'. In fact, he was regarded as the only leader that had 'any strong influence' over the rioters. Nonetheless, McCann’s 'efforts' soon came to be resented by the 'hard core' and a group of
them 'beat [him] up' in October 1970.\textsuperscript{79} Three months later, McCann had left Derry to take up a research post at the London School of Economics and to write his memoirs.\textsuperscript{80} Many of the youthful rioters who had rejected McCann's revolutionary socialism would later join the Provisional IRA, a traditionalist Republican splinter group. The Provos had a simple story to tell: Northern Ireland was inherently sectarian and incapable of reform, their community needed their protection and armed struggle was the only path to a united Ireland. The Black Power moment was over; the Provo moment had begun.

The idea that Black Power could inspire the creation of a transnational network of revolt and radicalise local movements for change was shared by the authorities as well as by the activists. During these years, British officials in a range of different places evaluated the challenge posed by Black Power and set out to counter it. This new security thinking informed the ways in which the servants of the British state responded to the beginnings of the Troubles. The intelligence community first identified Black Power as a threat in July 1967. This was the month that Carmichael came to London and Detroit burned. Six days of the worst rioting in American history left 43 people dead, 467 injured and almost 2,500 buildings in ruins. To restore order, the state and federal authorities had flooded the city with paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne, National Guardsmen and even tanks.\textsuperscript{81} The report of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) concluded that 'Black Power feeds on the wide range of negro social, economic and racial disabilities in the United States which it will take many years to remove'. As an American phenomenon, which was 'unlikely to develop into a coherent international movement', Black Power would make 'little headway among coloured people in Britain' and make 'little impact in Commonwealth Caribbean countries'. Its 'message is largely irrelevant'.\textsuperscript{82} The JIC's assessment was soon shown to be mistaken. Britain's intelligence agencies had underestimated the ease with which Black Power would be
able to cross international and racial boundaries. Indeed, they had not even considered it possible that Black Power could be taken up as a model by Northern Irish leftists. What therefore followed was an 'information panic'. Writing about India in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Bayly has described how the colonial authorities worried about their ability to identify hidden cults, decipher secret languages and head off rebellion.  

As the 1960s ended, the servants of the British state now worried about their ability to understand Black Power revolts -- not just in the Commonwealth and what remained of the empire, but also in the United Kingdom itself. Thus, the imperial circuits of surveillance which were moving in and through London, the West Indies and Northern Ireland thickened and multiplied.

The first to panic were senior figures in the military. Seeing soldiers on the streets of American cities, the chiefs-of-staff grew increasingly 'uneasy' about 'the possibility...that troops might have [to be] called upon...to help cope' with the second Grosvenor Square march on 27 October 1968. The Defence Secretary informed the Home Secretary that 'the troops are not trained in riot control'. The march passed off without significant trouble. But, much to the frustration of the Home Office, the generals 'clearly remain unbelieving that the day will not come when the police will have to turn to the Armed Services for help in coping with a "Grosvenor Square type" (the Ministry’s term) demonstration'. On 8 January 1969, 'Home Office and Security Service representatives' told a meeting at the Ministry of Defence that 'they could not envisage situations arising in this country which could necessitate the use of troops in...aid to the civil power'. This assessment proved to be a serious misjudgement.

Black Power gained influence in what was left of Britain's Caribbean dominion. During the final week of April 1968, the army had been called upon to aid the civil power in Bermuda. After a night of rioting, the Governor declared a state of emergency and 180 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers (a Northern Irish unit) were airlifted over to the island. Black Power
activists were erroneously blamed by politicians and the press for masterminding the trouble and links were drawn with the widespread violence in American cities following Martin Luther King's murder. Bermuda, despite its size, mattered. The British colony played a central role in NATO's defence strategy for the Caribbean -- and the United States and Canada also had bases there. Consequently, when Bermuda began to emerge as one of the nodes of the Black Power networks, the three powers co-operated with each other to monitor and suppress the local movement. Between 10 and 13 July 1969, the colony hosted the First Regional Black Power Conference, whose participants came from North America and Britain as well as the Caribbean. In the months building up to the conference, the local media had carried scare stories about what was happening in Northern Ireland. Numbers, though, were lower than the newspapers had feared and the organisers had hoped because the British intelligence agencies and their American cousins had stationed officers at the airport to get those individuals whom they had picked out as threats to be turned back by immigration. Those delegates like James who did make it into the island were greeted by two Royal Navy frigates sitting off the coast and 100 marines sunning themselves on the shore. The Anglo-American repression, however, did not stop 'a new movement' being 'formed' at the conference. Henceforth, as the British intelligence summary concluded, Caribbean Black Power had to be 'taken seriously'.

This was exactly what a June 1970 report did. By contrast with the original JIC assessment, this paper dismissed the 'theory that the political doctrines of Black Power are irrelevant in the Caribbean, where political power is largely in the hands of the coloured inhabitants'. Black Power activists had demonstrated that they were 'determined...to overthrow [these] governments' because they were 'incapable or unwilling to underwrite reform at the fast pace required'. Indeed, "black" and "white" apply less to pigmentation than to ideology'. Black Power groups had forged 'personal links' with their comrades in North
America. When 10 Trinidadian students were put on trial in Montreal during February 1969 for their part in a university occupation, militants hit back in the Caribbean by attacking Port-of-Spain's Canadian banks. The report was also sensitive to the ways in which 'Black Power ideas have been shaped to local conditions' and to the 'West Indian [radical] heritage'. Although talk of communist conspiracies had been silenced, British officials had started to speak the socio-economic language of conflict instead (this was to occur in Northern Ireland, too). Caribbean governments, argued the last line of the report, had to 'seek to match improved educational standards with increased job opportunities and to satisfy the demands of the majority for a greater share...of the countries' economic resources'.

The devolved regime in Northern Ireland picked up on the transnational worries of its masters in London and tried to frame what was happening in Northern Ireland within this wider context. Ahead of the first Derry civil rights march, the Home Office was sent a clipping of a Times editorial entitled 'No Right to Riot' which ran through events in Grosvenor Square, the rest of Western Europe and the United States before thundering that 'violence is being deployed as a weapon of protest in an entirely new way'. As the early Troubles progressed, links to Black Power were explicitly highlighted. In September 1969, during a BBC radio interview, the Unionist MP Robin Bailie cited Devlin's connections with the Black Panthers as evidence that the 'Ulster demonstrations' were part of an 'International socialist revolution'. The British authorities agreed, up to a point. Following the April 1969 riots, with an intervention becoming ever more likely, the army sent over a military intelligence liaison officer to report back first hand on what the leftists were doing. At the start of September 1969, a fortnight after troops had finally had to come to the aid of the civil power, he complained that the local Special Branch 'look[ed] at everything through "IRA-tinted spectacles"' and that coverage of 'Anarchists, Trotskyites, etc' was 'limited'. The circuits of surveillance flowing into and through Northern Ireland continued to thicken and
multiply. An MI5 report a month later set out the service's 'professional assessment of the subversive influences at work in Northern Ireland'. It described how 'a small group, predominantly Trotskyists, whose aim was revolution rather than reform' had 'gained control' of the civil rights movement and People's Democracy. ‘Our…sources indicate considerable traffic between these Trotskyists and like-minded groups in Great Britain.' After the British army came on to the streets of Derry and Belfast, the Irish Solidarity Campaign, a Trotskyist front, staged what the Guardian described as a 'mini-Grosvenor Square confrontation between demonstrators and mounted police outside the Ulster Office'. At an earlier meeting in Shepherd's Bush, the article noted that 'there was a call for the Republic to open its arsenals to liberate Ulster'. Neighbouring Notting Hill was the hub of the capital's Black Power movement and Trotskyists were increasingly involving themselves in its activities. On 31 October 1970, the Irish Solidarity Campaign held a march to show that it stood with 'black victims of police repression'. Circuits of revolt were tying together the province and the metropolis.

The generals were anxious that the Troubles would come home from across the Irish Sea for a much longer stay. 'The situation in Northern Ireland and examples of internal unrest in the United States,' wrote the Director of Combat Development in July 1970, 'are pointers to the changing nature of civil disturbance to which the British Army must adapt.' He sketched out scenarios in which 'industrial unrest, political agitation or racial/religious provocation' resulted in 'prolonged civil disorders' -- scenarios 'similar to that experienced recently in Northern Ireland...and Detroit'. A Whitehall working party on 'Internal Security' was put together to study 'foreign police and military methods and equipment, past, present and projected'. The Home Office appointed the Metropolitan Police's Robert Mark onto the party. Mark had previously recommended ways in which the Northern Irish police should be reformed and was currently overseeing Special Branch's investigations into London's Black
Power militants. The mobile servants of the British state believed that they were mastering their material. In August 1970, Special Branch told the Home Office that 'British communists, trotskyists and maoists' had taken up 'the "Black Power" cry', simply as 'a suitably damaging peg upon which to hang their revolutionary creeds'. A Special Branch report from October 1970 concluded that both Black Power and the Troubles had become nothing more than banners around which leftist groupings sought to gather new supporters. A year later, a military appreciation acknowledged that the 'character of the emergency in Ulster has changed'. The 'Security Forces have had to contend since February 1971 with a mounting scale of [Provisional] IRA terrorism'. 'To summarise,' the appreciation ended, 'the IRA...has the initiative.' The Black Power information panic was over; the Provo information panic had begun.

Mapping the geographies of Black Power's transnational connections calls into question the binary global/local divide. Black Power was not an idea from the United States that was diffused throughout the Cold War West; Northern Ireland was not 'off-centre', irrelevant to what was happening in the North American and Western European core. These years saw a thickening and multiplying of networks that flowed into and through the Cold War West and the Third World as well. But, the global Sixties should not be presented as an exceptional moment in British and Irish history. Since the eighteenth century, Irish nationalism has always been marked by its outward looking nature and comparative sensibility. It has been, is and will most likely continue to be shaped by the active cross-fertilization of anti-colonial ideologies and models. Equally, the British authorities have long viewed Irish rebels in comparative perspective. During this particular period, the servants of the British state spied the Kremlin and the colonies behind the disturbances in Derry and Belfast -- and acted accordingly. However, at different times, different agents worried about different threats. The Black Power moment passed, yet these basic patterns persisted.
McCann was objecting to how the Republicans and the Constitutional Nationalists were presenting the start of the Troubles as a solely Northern Irish story so as to strengthen their contemporary political positions. In a series of publications, Simon Prince been attempting to write the global Sixties back into the Troubles: Simon Prince, 'The Global Revolt of 1968 and Northern Ireland', *Historical Journal*, 49, 3 (September 2006), 851-875; Simon Prince, *Northern Ireland’s ’68: Civil Rights, Global Revolt and the Origins of the Troubles* (Dublin 2007); Simon Prince and Geoffrey Warner, *Belfast and Derry in Revolt: A New History of the Start of the Troubles* (Dublin, 2011); Simon Prince, "'Pushing Luck Too Far": ’68, Northern Ireland and Non-violence', in Daniel J. Sherman, Ruud van Dijk, Jasmine Alinder, and A. Aneesh (eds), *The Long 1968: Revisions and New Perspectives* (Bloomington, IN, 2013), 139-68. Northern Ireland is gradually being incorporated into transnational accounts of 1968. See, for instance, Robert Gildea, James Mark and Annette Warring (eds), *Europe’s 1968: Voices of Revolt* (Oxford, 2013).

Kennetta Hammond Perry has profitably used the 'imperial...dimension' to study the impact of 1950s civil rights campaigns on post-war Britain. "Little Rock" in Britain: Jim Crow's Transatlantic Topographies', *Journal of British Studies*, 51, 1 (January 2012), 155-177.

This formulation is adapted from Alan Lester, 'Imperial Circuits and Networks: Geographies of the British Empire', *History Compass*, 4, 1 (January 2006), 124-141.

Tony Ballantyne, *Orientalism and Race: Aryanism in the British Empire* (Basingstoke 2002), 14-15. The rest of the paragraph follows Ballantyne closely, while adapting his metaphor to a different time and place.

On Ireland's complex and contradictory position within the British Empire, see Kevin Kenny (ed.), *Ireland and the British Empire* (Oxford 2004).


Metropolitan Police Special Branch report on American political activity in London, 24 November 1967, National Archives of the United Kingdom (NAUK), HO 325/104.


14 B.R. Tomlinson, 'What was the Third World?', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 38, 2 (April 2003), 307-321, 309.


17 Transcript of BBC interview with Michael Farrell, [summer 2008] (personal notes).


20 Stokely Carmichael with Ekwueme Michael Thelwell, *Ready for Revolution: The Life and Struggles of Stokely Carmichael* (New York, NY, 2003), 573. The opening lines of Carmichael’s speech suggest that this was his opinion at the time, too. Carmichael, *Stokely Speaks*, op. cit, 77-8.
21 Transcript of BBC interview with Eamonn McCann, [summer 2008] (personal notes).
25 In the three years following Carmichael's visit, Special Branch carried out surveillance on 10 Black Power groups: the Universal Black People's Organisation, Action for People's Justice, the African Descendants' Advancement Movement, the Black Panthers, Black Peoples' Alliance, the Black Power Party, the Black Workers' Co-ordinating Committee, the Universal Coloured Peoples' Association, the Universal Coloured Peoples' and Arabs' Association and the Racial Adjustment Action Society. Copy of Metropolitan Police Special Branch report on Black Power Organisations in the United Kingdom, 11 August 1970, HO 376/155, Freedom of Information Act release.
28 Young Socialist, October-November 1966.
29 Transcript of BBC interview with Michael Farrell, [summer 2008] (personal notes).
31 Special Branch report on American Political Activity in London, 26 February 1968, NAUK, HO 325/104. The Stop It Committee had also started working with the Paris
American Committee to co-ordinate and increase the anti-war activity in Western Europe. 


33 *Guardian*, 18 March 1968.

34 Northern Irish leftists did not view Black Power as something distinct from the 'US civil rights struggle'. *Free Citizen*, no. 7, PRONI, D 3297/2.

35 Transcript of BBC interview with Eamonn McCann, [summer 2008] (personal notes).


43 *Derry Journal*, 6 December 1968.

44 Royal Ulster Constabulary report on Parade and Meeting in Londonderry, 5 October 1968, PRONI, HA 32/2/26.

45 Transcript of BBC interview with Dermie McClanaghan, [summer 2008] (personal notes).
Irish Militant, October 1967; MI5 memorandum, 18 February 1969, NAUK, PREM 13/2842.

Gown, 22 October 1968.

William Van Voris, Violence in Ulster: An Oral Documentary (Amherst, MA, 1975), 74. There are numerous documents in Kevin Boyle's private papers that support this testimony. For example: Untitled draft speech to swing People’s Democracy behind contesting the February 1969 Stormont elections, [n.d.], PRONI, D 3297/1.

MI5 memorandum, 18 February 1969, NAUK, PREM 13/2842.

Defamator, no. 4, PRONI, D 3219/3.


Defamator, no. 2, PRONI, D 3219/3.

Defamator, no. 3, PRONI, D 3219/3.

Transcript of BBC interview with Michael Farrell, [summer 2008] (personal notes).

'A former supporter of PD' to Kevin Boyle, 10 December 1968; Kevin Boyle to James Heaney, [n.d.], PRONI, D 3297/1; Transcript of BBC interview with Michael Farrell, [summer 2008] (personal notes).


Purdie, Politics in the Streets, op. cit., 230.


Farrell's newssheet, Free Citizen, made this argument again in the early summer of 1969. Free Citizen, no. 7, PRONI, D 3297/2.
Barnett, 'People's Democracy', op. cit. 11-17.

Interview with Kevin Boyle, recorded by the author, Chelmsford, 28 October 2006.


Roy Johnston, A Republican Programme for the 1960s, November 1963, Century of Endeavour electronic archive. In an article for the Sinn Féin newspaper, which was written almost a year later, the Director of Political Education, who was a fluent French speaker, argued that Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* should shape the movement's new strategy. *United Irishman*, October 1964.


*Barricade Bulletin*, 10 September 1969, Linen Hall Library Political Collection. McCann had earlier declared Derry to be 'in a state of war' and urged 'the fighters' to 'beat the soldiers as we have now beaten the police'. *Barricade Bulletin*, 14 August 1969, Linen Hall Library Political Collection. The Red Army Faction would later adopt a similar position on the revolutionary potential of ghetto uprisings. Klimke, *The Other Alliance*, op. cit., 130-1.


*Free Citizen*, no. 9, PRONI, D 3297/2. McDermott was made 'an honorary Black Panther sister' by the Boston chapter. Eilis McDermott, 'Law and Disorder', in Farrell (ed.), *Twenty Years On* (Dingle 1988), 147-60, 152-3.

*The Irish Rebel*, November 1969, PRONI, D 3297/2; Bernadette Devlin, 'A Peasant in the Halls of the Great', in Michael Farrell (ed.), *Twenty Years On*, op. cit., 75-88.
72 *Derry Journal*, 10 March 1970; Charles V. Whelan, Consul General New York, to Sean Ronan, Assistant Secretary Department of External Affairs, 14 March 1970, National Archives of Ireland, DFA 2000/5/42.

73 *Derry Journal*, 10 April 1970.


75 Poster advertising the event, [n.d.], PRONI, D 3253/5/14; *Irish Times*, 13 November 1970.

76 Kevin Boyle to James Simons, 3 December 1968, PRONI, D 3297/7.

77 *Derry Journal*, 10 April 1970.

78 Backus, ""Not Quite Philadelphia, Is It?'", op. cit., 186.

79 Intelligence Summary, 5 to 16 August 1970, NAUK, WO 305/3356; Intelligence Summary, 14 to 20 October 1970, NAUK, WO 305/3358.


84 Denis Healey to James Callaghan, 14 October 1968, NAUK, HO 325/130.

85 J. Clift, Note for the Record, 13 January 1969, NAUK, HO 325/130; Minutes of a Meeting Held in the Ministry of Defence, 8 January 1969, NAUK, HO 325/130.

86 Quito Swan, *Black Power in Bermuda: The Struggle for Decolonization* (Basingstoke 2009), 8, 25-7 and 46. The National Archives of the United Kingdom contains extensive evidence of the three powers sharing information and co-ordinating strategies. For instance,
the State Department provided the Foreign and Commonwealth Office with a paper entitled 'Black Radicalism: A New Caribbean Phenomenon', 27 May 1970, NAUK, FCO 44/403.

87 West Indies & Caribbean Area Monthly Intelligence Summary, 15 August 1969, NAUK, FCO 44/201.


89 Ministry of Home Affairs to R. North, 6 September 1968, PRONI, CAB 9B/205/7.

90 Transcript of '10 O'Clock', 8 September 1969, PRONI, CAB 9B/312/1. As late as 1971, the former chief of police was testifying to an inquiry that people with 'Black Power leanings' were to blame for 'the activation of violence'. J.A. Peacocke's evidence to the Scarman Tribunal, 1 April 1971, Institute of Advanced Legal Study, 32.

91 Hunt Committee, Note of Meeting with D.Y. Wright (Military Intelligence Liaison Officer), 1 September 1969, NAUK, CJ 3/57.


93 Guardian, 18 August 1969.

94 Metropolitan Police Special Branch report, 31 October 1970, NAUK, HO 325/143.


98 Metropolitan Police Special Branch report, 31 October 1970, NAUK, HO 325/143.

99 A Military Appreciation of the Security Situation in Northern Ireland, 4 October 1971, NAUK, DEFE 13/1378.